

WITH NEHRU IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Subimal Dutt



INDIA

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FOREWORD

I JOINED THE Indian Foreign Office as Secretary in charge of the Commonwealth Relations Department towards the end of July 1947, a few days before the partition of the subcontinent. I continued in that capacity till April 1952 when I proceeded to Bonn as India's first Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. Returning to my old desk in May 1954 I took over as Foreign Secretary in October 1955 and held the post till April 1961 when I finally left the Foreign Office on appointment as Ambassador in Moscow.

Pandit Nehru was Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister. As Prime Minister he had only a small Secretariat which had nothing to do with matters dealt with in the Foreign office. The three senior officers in the Foreign office dealt with the Minister direct. Although Nehru was the sole architect of the foreign policy of his Government, he gave the fullest freedom to us to express our views both on formulation of policies on specific issues and their implementation. During the years I worked with Nehru I used to keep brief notes on the more important matters dealt with from day to day. These supplemented by details obtained from Nehru's published speeches and other published literature form the basis of the present narrative. My object is to give a factual account of Nehru's approach to some of the principal international events of the time. On quite a few occasions, there was misunderstanding of India's attitude both at home and abroad and I have sought to throw light on the considerations which governed India's stand. It would be impossible to give an account of the many and varied issues dealt with in the Foreign office over a period of nearly twelve years within the brief compass of this book and I have not made the attempt.

Calcutta
May 1977

Subimal Dutt

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A STRANGER MEETS NEHRU

ON 3 JUNE, 1947, the British Government announced their plan for the partition of the Indian sub-continent. The Muslim majority areas in the northwest and northeast would form a new State to be called Pakistan while the rest of the country with a predominantly non-Muslim population would continue to be known as India. The Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, had already secured consent of the principal political parties—the Congress and the Muslim League—to this plan. The Muslim leaders led by M. A. Jinnah felt triumphant. Few among them had believed that their goal of a separate Muslim homeland would be so easily achieved. By contrast the leaders of the Congress were unenthusiastic. But they reconciled themselves to the partition of the country as the only practicable way of securing the orderly termination of British rule in India. Their feelings were reflected in Nehru's speech on the All-India Radio on the evening of June 3. "For generations past", he said, "we have dreamt and struggled for a free, independent and united India. The proposal to allow certain parts to secede if they so will is too painful for any of us to contemplate. Nevertheless, I am convinced that our present decision is the right one even from the larger viewpoint. The united India we have laboured for is not one of compulsion and coercion, but a free and willing association of a free people. It may be that in this way we shall reach that united India sooner than otherwise and then she will have a stronger and more secure foundation." The people of the country, as a whole, welcomed the end of long years of foreign rule. They hoped they could now look forward to the return of normal conditions in large areas in the northeast and northwest of the country which for months were being consumed in flames of communal passion and violence.

One leader who sadly watched these developments was Mahatma Gandhi. He had no illusion about the prospects of communal peace and obviously foresaw the terrible price

that would have to be paid for partition. But he preferred to remain silent. He did not wish to embarrass his colleagues who did not see eye to eye with him by expressing his misgivings in public. Nor would he blame the British Government. If the people of the country, Hindus and Muslims, could not agree on anything else, what could the British do? Yet, he must have been painfully aware that for the first time in 30 years his colleagues had reached a crucial decision without his consent.

Events began to move rapidly. The physical demarcation of the two new States presented no great difficulty except in some small border areas. The task of breaking up the administrative machinery, however, was formidable. Through 200 years of British rule a unitary structure of government had grown up in the country with many and varied appurtenances. This would have to be dismantled and divided between the two States. A still more painful operation was to break up a fine army with long-established traditions of unity and valour. Mountbatten who saw the task in all its vastness and complexity immediately set about tackling it with his characteristic energy and skill. High-powered committees consisting of ministers and senior civil servants representing the two States were immediately set up to grapple with the problems of partition. In the new atmosphere of hope, expectation and enthusiasm, no problem appeared too big.

I had known Delhi before, having worked in the Government of India secretariat as a junior officer in 1938-41. Times were different then. In those days the machinery of government moved slowly but surely. Everybody attached the utmost sanctity to precedents in the disposal of business. Supreme authority rested in the Governor-General as the agent of the British Government in Whitehall. He ruled with the advice and assistance of an Executive Council which counted among its members several distinguished Indians, but the ultimate decision was his and he could overrule his Council whenever he considered it necessary. The secretariat departments, located in the imposing buildings designed by Lutyens, were manned in the upper echelons mostly by European civil servants. The 1939-45 war had brought a certain sense of urgency in the disposal of

business but in essentials the machinery of Government and rules of business remained unchanged.

Next to Gandhi, Nehru was the most adored leader in India. The younger generation avidly read his books, most of them written during long years of detention in prison. When his autobiography first appeared in 1936, I had already served for over eight years as a member of the Indian Civil Service. Yet, with what enthusiasm and earnestness did I read the fascinating story of this strangely unworldly person who rejected the pleasures and comforts of a happy home for a hard and unrelenting struggle against British power in India and willingly suffered the hardships and privations that it involved. It was a moving story, intensely human, sad and, in a sense, romantic. Nehru's face was familiar to me from the pictures I had seen in books, magazines and newspapers. As young student, I had attended meetings addressed by Gandhi, C. R. Das, Subhas Bose and many leaders of the freedom movement. But I had not seen Nehru. He was so familiar and yet so distant.

One morning in July, 1947, I was working in the Writers' Buildings, Calcutta, which was the headquarters of the Provincial Government in Bengal. I was then Secretary in the Provincial Government in the Department of Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries. Suddenly, I received an urgent summons from Frederick Burrows, the last British Governor of Bengal, to see him in his residence. He showed me a telegram from the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, containing an urgent request from Pandit Nehru to release me for the post of Secretary in the Commonwealth Department of the Government of India which was then in Nehru's charge as Vice-President and member of the interim government at the Centre. I was greatly surprised. Things were in turmoil in Bengal, which was one of the British Indian Provinces to be divided between India and Pakistan under the Partition Plan. I was on one of the important Partition Committees.

Burrows asked me to proceed to Delhi without delay. I disentangled myself with some difficulty from the work in hand and arrived in Delhi on 24th July 1947.

I had been away from the Central secretariat for six and half years. The first thing that struck me when I

entered the department was a complete change in the surroundings. Gone was the placid atmosphere in the spacious corridors of the massive building. The whole place was humming with activity. Officials were flitting from one room to another with an air of suspense and anxiety. Khadi clad persons were walking about with supreme unconcern, and here and there, could be seen a few Jinnah caps.

The machinery of Government had ground to a halt in the period immediately following the announcement of the Partition Plan. The Congress Members of the interim government had wished to continue the normal processes of administration, but every proposal of theirs was resisted by the Muslim League representatives in the interim government. As soon as the Indian Independence Act passed by the British Parliament formally creating two new Dominions—India and Pakistan—received the Royal Assent on July 18, Mountbatten solved the deadlock by splitting the Government into two provisional administrations for the two new States. Every department of Government had an India Section and a Pakistan Section in charge of senior Civil Servants chosen by the leaders of the Congress and Muslim League in the interim government.

I became Secretary in the shadow Department of Commonwealth Relations. The sister Department of External Affairs was still in charge of Creighton, a British member of the old Foreign and Political Service, but he was on his way out and no Indian successor had yet been chosen. Muhammad Ikramullah was the Secretary in charge of the shadow Pakistan Department of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. I had heard of strained relations between the Indian and Pakistan counterparts in different Departments of Government. Almost overnight friends became strangers; erstwhile colleagues were indulging in mutual recrimination. Ikramullah, however, received me courteously and showed no trace of bitterness.

Why should one find fault with Pakistani officers only? Even those who decided to serve the new Government of India did not all acquit themselves creditably. The British civil servants were departing and there was a scramble amongst Indian officials for the places falling vacant. Appointments to senior secretariat and administrative posts

were within the special responsibility of the powerful Home Minister, Vallabhbhai Patel. He was anxious to secure the loyalty of the senior civil servants by guaranteeing them rights and privileges they had enjoyed under the old regime. But one heard of court being held in his house from day to day. I found myself out of place in such an atmosphere. Indeed I was regarded with suspicion by those amongst my colleagues who were already occupying seats of authority. They had no use for a newcomer, almost an interloper, like me. I felt discouraged.

I paid my first call, in the Foreign Office, on Girija Bajpai under whom I had worked as a junior officer during my first tenure of service in the Government of India secretariat. Bajpai was now a Special Officer in the twin Department of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. He had been Agent-General for India in the U.S. from 1941 to 1946 and in that capacity was supposedly responsible for assisting the British war propaganda in the United States by maligning Indian Congress leaders who had demanded of the British Government in August 1942 to quit India. When the interim government decided to open diplomatic relations with the United States, Bajpai was recalled from Washington. It was characteristic of Nehru not to ask Bajpai to leave government service. He posted him to the Foreign Office as officer on special duty. It did not take him long to discover the quality of this experienced Civil Servant. In July Nehru selected him for the seniormost position in the Foreign Office, that of Secretary-General.

Bajpai received me warmly. We talked of the old days. He was not particularly communicative about the present. This was a little surprising as he was usually free in his comments on men and matters. He asked me to call on Nehru without delay. The following day, I saw young Tarlok Singh who was Nehru's Private Secretary. I found him coping with a large crowd of visitors in a poorly-lighted room which he shared with a number of stenographers. I sent in my card to Nehru. Within a few minutes he sent for me. What a contrast his room presented to the scene outside. It was a picture of calm, neatness and orderliness. Everything was in its place on the

table—pencils, pens and even the paper-weight. Nehru seemed preoccupied and for a moment or two took no notice of me. Then he looked up and greeted me with his usual broad smile. He asked me a question or two about Bengal and immediately proceeded to give me an outline of the Indian problem in South Africa which was then the main preoccupation of the Department of Commonwealth Relations. He referred appreciatively to the work of the Indian delegation to the previous session of the United Nations General Assembly which had been ably led by his sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit. After a few minutes he looked at the clock on the wall and my first meeting with the person with whom I was to work closely for the next 15 years was over. I left his room with mixed feelings.

CHAPTER TWO

OPENING MONTHS

15TH AUGUST was hardly three weeks off. These three weeks were a period of intense activity and excitement all over the country. The Departments of Commonwealth Relations and External Affairs were amalgamated on July 1. In the new Department of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations—the business of the Commonwealth Relations wing of which I was in charge was to look after the interests of Indians overseas. Hundreds of thousands of Indians had migrated as recruited labour to Ceylon, Mauritius, Fiji, British Guiana, Zanzibar, Malaya and South Africa during the past hundred years. Besides there were large Indian communities in Burma and East Africa and smaller Indian settlements in many parts of the far flung British Empire. Indian labour had helped to open up vast areas on which now flourished rich rubber, tea and sugar plantations. So long as the British Government at Whitehall exercised full authority over the colonies, the Viceroy and Governor-general, as the overlord of India which was much the most important British colonial possession, could exert considerable pressure on the British Government at home to protect the rights of Indian settlers. As, however, the British gradually parted with power in the colonies in favour of the indigenous people, the Government of India's capacity to influence policies in colonial territories became less and less. It was somewhat ironical that as the native people assumed power in British territories, the lot of the Indian settlers became increasingly more difficult. There were reasons for this. In many colonies Indians formed substantial percentages of the local population ; in the Fiji, British Guiana and Mauritius, people of Indian origin were in the majority. The indigenous people, newly conscious of their rights, feared that by virtue of their numerical strength people of Indian origin would appropriate to themselves the benefits flowing from increasing devolution of power. Attempts were made in many colonies to prevent this by imposing disabilities of various

kinds on Indian settlers. Nowhere was the position of the Indians more difficult than in the Union of South Africa which as a Dominion was entirely free in the conduct of its foreign and domestic affairs. The vast majority of people of Indian origin settled in South Africa were citizens of that country by law but the Government of South Africa with their declared policy of apartheid were determined to subject all non-white population—African, Indian and coloured—to discriminatory treatment in respect of residence, trade, profession and employment. During the first four decades of this century, there were prolonged correspondence and negotiations between the Governments of India and South Africa on the treatment of people of Indian origin but by mid-forties contact between the two Governments had practically ceased. Throughout India there was widespread resentment at the policies and practices of the South African Government. One of the earliest decisions of Nehru as the Vice-President of the Interim Government of India was to lay a formal complaint against South Africa before the United Nations for denying fundamental human rights to people of Indian origin in that country. The Indian complaint was considered by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its session in 1946. Nehru appointed his sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, to lead the Indian delegation. She and her fellow-delegates created a profound impression on the statesmen assembled at that international gathering and the Government of India's complaint received the necessary two-thirds majority. The world had thus a preview of the free, fearless and independent policy that new India under Nehru's leadership was to follow in the following years. India's advocacy roused hopes in millions of downtrodden people in dependent territories all over the world.

Another session of the General Assembly was due in September 1947 and once again India gave notice that she would bring up the question at the General Assembly. Mrs Pandit, now Ambassador-designate to the Soviet Union, was again asked to lead the Indian delegation. Nehru laid down the essential guidelines for the delegation, but the Commonwealth Relations wing had to prepare a detailed brief. It was the responsibility of this wing also to deal

with many problems arising from the impending Constitutional changes in India and our changed relationship with the rest of the British Commonwealth. India's continued membership of the Commonwealth had not yet become a live issue.

During those days Nehru came to the department for only brief periods. It was characteristic of him to let the biggest room in the Foreign Office be used by the Secretary-General. His own room was of modest size but attractively furnished. Meetings of the Cabinet used to be held in the Government House. A mood of benignity had settled on Nehru despite intense pressure of work. The bitter discussions with the Muslim representatives in the interim government had come to an end. There was a parting of ways and he accepted the inevitable with resignation. He was not one to hug the illusions of the past or to indulge in self-pity. For him a new battle was soon to begin—a battle against poverty, illiteracy and disease. He had not spent more than ten years of his life in British prison for the mere honour and dignity of Prime Ministership or for the abstract glory of the country. Young in spirit, though not in years, he was determined to give content to the freedom which he and his fellow workers had won for the country at such sacrifice.

There was no ambiguity or uncertainty about the policy which new India under Nehru's leadership was to follow in the conduct of its foreign relations. Even before the country formally achieved independence on August 15, Nehru emphasised in a statement that the Government of India would not be entangled in the opposing power blocs. India would try to be friendly with all countries. This he repeatedly emphasised formally and informally in the subsequent months. Another plank in the new Government's policy was to continue a relentless fight against colonialism in all its manifestations. This policy was soon put to a test. Towards the end of July 1947, the Dutch launched a military attack on the Indonesian Republic under a pretext of police action. Despite his preoccupations at home Nehru reacted to the Dutch action with characteristic vigour. He strongly denounced the Dutch action and demanded that the issue be referred to the United

Nations or settled by resort to arbitration.

Reports of ceaseless activity of the Prime Minister were circulating in Delhi—how he retired to bed long after midnight and was up again in the early hours of the morning fresh for another day's work. In later years I was an eye-witness to his unrelenting daily schedule. Not unoften would he send for the senior officials of the Foreign Office at midnight and discuss international issues at an hour when ordinarily most persons' physical and mental capacity would be at the lowest ebb. And whether or not the Prime Minister was available for personal guidance, he would not keep any matter pending with him for more than a few hours. All papers which reached him by late evening invariably came back the following morning with clear decisions recorded on them.

Nehru's official residence at 17, York Road was an unpretentious building entirely inadequate to the demands that were being made on it. It became the most crowded place in New Delhi. All manner of people roamed about its corridors and gathered on its wide lawns. There were political leaders, Congress volunteers, newspapermen—Indian and foreign—and large groups of simple village people who had heard of strange happenings in Delhi and wanted to see things for themselves. The ubiquitous security police had not yet taken charge of Nehru's official residence or his movements, and in those days it was not difficult to approach him without previous engagement.

One evening there was a reception for Vijayalakshmi Pandit who was leaving soon for Moscow. The elite of the capital were present as also a large number of humble people. The Ambassador-designate was obviously excited, but more excited were the people about her. To most Indians the Soviet Union was a mystery land. The epic struggle in defence of their freedom, which the Soviet people had brought to a successful conclusion in the recent past, had invested that country with an aura of romance and admiration in the eyes of the Indians. The younger generation wanted to know all about the Russian people and the secret of their strength. And who would be a more reliable observer than Nehru's own sister who had already proved her ability in many fields? It was common

knowledge that Vijayalakshmi's appointment had been strongly opposed by the Muslim League members of the interim government. But now that the country was being divided this controversy became irrelevant. That particular evening Nehru and not his sister was the principal centre of attraction to the large crowd gathered on the Prime Minister's lawn. It was a festive occasion as indeed all such gatherings were in the early days of that August. There was an intense feeling of relief that the bitter feuds which had rent the two principal communities would come to an end and leaders could devote their energies to the development of the country. How shortlived were these hopes!

As the appointed day for the transfer of power approached, the Foreign Office was busy attending to innumerable details about protocol and procedures. Important visitors were arriving in Delhi from all over the world. The Department was not yet properly organised; there was not even a Chief of Protocol. The Prime Minister's secretariat was equally ill-equipped. However, in the general air of excitement few were inclined to take offence. Heads of the few foreign Missions in Delhi hardly ever troubled the Foreign Office. On the evening of August 14, the Constituent Assembly had a historic session. Members were there in full strength. The visitors' galleries were full to capacity and long before midnight the approaches to the Assembly building as well as the surrounding areas presented a sea of human heads. Nehru rose to move the resolution calling upon the Members to take the pledge of dedication and service to free India. He made a short but moving speech. "Long years ago", he said, "we made a tryst with destiny and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure but very substantially. At the stroke of midnight hour when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom." From the gallery where I sat with other officials I could see tears in many eyes on the floor of the House and in the galleries. The resolution was supported by Chowdhury Khaliquz-zaman who in earlier years had been closely connected with the Congress but was later to transfer his allegiance to the Muslim League and migrate to Pakistan.

Nehru and Rajendra Prasad left for the Government House at the end of the sitting and then pandemonium broke loose. It was difficult to get out of the building. Immense crowds, wild with joy but entirely good-humoured, made exit impossible. It was hours before the crowds dispersed. The following day, August 15, was still more exciting. It was a day of crowded engagements. During the previous night hundreds of thousands of ordinary people from the rural areas around Delhi had arrived in the city on foot and in all conceivable forms of transport. Ceremonies relating to the transfer of power began in the morning. In the Durbar Hall of Viceroy's House, Chief Justice Kania first swore in the new Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, who then administered oaths of office and secrecy to Nehru and his colleagues in the new Cabinet. The Indian National flag was flying for the first time on the dome of the great Durbar Hall. If Mountbatten, as the last representative of the British Crown in India, felt any emotion on this historic changeover, he showed no sign of it outside. The British national anthem was played for the last time on a formal State occasion. It was followed by the new Indian national anthem "Jana Gana Mana" in tunes which to the assembled gathering heard somewhat strange. The next important function was held in the Parliament building. Rajendra Prasad, as the President of the Constituent Assembly, read out a number of congratulatory messages which had arrived from all over the world. The House was then addressed by Mountbatten, the new Governor-General, resplendent in his uniform. The King's message which he delivered to the House was greeted with a chorus of welcome. In the atmosphere of general friendship and cheer all past rancour and controversy were forgotten. In a simple and felicitous address Rajendra Prasad said, "While our achievement is in no small measure due to our own sufferings and sacrifices, it is also the result of world force and events, and last but not the least, it is a consummation and fulfilment of the historic traditions and democratic ideas of the British race." The whole House seemed to agree with him and many heads nodded assent.

Other functions followed. Those in the open air were besieged and invaded by crowds delirious with joy. Shouts

of 'Mountbatten-ki Jai'—glory to Mountbatten—rent the air and, of course, of glory to Mahatma Gandhi and glory to Pandit Nehru. In the evening the Governor-General had a banquet for the new Ministers and other distinguished guests, followed by an open-air reception attended by several thousands. The last such function I attended in the Government House was in 1939 when I was acting as Secretary to the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research. In those days invitations to the Government House were governed by strict protocol. Officers of and above the rank of Deputy Secretary to Government were entitled to invitation to dinner once a season ; those of lesser rank but not below that of Under Secretary could expect to be invited only to after dinner receptions. Whether at dinner or at reception, officials were expected to be dressed in white tie and tails. On this particular night there was, of course, no question of any sartorial restriction. Most of the Indian guests were in simple Indian clothes, not a few in white flowing *dhota* and *kurta*. *Achkan* and *churidar* were yet to establish their dominance at official functions.

The following morning Nehru raised the flag of independent India on the historic Red Fort in Delhi to the cheer of a crowd estimated at half a million. The Foreign Office was open for business that day and we were kept busy drafting replies to the numerous messages of greetings to the Prime Minister from all over the world. The more important drafts were reserved for Nehru's personal approval ; others were despatched in his name. On the seventeenth morning when Nehru came to the Department he looked rather grim. We did not know then that Mountbatten had handed the Radcliffe Award on the partition of Bengal, Punjab and Assam to Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan at Delhi on the 16th afternoon. The independence rejoicings were not yet over and here was the bomb-shell of the Award. It gave India some tehsils of Gurdaspur district thereby providing a territorial link with Kashmir to Pakistan's utter dismay. But Khulna, a Hindu majority district, and Chittagong Hill Tracts inhabited by a predominantly non-Muslim population, went to Pakistan. Montgomery and Lyallpur, two districts which the Sikhs had developed into fine farmlands had, of course, to go to Paki-

stan having no contiguity with India. The Sikhs, however, had hoped that at least a part of Lahore would remain with India. With the inclusion of the whole of Lahore in Pakistan everything seemed lost to the Sikhs. They were dumb with shock and anger.

Administration had broken down in the Punjab for months. Since March inter-communal violence accompanied by loot, arson and murder raged without interruption and the province was being administered under Emergency Regulations. The Radcliffe Award acted as a fresh spark in the powder keg. Fighting spread with renewed ferocity between Muslims and non-Muslims in every town and village on both sides of the border in the Punjab. Men, women and children were put to the sword by howling mobs for no other offence than that they belonged to a community other than their own. Hundreds of thousands of Hindus and Sikhs living in areas now included in the West Punjab as part of Pakistan, began a long and weary trek towards India. There was a similar mass movement of Muslims from the East Punjab in the reverse direction. At places columns of refugees extended over 50 miles. In the initial stages, there was hardly any arrangement for food, water-supply and sanitation. Security arrangements were entirely inadequate. Refugee columns were repeatedly attacked on route and there was indiscriminate slaughter. Women were forcibly separated from their men folk and abducted by the riotous mobs.

Nehru faced the peril with grim determination. The free and secular India of which he had dreamt and for which he had spent many years of his life in British jail looked like dissolving in a flood of hatred and violence on the morrow of independence. He was determined to stop this bloodbath. Accompanied by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan and some of his own colleagues, he toured the two Punjabs by air on 17th August. He returned from the flight gravely shaken by what he had seen. In a broadcast from New Delhi on August 19 he expressed his determination to deal firmly with the situation, whatever the cost. Migration could not be halted but immediate arrangements must be made for the transport of

refugees in both directions under orderly control. Obviously he had not yet given up hope of return to normal conditions. "While we shall give every help to those who wished to come to East Punjab", he said, "we are not likely to encourage mass migration of peoples across the new borders, for this will involve tremendous misery to all concerned. We hope that very soon peace and order will be re-established and people will have security to carry on their avocation." People in the Punjab had heard such reassuring words before and refused to be convinced. They had made up their minds to seek the protection of a Government on which they could rely—Hindus and Sikhs in India and Muslims in Pakistan.

Within a few days agreed arrangements were made by the Governments of India and Pakistan for the movement of refugees by special trains. The protection of these trains presented grave difficulties. The ordinary police force on both sides had disintegrated. The loyalty of the special military force set up to deal with the border trouble was also subjected to severe strain and doubts arose about the dependability of the force. Thousands of individuals and groups of refugees were making their way from one country to the other by diverse routes and it was almost impossible to provide adequate protection for them.

Day and night scores of telegrams were pouring into the Foreign Office giving gruesome accounts of attacks on refugee trains and appealing for protection and succour for thousands stranded at wayside railway stations. We in the Foreign Office did not trouble Nehru with these telegrams and took whatever action was possible in consultation with other Government Departments. The first flood of fury spent itself within a month or so, but migration continued on a mass scale for months. Accurate figures are not available, but it is believed that between August 1947 and March 1948 five million Hindus and Sikhs migrated from Punjab and North-West Province in Pakistan to India and about the same number of Muslims moved from India to Pakistan. Estimates of casualties vary but it is generally agreed that no fewer than 200,000 persons lost their lives.

Another serious problem now presented itself. Refugees from West Pakistan began to spread out over Delhi and the western districts of the U.P. They brought stories of murder, rape and rapine, and these moved from mouth to mouth inflaming hatred and passion in the fellow members of their communities. By the beginning of September nearly 200,000 refugees arrived in Delhi utterly destitute. They crowded the slums of old Delhi and any open space and deserted building they could find. Thousands roamed about in the fashionable shopping centre at Connaught Place. Many still bore gaping wounds—tell-tale evidence in support of their grim stories. Passing along the corridors of the Connaught Circus one evening I overheard young people openly criticising the Congress leaders for the partition of the country and vowing vengeance. These were clear portents of danger.

Law and order began to deteriorate rapidly in Delhi. In the first week of September, there were sporadic attacks on Muslims in Old Delhi. Gangs of determined ruffians began to move about in fashionable New Delhi too. Soon followed a massacre of waiting passengers at the Willingdon airfield then on the outskirts of New Delhi. Heads of foreign missions received threats that unless they turned out their Muslim staff, they would be taking great risks. One midnight I had a visit from Symon, then British Deputy High Commissioner, and the Counsellor of the American Embassy in New Delhi. They treated me to a long talk on the duty of the Government of India to give protection to foreign missions, as if the Government were not sufficiently aware of their obligations. In fact, Nehru and Patel, the Home Minister had already taken the strongest measures to deal with the situation. Curfew was imposed and troops were called out in aid of the civilian authorities. An Emergency Committee of the Cabinet was set up to deal with the law and order situation on a footing of war emergency. Mountbatten accepted the Chairmanship of the Committee at the urgent request of Nehru and Patel, although he was now only a constitutional Governor-General. I attended several meetings of this Committee as a representative of the Foreign Office. Mountbatten would begin by giving a masterly analysis of the situation during the

previous 24 hours and in a few short sentences would describe the points on which immediate decisions were required. No time was lost in reaching decisions and initiating appropriate action. In those days Nehru looked extremely sad. Patel was grim and obviously extremely angry. Both of them pledged their personal support to whatever steps the Emergency Committee would decide. Nehru moved from place to place in Delhi seeing the situation for himself and giving directions on the spot. One morning a report reached him that a gang had invaded the house of Badruddin Tyabji, then a Joint Secretary in the Foreign Office. He rushed to the house and gave the officer and his family personal assurance of the fullest protection. On another occasion while touring New Delhi with the Defence Minister Sardar Baldev Singh he saw a plundering mob near the Odeon Cinema in the Connaught Circus, New Delhi's fashionable shopping centre. Unconcerned about his own safety he rushed at the mob brandishing his short stick and succeeded in dispersing it.

The diplomatic corps in Delhi were restive. Some were apprehensive about their personal safety. In order to assure them of Government's determination to deal with the situation firmly, Nehru met them together in the Government House. He did not conceal the seriousness of the situation but said he was determined to restore law and order and protect the law-abiding people whatever be their community. He was not finding fault with anybody. In the interest of his own country anarchy must be put down; otherwise both India and Pakistan would suffer tremendous injury. He disclosed at the meeting that he would meet Pakistan leaders at Lahore, Ambala and other trouble spots in West and East Pakistan in an effort to devise common measures for the protection of the refugees, millions of whom were on the march.

The diplomatic corps appeared reassured by the Prime Minister's frank talk. They were more convinced by the practical steps that the Government of India took to deal with the emergency. Civilian transport was requisitioned for moving many thousands of Muslim refugees who had taken shelter in the Old Fort on the outskirts of New Delhi to other areas in India. Government also laid on special

trains for the movement of those among them who wanted to proceed to Pakistan. Volunteer guards were set up at the camp site and adequate police and military guards were attached to trains carrying the refugees. Nehru publicly declared that the severest penalty would be imposed on any government servant, civilian or military, who was found guilty of communal bias in the discharge of his duty. He said he felt ashamed of the doings of his own people but showed no trace of bitterness against Pakistan. Soon he recovered his usual composure and serenity. If he had any feeling that his faith in partition as a cure for the communal ills of the country had been mistaken, he kept it to himself.

On September 9, Gandhiji reached Delhi and immediately started giving his famous evening sermons on the grounds of the Birla House where he was staying. I attended some of his evening prayer meetings. These were attended by large crowds including, to my surprise, H. S. Suhrawardy, Chief Minister of Bengal at the time of partition, clad in cotton *kurta* and *pyjamas*. Disowned by the Muslim legislators of Bengal on the eve of partition he had attached himself to Gandhiji's retinue. Obviously, he knew few persons in those gatherings and was glad to meet me. I was Secretary in the Government of Bengal during the time he was Chief Minister.

Nehru frequently saw Gandhiji in those difficult days and derived much comfort and support from the old leader's company and counsel. Both knew that although the fury of communal violence had somewhat abated in Delhi, there was a bitter feeling of resentment and frustration among the Hindu and Sikh refugees. Gandhiji was constantly urging his countrymen not to forget the ideals of a free, democratic and secular India for which the people had suffered so much. Nehru was doing the same in meetings all over the country in spite of his intense preoccupation with ministerial duties.

Nehru turned to Gandhiji for advice on all important issues, domestic and international. He asked me one day to call on Gandhiji at the Birla House and explain to him the instructions that the Government proposed to give the Indian delegation at New York on the problem of people

of Indian origin in South Africa. Arriving by previous appointment, I found the old man about to begin his stroll on the grounds of the Birla House. He asked me to join him in the stroll which I did. I explained to him the instructions which the Government proposed to issue. He listened to me in silence, asked me one or two questions and enquired whether Nehru had personally approved of the brief. I answered in the affirmative and he nodded his approval. It was obvious to me that his mind was on other things.

CHAPTER THREE

INDIAN FOREIGN OFFICE

IN 1784, the Government of India set up a new department to deal with external affairs. It was called Secret and Political Department until 1842 when it was renamed Foreign Department. The activities of the department expanded with the gradual expansion of British power in India. In 1914 the department acquired a new name, Foreign and Political, with two distinct wings. The Foreign Wing dealt with the tribal areas in the North West and North East regions of India, countries adjoining India—Afghanistan, Nepal and Tibet, as well as British possessions in the Persian Gulf while the Political Wing was responsible for the British Indian Government's relations with the 600 odd Indian princely states.

Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the functions of the Crown in relation to the Indian princely states were formally separated from the Government of India and entrusted to the keeping of the Viceroy as Crown Representative. Although the same dignitary functioned as the Viceroy and Governor-General, the Governor-General as such had no jurisdiction over affairs concerning Indian states. As a result all matters relating to the Indian states were kept out of the purview of the Governor-General's Executive Council which included a few Indian members. The Foreign and Political Department was simultaneously split into two entirely separate departments, External Affairs and Political, with responsibilities roughly corresponding to those of the Foreign and Political Wings of the old department. Both continued in the direct portfolio of the Viceroy and Governor-General.

In administering the external affairs of India the Governor-General functioned merely as an agent of the British Government at Whitehall. He could not take any policy decision on his own and had to execute whatever policies were laid down in London. Indeed by the time of the transfer of power to Indian hands in 1947, the External Affairs Department of the Government of India had ceased

to have even formal responsibility for relations with Afghanistan thereby emphasising the fact that an authority with its seat in India would not have any thing to do with Britain's relations with countries outside India. The External Affairs Department continued to be responsible for the administration of the Indian tribal areas. It also dealt with the French and Portuguese possessions in India and India's political relations with Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet.

The Indian Agent in Sinkiang in Western China as well as the Indian Agent-Generals appointed during the war years at Chungking and Washington were under the formal control of this department. Curiously, however, the most important Indian official abroad during the British days, the High Commissioner of India in London, was under the control of the Commerce Department of the Government of India. This was because this dignitary despite his high sounding designation had no political or diplomatic functions. He was essentially concerned with consular and trade matters.

There was still another anomaly. Until 1941 matters concerning the large Indian communities settled abroad, mostly in British dominions and colonies, were not dealt with in the External Affairs Department but in a Division of the Education, Health and Lands Department of the Government of India. By this expedient questions concerning oversea Indians came within the jurisdiction of the Governor-General's Executive Council. In practice an Indian member of the Council was entrusted with this responsibility. A separate Department of Indians Overseas was set up in 1941 to deal with this subject. It was redesignated Department of Commonwealth Relations in 1945 and continued as such until the transfer of power in 1947.

When Nehru joined the interim government of India in September, 1946, he took charge of both the Departments of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. The Political Department continued in the direct portfolio of the Governor-General in his capacity as the Crown Representative. By the summer of 1947 it became obvious that the British Government could not retain any link with the Indian princely states. Still another department called the States Department was then created to deal with matters

arising between the Central Government and the Indian states. Home Minister Vallabhbhai Patel was placed in charge of this department on the understanding that he would work in consultation with Abdul Rab Nishtar, one of the Muslim League nominees in the interim government, insofar as relations with states likely to be included in Pakistan were concerned. Relations with princely states had in any case nothing to do with external affairs and Nehru was not anxious to bring the business in relation to these states under the umbrella of the Department of External Affairs.

Nehru, however, considered it illogical that one department of Government should be in charge of relations with countries outside the Commonwealth and another with countries within the Commonwealth. On July 1, 1947, the two departments were merged with a double-barrelled name—Department of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. This apart, no change was made in the basic structure of the department.

Nehru was a close student of international affairs from his early youth. Since the late twenties he took a leading part in drafting resolutions on foreign affairs at the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress. As early as December, 1929, in his presidential address at the Lahore session of the Congress, he stated his approach to international affairs in the following words :

“India today is a part of the world movement. Not only China, Turkey, Persia and Egypt but also Russia and countries of the West are taking part in this movement. We have our own problems—difficult and intricate—and we cannot run away from them and take shelter in the wider problems that affect the world. But if we ignore the world, we do so at our peril.” The principle of non-alignment, which was the bedrock of India’s foreign policy under Nehru’s leadership in independent India, was accepted by the Congress at the Haripura session. The resolution stated that it was urgently necessary for India to direct her policy as an independent nation, thereby keeping aloof from both imperialism and fascism and pursuing her path of freedom and peace. “India”, according to the resolution, “was resolved to maintain friendly and cooperative rela-

tions with all nations and avoid entanglement in military and similar alliances which tend to divide up the world in rival groups and thus endanger world peace."

Joining the interim government as Vice-President and Minister-in-charge of External Affairs on September 2, 1946, Nehru lost no time in outlining the broad features of the foreign policy that he intended to follow. In his first broadcast to the nation on September 7, he said, "We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics or groups aligned against one another which has led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races. We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism wherever and in whatever form it may be practised. We seek no domination over others and we claim no privileged position over other peoples, but we claim equal and honourable treatment for our people wherever they may go and we cannot accept any discrimination against them."

Although Nehru was the sole architect of the foreign policy of independent India, he had little time to give to detailed work in the Foreign office. He was not merely Foreign Minister. He was Prime Minister, Chairman of the Planning Commission, later Minister-in-charge of the Atomic Energy Department and leader of the Lok Sabha. He attached considerable importance to his parliamentary work and gave it precedence over his other responsibilities. The day-to-day work in the Foreign office was left to the Secretary General, the Foreign Secretary and the Commonwealth Relations Secretary whose business it was to keep the Minister informed of reports received from our missions abroad on international developments. In practice, the Commonwealth Relations Wing which was in my charge functioned almost as a separate department. International issues could not obviously be dealt with in separate compartments within the same organisation. There was

hardly any issue of importance in which the four big powers—U.K., France, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. were not directly involved. Whenever we had to speak to the representatives of these countries in Delhi, I used to see the High Commissioner for the U.K.. We had to speak to a common brief, of course. Close co-ordination between the two wings in the department was essential, and this was ensured by regular discussion at meetings of senior officials chaired by the Secretary General every morning.

Gradually the territorial demarcation between the two wings got blurred, and although the Commonwealth Relations Wing retained its distinctive name, the Commonwealth Secretary was also placed in charge of the countries in Southeast Asia. In the initial stages some misunderstanding arose on this account. The Ambassador of Burma, for example, mildly protested to me as Commonwealth Secretary that though his country had severed its Commonwealth connection, the Indian Foreign Office was forcing him to deal with the Commonwealth Relations Wing. To avoid such embarrassing criticism the department was renamed in 1949 as the Department of External Affairs, the words Commonwealth Relations being dropped. Some eyebrows were then raised in the British High Commission. We were informally asked whether the change in nomenclature envisaged any change in our Commonwealth membership. The High Commission was assured that there was no such intention.

Bajpai was the principal official adviser of the Prime Minister on both Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, but in practice he took little interest in the problems dealt with in the Commonwealth Relations Wing which was generally regarded as a poor relation in a big family. Bajpai's main interest was in matters concerning the big powers and, more particularly, Kashmir. An extremely hardworking person and a very able draftsman, he used to take charge of all important telegrams as soon as they arrived in the department and would be ready with draft answers for the Prime Minister's approval, sometimes before other officers had had time to consider them and not unoften even before the Prime Minister had seen them. Nehru found in him an able aide and depended a good deal on his advice. Foreign

Secretary K.P.S. Menon concentrated more on personnel administration and protocol, a difficult enough task during the early years. Since the Foreign Minister could spare little time for foreign envoys, the Secretary General would see them if they wanted to see the Minister personally. On less important matters they called on the Foreign Secretary or the Commonwealth Secretary whoever was concerned.

In the first two years after independence, one of our principal preoccupations in the Commonwealth Relations Wing was the problem of treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa. Vijayalakshmi Pandit led the Indian delegation at the General Assembly session again in 1947. But that year the resolution sponsored by our delegation failed to receive the required two-thirds majority despite the leader's able advocacy. Cold war increasingly influenced the attitudes of the big powers and not many problems were considered strictly on their merits. It almost looked to us that the United Nations was getting tired of the question of the South African citizens of Indian origin. While the condition of the Indian community was getting worse, the attitude of the Union Government increasingly hardened.

The Commonwealth Relations Wing was also in charge of a variety of unresolved issues between India and Pakistan. The most difficult one was, of course, Kashmir. But the Kashmir problem was dealt with, in a special cell in the Home Department of Government, under Bajpai's guidance on the theory that so far as India was concerned, relations between Kashmir and the rest of India were domestic. It may appear somewhat extraordinary that although India and Pakistan were fighting an undeclared war on Kashmir until the beginning of 1949, the Governments of India and Pakistan were simultaneously negotiating with each other over other outstanding issues, for example, evacuee property, division on assets and liabilities and division of canal water between the two Punjabs. Delegations led by Ministers on both sides met alternately in New Delhi and Karachi and despite a good deal of mutual suspicion and lack of trust much useful work was done at these meetings. Nehru entrusted his Cabinet colleague Gopalaswami Ayangar, a former civil servant with wide administrative experience,

with conducting negotiations with Pakistan on various disputes between the two countries. Nehru had great respect for his judgment and trusted him entirely.

Within the Government a number of departments were concerned with Indo-Pakistan problems and initially there was a suggestion that H. M. Patel, an able Defence Secretary, who had dealt with Indo-Pakistan problems as a member of the Steering Committee at the time of partition, should be made responsible for co-ordination at secretary level among the different departments in addition to his normal duties. The Foreign Office resisted this and I as Commonwealth Secretary was made responsible for interdepartmental co-ordination in all matters relating to Pakistan except Kashmir.

Nehru had an extremely busy schedule everyday throughout the year. He would arrive in the Foreign Office a little after nine each morning and immediately meet the Secretary General and the two senior Secretaries. Secret and confidential telegrams that had arrived overnight from our missions abroad would be discussed at this meeting and the Prime Minister would give his decisions. He left follow-up action to the Secretaries and would see most of the outgoing telegrams only after issue. In the early years, he hardly drafted any communication unless it was of a personal nature or the matter was particularly important. When I returned to the Foreign Office in June, 1954, after a spell of two years as Ambassador in the Federal German Republic, I noticed that the Prime Minister was personally dictating many of the important letters and telegrams. By then Bajpai had left the Foreign Office. For drafting ability he had few equals in the Government of India.

The Foreign Office was overwhelmed with work almost from the day of transfer of power. We quickly opened diplomatic missions and consular and trade posts all over the world. Not always was this of our own choice. Other countries opened their missions in New Delhi and failure to reciprocate would have caused them serious offence. In fact we would have preferred to place our missions in some of the smaller countries under one Indian Ambassador and initially did so. But many governments insisted on

resident Indian missions in their countries and we had to fall in with their wishes.

The Foreign Office was inadequately staffed and as a result the reports that used to reach us from our missions abroad did not receive adequate attention. In the Commonwealth Wing I would personally summarise the reports from the more important countries—U.K., Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, for example, for the Prime Minister's information. Other reports were left to the desk officers. On the whole our Ambassadors had the feeling—later I had that experience myself when serving abroad—that they were not being kept in touch with thinking in the Foreign Office on various important matters and this was a serious handicap for them. One result of this lack of adequate communication was that many of our Ambassadors wrote personal letters to the two senior Secretaries on relatively unimportant matters thereby adding to the burden of these two over-worked officers. It might almost be said that the Foreign Office at the official level was like an inverted pyramid with much of the work concentrated at the top level. This could not make for efficient and ordinary disposal of business.

I returned to the Foreign office in June, 1954, after two years' absence and took charge of my old desk in the Commonwealth Relations Wing. Bajpai had left in the summer of 1952 to become the Governor of Bombay and a few months later K. P. S. Menon also relinquished the post of Foreign Secretary on appointment as Ambassador in Moscow. To my agreeable surprise I found the organisation of the Foreign office in a much better shape. The new Secretary General, N. R. Pillai, a distinguished civil servant, who had made his name as Secretary in the Commerce Department of the old Government of India, was a man of retiring disposition, but he was highly respected for his ability and courtesy. His advice was available to senior officers but he would not needlessly interfere in their work. The responsibilities of the Commonwealth Wing had expanded in the intervening years. These included relations with countries in the Middle East which Nehru preferred to call West Asia and the African continent. The Geneva Agreement on Indochina placed a

heavy responsibility on India. Business connected with this Agreement was dealt with in the Commonwealth Wing. The Commonwealth Secretary also took a more direct part in administrative and other business not directly falling with his territorial responsibilities.

Nehru used to see a large number of visitors everyday including members of Parliament, Central and State Ministers, important foreign visitors and many ordinary Congress workers. He used to decide himself whom he would see on a particular day from a list of requests placed before him by his Private Secretary. It was extraordinary that in spite of a very heavy schedule, he would not keep any visitor waiting, nor would any visitor leave him with a feeling of having been hustled. When Parliament was in session, he would move from his office in the External Affairs Ministry to the Parliament House at about 11 a.m. He used to get a list of his engagements for the day the first thing in the morning. If we had to receive his instruction urgently on any business, we had to slip into his room between two visitors. He had no time for long-winded discussion. One had to put before him the essence of the problem with suggestion as to what action should be taken and he would at once give his decision. Very often after the Parliament rose for the day, in the late afternoon he would come back to the department and walk into the rooms of Secretaries. We could then give him the latest information. Most of his paper work he used to do after dinner. He would then dictate notes on the papers which had reached him during the day from the Foreign Office and other Ministries of the Government to a relay of personal assistants until midnight. The Foreign Office was open every day in the week, no matter whether it was a holiday or Sunday. The only concession he made was to let the office close at 2 p.m. on Sunday afternoon. I begged him not to come to the department on Sunday afternoon for, after all, his junior staff must have some time to look after their personal business. An appeal on behalf of the peons was decisive.

In October, 1955, I succeeded R. K. Nehru as Foreign Secretary and continued in that capacity until April, 1961. Despite extreme hard work these were years of intense

personal satisfaction to me. I discovered unforeseen qualities of human sympathy and understanding in the Prime Minister and all the time one felt that to be able to work for him was a reward in itself. He was ready to see me any hour of the day or night if I wanted instruction on any important matter. Quite often he asked me to see him after dinner in his house. One morning while he was attending a meeting of the Congress Working Committee in his house, an important telegram had come from our permanent representative in New York and we had to send him instruction immediately. When I conveyed a message to that effect through his Private Secretary, the Prime Minister immediately came to the phone at the other end and spoke to me. Even when he was on tour away from Delhi, I could leave a message on the phone with the Secretary for instruction on any urgent matter and be sure of receiving a reply in the late evening when the Prime Minister would have time to attend to official business. It was singularly satisfying to work with a Minister who would never leave any matter waiting for his decision wherever he might be, at headquarters or anywhere within India or outside.

Although the final decision on all important matters of policy was Nehru's, he would often consult the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. In later years he made this an invariable rule. The committee included Rajagopalachari who was Home Minister for some time and later his successor Govind Ballabh Pant and Ministers Abul Kalam Azad, T. T. Krishnamachari and Morarji Desai. Nehru attached a good deal of importance to Pant's views. Azad expressed himself freely and frankly—one of the few who did so. The other members had marginal influence on policy decision.

Krishna Menon was included in the committee after he became a Minister without portfolio in 1956. He had a good deal of influence with Nehru but he used to exercise it more behind the scenes than in meetings of the committee. Even earlier, since his return from London in 1952, he used to be consulted on all important matters in the Foreign Office. Nehru wanted Secretaries to consult Menon on Korea and Indochina and other matters which

were likely to prove contentious at the United Nations. From mid-fifties Menon used to lead the Indian delegation at the annual sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. He had a razor-sharp mind and a striking capacity to devise formulae to reconcile different, sometimes opposite, points of view. Although Menon had Nehru's full confidence, it would be wrong to think that he had authority to take the final decision on any issue. Decisions were invariably Nehru's. After the general elections in 1957, Menon was made Minister of Defence, but he was anxious to continue actively to participate in the work of the Foreign office. Even the ablest man would find the Defence Ministry more than a full time job and from the end of 1957 Menon came less and less into the picture in matters which I dealt with as Foreign Secretary. Nehru's confidence in him was, however, unshaken until the end, and whenever Menon was criticised in Parliament, as often he was, Nehru vehemently rose to his defence.

Nehru attached the greatest importance to keeping the Parliament informed on all matters of importance. The Foreign Office would hold back official announcements when the Parliament was in session until the Prime Minister could make them on the floor of the House. There were innumerable questions in Parliament relating to the Department of External Affairs each session, and whether the Prime Minister himself answered a question or not, replies had to be submitted to him in draft for approval. He insisted that no information which was not absolutely secret should be held back from the Parliament even though the replies might be embarrassing to Government. He would not take advantage of ambiguity in a question to avoid giving information which a Member wanted. Every session there were at least two formal debates on foreign affairs—one in the Rajya Sabha and one in the Lok Sabha. Nehru very seldom delivered written speeches in Parliament. As a result, occasionally some of his speeches were rather rambling or repetitive. He had a stupendous memory. Nevertheless when one speaks for an hour or more on a variety of topics, some lack of precision on details was not unnatural. In later years when India and China became locked in bitter disputes over their common

frontier and other related issues, the Chinese Premier took advantage of the imprecision in some of Nehru's statements in Parliament.

The Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs used to meet at least once each session. It was a large body and not many members came sufficiently prepared to take an effective part in the discussions. Nehru would usually begin with a general talk on the more important issues then engaging the Foreign Office's attention and would then reply to questions from the Members. Unfortunately, once or twice, discussions at these meetings somehow got to the press and thereafter the Prime Minister was careful in exchanging views on really sensitive issues.

From 1952 a Deputy Minister was attached to the Department of External Affairs to help the Prime Minister in his Parliamentary work. Only for a short period in 1954-56, there was a Minister of State, Dr Syed Mahmud, a close personal friend of Nehru. Neither the Minister of State nor the Deputy Minister was asked to attend discussions within the Ministry on matters of policy. As a result, all the three Deputy Ministers with whom I worked during my years in the Foreign Office were highly dissatisfied with their position. They used to complain to Nehru and from time to time he would tell me that the Deputy Minister should be consulted on matters concerning specified territories and papers relating to these territories should be routed through the Deputy Ministers. In practice the Prime Minister would decide on really important matters after personal discussion with the Secretary General and the two Secretaries. Other matters did not need a Minister's decision. There was, therefore, hardly any business that required reference to the Prime Minister through the Deputy Minister. As a result there was little that Secretaries could do to make the Deputy Minister happy.

The tribal areas in the north-eastern part of India formed what was called the North East Frontier Agency. The administration of this Agency which was under the direct control of the Governor-General came under the External Affairs Ministry after the transfer of power in August 1947. Strictly speaking, the Home Ministry which was responsible for internal affairs should have been dealing with the tribal

territory as with the States and Union Territories, but that Ministry had enough on its hands and was not anxious to take on more. Besides Nehru had close personal interest in all matters concerning the welfare of the tribal people and the areas inhabited by them touched sensitive borders with China and Burma. He therefore decided to keep the administration of these areas under his direct control in the Foreign office even after the new Constitution came into force in January, 1950.

This additional responsibility threw a heavy burden on the Foreign Office. The Governor of Assam administered the North East Frontier Agency as an agent of the Ministry of External Affairs through a number of officers who continued to be designated political officers, but all matters of policy and important executive decisions had to be referred to Delhi. Nehru was most anxious that the customs and culture of the tribal people should be protected and their social structures maintained intact. In the old days the Government of India's policy was to have minimum of administration in the tribal areas. The policy of the new Government was to extend the benefits of development to the tribal people as to the rest of India. Accordingly schools were started, new roads built and cottage industries set up in far-flung areas. The administration also adopted a policy of associating the tribal organisations and their leaders with the development activities. The Government of Assam and Assam politicians were not happy with the Central Government's education policy in the tribal areas under which Hindi would be taught in the lower classes in schools and Assamese taught only as a second language in the higher classes. The situation was somewhat delicate, but because of Prime Minister's close interest in all matters concerning the progress of the tribal people, the State Government did not press their objection.

The Naga Hills district which formed part of the North East Frontier Agency was a source of special concern to the Foreign Office. Among all the tribal people the Nagas were the most advanced educationally and conscious politically. For years before the transfer of power a section of the Nagas living in the Naga Hills district had been agitating for an independent Nagaland outside India. Nehru

repeatedly announced in public that the Government of India were ready to allow maximum autonomy to the Naga people in the administration of their affairs but would never permit secession. An extremist section led by Phizo rejected Nehru's assurance and went underground. They started formal guerilla action in 1953 against the forces of law and order. As the local authorities were unable to cope with the situation, the Central Government sent in an Army contingent to deal with the subversive elements. The ordinary people suffered a good deal both from the depredations of the rebels and from punitive action by the military.

Ultimately in 1960 a group of Naga leaders approached Nehru with the suggestion that the Naga Hills district should be separated from Assam and together with Tuen-sang Division which was also largely peopled by the Nagas should be constituted a separate State. This, they said, would give the Naga people a feeling of identity and much desired autonomy and cut the ground from under the feet of the extremists. This suggestion was acceptable to Nehru. After detailed negotiations between a Naga delegation led by a patriotic Naga leader Dr Imkongliba Ao and a Government of India delegation led by me as Foreign Secretary an agreement was reached under which a separate State to be known as Nagaland was to be set up as the sixteenth State of India.

An announcement to that effect was made by Nehru in Parliament on August 1, 1960. Until the Constitution could be amended, the administration of Nagaland as a unit separate from the North East Frontier Agency came into force under the Nagaland (Transitional Provisions) Regulation. The Lok Sabha passed the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Bill on August 29, 1962.

The Naga leaders insisted that the Ministry of External Affairs should continue to deal with their territory and as a result the Indian Foreign Office continued to bear administrative responsibility for the new unit. This change made no impression on the rebels. They intensified their activities and started a fresh campaign of terror against the local administration and law abiding elements. They also succeeded in establishing lines of communication with China

and Pakistan through densely wooded and generally inaccessible areas bordering on Burma and Chittagong Hill Tracts and received arms and ammunitions and training facilities in guerilla warfare from both these countries. These rebel activities were of almost as much concern to the Foreign Office as the rapidly deteriorating relations with China during the years 1959-1961.

CHAPTER FOUR

A NEW GENERATION OF DIPLOMATS

IMMEDIATELY ON taking charge of the Department of the External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations on September 2, 1946, Nehru decided to establish direct diplomatic relations with the more important countries of the world. As a first step towards this, he decided to send V. K. Krishna Menon, a personal friend and close confidant, on a sounding mission to the capitals of the European countries. Everywhere Menon found the governments of the countries he visited keen on diplomatic relations with India. A similar mission under Abul Kalam Azad was planned for Muslim countries in the Middle East. Azad could not leave India, but these countries also conveyed to the Government of India their anxiety to exchange diplomatic missions with India without delay.

For its enlarged responsibilities the Department of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations needed a large diplomatic, consular and supporting staff. During the British days senior personnel serving in the External Affairs and Political Departments belonged to a joint cadre known as the Indian Foreign and Political Service. This cadre was almost entirely European until about two decades before the transfer of power. Thereafter, a number of specially selected Indian officers belonging to the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Army were taken into the cadre, but their presence made little difference to the European complexion of the Indian Foreign and Political Service. I remember when I first went to Simla in 1939 as a junior officer in the Government of India Secretariat, a senior Indian colleague pointing to the Kennedy House Annexe, then housing the External Affairs and Political Departments, remarked that an Indian could enter that building only as a clerk or as a cleaner. Despite an element of exaggeration this remark was by and large true.

On the transfer of power in August, 1947, all the European officers serving in the old departments with one exception left India. Most of them retired home but a few

chose to serve in Pakistan. The only European left in the Indian Foreign Service was the so-called Indian Agent in Lhasa, for whom an Indian replacement was not immediately available.

Independent India could not obviously conduct its diplomatic relations with foreign countries through the nationals of another country. The departure of the British personnel made it all the more necessary to take immediate steps to recruit qualified Indians for the new Indian Foreign Service. Nehru had foreseen this necessity and in April, 1947, he recalled Girja Bajpai from his Washington assignment and entrusted him with special responsibility for constituting the new service.

In the old days the principal sources of recruitment for the Indian Foreign and Political Service were the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Army. The Indian Civil Service was also seriously depleted by the departure of European officers after the transfer of power ; so were the Armed Services. Many in the Central Services were anyway unwilling to go abroad and not all volunteers from these services would be suitable for diplomatic work. The normal channel of entry of young recruits into the new Indian Foreign Service as to all other Government of India services would be through an open competitive examination held each year by the Union Public Service Commission. But this method was clearly unsuitable for recruiting a large number of candidates of different age-groups required for the immediate needs. Therefore, the range of selection, whatever the methods adopted, had to be broadened to include persons from outside Government service, such as teachers, lawyers and persons with experience in trade, industry and business. Bajpai suggested to Nehru that as a first step 30 experienced officers mainly from the Indian Civil Service should be recruited to the Foreign Service to provide a core of trained personnel. They would include persons who had already served overseas in one capacity or another under the old Government. Nehru readily approved of the suggestion. He was entirely free of prejudice of any kind. During the long years of struggle against the British rule in India he and other Congress leaders had been severely treated by the I.C.S. officers,

British and Indian, who were primarily responsible for the execution of British policies in India. But neither Nehru, nor Home Minister Patel bore any ill will towards members of the I.C.S. on this account and both set their faces against any form of witch-hunting. Nehru urged only one condition. The new recruits to the Foreign Service must be given to understand that they could not look forward to headships of diplomatic missions. These were to be reserved for public men. Bajpai threatened to lay down his responsibility. What career, he asked, could he offer to persons with ability if they could never become heads of mission ? He recognised the special prerogative of the Foreign Minister to select Ambassadors but a general embargo against career diplomats would not attract competent persons to the new service. Nehru saw the point and did not press his objection.

Selection of thirty officers from the existing All India and Central Services was easy. But how were the other 100 odd recruits of different age groups to be selected ? Under the Indian Constitution, the Federal Public Service Commission had to be consulted. At the request of the Department the Commission invited applications from persons possessing the prescribed qualifications in respect of education, age and experience, interviewed a large number of candidates and recommended a few hundred whom they considered suitable.

Then there was an extraordinary development. On the ground that the persons considered suitable by the Public Service Commission were not all quite suitable for the Foreign Service, a Committee of secretaries with Bajpai as Chairman and K. P. S. Menon, Foreign Secretary, and C. C. Desai, Commerce Secretary was set up to interview the Commission's nominees and to consider other suitable candidates. Lala Sri Ram, a leading Delhi industrialist, was included in the committee to advise on the qualifications and suitability of applicants from business and other professions. Unfortunately, this committee began to entertain fresh applications ad hoc without notifying to the general public that fresh applications would be received. Some of the candidates that they finally selected did not possess the minimum qualifications earlier demanded by

the Federal Public Service Commission. This gave rise to criticism by Members of Parliament and others and charges of favouritism were flung at Government.

Nehru was entirely innocent of this procedural irregularity. He took little interest in civil service procedures and would accept whatever his senior advisers suggested. Nor was he interested in any individual candidate. All that he insisted on was that some ex-members of the Indian National Army who had fought the British Government under Netaji Subhas Bose's leadership during the war years should be taken into the new service. The much publicised trial of the ex-Indian National Army personnel in the Red Fort in Delhi in 1946 had brought the Congress a rich electoral harvest but since then politicians, by and large, forgot their existence. Members of the former I. N. A. were finding it difficult to get any job or opportunity in any service or profession. Entry into the Indian Army was barred to them; so was their entry into the regular civil services which had their own strict requirements of education and age. Nehru did not appreciate these administrative obstacles. Here was a group of devoted people who had fought and suffered for the country's independence according to their own light and the least the new Government could do was to show them some special consideration. If other services under Government were closed to them, some at least could be taken into the Foreign Service which was under his direct control. Thus it was that on his insistence a number of ex-I.N.A. officers were finally selected for the Indian Foreign Service.

A Service recruited under these conditions necessarily consisted of heterogeneous elements with different backgrounds of education and experience and with marked differences in age. Unfortunately, there was no time to give the new recruits any preliminary training. Already a large number of diplomatic missions and consular posts had been opened abroad and for lack of personnel many of these could not function properly. The new recruits were, therefore, sent abroad in haste even though most of them had no previous experience of work under Government. It is fair to add that many of these emergency recruits did well later and a few were outstanding

by any standard.

There were some other difficulties not strictly connected with the birth pangs of a new service. In the first years after independence while diplomatic officers posted in Indian missions abroad were under the control of the Foreign Office, others, for example, the Press and Commercial Attaches were subject to the control and guidance of their parent departments in New Delhi. Within a year or so, the Information posts came under the control of the Foreign Office despite the strong opposition of Patel who was Information as well as Home Minister, but several years were to pass before the personnel holding posts were integrated with the Foreign Service proper.

The Education Ministry also came into the picture. It claimed the right to control exchange of cultural delegations with foreign countries. Some of the selections made by that Ministry for inclusion in these delegations were not particularly happy. Nehru wanted the Foreign Office to take full charge of cultural exchanges with other countries. This was strongly resisted by the Education Minister, Abul Kalam Azad. There was some exchange of strong notes between him and the Prime Minister but since Azad would not yield, Nehru did not press his view. Only after Azad's death in 1958 did the Department of External Affairs assume full control over cultural relations with foreign countries.

The difficulties of integration did not, however, arise solely or even mainly from the unwillingness of other departments to shed control over personnel dealing with their special subjects. In the Foreign Office few senior officers had expert knowledge of trade, commerce and economics, nor were these officers sufficiently interested in these subjects. From time to time we examined the feasibility of starting separate Commercial and Economic Sections within the External Affairs Ministry on the German model. I myself was not keen on this as I knew the limitations of Foreign Service personnel. Members of the service posted abroad seemed interested only in the so-called diplomatic work, and were disinclined to work as Commercial or Press Attaches. This was particularly unfortunate as in most of our missions and posts in foreign countries

there was not enough diplomatic work, and strict demarcation of functions between the different branches led to inadequate use of our limited manpower. Exhortations on the need for full integration issued from Delhi from time to time had little effect. The malady was not confined only to the middle and lower levels. Not many Heads of Missions were interested in work other than diplomatic and political; and it has to be stated with regret that the senior people did not set good examples to their junior colleagues in this respect.

Most of the senior ambassadors selected in 1947-48 were drawn from public life, some with mature political experience, whom Nehru knew well and could trust to carry out his policies faithfully. Among these were Asaf Ali in Washington, Vijayalakshmi Pandit in Moscow, V. K. Krishna Menon in London, Sri Prakasa in Karachi, Dewan Chamanlal in Ankara, Minoo Masani in Brazil and Ali Zaheer in Tehran. S. Radhakrishnan succeeded Vijayalakshmi in Moscow in 1949 while K. M. Panikkar took over the Embassy in Nanking which fell vacant on K. P. S. Menon's transfer to New Delhi as Foreign Secretary in April 1948. In making selections for posts of ambassadors Nehru used to consult his senior colleagues informally and only after a decision had been taken would he mention the appointments in the Cabinet. Home Minister Vallabhbhai Patel was not interested in appointments outside his own departments. He would strongly resist any interference from Nehru in personnel matters in the departments in his charge, Home, Information and Broadcasting and States. Equally he had little interest in the selections for posts under Nehru's control and usually agreed with Nehru's choice. Another senior Minister, Abul Kalam Azad, who in many ways was closer to Nehru than any other Minister, expressed his views freely but would ultimately agree with the Prime Minister. President Rajendra Prasad never interfered in these appointments. In later years the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary took the initiative in suggesting new appointments after they had first discussed the proposals among themselves, and Nehru usually accepted their advice.

Postings and promotions of officers other than heads

of missions were considered by the Prime Minister on the advice of a board consisting of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries and the Secretary, Commerce Department, the latter being interested in trade posts abroad. Nehru was not interested in individuals and was above private approaches of any kind and would usually approve the Board's proposals. Unfortunately the Board itself did not always adhere to its own recommendations. It was not an easy task to select suitable officers for a large number of posts falling vacant all over the world. Several criteria had to be satisfied. The Foreign Office sought to follow the British practice of rotating personnel between different regions so that an officer who had served in a difficult country, climatically or otherwise, had an easier posting in his next round. But in its anxiety to consider the convenience of individual officers the Board did not take sufficient note of the need for area specialisation. As a result there were few persons in the Indian Foreign Service who could be called regional experts. The fullest use of an officer's linguistic attainments was also not always made.

I recall only two cases during the twelve years I worked directly under Nehru, in the Foreign Office, when he wanted officers whom he knew personally to be promoted to higher posts within the Service. He was visibly irritated when on one occasion I pointed out that the Union Public Service Commission whom we had to consult under the rules had refused to agree to the promotion. Nehru was not impressed by this argument. Why could he not promote a person about whose ability he as Minister had no doubt? If rules stood in the way, he said, something must be wrong with them. I explained to him that Government who had made the rules were competent to change them, but until the rules were changed, it would not be right to contravene them knowingly. He did not press his view although he was not entirely satisfied.

By the end of 1950 emergency recruitment to the Foreign Service entirely stopped. Seniority, *inter se*, of those already taken into the service had to be decided. After detailed examination a list was ultimately drawn up by the Secretaries. It was characteristic of Nehru's concern for the minorities that when I took the list to him

for final approval, he took up only the Muslim names one by one and asked me how their seniority had been decided. Obviously he wanted to satisfy himself that the Muslim officers had been fairly treated. I did not regard this as an adverse reflection on the judgment of his senior official advisers. Most of the Muslim officers had opted for service in Pakistan at the time of partition. The few who had stayed back rightly or wrongly felt themselves neglected. Nehru was aware of this feeling and wanted to be sure that at least those Muslim officers who were serving directly under him should receive a fair deal.

It was some time before normal working relations were established between non-career ambassadors abroad and the Foreign Office. For the first year or so, some of them used to write to the Prime Minister direct on all matters, important and unimportant. Some addressed him by the first name even in semi-official dispatches. A number of them disliked corresponding with the Foreign Office and resented instruction issued over the signature of a permanent official. One or two openly stated that the Prime Minister was paying too much heed to the advice of his senior officers in the Foreign Office. None was more suspicious of the Foreign Office than V. K. Krishna Menon who was India's High Commissioner in London for five years from 1947 to 1952. An extremely able man, always conscious of his personal friendship with Nehru, he ruled the High Commissioner's Office in London as a closely guarded empire in the administration of which he would not tolerate the slightest interference from the civil servants in Delhi. The High Commissioner's Office in London was a miniature Government of India, with most Departments of Government in Delhi duplicated in London, and had on its roll more than a thousand employees—British and Indian. The new High Commissioner was particularly distrustful of the Indian Civil Service and was irritated by any communication from Delhi which he suspected had not been approved personally by Nehru. It is only fair to add, however, that he stood squarely for the rights of his staff and despite his abrasive personality evoked personal loyalty and affection among them. An extremely hard-working man himself, he used to drive his staff ruthlessly and achieved quick results.

in matters in which he was really interested. In a number of other missions, difficulties arose because some of our ambassadors, both non-career and career officers, had much too grandiose ideas of their position and power and inflicted these ideas on their junior colleagues. There was not enough recognition that the head of a mission could not function alone, that for the success of his mission he should be able to inspire the loyalty, cooperation and respect of his staff and the only way to do so was fair and objective treatment and not threat and expression of displeasure in diverse, often unorthodox ways. Within a few years all but a few non-career ambassadors retired from the foreign field. Some preferred to return home ; others were refused extension of tenure. By the time I left the Foreign Office in April, 1961, only two Indian missions could be regarded as reserved for non-career ambassadors—Washington and London, and even for Washington a senior civil servant was selected that year. I recall having suggested to Nehru a number of times in 1958 and 1959 that he might consider selecting some public men for three or four of the more important embassies since there was a dearth of sufficiently senior officers in the permanent cadre. Every time I referred to the suggestion he kept quiet. That was his characteristic way of expressing dissent. Had he learnt by experience ?

CHAPTER FIVE

BENGAL PACT

WITHIN A few weeks of the partition of the sub-continent Hindus and Sikhs of West Punjab fled en masse to India. Non-Muslims moved out also from the North West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and the princely state of Bhowalpur which had become part of Pakistan. By the end of 1947 a mere fifty thousand or so of Hindus and Sikhs were left behind in these provinces. They had also made up their minds to seek refuge in India and were waiting for facilities of transport which had been agreed upon by the two Governments.

A sizeable non-Muslim population, 1.4 million, was still living in Sind. Trade and business in the city of Karachi which overnight became the capital of Pakistan was dominated by the Hindu business and trading community. Karachi's population almost doubled in the course of a few months by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of employees of the new Central Pakistan Government as well as refugees from Uttar Pradesh and other states in India. Pressure on non-Muslims followed. In January, 1949, communal rioting started in Hyderabad, the second biggest city of Sind, and rapidly spread to Karachi and other towns. Within a few weeks nearly half a million people fled to India, mostly by ship to Bombay. Another six hundred thousand panic-stricken people were also anxious to move out to India. In response to an appeal from the Government of India the Government of Pakistan agreed to provide them with necessary facilities. Thus within eight months of partition few Hindus and Sikhs were left in West Pakistan.

There was no similar mass migration between East Bengal, then part of Pakistan, and the adjoining Indian States, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. Traditionally relations between Muslims and Hindus in both parts of old Bengal were friendly. They had similar food habits and shared in common many social customs and cultural traits. Both the communities were equally proud of their language, Bengali. This inter-communal harmony had come under

increasing strain with the growing virulence of Muslim League politics in the twenties and thirties and there were occasional incidents of communal violence. These, however, were restricted to small localities and were quickly brought under control by the Administration. The situation rapidly deteriorated from the mid-forties. The Muslim League under Jinnah's leadership adopted a militant attitude towards the Congress and the Hindus and this inevitably affected relations between the two principal communities in Bengal. Following Jinnah's call for direct action in August, 1946, Calcutta witnessed murderous incidents of the most ghastly kind which came to be known as the great Calcutta killing. The city of Calcutta was at the mercy of lawless elements for a number of days and the streets were littered with dead bodies. The Government of Bengal which was then dominated by the Muslim League looked on indifferently until the fury passed its peak. The Calcutta killing was followed by serious rioting in Bihar in October, 1946, in which Muslims were the principal victims. A quick reply came from the Muslims in the district of Noakhali in East Bengal. Whole villages were devastated by rioting and men, women and children were maimed and killed indiscriminately. Not a single Hindu house was spared over an extensive area and many Hindus were forcibly converted to Islam and their womenfolk abducted and forced into marriage with others. This outbreak of mass violence created panic among the Hindus all over East Bengal. Many middle class people moved to towns from the rural areas and not a few sent away their families to Calcutta. Gandhiji rushed to Noakhali and spent weeks there walking from village to village preaching non-violence and inter-communal amity. He succeeded in restoring some measure of confidence in the minds of the Hindu minority and rousing a feeling of shame among the Muslim majority.

Within a few months of the communal violence in Noakhali came the partition of the country and the division of Bengal and the good effect of Gandhiji's humanitarian mission was completely undone. Other forces came into operation immediately. East Bengal now became part of Pakistan. In the heated atmosphere of those days petty but ambitious politicians embarked on a campaign of hate

against the Hindus of East Bengal. Pakistan, they said, was intended to be the homeland of Muslims and there was no place for non-Muslims in the new state. This propaganda which was eagerly taken up by half-literate Muslim preachers in rural areas fell on receptive ears among the under-privileged Muslim masses. There was already a substratum of resentment against the upper caste Hindus. Most of the agricultural land was owned by them and the Hindus also dominated the liberal professions like law, medicine and teaching. The process of squeezing the Hindu middle class from its privileged position started almost immediately after partition. They were subjected to all manner of petty harassments in which the Ansars, an official para-military organisation, took a leading part. Offences against Hindu women increased in number and frequency. The East Bengal Government requisitioned a large number of Hindu houses in urban areas adding to the general feeling of uncertainty in the community.

The victims found no protection from the subordinate Police and Magistracy the personnel of which was almost entirely Muslim. The non-Muslim Government servants in East Bengal had moved to India at the time of partition, taking advantage of an option given to them as part of the partition settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League. Most of the senior posts in East Bengal were now held by non-Bengali Muslim officers sent by the Central Pakistan Government. These officers—majority of them Punjabis, disliked the people of East Bengal—Hindus and Muslims—but they were particularly severe on the Hindus. Many of them had suffered personally during the communal upheaval in their homeland in the Punjab in the wake of partition and had feelings of bitterness against all Hindus. The Hindus of East Bengal felt utterly helpless. Day in, day out they listened to statements by Muslim leaders that Pakistan was an Islamic State and they were often abused as infidels and fifth-columnists. This convinced the upper and middle classes in the Hindu community that they could live in Pakistan only as second class citizens. They disliked most the new Government of East Bengal's policy of giving an Islamic bias to education at all levels and saw no future for their children.

Many leading Hindus moved out to West Bengal and many others sent away their families to Calcutta. This made the position of those who stayed behind still more difficult. Hindu parents became particularly concerned about the future of their daughters not because offences against women became more frequent but because it would be difficult to find suitable young men within the community for girls of marriageable age. Migration of middle-class Hindus from East to West Bengal soon assumed significant proportion. Only the poorer classes in the community—small cultivators, petty artisans, landless labourers did not yet join the exodus.

The general feeling of frustration and helplessness among the Hindus of East Bengal was voiced by their leaders who had come away to India. Hindus, they said, had no future in East Bengal and sooner or later all of them would have to seek new homes in India. They urged the Government of India to take planned steps to bring over to India the entire Hindu population of East Bengal who numbered 13 million at the time of partition. Many appeals were made to Nehru for immediate action. As time passed, criticism of the Government of India for their supposed indifference to the fate of the Hindu minority of East Bengal became more and more strident. Critics charged Indian leaders with ingratitude and selfishness. The East Bengal Hindu had taken a prominent part in the freedom movement since the early years of the century. There was hardly any middle-class Hindu family one or more of whose members had not participated in non-cooperation, civil disobedience or underground terrorist movement against British rule, and had not suffered imprisonment or detention in British prisons. Indian leaders were now accused of deliberately shutting their eyes to the plight of these people who were the innocent victims of a political settlement to which they were no party. This attitude of indifference to the Hindus of East Bengal was contrasted with the generous provision that was being made for the Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Pakistan.

Nehru was surprised by these criticisms. He was fully aware of the difficult condition of East Bengal Hindus. There was no lack of information in the Indian Foreign

Office. The Deputy High Commissioner for India in Dacca who was accessible to the minority community kept Delhi fully informed of the happenings in East Bengal. Even though officially he had no power to make any representation to the East Bengal Government, he brought the more serious complaints to the notice of the East Bengal Government. Nehru, however, was not clear in his mind as to what the Government of India could do to assist those who were nationals of Pakistan and were still living in East Bengal.

Hindus and Sikhs had been forced out of their homes in what was now part of West Pakistan by cataclysmic events and the Government of India had no choice in the matter. Nehru was anxious to avoid facing another refugee problem in East India while his Government's energies were fully occupied with grappling with the stupendous problem of relief and rehabilitation of millions of refugees from West Pakistan. Besides, he had still not lost hope that conditions would settle down, and with gradual improvement in the relations between India and Pakistan the Hindus would be able to live honourably in East Bengal. He would not, therefore, like them to run away from their homes leaving all their possessions behind and swell the ranks of the destitute in Calcutta. The basic ties between India and Pakistan—cultural, economic and other—would, he said, assert themselves again in course of time and it would be to the mutual interest of both the countries to look after their minorities. At the same time he did not want any travel restriction to be imposed on those who were coming over to India, and directed the Central Ministry of Refugee and Rehabilitation to assist in the relief and rehabilitation of the migrants from East Bengal.

A further complication arose within a few months. The first Chief Minister of West Bengal was P. C. Ghosh, a well-known political leader from East Bengal and for many years one of Nehru's colleagues on the Congress Working Committee. Within a few months of assuming office Ghosh faced a revolt within his party and had to resign. The new Cabinet under the leadership of Dr B. C. Roy, a close personal friend of Nehru's, included a few hardliners who saw a threat to the way of life and the

economic well-being of the permanent Hindu residents of West Bengal in the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees from across the border. The new Government was anxious to move the refugees to other parts of India but this was resisted by the refugees and their leaders. The refugee problem now became a play thing of politics in West Bengal. The resulting bickerings aggravated the feelings of frustration among the Hindus of East Bengal, both those who had come over and those who were hoping to come over.

Bengalis are an emotional people and they found a common target of attack in Nehru and his Government. In the following months discontent spread and the popularity of the Congress in Bengal slumped. In June, 1949, at a bye-election to the State Legislative Assembly in a Calcutta Constituency the Congress candidate was decisively defeated by Sarat Chandra Bose, elder brother of Netaji Subhas Bose, who was once a leading Congressman but had left the Congress in protest. There were other signs of discontent against the ruling party in West Bengal and Nehru decided to see things for himself.

He arrived in Calcutta on July 12 and received an enthusiastic reception. But on the long route to the Government House small groups raised slogans of protest with black flags and at one point shoes and leaflets were hurled at his car. These protests were led by young volunteers of the Communist Party of India. That party was then in a most militant mood all over India. For two days Nehru received a continuous stream of deputationists mostly with one complaint or another against the State Chief Minister, who was then away in Switzerland, and his Government, against the ruling Congress caucus and against the Government of India. On July 14 afternoon Nehru addressed a huge mass meeting attended by about a million people on the famous Maidan in Calcutta. Utmost security precautions were taken but within about 30 yards of the rostrum on which Nehru was seated a bomb exploded killing a policeman on duty. And before he finished speaking, the crowd became restive at the fringes—something which normally was inconceivable. He returned to the capital in a sombre mood.

An unforeseen turn of events now aggravated the peril of East Bengal Hindus. In September, 1949 the British Government devalued sterling and most other Commonwealth countries correspondingly devalued their currencies. Pakistan refused to follow suit. The purchasing power of the Pakistan rupee was already lower than that of the Indian rupee and the Government of India refused to recognise the inflated official value of Pakistan currency. As a result trade between India and Pakistan came to a stop. The economy of East Bengal depended on the price of raw jute. India was the principal market for this jute as there were few processing mills in East Bengal in those days. Huge stocks of unsold jute accumulated all over the rural areas in East Bengal causing widespread distress among millions of poor Muslim cultivators. The supply of Indian coal to East Bengal was also completely disrupted. As a result, transport services in East Bengal by train and steamer which were entirely dependent on imports of coal from India came to a stop. The entire economy of the province was near collapse.

The simple Muslim village folk of East Bengal were bewildered by this distressful situation. Little did they understand the operation of the economic forces or realise that their hardships were brought on by their Government's obstinacy in trying to keep up an artificial value of their currency. Self-seeking politicians had now a field-day. They intensified their anti-Indian propaganda. India, they said, had not accepted Pakistan and was now trying to throttle it. Indian agents for the execution of this nefarious design were the Hindus of East Bengal who had therefore no right to stay in Pakistan. They were fifth-columnists and must be driven out and their properties must be confiscated for the benefit of Pakistan.

Nehru was alarmed. Already there was a long list of outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan. Kashmir was before the United Nations and despite the cease-fire there were bitter feelings on both sides and talk of resumption of hostilities. Another potentially more dangerous dispute concerned the equitable distribution of water in the Punjab rivers between India and Pakistan. There were a number of other contentious issues not the least of which

was the adjustment of the value of properties left behind by the evacuees in West and East Punjab. The fate of millions of people was involved in a satisfactory settlement of these disputes and, even with the best will in the world, time would be needed to reach agreements acceptable to public opinion on both sides. Nehru had no doubt in his mind that the disputes would have to be settled peacefully some day. The first thing needed was to create a calm atmosphere in which constructive discussions could take place. Any talk of war to solve the outstanding disputes must first be ruled out. In December, 1949 he asked the Indian Foreign Office to hand over a draft No War Agreement to the Pakistan High Commissioner for transmission to his Government. The draft Agreement provided that the two countries should subscribe to a declaration denouncing resort to war as a method of settling disputes and affirming that all existing and future disputes should be solved by peaceful methods. Nehru wrote personally to Liaquat Ali Khan on this subject and the correspondence between the two Prime Ministers lasted the better part of a year. The reaction of the Pakistan Government was negative. The Pakistani Prime Minister insisted that along with a general No War Declaration an agreement should be reached on procedures for settling individual disputes. To this end he suggested a definite time schedule under which a period of two months would be allowed for mutual negotiation ; failing settlement by negotiation, another two months for mediation ; and finally, if mediation failed, a dispute should automatically be referred to arbitration by a mutually agreed special agency or appropriate international authority whose award would be binding on both parties. Nehru would not agree to this procedure. The outstanding problems, he said, were not similar and therefore not capable of identical treatment. The Kashmir dispute, for example, involved a question of sovereignty, and to agree in advance to arbitration would make negotiations and mediation infructuous. The Government of India, however, had no objection to the appointment of a tribunal for solving the disputes regarding the waters of the Punjab rivers and the properties of evacuees. Ultimately nothing came of the correspondence and exchange of notes.

Within a few days of the Government of India's formal proposal to the Pakistan Government about the No War Agreement events in East Bengal began to move fast. In the third week of December, 1949, there was a minor incident in a remote village in Khulna district, in East Bengal, involving some Hindu villagers and a police party. It was alleged by the police personnel that they had been assaulted by the Hindu villagers. Two days later a large police force accompanied by Ansars and local rowdy elements raided the houses of Hindus not only in the particular village but also over a wide area in the neighbourhood. They plundered and burnt houses and attacked men, women and children. These brutalities were accompanied by forcible conversion of Hindus to Islam, abduction of Hindu women and desecration of Hindu places of worship. Simultaneously a strong police cordon was placed round the villages to prevent the story of the raids leaking out. Some three weeks later some of the villagers managed to cross into a neighbouring district in India and soon the full account of the atrocities came out in the Calcutta press. This led to considerable feelings among the Hindus of Calcutta and there were stray assaults on Muslims and some burning of Muslim houses. In retaliation the Muslims stabbed two Hindus in front of a mosque in North Calcutta. Communal violence now burst out in full fury in Calcutta in which the victims were mainly Muslims. The Government of West Bengal took very strong measures. They called in the military and within a few days the disturbances were brought under full control.

Swift retaliation on Hindus followed in East Bengal. In Dacca a huge Muslim crowd went on rampage on February 10, 1950. Throughout the city Hindus, men, women and children, were attacked indiscriminately and their houses were plundered and set on fire. In less than twenty four hours many thousands of Hindus who had been living for generations in the city had to leave their homes and seek shelter in refugee camps. Two thousand people lost their lives and many more were injured.

What happened in Dacca was repeated in many districts of East Bengal. Hundreds of thousands of Hindus now left their homes in panic and crossed over the far-

flung border to West Bengal utterly destitute. The refugees brought with them gruesome accounts of the atrocities committed on the Hindu community throughout East Bengal. For the first time cultivators, petty artisans and simple illiterate village folk joined the trek to India.

During this critical period hundreds of telegrams reached the Foreign Office urging the Government of India to intervene in the situation and protect the helpless Hindus of East Bengal. The situation was extremely tense and there was open talk of war in Calcutta and Delhi. Considerable pressure was brought to bear on Nehru to take immediate action and send an ultimatum to Pakistan to halt the atrocities. There was little doubt about the facts. Nevertheless it was strange that the Deputy High Commissioner for India in Dacca was silent. The Foreign Office knew only later that the Government of East Bengal had advised him not to move out of his home as they could not guarantee his personal safety. In this situation Nehru sent a personal telegram on February 17 to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan urging him to give full facilities to the Deputy High Commissioner to visit the affected areas and ascertain facts. He also suggested that the situation in East and West Bengal should be surveyed by two fact-finding Commissions consisting of one representative each of the two Provincial Governments. Two days later he followed up with another telegram proposing that both he and Liaquat Ali Khan should visit the disturbed areas to ascertain facts for themselves. The Pakistan Prime Minister agreed to give the necessary facilities to the Deputy High Commissioner but the other two suggestions were not acceptable to his Government. Nehru was in a great fix. Feelings were roused throughout India and the general suspicion was that mass massacre of Hindus was still continuing in East Bengal. Many people in West Bengal, not all belonging to the right wing Hindu Mahasabha, criticised Nehru for being callous to the fate of millions of innocent people who they said were facing utter annihilation.

Nehru, who was fully aware of the depth of feelings in West Bengal, realised the grave implications of continued disturbances in East Bengal. In a statement in Parliament

on 23 February, 1950, he disclosed the facts as they were known to the Government of India and made an appeal to his countrymen for restraint and sanity. "I should like to make an appeal to our own people in this grave moment of crisis", he said, "If they desire that Government should take effective action whenever necessary, they must realise that perfect order and security must prevail in India. There are anti-social elements and communal groups who, in spite of their declared opposition to communalism, really function in tune with the intense communalism that prevails in Pakistan. These elements have to be checked, because they bring disrepute to our people and weaken the country. Because of the very great seriousness of the situation, we must remain calm and determined not to indulge in loose talk or any action which is improper and harmful". Nehru pointed out that "communal bitterness in one country inevitably has repercussions in the other. If tragedies are enacted in Pakistan, they have a powerful effect on our people and we cannot remain indifferent to these. It is for the Government of Pakistan to consider seriously what the consequences are likely to be if it is unable to give peace and security to its own people". For some days he even toyed with the idea of resigning office and proceeding to East Bengal in a private capacity. His colleagues dissuaded him from such a purposeless course of action. What could he do in East Bengal in his private capacity, they asked, even if the Pakistan Government gave him permission to go there?

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan soon realised the serious consequences of letting the situation drift even from the viewpoint of Pakistan's self interest. Already 100,000 Muslims had left West Bengal in panic and sought refuge in East Bengal and if tension continued, many more would follow. The Pakistan Government was in no position to face another refugee problem in East Bengal. There were millions of refugees already in Western Pakistan and the resources of the new Government of Pakistan were being strained to the utmost in looking after them. It was, therefore, essential for both the Governments to cooperate in restoring normal conditions. Ultimately, in response to Nehru's invitation he arrived in Delhi on April 2 for a

personal discussion. After prolonged talks the two Prime Ministers reached an Agreement on April 8 and Nehru placed it before Parliament on April 10. The agreement was designed to restore the confidence of the minority community in each country in the good faith of the Government of that country. The Agreement which later came to be known as the Bengal Pact applied to West Bengal, Assam and Tripura in India and East Bengal in Pakistan. It laid down detailed measures for the security and protection of the lives and properties of the minority community. Provision was also made for the freedom of movement of migrants within the areas affected and for return to their homes if they wished and their rehabilitation. During the height of the troubles and indeed for many months earlier many newspapers in both the countries had been indulging in highly sensational accounts of communal violence. These added to the prevailing panic and many people left their homes not because anything had happened to them but for fear of possible happenings in the future. The two Prime Ministers appealed to their people and the press to help in bringing about a peaceful atmosphere and to refrain from provocative publicity which more than any other single factor had contributed to the rapid worsening of the communal situation.

During the six days that discussions with Liaquat Ali Khan lasted, Nehru kept in close touch with his senior colleagues. He, Patel, Gopalaswamy Aiyangar, Azad and Kidwai used to meet every day to review the progress of the discussions. The other members of the Cabinet were not taken into confidence at that time. Among them was Shyama Prasad Mukherji who enjoyed the confidence of wide sections of people in West and East Bengal. Shyama Prasad felt convinced that Nehru was buying a temporary peace with Pakistan at the cost of the future of nine million Hindus still in East Bengal. Pakistan was an avowedly Muslim State, he said, and would never give a fair deal to its Hindu citizens. Its immediate interest was to prevent the exodus of Muslims from India. He urged that a realistic view of the situation should be taken and however unpleasant it might be, the Government of India should insist on an exchange of population between India and Pakistan

so that all the nine million Hindus of East Bengal could be brought over to India. If exchange of population was not feasible, the Hindus, he said, should any way be allowed to come away; and in order to accommodate them India should demand extra territory from Pakistan.

Nehru was shocked by Shyama Prasad's suggestion. A demand for extra territory would lead to a war between the two countries and in his view no person in his senses could contemplate a war which would be ruinous to both. Dealing with the subject at length in course of the debate on the Bengal situation in Parliament in August Nehru said, "I, in all humility, ask Dr Mukherji or anyone who thinks in the same way, will you add to the security of the minority community by putting forward these proposals? What will the reaction of Pakistan and the minorities be? Realising that there are groups in India which want war against it, which want to eliminate or liquidate it, the Pakistani Government must react in a hostile way, in a way which cannot conduce to the security of the minority communities in the area concerned. The proposals are, therefore, the worst possible approach to the problem of security". Nehru was equally shocked by the proposal for an exchange of population. It would inevitably mean forcing the Muslims who were citizens of India under the Indian Constitution to leave their country and seek refuge in Pakistan. He had already firmly repudiated the suggestion in a statement in Parliament on February 23, 1950. "People talk vaguely", he then said, "of exchange of population but from many points of view such a suggestion is totally unrealistic. Tens of millions of people cannot be uprooted and transported to distant places. It is true that in the Punjab migration took place on a vast scale bringing infinite suffering in their train. That took place because you were face to face with elemental forces and the two newly formed Governments had suddenly to face a crisis. There is no such excuse now and both India and Pakistan should have the strength and capacity to discharge their primary function of giving security and confidence to the people whoever they might be". Elaborating this point later during the debate in Parliament on the Bengal Pact, he said, "this brutal and barbarous approach ... would be

completely at variance with all that the Congress has stood for Such proposals shame us in the eyes of the world They put us in a position in which we have to say to people who are our fellow citizens, 'We must push you out because you belong to a faith different from ours'. This is a proposal which if it is followed will mean the ruination of India and the annihilation of all that we stand for and have stood for. I repeat that we will resist such a proposal with all our strength, we will fight it in houses, in hills and in market places. It will be fought in the Council Chambers and in schools for we do not like India to be slaughtered at the altar of bigotry".

Even while Liaquat Ali Khan was in Delhi, reports appeared in the press that Shyama Prasad Mukherji had sent in his resignation from the Cabinet. In fact, both he and the other Cabinet Minister from West Bengal, K. C. Neogy, resigned as soon as the Bengal Pact was signed. Nehru was happy to let Shyama Prasad go. For months the two had not been seeing eye to eye on many matters of policy. The Prime Minister, however, thought well of Neogy and tried his best to dissuade him from resigning. Left to himself Neogy would not be anxious to quit office, but he was afraid of the reaction in his home State if Shyama Prasad went out on an issue of the minorities in East Bengal while he, who hailed from East Bengal, had stuck to office. The one person who tried his best to dissuade Shyama Prasad from taking the fateful action he had in mind was Home Minister Patel who had a soft corner in his heart for Shyama Prasad and sympathised with his strong feelings about the Hindu minority of East Bengal. Patel genuinely felt that Shyama Prasad could be of more assistance to the Hindu refugees by remaining inside the Cabinet than going out. But Shyama Prasad had already gone too far. During those critical days late one evening Patel rang me up in my house. I was surprised since I did not know him well. "You come from Bengal", he said, "and must be knowing Shyama Prasad well. You Bengalees must dissuade him from resigning. His departure from the Cabinet will be harmful to the interest of Bengal. I have done my best but he would not listen".

Early next morning I went to Shyama Prasad's house. The first courtier of the day, a senior Bengalee officer, not in any way connected with the Department under the Minister had already arrived. I asked to be seen alone and my request was immediately granted. I reported to Shyama Prasad what Patel had told me adding that I shared the latter's view that his departure from the Cabinet would not help the cause he had in mind. He listened to me in silence. Just then a telephone on his table rang. After he had finished speaking on the phone, he turned to me with a smile and said that it was a Bengalee lady congratulating him on his decision. He was obviously pleased. What an easy prey to flattery I said to myself.

Resignations of Shyama Prasad and Neogy were formally accepted on April 19. The same day Shyama Prasad made an impassioned statement in the Parliament explaining the reasons of his resignation. He said, he had no faith in the plighted words of Pakistan. Pakistan was an avowed Islamic State and its Government had not observed the terms of the two earlier Agreements on the treatment of minorities. The latest Agreement would be treated by them the same way. He was warmly applauded when he finished his speech. This was a tribute to his oratory; in his days as an orator he was unmatched in Parliament and outside. Neogy was not present nor did he make any statement.

It was characteristic of Patel that having agreed to the Bengal Pact he proceeded to Calcutta on April 16 to persuade the people of West Bengal to give it a trial. Feelings in West Bengal were running very high and Patel spent a week in Calcutta meeting people of all shades of opinion and explaining to them that the Agreement was in the best interest of the minority in East Bengal. His concern for the Hindus of East Bengal was widely recognised in both Bengals and his words carried more weight than those of any other member of Government.

The Bengal Pact served its immediate purpose. Within the following four months almost all the Muslims who had left West Bengal returned to their homes. Similarly,

about six hundred thousand Hindu refugees returned to East Bengal and conditions returned to normal for the time being. The Bengal Pact was welcomed with relief by the people of Pakistan. Nehru visited Karachi on April 26 in response to Liaquat Ali Khan's invitation and received a tremendous ovation from people in all walks of life. I was an eye witness to the delirious scenes of welcome.

The press in both countries which earlier had added to the tension by highlighting stories of atrocities by members of one community on those of the other cooperated in restoring confidence in the minds of the people and for the first time since partition mutual recrimination ceased. Addressing a joint session of the Pakistan and Indian Newspapers Conference at New Delhi on May 4, 1950, Nehru summed up the results of the Pact in the following words :

"If we analyse the Agreement we may not like some of its clauses but the fact remains that the really important thing is not the contents of the Agreement but the fact that it came about It is clear that the reaction to the Agreement represents a certain urge and desire in the people's minds. Large numbers of people were rather afraid of what was happening and wanted an escape, a way of putting an end to the existing bitterness. They were frustrated ; but they could not do anything. In fact, no individual can do anything when millions were moved by passion and fear. But, as soon as a way was found, there was a powerful reaction which showed that basic feelings and urges of the people of India and Pakistan were essentially against the continuance of the poisonous atmosphere. Everywhere there was a desire to seize on anything that brought security and peace of mind to them. In spite of this, we have obviously not solved our problems—what is more, we are not going to solve them suddenly. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a very healthy desire in the minds of the people is, in itself, a most hopeful sign".

CHAPTER SIX

INDOCHINA

RETURNING to Delhi in the middle of June, 1954 after two years' absence in West Germany, I resumed charge of the old Commonwealth desk in the Foreign Office. Southeast Asia fell within the territorial responsibility of the Commonwealth Secretary and the affairs of Indochina became my immediate preoccupation. The situation in Indochina was grave. The French who had been vanquished in Dien Bien Phu by the North Vietnamese forces under Giap had no heart left in the fighting despite promises of massive support by the Americans. Nehru feared that any large-scale American intervention would bring in the Chinese and the conflagration would spread beyond the frontiers of the Indochina States. On February 12 he had issued an appeal for cease-fire. This evoked some interest among the powers concerned but the fighting continued. After the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu, there was some speculation in the Western press that the U.S.A. would use hydrogen bomb if the Chinese intervened in the fighting. Nehru strongly criticised such suggestions in a long statement in the Lok Sabha on April 24. He expressed the Government of India's concern at the repeated references to 'instant and massive' retaliation and to possible attacks on the Chinese mainland. In a constructive effort to find a solution of the deadlock in Indochina he put forward a six-point formula for consideration at the Conference of Foreign Ministers which was due to meet in Geneva in two days' time. According to this formula the first priority should be given to cease-fire. Also the Government of France should unequivocally commit itself to the grant of complete independence to the Indochina States and the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China should reach a solemn agreement on non-intervention in Indochina. Nehru secured support for these proposals at the Conference of the Southeast Asian Prime Ministers which met in Colombo at the end of April. The views of

the Prime Ministers of the five important countries in the area—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia, he felt, were bound to carry weight with the big powers assembled in Geneva.

The Geneva Conference had been agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Britain and France at their meetings in Berlin in January-February, 1954. It assembled in Geneva on April 26 under the co-chairmanship of the British and Soviet Foreign Ministers and lasted till 21 July. Nine countries—France, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., China, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, participated in the discussions on Indochina. It was the first important international Conference that the People's Republic of China was attending and all eyes were turned on Premier Chou En-lai who was leading the Chinese delegation. He knew his mind and soon made it clear that his country would not yield to any pressure or threat from America. Both Dulles and Molotov took rigid postures and it was not long before formal discussions at the Conference were deadlocked. The atmosphere was thick with suspicion. At that stage Krishna Menon who was ostensibly on his way from Delhi to New York turned up at Geneva. He had told Nehru before leaving Delhi of his plan to halt for a few days at Geneva, but carried no brief with him. India, any way, had no seat at the Conference table. With his characteristic penchant for discussions behind the scenes, Menon soon became an important intermediary between the British and the French delegations on one side and the Russian and the Chinese representatives on the other. Nehru's prestige in international affairs was very high those days and despite American reservation the Western countries regarded him as a genuine exponent of the Asian-African opinion. Menon was known to be Nehru's close friend and confidant and his suggestions in informal discussions with the leaders on both sides were believed to carry Nehru's approval. In fact Menon acted mostly on his own and kept Nehru informed only of brief outlines of his discussions with different leaders. The Indian Foreign Office hardly came into the picture. Menon soon established close rapport with Chou En-lai and of this full advantage was taken by Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, who was

most anxious to see the Conference succeed. Eden himself kept Nehru closely informed of the substance of the discussions in Geneva as he was anxious to carry the support of the Asian members of the Commonwealth as well as of the important Southeast Asian countries for any solution that might eventually result from the talks in Geneva.

The Conference recessed for a brief spell in the third week of June. Nehru had already sent an invitation to Chou En-lai to pass through Delhi on his way back to Peking. Chou En-lai arrived at Delhi on June 25 and received a very warm welcome from Nehru and his colleagues. This was the first visit to India of a dignitary from the People's Republic of China and despite Delhi's heat a large crowd gathered at the airport. Chou En-lai spent less than seventy two hours in Delhi and most of his time was taken up with discussions with Nehru. The Chinese Premier assured Nehru that China had no design on the integrity or sovereignty of the States of Indochina, and would be satisfied if, after liberation from colonial rule, these States followed a policy of genuine non-alignment. In a joint statement issued on the conclusion of the visit the two Prime Ministers expressed the hope that the problem of Indochina would be solved in accordance with the principles of *Panch Sheel* (Five Principles of Coexistence). In their view a proper solution should aim at the creation of independent and democratic States which would not be used for aggressive purposes or be subject to foreign intervention.

When the Conference reassembled in July, most of the discussions among the parties took place in private sessions or in informal meetings between heads of delegations. The main outlines of the subsequent Agreement were hammered out at these meetings. On July 19 late in the afternoon Nehru received a frantic telegram from Eden enquiring whether India and other Colombo Powers would agree to guarantee a settlement on Indochina and join a collective pact for the purpose. Nehru was opposed to collective pact of any kind, and despite his anxiety to see the impasse at Geneva resolved without further delay he immediately replied back saying that the suggestion was opposed to India's basic policy of non-alignment and was not, therefore, acceptable to him. Fortunately a final agreement

on ceasefire was approved at the plenary session on July 21. The United States and South Vietnam refused to join in the Final Declaration but in a separate statement the United States affirmed its intention not to use threat or force to disturb the Agreements and in another statement South Vietnam promised 'not to use force to resist the procedures for implementing the ceasefire Agreement'. Despite these reservations when the news of the final agreement reached Delhi, Nehru felt extremely happy. He sent congratulatory messages to the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia who were closely associated with him in the formulation of the Colombo proposals; also to Mendes-France, Eden, Molotov, Chou En-lai and Bedel-Smith in Geneva. On behalf of the Prime Ministers of the Colombo Conference countries, Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, sent a telegram to Eden welcoming the Indochina settlement as a notable contribution towards the consolidation of peace in Southeast Asia. Nehru was highly appreciative of Menon's role at Geneva and was most generous in his references to him in discussions in the Foreign Office and elsewhere. He felt that the tributes paid to India by the French Prime Minister Mendes-France and by the Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai for India's good offices in finding a solution at Geneva were due to Menon personally.

The Geneva settlement included three separate cease-fire Agreements in respect of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. These Agreements provided that three International Commissions, one for each of the three States, composed of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with India as the Chairman, should be set up to control and supervise the cease-fire Agreements. Nehru directed the Foreign Office to initiate steps immediately to set up the Commissions. An essential first step was to settle the preliminary details as to how the Supervisory Commissions were to function. For this a Conference of the representatives of the three member countries on the Supervisory Commissions as well as the representatives of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, was called in Delhi in the first week of August. Krishna Menon rushed back from New York in time for the opening session. It was agreed

at this Conference that India should provide the personnel for the common services, security, transport and communication. It was also decided to send an advance mission to Indochina on a preliminary survey. As Indochina fell within the territorial responsibility of the Commonwealth Secretary, I was asked to lead the advance party.

Our party which included Canadian and Polish representatives left Delhi on 8th August in two I.A.F. Dakotas. Prime Minister U Nu of Burma had been taking a keen interest in the Geneva Conference and subsequent developments. Representatives of the Burmese Foreign Office gave us a warm send-off at Rangoon during a brief halt there and we reached Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, about midday. There was evidently great excitement in the city. We were officially received by Cambodian Ministers and crowds greeted us all along the route to the large palace that the Cambodian Government placed at our disposal. There was a holiday atmosphere everywhere. The same afternoon we called on King Norodom Sihanouk. He received us very cordially and promised the fullest cooperation of his Government in the work of our Commission. Unlike Vietnam and Laos, Cambodia had no internal problems and the King and his people were happy that at long last they were going to achieve freedom from colonial rule. We were enthusiastically feted and a special visit was arranged for us to the historic ruins of Angkor Vat with a ministerial escort.

After two days we proceeded to Saigon. The situation there was much more difficult. The Diem Government had not accepted the Geneva Agreement and there was an express hostility towards the International Commission. The French were everywhere but apparently they did not have much influence with the Saigon Government. On the date of our arrival a big ship carrying refugees from North Vietnam laid anchor in the Mekong river just opposite our hotel and the usual crowd of relief workers was there to receive them. Stories of oppression on Catholics and non-communists in the north brought in by the refugees added to the tension in the town. When we called on Diem at the palace, we found him glum and uncommunicative. From the few words we had with him it was obvious that while

his Government would not directly oppose the setting up of the International Commission on their territory, we could not expect much willing cooperation from them.

We next proceeded to Hanoi. The Ho Chi Minh Government had not yet taken over the city which was still under nominal French control but there was great excitement amongst common people at the impending change of regime. Most of the shops were closed and few cars were to be seen on the wide boulevards which the French had built. The French traders and civil servants were leaving en masse and the local businessmen and professional people who had done well in the past joined in the exodus apprehending trouble at the hands of the new regime. The French manager of the leading hotel where we had reserved our accommodation told us as soon as we arrived that he was about to close the establishment and had already given notice to his staff. Curiously, we saw few Viet Minh volunteers and there were few demonstrations of any kind. We were most anxious to meet the leaders of North Vietnam and the resistance fighters without delay, and made our wish known to the North Vietnamese liaison officers. Within a day or two we received a message that Ho Chi Minh and his Ministers would be glad to meet us at a spot in the country some distance from Hanoi.

We left Hanoi in an one-engined plane provided by the French and landed in an open field half an hour later. Two jeeps were awaiting us there and we were driven by North Vietnamese drivers along a road which once must have been in very good condition but was then in a deplorable state. The hard surface had been removed and all the bridges and culverts were down. Some makeshift arrangements were made to enable our vehicles to pass. Our North Vietnamese escort told us that the road had been cut by the Viet Minh forces to impede the French advance and the tarred surface had been deliberately removed to immobilise wheeled traffic. We were greeted along the entire route by crowds led by cheer leaders. After we had proceeded a few miles, we had to get out of our jeeps. There was a big river over which an old steel bridge was hanging twisted and damaged. A temporary bamboo structure had been placed across the river to enable us to cross it on

foot. On the other side of the river there were two other jeeps waiting for us. The country gradually became more hilly. At more than one spot we could see big holes that had been cut into the hill sides and Viet Minh watchers inside. We were told that during the last stages of the war of liberation the Viet Minh had established communications by digging long underground passages from one place to another and most of the leaders lived and worked in underground shelters. Ultimately we reached an open space where a new township of thatched huts had been put up for our use. The place looked deserted. Suddenly we saw a procession of about 20 people approaching the camp site led by the great Ho Chi Minh himself. He was followed by Deputy Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Commander-in-Chief Giap. Ho Chi Minh was dressed like a Vietnamese peasant in long thin khaki trousers, a closed-collar khaki coat and brown canvas shoes. His unkempt hair and straggling thin beard lent an air of simplicity to his face. We went forward to greet him and he gave us each a very warm handshake. He immediately started talking to us about our programme of work ahead and assured us of the fullest cooperation of his Government and people. He was obviously happy at the arrival of the Commission knowing fully well that the sooner the Commission would complete its task, the quicker he could consolidate the victory which he and his people had won at such sacrifice and suffering. His simplicity and directness made a powerful impression on all of us. A small crowd had gathered round our group as he sat talking to us. Uncle Ho who was the idol of his people was apparently accessible to all and there was hardly any security restriction. Nevertheless, the officials who accompanied him were deferential to their leader and at the official lunch at which Pham Van Dong was the host and Ho was present, strict protocol was maintained. Several toasts were proposed by the host—to India, Poland and Canada, to the guests personally and to peace and friendship. We reciprocated with equal warmth and our discussions ended in a very friendly atmosphere.

On 11th August the International Commission for Vietnam formally came into being. I took over temporarily as Chairman and had our inaugural meeting in the hotel

lounge. We then flew off to Vientiane, the seat of the Government of Laos. Vientiane was not much of a town and we wondered how a small place like it could provide the facilities required by our Commission. We called on Prime Minister Sananikone. The Laotian Government had their trouble with the Pathet Laos, and only reluctantly did they agree to the Geneva Agreement insofar as it recognised Pathet Lao control over the two northern provinces, Phong Saly and Sam-neua. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister assured us of the fullest cooperation and we had inaugural meeting of the Commission for Laos the same day.

Returning to Saigon we sought to settle some of the preliminary difficulties which had arisen during our absence. The Saigon authorities were creating difficulties about accommodation and other facilities for the North Vietnamese liaison officers attached to the Commission. We took a strong stand on this and ultimately the difficulties were solved. My Polish and Canadian colleagues and I acted as a united team and we had none of the difficulties that were to plague the work of the Commission later.

I had sent a number of telegrams to the Foreign Office in New Delhi on our work in Indochina, followed by a long personal telegram to the Prime Minister giving him an account of my interview with Ho Chi Minh. Without realising it I had probably become sentimental over the personality and achievements of the great leader of the Vietnamese people. After my return to New Delhi I was told by Vice-President Radhakrishnan that Nehru had shown my telegram to his colleagues and others and some felt that I had been unduly affected by the local atmosphere. Nehru himself, Radhakrishnan said, did not share the view.

The only message that reached me in Indochina from the Foreign Office was one asking me to return to Delhi as early as I could. I was a little surprised at the somewhat peremptory direction but the task that had been entrusted to me to set up the three Commissions and to arrange the necessary details for their proper functioning had been completed and I was not anxious to prolong my stay abroad.

Returning to Delhi on 23rd August I learnt that our

movements and activities in Indochina had received wide publicity in India. The Prime Minister asked me to meet him at breakfast next morning. When I arrived for breakfast, Krishna Menon was already there. Both, I felt, were rather preoccupied. I was a little surprised. I thought that they would ask me about my experience in Indochina and the recent developments there, but they hardly showed any interest. Later in the day I found out the reason. Vice-President Radhakrishnan told me that Nehru had been most unhappy for some days. Anxious to show his appreciation of Krishna Menon's work in Geneva, he had suggested Menon's name to the President on August 1 for inclusion in the Cabinet. He had not mentioned the proposal to any of his senior colleagues. When Maulana Azad came to know of it, he was greatly upset. He had been strongly opposed to Krishna Menon's inclusion in the Cabinet until Menon was cleared of responsibility for the purchase of some reconditioned Army jeeps during his tenure as High Commissioner in London. About this purchase there were dark hints of irregularities in high places in Parliament and in the press. Azad threatened to resign from the Cabinet himself. The Prime Minister did not want to precipitate a ministerial crisis immediately and although he withdrew his proposal for the time being, he was unhappy for some days and relations between him and Azad became strained.

On 25th August Nehru made a long statement on international affairs in the Lok Sabha. Dealing with the recent developments in Indochina he referred appreciatively to our recent visit to the Indochinese States. A Chairman had yet to be selected for the International Commission on Vietnam which was much the most important of the three Supervisory Commissions. I was not anxious for the assignment. I had just returned home after two years' absence. Krishna Menon had his own ideas. His choice fell on M. J. Desai who had worked as Minister-Counsellor under him in the High Commission in London and enjoyed his full confidence. For the Commission in Laos, he selected Khosla, a senior member of the Foreign Service, who had also worked earlier under him in London. For the Cambodian Commission, he recommended G. Parthasarathy, son

of the late Gopalaswamy Ayangar, once a trusted colleague of Nehru in the Indian Cabinet. Parthasarathy was then Assistant Editor of the Madras newspaper *The Hindu*. His selection was somewhat extraordinary but he had the reputation of a sober and thoughtful person with progressive views and his appointment caused no flutter in the close circle of the Indian Foreign Service.

The Geneva Agreements in respect of Cambodia were implemented in full without any difficulty. After general elections had been peacefully completed in October, 1955 the Supervisory Commission for Cambodia announced that its major task had been fulfilled. The work of the Commission on Laos did not prove as easy because of the differences between the Laotian Government and the Pathet Laos who controlled the two northern provinces, Phong Saly and Sam-neua. Fortunately, two successive Indian Chairmen of Laos Commission, J. N. Khosla and S. Sen, were competent persons possessed of abundant patience and tact. Sen succeeded in making the contending parties agree during December, 1956, to the two northern provinces merging with the rest of the country and a composite Government being set up at Vientianne.

The problem of implementing the Agreements on Vietnam began to present difficulties even before the ink was dry. Prime Minister Diem of South Vietnam—he had not replaced Bao Dai as Head of State until the following year—knew that in any fair election the Vietnamese people would accept Ho Chi Minh as their leader by an overwhelming majority. North Vietnam had a population of 15 million and South Vietnam less than 12 million, and even if the entire South Vietnam population voted for Diem's rule which they would not, he would fail to secure majority in the united country. From the beginning he took the stand that as the Government of the South had not signed the Agreements in Geneva, they were not bound by them. As the months passed, the Supervisory Commission began to meet increasing obstruction from the authorities in the South. It was no secret that Diem's Government were arresting a large number of persons most of whom were supporters of North Vietnam. The Commission could secure only scanty information about these arrests or about the

arrival of fresh military equipment and American military advisers in the South. Although comparatively more co-operative, the North Vietnamese Government, on its part, also failed to provide adequate facilities to the Commission to inspect the mountain routes in the far north through which, according to persistent reports, military equipment was reaching North Vietnam from China.

The Final Declaration of Geneva provided that from 20th July, 1955, the authorities of North and South Vietnam would hold consultations with a view to holding general elections throughout the country in July, 1956. Diem took the stand that though he was not bound by the Geneva Agreements, he was not opposed in principle to popular will being ascertained. He asserted, however, that these would not be free in the north and therefore there would be no point in attempting elections throughout the country. Typical of the attitude of the South Vietnamese authorities were the incidents organised on the anniversary of the Geneva Agreements in July, 1955. The day was observed in South Vietnam as one of mourning. An officially inspired mob stormed the two hotels occupied by the members of the International Commission and looted their belongings. The South Vietnam Government did not bother to send even a formal expression to regret at this outrage though they took great care to express regret and offer compensation to a few Americans whose belongings also were damaged by the mob possibly through oversight. As soon as the news reached New Delhi, Nehru became extremely angry. It was a dangerous thing, he said, to upset the structure which had brought about peace in Indochina; Diem's obstinacy might result in undoing the good work which the International Commission had done for the preceding 12 months. The Government of India formally requested the two Chairmen of the Geneva Conference to consider the situation arising from the riots in Saigon, but ultimately nothing effective was done.

Early in 1956 the Chinese Government proposed that the original Geneva powers should meet along with the three member countries of the International Commission to consider the situation in Vietnam. Nehru had discussions on Vietnam with Dulles and Eden who happened to visit

Delhi in March, 1956. He continued to press for a meeting of the two co-chairmen to discuss the worsening situation in Vietnam. Ultimately, Eden and Molotov met in London in April and sent messages to the Governments of the two Vietnams expressing their concern at the non-implementation of the Geneva settlement. But no effective action was or could be taken by them. Thus the 17th parallel in effect became the political boundary of the two separate States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north and the Republic of Vietnam in the south. In subsequent months Nehru threatened more than once that if the Geneva Agreements were not to be implemented in letter and spirit, India might have to withdraw from the International Commissions. He knew, however, that India's withdrawal would bring down the entire edifice of the Geneva settlement and immediately endanger peace in South East Asia. However unhappy he was with the working of the Geneva Agreement in regard to Vietnam, this was a risk he could not take.

In October 1955 I assumed charge as Foreign Secretary but at the Prime Minister's wish continued to look after the Indochina desk for some time. In December M. J. Desai relinquished the Chairmanship of the Vietnam Commission and joined as Commonwealth Secretary in the Foreign Office. Thereafter I ceased to have any direct responsibility for matters concerning Indochina.

CHAPTER SEVEN

INDIA-TIBET-CHINA

IN HIS first broadcast to the nation as Vice-President of the interim government on 7th September, 1946, Nehru referred to China in the following words: "China, that mighty country with a mighty past, our neighbour, has been our friend during the ages, and that friendship will endure and grow. We earnestly hope that her present troubles will end soon and a united and democratic China will emerge, playing a great part in the furtherance of the world peace and progress".

This friendly reference to China reflected the true feelings of the Indian people for the people of China. From the early years of this century when the nationalist movement gathered momentum in India, the leaders of the Indian National Congress regarded their struggle as part of a wider movement for the liberation of all the subject peoples in Asia who were then under the domination of Western powers. With China in particular India had close ties of culture extending back to many centuries of recorded history. Nehru knew more than most people of his generation the suffering and humiliation to which China had been subjected by foreign powers. As early as 1925 the All India Congress Committee passed a resolution expressing sympathy with the Chinese people in their struggle for national unity and recording their protest against the despatch of Indian troops to China. In December, 1927, the Congress meeting in full session in Madras sent the people of China its warmest greetings and assurances of full sympathy with them in their fight for freedom. The resolution reiterated the earlier demand that no Indian troops should be sent to China to fight a war against the Chinese people who, it said, were "the comrades of the Indian people in their joint struggle against imperialism". Earlier, in February that year, at the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities at Brussels Nehru had sponsored a joint declaration by the Indian and the Chinese delegations referring to the intimate cultural ties existing for the past 3000

years between their two countries. "British imperialism", the declaration said, "which in the past has kept us apart and done us so much injury is now the very force that is uniting us in a common endeavour to overthrow it". Presiding over the Lucknow session of the Congress in 1936 Nehru extended his sympathy to the Chinese people who had been fighting the Japanese invaders on their soil. He offered his full co-operation to all those who stood for human freedom in their struggle against imperialism for, as he said, "we realise that our struggle is a common one". Similar resolutions expressing sympathy with China in her fight against Japanese imperialism were passed by the Congress in 1937 and 1938. The Congress gave practical expression to its sympathy by organising a boycott of Japanese goods in India and as a gesture of India's solidarity sent an ambulance corps to China under the leadership of Dr Atal. This was greatly appreciated by the Chinese guerrilla fighters. Their leader, Mao Tse-tung, sent the following message to Nehru from Yen-an on 24th May, 1939; "We take this opportunity to thank your great Indian people and the Indian National Congress for the medical and material aid that you have given and hope that in the future the Indian National Congress and the Indian people will continue to help and aid us and thus together drive out the Japanese imperialists". In August, 1939, Nehru went on a goodwill mission to Chungking to "convey the affection and sympathy of the people of India to the Chinese people and to bring back something of the courage and invincible organisation of the Chinese people and their capacity to pull together in peril". He was warmly received by Generalissimo and Madam Chiang Kai-shek. In a broadcast on the Chungking radio on August 29, Nehru stressed the importance of Sino-Indian co-operation. His visit to China was cut short by the outbreak of war in Europe. He rushed back home to be with his people in the critical days ahead.

In February, 1942, Chiang Kai-shek came to Delhi and met Nehru and other Indian leaders. The Chinese leader declared that there could be no international peace so long as freedom was denied to either China or India. On the eve of his departure from India Chiang Kai-shek issued a

public statement expressing the hope that Great Britain would give political freedom to India as speedily as possible. It was no secret that he had been using his influence with President Roosevelt to make him exert pressure on Churchill for the early grant of independence to India. Though nothing came of these efforts owing to Churchill's obduracy and Roosevelt's unwillingness to offend his British ally during a critical phase of the war, the Indian people deeply appreciated the friendly spirit that animated the Chinese leader and his people. During the three following years the Indian National Congress was locked in a bitter struggle with the British power in India. Most of the Congress leaders were put behind bars, but on their release in 1945 they took the earliest opportunity at the meeting of the All India Congress Committee on 4th September, 1945, to express their admiration for the Chinese people and their hope that China would be united and strong for peace and freedom.

On 2nd September, 1946, Nehru joined the interim Indian Government under Viceroy Lord Wavell as Vice-President and Member-in charge of External Affairs. In that capacity he had the special satisfaction of receiving the new Chinese Ambassador Dr Lo Chia-chun who became the Dean of the growing Diplomatic Corps in New Delhi. Much respected as a scholar Dr Lo soon established close personal friendship with Nehru thereby establishing a direct channel of communication between his Government and the leader of the new Indian Government. But it was not long before the Government which Lo represented ceased to be relevant to Sino-Indian relations. Events in China moved fast. Chiang Kai-shek's forces were rapidly collapsing before the onslaught of the People's Liberation Army under Mao Tse-tung's leadership. As this Army marched south, millions of Chinese people welcomed them as deliverers from a corrupt and oppressive regime. On 1st October, 1949, the Central Government of the People's Republic of China with Mao Tse-tung as President was proclaimed at the Square of the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Peking. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the new Government, Chou En-lai, handed a communication to the foreign representatives in Peking inviting their Governments to

open diplomatic relations with the new Government. Ambassador Panikkar immediately transmitted the request to Delhi. Nehru who was fully aware of the significance of the new events in China lost no time in accepting the Chinese request and two days later there was a friendly message from him expressing the Government of India's intention to recognise the new Government and exchange diplomatic representatives with it.

With his unerring sense of history Nehru saw the establishment of the new regime as the culmination of a century-old struggle for the independence and self-expression of the Chinese people. The hopes generated by the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 were belied by subsequent developments. Then came years of disunity, corruption, violence and oppression by war lords. Millions of humble people saw no future for themselves and their children and suffered silently. Now was the dawn of a new era. The new Government with its insistence on honesty, equality and integrity in public life evoked the loyalty and patriotism of the common people. On 30th December, 1949, the Government of India formally announced its recognition of the People's Republic of China being the second non-socialist country to do so. It held back the announcement for a few days in deference to the wishes of the Burmese leader U Nu who wanted his country to be the first non-socialist State to recognise the new Government.

There was a general feeling of sympathy in India with Chiang Kai-shek in the misfortunes that had befallen him and some circles did not take kindly to the triumph of the communist forces. Nehru did not allow his friendship for the fallen Chinese leader to influence his judgment on the realities of the Chinese situation. He did not necessarily approve of all that happened in China under the new dispensation or of some of the drastic measures taken by the new Government to consolidate its position. But, as he said in a speech to the Indian Parliament on 17th March, 1950, "It is not a question of approving or disapproving; it is a question of recognising a major event of history and of appreciating it and dealing with it". Some months later, speaking to the Central Committee of the World Council

of Churches at Lucknow, he said, "For the first time after 30 or 40 years of civil war and domination of the warlords, China has a strong centralised Government and internal order. There is a country now having a sense of power and national pride. Chinese people, politics apart, have an astonishing capacity for hard and continuous work. It is a great power within its domain and is likely to become stronger". He urged the world to recognise these facts and admit New China to its rightful place in the United Nations. "No problem in East Asia", he said, "could be solved without the recognition of this reality; troubles in the area would persist if this patent fact is ignored". China was a founder member of the U. N. and had a permanent seat in the Security Council and Nehru urged that the People's Republic of China represent China in the U. N. and its organs. It was absurd, he said, for the world to deal with the Formosa regime as the real Government of China.

Unfortunately, China's new leaders were less than enthusiastic in reciprocating Nehru's gestures of friendship. In September, 1949, there were carping criticism of Nehru in the controlled Chinese press. A Chinese magazine accused the Prime Minister of India of aiding imperialist designs for the annexation of Tibet and charged him with the "bestly ambition of aggression". Another Chinese magazine, the *Shanghai Observer*, wrote on 11th April, 1950, "It is a matter of Nehru weighing his desire for U.S. assistance against his need to assume the hypocritical role of a progressive leader to deceive the Indian people". These views reflected the general hostility of the Soviet and the Chinese Communist leaders towards India in the period following August, 1947. They described Nehru as a tool in the hands of British imperialism. Significantly, the Communist Party of India was also extremely critical of Nehru during this period. In reply to a message of greetings from the C. P. I., Mao Tse-tung cabled on October 19, 1949, "I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China a free India will one day emerge as the socialists'

and peoples' democratic family".

Ideology apart, serious misunderstanding soon arose between the Government of India and the new Government of China over the problem of Tibet. Independent India inherited this problem from the British. In 1904, a British mission under Colonel Younghusband supported by a strong expeditionary force marched into Tibet from the adjoining Indian territory on a transparent excuse. As this expedition neared Lhasa, the Dalai Lama fled from his capital. His Government signed a convention with Great Britain under which the Tibetan Government agreed to open trade markets at Gyantse and Gartok in addition to the one established at Yatung under the Anglo-Chinese contract of 1890. To these markets all British and Tibetan nationals were to have the right of free access. The British Government also secured the right to station a small military force at Gyantse for the protection of the trade route between India and Tibet. Although the 1904 Convention was reached by Britain and the Tibetan authorities in direct negotiation, Great Britain continued to recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. This was implicit in the Convention signed by Great Britain and China in 1906 which formally confirmed the earlier Convention of 1904. Article II of the 1906 Convention read as follows :—

"The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to interfere in the territorial and internal administration of Tibet". Article III of the same Convention recognised Chinese position in Tibet.

The following year Britain signed another Convention with Russia regarding Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. The Convention, so far as Tibet was concerned, had the following provision :

"Article II. In conformity with the admitted principle of suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude direct relations between

the British Commercial Agents and the Tibetan authorities provided for in Art. V of the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet of 7 September, 1904^f and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of 27 April, 1906".

The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa from his self-imposed exile in December, 1909. Within a few months, the Chinese Government issued a proclamation deposing him and gradually took over the administration of the greater part of the country. He fled again from Lhasa in February, 1910, this time pursued by the Chinese troops and eventually reached India where he was given a safe asylum. Despite urgent requests from him and his Ministers, the Government of India refused to intervene in Tibet. When revolution broke out in China in 1911 and the Manchu dynasty was overthrown, the small Chinese contingent stationed in Lhasa rose against their officers and began to earn their living by oppressing the local people. By December, 1912, the Tibetans expelled the Chinese garrison from their territory. From the same year the Tibetan authorities discontinued the practice of sending an annual mission to Peking to pay the conventional tribute to the Emperor of China.

The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa from his exile in India in June, 1912, and once again assumed complete authority over Tibet. No vestige of Chinese authority was left in any part of Tibet which now became virtually independent of China. Britain, however, was still prepared to accept Chinese suzerainty over Tibet but this suzerainty, they insisted, was subject to China's recognition of Tibetan autonomy. In the absence of explicit acceptance of this position by the Chinese Government, the British Government refused to accept Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. In fact, there was no Chinese representative in any part of Tibet from December, 1912, until 1933. That year a Chinese delegation arrived in Lhasa ostensibly to convey condolence to the Tibetans on the death of the Dalai Lama but stayed on even after its formal business was over. The Tibetan authorities on their part did not recognise any controlling authority in the Chinese Mission. The British took advantage of the Chinese presence to open a permanent British

Mission in the Tibetan capital. However, despite Tibetan refusal the Chinese Government in Peking held on to their tenuous claim of authority over Tibet and when the Tibetan authorities in Lhasa set up a Bureau of Foreign Affairs in 1942, the Chinese refused to recognise it. The British position continued to be that they would accept Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, provided that the Chinese Government recognised Tibetan autonomy. This was explicitly stated on 5th August, 1943, by Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, in a memorandum to T. V. Soong, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Memo said, "Since the Chinese revolution in 1911 when Chinese forces had withdrawn from Tibet, Tibet had enjoyed de facto independence. She had ever since regarded herself as completely autonomous and has opposed Chinese attempts to reassert control. The British have always been prepared to recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet but only on the understanding that Tibet was regarded as autonomous. Neither the British Government nor the Government of India had any territorial ambition over Tibet, but they are interested in the maintenance of Chinese relations and preservation of peaceful conditions in an area which is continuous with the North-East Frontiers of India. They would welcome any amicable arrangements which the Chinese Government might be disposed to make with Tibet whereby the latter recognised Chinese suzerainty in return for an agreed frontier and undertaking to recognise Tibetan autonomy".

The British Mission in Lhasa and the Trade Agencies at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok with the attendant rights and obligations were taken over by the new Government of India after the transfer of power from British to Indian hands on August 15, 1947. Nehru, however, recognised that whatever the exact political and constitutional relationship between Tibet and China, independent India could not justifiably hold on to the extra-territorial rights that she had acquired in Tibet as successors to Britain. At the same time, India could not ignore the fact that Tibet had in the past asserted and enjoyed the fullest autonomy in internal affairs and indeed had virtually assumed an independent status since 1912. India's main interest was to

maintain trade and cultural connections with Tibet but any revision of the arrangements then existing had to wait until the emergence of a suitable central Government in China. Meantime, Tibetans themselves did not remain inactive. When Chiang Kai-shek's Government was disintegrating in mainland China, the Dalai Lama's Government requested the Nationalist Chinese Mission to leave Lhasa. They also made some fitful efforts to secure arms from India for self defence. When the first Indian Political Officer in Sikkim, H. Dayal, visited Lhasa in 1949, the Tibetans formally requested him for arms and ammunition from Delhi. The Government of India was not keen on getting involved in Tibet's internal affairs and showed no interest in the proposal.

India's attitude towards Tibet's status in relation to China was clarified by Nehru at a Press Conference in London in November, 1949. India, he said, had always recognised Chinese suzerainty over Tibet but considered Tibet to be an autonomous unit. The new Government of China under Mao Tse-tung lost little time in declaring its own intention. On 1st January, 1950, barely 48 hours after India's recognition, the new Government announced that the liberation of Tibet was one of the basic goals of the People's Liberation Army. Unnerved by this announcement the Tibetan Government sent delegations to India, Nepal, the United Kingdom and the United States with appeals for support. The Government of Peking promptly denounced these delegations as illegal. The foreign Governments to whom the Tibetans had addressed their appeal were not too anxious to oblige them. The Government of India advised the Dalai Lama's Government to try to reach an understanding with the new Chinese Government by peaceful negotiations. The Tibetans were not unwilling to negotiate but wanted the discussions to take place in a neutral place and sought facilities from India to proceed to Hong Kong. The British Government who had in the meantime recognised the new Government in Peking did not wish to place themselves in an embarrassing situation and delayed granting visas to the Tibetan delegation for Hong Kong. In these circumstances, the delegation carried on some preliminary negotiations at New Delhi with

General Yuan Chung-shien, the first Ambassador of the Chinese People's Republic in India. The Government of India on their own advised the Peking Government not to do anything that could be used by powers unfriendly to new China to prejudice her case in the U. N. They also advised the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking without delay and open direct negotiations with the Chinese authorities. Events, however, moved too fast for the delegation. On 25th October, 1950, the Peking Radio announced that the process of liberating Tibet had begun. A large Chinese force crossed the Sino-Tibetan border on the east and began moving towards Lhasa.

The news of the Chinese military action in Tibet roused feelings of deep anger in India. Nehru described the Chinese action as a surprise onslaught. On 26th October, the Government of India addressed a note to Peking conveying its regrets and protests at the action to which the Chinese Government had resorted. The note reminded the Chinese Government of their assurances to Ambassador Panikkar that they intended to solve the problem peacefully. The invasion which the Chinese Government had launched could not be in the interest of peace. "In spite of friendly disinterested advice repeatedly tendered", the note added, "China decided to seek solution of the problem of their relations with Tibet by force, instead of the slower and more enduring method of peaceful approach". To this note Peking sent an angry reply on October 30, saying that Tibet was a domestic problem of China and no foreign interference would be tolerated. It also alleged, without any basis whatsoever, that the Tibetan delegations had delayed their departure under outside instigation and that Indian opinion had been affected by foreign influences hostile to China.

The Chinese reply was deeply resented in India. Delhi issued a protest note on the following day repudiating the Chinese allegations. "India", the note said, "had no political or territorial ambition in Tibet. It was only interested in a peaceful solution of the problems concerning her neighbours". The Government of India's suggestions, the note pointed out, were well intended and they

still hoped that it would be possible to adjust the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty. The Government of India made it clear that they had no political or territorial ambition in Tibet, nor did they seek any privileged position for themselves or for their relations with Tibet, but they had certain rights which had grown out of usage and agreement, natural between neighbours with close cultural and commercial relations. These relations had found expression in the presence of the Agents of the Government of India at Yatung and Gyantse for over 40 years. The Government of India were anxious that these establishments which were to the mutual interest of India and Tibet and did not detract in any way from Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, should continue. The new Chinese Government were not convinced. They replied on 16th November that China had sovereign rights over Tibet and accused India of obstructing them.

When the Chinese invaded Tibet, the Dalai Lama assumed full powers, but within a month he fled from Lhasa and proceeded towards the Chumbi valley in the south. In desperation the Lhasa Government requested India to sponsor her case before the United Nations. Nehru was anxious not to create further difficulties in the way of peaceful settlement and the Tibetans were advised that if they wanted to take the case to the U. N. O. they should do so direct. On 24th October, 1950, the Political Committee of the U. N. General Assembly took up the Tibetan appeal on a request by El Salvador which submitted a draft resolution to establish a committee for studying appropriate measures that the General Assembly should take against the Chinese acts of unprovoked aggression. Britain which was as anxious as India not to annoy the new Chinese Government moved that the consideration of the question should be postponed. The move was strongly supported by the Indian delegate, the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, who asserted that the Tibetan question could still be settled by peaceful means and that such a settlement could safeguard the autonomy which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades while maintaining its historical association with China. Ultimately it was unani-

mously decided to adjourn consideration of the issue sine die.

On 23rd May, 1951, Peking announced that a 17-point Agreement had been signed by the Chinese and Tibetan representatives which provided, *inter alia*, that China would deal with all external affairs relating to Tibet but Tibet's autonomy and its peculiar political system would not be interfered with. The Tibetan delegation was led by Ngabo, Governor of Chamdo in outer Tibet, whom the Chinese Army had captured in their westward march towards Lhasa. The authorities in Lhasa had no option but to accept the Agreement.

The misunderstanding between India and China caused by the Tibetan controversy did not last long. Nehru continued to plead for the admission of new China to the United Nations. He repeatedly stressed that Chinese nationalism was a more potent force in Chinese policy than communism. In his view the Western policy of containing China was forcing it to complete dependence on the Soviet Union. So far as India was concerned, Nehru did not feel that Peking represented a threat to Indian interests in the foreseeable future. China, he said, would be too preoccupied with her internal problems of economic development, social change and agrarian reform to venture upon any foreign aggression. The Chinese leaders also apparently wanted to keep the controversy with India over Tibet within limits. On 26th January, 1951, at a reception given by Ambassador Panikkar in Peking celebrating the first Anniversary of the Indian Republic, Mao Tse-tung himself proposed a toast for India. He said, "It is a great day. The Indian people are a fine people. There have been thousands of years of friendship between the peoples of India and China". According to Panikkar's report, Mao Tse-tung spoke in warm terms about Nehru and expressed the hope that he would see Nehru soon in China.

A very favourable impression was created in India when early in 1951 China offered one million tons of foodgrains to India in exchange of a wide range of commodities. India was then facing an acute food shortage and desperately searching for food supply in all parts of the

world. Welcoming the Chinese offer the Indian Food Minister announced in Parliament on 7th April, 1951, that 50,000 tons of foodgrains had been requested immediately and this request has been accepted by the Chinese Government. This was followed by an official announcement on 4th June, 1951, that India was importing 80,000 tons of rice and 1,50,000 tons of wheat from China. It was some months before the formal agreement was concluded but the Indian public did not fail to notice the contrast between the alacrity with which the Chinese made the offer and the opposition which the Indian request for a wheat loan met in the United States.

India's peace efforts during the Korean war and her constructive role in the subsequent cease-fire negotiations and armistice talks also helped to convince the Chinese leaders that the Government of India under Nehru's leadership were determined to follow a policy of non-alignment and friendship with all countries. War broke out in Korea on 25th June, 1950. India voted in the Security Council for a resolution declaring that the armed attack from North Korea constituted a breach of peace. A second resolution was passed on the 27th June on the U.S. initiative requesting the member countries to offer necessary assistance to the Government of Korea to repulse the attack and restore international peace and security of the area. The Indian representative on the Council, B. N. Rau, did not participate in the voting, not having received any instruction from Delhi. The Government of India, however, issued a statement on 29th June accepting the resolution but simultaneously expressing the hope that even at that stage the dispute could be settled by negotiation. The Indian attitude was appreciated in the Western countries but the subsequent decision of Delhi not to send any combat troops to Korea to fight under the U.N. flag caused disappointment. On humanitarian grounds, however, Nehru decided to send a medical unit to Korea. Concerned at the increasingly grave situation, Nehru addressed an appeal to Stalin and Dean Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State, urging that the U.S.S.R. should return to the Security Council and China might be admitted to the U.N. Nehru said he was convinced that the situation in the Far East

could be dealt with satisfactorily if the principal parties concerned agreed to sit round a conference table. This suggestion was rejected by the U.S. which condemned it as an appeasement of aggression. The role of a peace-maker is not easy and Nehru was in turn praised and criticised in both the U.S.A. and China.

When the General Assembly of the U.N. met in September, 1950, the Indian representative conveyed a warning that if the U.N. forces in their march towards the north would cross the 38th parallel into North Korean territory, the Chinese Government would actively intervene in the conflict. This warning was based on reports received by the Government of India from Ambassador K. M. Panikkar. The warning was not seriously taken by the U.N. Command under General McArthur whose forces crossed the dividing line between South and North Korea on October 7. The Chinese reply was quick and decisive. Within a few days the U.N. forces faced innumerable Chinese soldiers who euphemistically described themselves as Chinese volunteers. Immediately there was a Western move in the General Assembly to declare China as an aggressor. India strongly opposed the move. The Indian representative urged that Chinese participation in fighting was not due to any aggressive intention. It was more probably due to what the Chinese considered a threat to their territorial integrity from the immediate risk of U.N. forces approaching their border. Despite the opposition of India, Burma and the Socialist (Communist) States a resolution branding China as an aggressor was passed by the General Assembly. The Indian opposition was bitterly criticised in the U.S.A. If it met with Chinese approval, there was no indication to that effect from China.

Undeterred by criticism Nehru continued to urge efforts for peace both in public and in private communications to leaders of other countries. At the U.N. the search for a peace formula was continued in the following months by the Indian representative in co-operation with the representatives of several Arab countries and some members of the Commonwealth. Formal cease-fire negotiations, however, did not commence until 8th July, 1951, and not until 27th November, 1951, was a provisional cease-fire agreed upon.

The subsequent armistice talks between the two sides dragged on for months. The principal obstacle to an agreement was the destination of the prisoners of war in the custody of the two sides. India proposed that their repatriation should be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1949, the guiding principle being that "force shall not be used against prisoners to prevent or to effect their return to their home States". As a concrete step to that end it was suggested that the prisoners should be entrusted to the custody of a repatriation Commission. The Soviet Union strongly opposed the suggestion in the U.N. The Indian resolution was ultimately accepted by the General Assembly in November, 1952, by an overwhelming majority but promptly rejected both by China and North Korea. The stalemate therefore continued. Within a few months, however, there was a significant change in the attitude of China. After prolonged negotiations an agreement was reached on June 8, 1953, between the two Commands on the procedure for repatriation of the prisoners of war. This was more or less similar to the Indian plan already approved by the General Assembly. A neutral Nations' Repatriation Commission was to take custody of those prisoners who had not already exercised their option of repatriation. It was significant that while the U.N. resolution provided for membership of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland on the Commission, at the Chinese insistence India was made the 5th member and Chairman of the Commission. India was also asked to provide the necessary armed forces and other operating personnel to enable the Commission to carry out its responsibilities. The able and impartial manner in which the Indian Chairman, General Thimayya, and his group of devoted aides discharged their tasks despite endless difficulties created by Syngman Rhee and his Government must have helped to dissipate any lurking suspicion in the Chinese mind about the genuineness of Nehru's policy of non-alignment.

Nehru felt that the ground was now ready for opening formal discussions with China regarding India's relations with Tibet. With his background of anti-colonial struggle he had no doubt in his mind that the Indian Government

should not try to hold on to the rights, some of them extra-territorial in nature, acquired by the Government of India in Tibet during the British days. India would, of course, not do anything at the cost of Tibet's autonomy, but its real interest in Tibet was trade and cultural exchange. As early as September, 1951, Panikkar had had some informal talk on the subject with Premier Chou En-lai. He followed this up with a note to the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister in February, 1952, regarding Indian interests in Tibet. He later met Chou En-lai who assured him that there would be no difficulty in safeguarding the economic and cultural interests of India in Tibet. Reporting this Panikkar told the Government of India that he had not alluded to the question of the frontier nor did Chou En-lai. As a friendly gesture the Government of India quietly renamed the Indian Political Agency in Lhasa as Consulate General in September, 1952, thereby emphasising that India had no political interest in Tibet.

The Foreign Office at New Delhi carefully considered whether the problem of the frontier between India and Tibet over which small disputes had arisen in the past between the Government of India and the Tibetan Government in Lhasa should be raised during the negotiations with the Chinese Government. Bajpai, who had left the Foreign Office in the summer of 1952 to take over as Governor of Bombay, advised that opportunity should be taken to get the Chinese formally to recognise the traditional boundary between India and Tibet in the East—the so-called MacMahon Line—so that all outstanding questions between India and Tibet would be definitely and finally settled. On the contrary, Panikkar advised Nehru that India should not raise the question of the border and Nehru accepted this advice. Nehru saw no reason why India on her own should raise the question. So far as India was concerned, the border was well-established and well-understood. If the Chinese wanted to raise any question, it was for them to do so.

Formal negotiations between the two sides commenced in Peking in December, 1953. At the very first meeting which took place in the presence of Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier said that relations between China and

India would become closer every day and the discussions would settle the questions "which were ripe for settlement". In reply Ambassador Raghavan remarked that there were some small questions between India and China, but he wished to see nothing big or small remaining outstanding between the two countries. Chou En-lai rejoined that two large countries like India and China with a common frontier were bound to have some questions but all these could be settled smoothly. During the negotiations neither side referred to the border problem. Ultimately agreement was reached on all the points discussed. This agreement was signed in Peking on 29th April, 1954. Expressing his satisfaction on the occasion Ambassador Raghavan said "We have gone fully through the questions that existed between the two countries in the Tibetan region". But Chou En-lai said once more that the questions "which were ripe for settlement" had been settled. The Ambassador did not fully realise the significance of the words "ripe for settlement". It is doubtful if his Government also did so.

The new "Agreement between India and China on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India" provided that the Government of India would retain her trade agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok and reciprocally the Chinese Government would be entitled to establish Trade Agencies in New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong. The Agreement specified six mountain passes which could be used by traders and pilgrims moving from one country to the other. By a simultaneous exchange of notes India agreed to withdraw the small military contingent which she had been maintaining at Gyantse since 1904 for the protection of the trade routes between India and Tibet, and to hand over to the Chinese Government, on payment, the Posts and Telegraphs installations which she had been operating in Tibet. Later India handed over these installations to the Chinese free of cost.

The new Agreement, although ostensibly one on trade and intercourse between the two countries, was important for an entirely different reason. Its preamble stated that the two Governments desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the

peoples of China and India based their agreements on the following principles :—

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty ;
2. Mutual non-aggression ;
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs ;
4. Equality and mutual benefit ; and
5. Peaceful co-existence.

Nehru who had been guiding independent India's foreign policy on these principles was particularly pleased with their formal acceptance by China. He assumed that the two biggest countries of Asia could now look forward to living in enduring peace and friendship with each other and there was no difference which could not be solved by applying these principles. As he said later, it was an Agreement by the two countries never to commit aggression on each other.

In the Indian Parliament there was some criticism of the Agreement on the ground that it amounted to recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet as was implicit in the description "Tibet region of China". Nehru was not impressed by this argument. Chinese sovereignty, he said, had not been challenged for 200 or 300 years by any outside power and not even by the British Indian Government which only used to emphasize Tibet's autonomy. Recent events, Nehru added, had made a change inevitable. What the Government of India did was not to recognise a new thing but merely to repeat what it had stated previously and what in fact inevitably followed from the circumstances, both historical and practical.

On a later occasion Nehru said "It is a matter of importance to us, of course, as well as, I am sure, to China that these countries, which have now almost 1300 miles of frontier, should live on terms of peace and friendliness, respect each other's sovereignty and integrity and agree not to interfere with each other in any way and not to commit aggression on each other. By this Agreement, we ensure peace to a very large extent in a certain part of Asia". "We have done nothing better in the field of foreign affairs during the last six years than signing this Agreement

over Tibet", he said. "I have not the slightest doubt about it". "It is absolutely correct. This Agreement is good not only for our country but for the whole of Asia and the rest of the world". Some sections in Parliament were still not entirely satisfied. Nehru, therefore, returned to the subject during the debate on foreign affairs in the Indian Parliament, on September 30, 1954. He frankly admitted that the Government of India could not do anything but gracefully give up the rights which British had acquired by force in Tibet. "Where did we come into the picture", he asked, "unless we wanted to assume an aggressive role of interfering with other countries"? "Many things in this world", he added, obviously referring to China's invasion of Tibet, "which we do not like and which we could wish were rather different but we do not go like Don Quixote with lance in hand against everything that we dislike. We put up with these things because we would be, without making any difference, merely getting into trouble". Rarely was Nehru more brutally frank.

The Five Principles which Nehru called '*Panch Sheel*' embodied in the 1954 Agreement were reproduced in the joint statement issued in New Delhi on June 28, 1954, on the conclusion of Chou En-lai's visit to India. In the following years they were included, as a matter of course, in the joint statements issued by Nehru and Heads of States and Governments of foreign countries paying official visits to India. Among these were Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Egypt, Indonesia, Laos, the People's Republic of Mongolia, Nepal, Poland, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Yugoslavia. It gave Nehru special satisfaction to see these principles substantially included in the Declaration of World Peace and Co-operation adopted by the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April, 1955.

CHAPTER EIGHT

INDIA-CHINA FRIENDSHIP AT ITS ZENITH

ON 25TH JUNE, 1954, Chou En-lai arrived in Delhi. The weather was the hottest that Delhi could offer. The visit was unexpected. Nehru was preparing to leave for the hills after a long session of Parliament and most of the Ministers had gone out of Delhi. About two months earlier Nehru had sent a cordial message to Chou En-lai who was then in Geneva to pass through Delhi on his return journey. The Conference on Indo-China which Chou En-lai was attending was on the verge of a breakdown in the second week of June but suddenly took a turn for the better. There was a brief interval and Chou En-lai took advantage of his return journey home to pass through Delhi. Despite the weather a large crowd had gathered at Palam and gave the distinguished visitor a very warm welcome. Nehru embraced him as he alighted from the plane. The Indian people realised the importance of the occasion. Here was the first meeting of the leaders of the two biggest countries of Asia, both only recently liberated, one from foreign colonial rule and the other from an oppressive internal regime. Chou En-lai himself appeared visibly affected by the warmth of the welcome. In a brief statement to the press at the airport he said that the Government and the people of China attached great importance to their friendship with the Government and the people of India; the peace and friendship of the 960 million people of China and India constituted an important factor in maintaining the peace of Asia and of the world.

The same night welcoming the distinguished visitor at a State banquet Nehru said, "We meet as individuals but we meet also as representatives of great nations with tremendous past. It is a matter of interest and significance not only to our two countries but to Asia and even the world how these countries behave with each other and how far they can cooperate for the peace and well-being of the world. The past 2000 years stand witness to our mutual relations.

We have been neighbours during this long stretch of years ; we have been vital countries throwing out our thought and culture to each other and to other neighbouring countries. Our people have come into contact in many lands, more specially in Southeast Asia ; yet there is no record of war between us. This long period is of the peaceful commerce of ideas, of religion and of art and culture. Both China and India have their particular and individual backgrounds. Each has her own special culture and inheritance. In many ways they are different and have grown according to their own genius. Yet in spite of these differences, we have been good neighbours and friends and have not come into conflict with each other during the millennia of history”.

In an equally felicitous reply the Chinese Premier referred to 2000 years of traditional friendship between India and China. He also paid high tributes to Nehru’s efforts for peace. “India”, he said, “has constantly been interested in striving for the termination of the Indo-China war and has certainly supported efforts made at the Geneva Conference to restore peace in Indochina. It is very obvious that this position of India is of great significance for safeguarding peace in Asia”.

The visit lasted barely three days. On the 26th Chou En-lai paid a visit to Agra for the day, had more discussions with Nehru on the 27th and left early on the 28th. In all the two leaders had three or four long discussions. From the beginning there was a lack of rigidity in the talks and the atmosphere was friendly. The Chinese Prime Minister was moderation itself. He frankly admitted that he was not well-acquainted with most of the Asian countries—even Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon—and his knowledge of the West Asian countries was extremely limited. He said he was anxious to learn about these countries from Nehru who, he said, knew and had established close personal contact with the leaders of these countries. He went even further. India, he said, was economically and industrially more advanced than China and he was anxious to exchange experience with the Indian leader. The two countries, in his view, had an important role to play in Asia and it was essential for them to co-operate with each other.

A day before Chou En-lai’s arrival, the Burmese Prime

Minister, U Nu, had sent a personal message to Nehru expressing his concern at the attitude of the Chinese residents of Burma and requesting Nehru to have a word with Chou En-lai on the subject. In his talks with the Chinese Premier Nehru mentioned India's policy in regard to the large Indian communities settled in other parts of the world and said that his advice to the Indians had been to identify themselves with the interests of the countries where they had settled. Chou En-lai said that such was exactly the policy of his Government too. The Chinese communities living abroad had been advised by the Chinese Government to accept the nationality of these countries. If, however, they wished to continue as Chinese citizens, they should in no way interfere with the politics of other countries.

Chou En-lai hardly referred to communism or mentioned the Soviet Union. Nehru on his own raised the question of international communism and the activities of communist parties in Asian countries including India. He pointed out that the communist parties were behaving irresponsibly and sometimes even monstrosly. This, he felt, was extremely foolish because it only helped to spread in the smaller countries of Asia fear of the two biggest communist countries in the world—China and the Soviet Union.

The two leaders spent considerable time discussing the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. Nehru urged that an immediate decision on armistice should be reached. It was undesirable, he said, for killing to continue on both sides while the talks were on. If the parties agreed to an armistice in principle, at least slaughter would cease. Nehru also touched on Chinese relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. He mentioned that hundreds of Americans—many of them missionaries—had been detained in China and a long argument was in progress about their release. This was creating an unfortunate impression about New China in other countries. Chou En-lai's answer was that several thousand Chinese students had been forcibly detained in America and unless America released them, China would not release the Americans. As regards the U.K., the Chinese Government had decided to have close relations with that country and were hoping to send a diplomatic representative to London without delay.

Discussion then centred on Laos and Cambodia. The Chinese Premier said that his country would like the Indochinese States to get complete independence. China would be content if they adopted a policy of neutrality as India had done. China's sole anxiety was that no American bases should be permitted on these territories.

Nehru then referred to Burma. Chou En-lai was all in favour of regional co-operation and suggested that an agreement about future co-operation might be reached between China and India; Burma and Indonesia could later be invited to join it. Such an agreement, however, would have to wait for a settlement of the Indochina dispute.

Referring to India's membership of the Commonwealth Nehru explained that even though India chose to stay in the Commonwealth, it was entirely free and independent in its domestic and foreign policies. On the other hand close contact and discussion with Commonwealth countries enabled India to exercise some influence on other members and reduce the area of misunderstanding in the world. It was a good thing, Chou En-lai said, that India should continue to be in the Commonwealth if this was good for world peace. The Chinese Premier was significantly free from bitterness against Pakistan despite its membership of the SEATO but he left no doubt in Nehru's mind that he thoroughly distrusted America. In public the two leaders spoke of the need for solidarity among Asian-African nations. A joint statement issued by the two Prime Ministers on the conclusion of the visit repeated their support to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence embodied in the Agreement between their countries relating to the Tibet region of China. They expressed their confidence that friendship between India and China would help the cause of world peace.

The close personal friendship established between the two leaders was strengthened by Nehru's return visit to China in October, 1954. As Nehru said later, he did not go to China with any specific objective, but he had no doubt that the meeting of the two Prime Ministers of the two biggest countries in Asia was a very big thing itself and a world event. Nehru received a big welcome from the Chinese people wherever he went in China. At Peking over

a million people lined the ten mile route from the airport to the city. As Nehru said later, it was not merely an official welcome ; it was a popular welcome in which millions of common people joined. It appeared to him almost an emotional upheaval representing the basic urge of the people for friendship with India. Greatly moved by the demonstration of popular welcome, Nehru said in one of his public speeches in China, "I have come to you as a messenger of peace and goodwill and I found here both peace and goodwill". "India and China may co-operate in many ways", he added, "and for the good of both our countries as well as for that of the world and world peace our co-operation is highly necessary".

The Chinese Government as a gesture of special friendship and confidence included a visit to Harbin and Port Arthur in Nehru's itinerary—a privilege which they had accorded to no other foreign visitor before.

Nehru had two long talks with Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Both China and India, Mao said, had more or less common experience in recent history and both needed peace to reconstruct their economies. India was industrially somewhat more advanced* but both countries had large populations and both should concentrate on quick industrial development. Given peace, Mao said, China would take about Four Five-Year Plans to become an industrialised country with foundation solidly laid for a socialist economy. China was not a threat to any country and she wished to live in peace with all other countries, but the U.S.A. did not like her to do so and brought pressure on other countries to prevent them from co-operating with China. Then followed a significant observation by the Chinese leader : "China", he said, "had no atom bomb or any equipment of the latest type but she was not worried. Ultimately it was the people who would be the deciding factor. China, of course, was not afraid of a revolution and could not be frightened by atom bombs". After the First World War, Mao said, 150 million people became communists ; after the Second World War 1000 million. If there is another war, the whole world would be communist and imperialism

* A similar remark was made by Chou En-lai addressing a mammoth public meeting in Calcutta on 9th December, 1956.

would be buried for ever.

On his way to China and back Nehru visited Rangoon, Vientiane, Hanoi, Saigon and Phnompenh. He was warmly welcomed everywhere except at Saigon. To the leaders of the countries he visited he conveyed his impression that China had no aggressive intentions against them. The Chinese people were convinced of the necessity of peaceful co-existence and it was not in their interest to get involved in cold wars. Nehru's words must have helped to reassure the leaders of these countries of China's peaceful intentions and to detract from the importance of the SEATO as a security against external aggression.

Nehru returned to India greatly impressed by what he had seen in China. He summed up his impressions in more than one public speech and at a big press conference. China, he said, was a resurgent Asian nation which for the first time in history had achieved the unity of its far-flung regions. China's internal policies were no concern of his but his impression was that a mass upsurge was in progress in that country. The Chinese had always been and would remain essentially Chinese, whatever the political system they adopted. Indians had been influenced by Western thought and educated Indians spoke Western languages. Many of the leaders of New China knew no other country than their own and spoke no other language than Chinese. They did not suffer from individual opportunism; and all worked for the good of the common people. There was, of course, a difference in the social and political systems which India and China had deliberately adopted. Recent Chinese and Indian histories had followed different courses. India had adopted individual freedom and Parliamentary democracy. China had adopted democratic centralism under which a few people at the top decided what was good for the people. Neither system, Nehru said, was per se good or bad. The only test is which one furnished results. It was not his business to advise China. His was a study tour. He only went to understand the Chinese people. Reporting to the Indian Parliament, Nehru expressed the hope that his visit had helped a little in easing the tension in Indochina and Southeast Asia. *

There is no reason to think that at that time the Chinese

leaders had merely put up an appearance of friendship for India. Obviously they wanted to take advantage of Nehru's outstanding position in Asia and Africa to remove any lurking suspicion that China was interested in spreading its ideology and not in co-operating with other countries. As Chou En-lai said in his speech of welcome at the State banquet to Nehru in Peking "We hope that the established friendship between China and India will be further strengthened and developed so that Sino-Indian relations will be a model for the whole world of peaceful co-existence among countries with different social customs and ideologies".

The friendship and understanding established between Nehru and Chou En-lai was further strengthened by the discussions they had during the Bandung Conference. The initiative for this Conference came from the Indonesian Prime Minister, Ali Sastromidjojo. At the Colombo Conference of the Prime Ministers of India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ceylon in April/May, 1954, he mentioned the idea of holding a Conference of Asian and African States. The other Prime Ministers were not very enthusiastic. Nehru himself was somewhat doubtful of the success of such a Conference but after a persuasive visit by Sastromidjojo to New Delhi in September, he lent his support to the proposal. Nehru, however, suggested that the five countries should meet at a preliminary Conference in Bogor to consider the proposal in all its aspects. This Conference met on December 28, 1954. Nehru took a leading part in it. There were some difficulties about the countries to be invited to the main Conference. The Burmese Prime Minister U Nu supported by Nehru championed Chinese participation and indeed made it clear that without China his country would take no part in a Conference of Asian-African countries. Pakistan and Ceylon were opposed to China being invited while Indonesia was unenthusiastic. Ultimately, on an assurance that participation of any country in the Conference would not mean its recognition by the other participants agreement was reached. The final communique issued in Bogor stated that the acceptance of invitation by any country would in no way involve or even imply any change in its view of any other participating country ; also the form of Government and the way of life of any country should in

no way be the subject of interference by another. It is interesting to recall that Nehru tried hard to have the Five Principles mentioned in the communique but had to abandon the idea in the face of strong opposition from Prime Ministers Kotelawala of Ceylon and Mohammad Ali of Pakistan.

The Conference at Bandung lasted from 18th to 24th April, 1955. 29 nations participated in the Conference. Of the thirty invited only the Central African Federation declined the invitation. Australia and New Zealand were not invited and Nehru had to explain the omission which was not entirely logical to the Australian and New Zealand representatives after his return to Delhi from the Conference. At Bandung all the participants were fully conscious of the historic importance of their meeting. Here were representatives of countries with a population of nearly 1500 million and representing almost a quarter of the total area of globe. Many of them had been liberated from Western domination only during the preceding 10 years. Indonesia as the host country provided the Chairman of the Conference in Prime Minister Ali Sastromidjojo. He was a good natured, friendly individual but hardly equal to the task of presiding over such a distinguished gathering. Nehru dominated the proceedings throughout. Outside the Conference his house was a meeting place for the leaders of different delegations and from early morning till late in the evening he used to receive a stream of eminent visitors. One of the most frequent among the visitors was Chou En-lai. It was his first debut in an Asian-African gathering and although he was calm and unruffled, he did not seem quite sure of his position. Nehru took him as a younger brother. During mid-day recesses the two used to walk hand in hand along the streets of Bandung with crowds cheering on both sides. During the long private discussions Nehru reminded the Chinese Prime Minister of the fear and anxiety of many Asian and African countries about China. He referred in particular to the problem of the people of Chinese origin in Indonesia, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. Chou En-lai readily agreed to give assurances to these countries about his Government's policy in regard to overseas Chinese; and even while the Conference was

in progress, an Agreement was reached between China and Indonesia on the problem of the dual nationality of the people of Chinese origin in Indonesia. The Chinese Premier also assured the representatives of Thailand, Laos and Cambodia of the determination of his Government not to interfere in their affairs and to advise the local Chinese communities to choose between Chinese citizenship or the citizenship of the countries in which they were settled. On 23rd April he issued a statement to the effect that the Chinese people were friendly to the American people. They did not want a war with the United States and China was willing to negotiate with the United States on the relaxation of tension in East Asia, particularly in the Formosa area.

At Bandung Chou En-lai played a constructive and conciliatory role while quietly asserting his view points. Two Prime Ministers in particular, John Kotelawala of Ceylon and Mohammad Ali of Pakistan, were suspicious of the trend of the Conference. They felt that Nehru was holding a special brief for the Chinese and somehow the Conference was being given an anti-West complexion. This suspicion came out forcefully during the discussions on colonialism. Kotelawala wanted the Conference to condemn all forms of colonialism including what he described as Soviet colonialism in East Europe. Nehru strongly reacted to this remark. He reminded the Conference that theirs was a meeting of Governments and as Government representatives they had to function within certain limitations. India could never agree to the 'proposition that Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example, who were members of the United Nations and with whom India had exchanged diplomatic representatives, were colonies of another country. If the issue was one of domination by some big power over others, the discussion would have to be widened to include domination by some other great powers also. There was no objection, Nehru said, to the Conference condemning interference by one Government in the affairs of another. "I appeal to you", he said, turning to Kotelawala, "to take a proper view of this issue. Do not break the Conference by condemnation and recrimination". While Nehru was obviously angry, Chou En-lai was quiet and persuasive. When the question was discussed at length in the

Political Committee, the only head of delegation present was the Chinese Premier and it was he who ultimately suggested condemnation of colonialism in all its manifestations" in place of "colonialism in all its forms". This satisfied Kotelawala.

Nehru was extremely anxious to get the conference to give its formal blessing to the Five Principles of Co-existence and to embody them in the final communique. This was strongly resisted by Pakistan as at Bogor four months earlier. The discussions were again remitted to a Committee. There Prime Minister Mohammad Ali took a back seat and let his Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed be the spokesman of his country. Ahmed insisted that reference to the Five Principles was quite unnecessary; they were already embodied, he said, in the U. N. Charter. Pakistan on the other hand insisted on the recognition of the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively. There must be a realistic appreciation of the world situation and of the reasons which led small countries to seek alliances with stronger nations. Pakistan feared not without reason, Aziz Ahmed said, that acceptance of the Five Principles, without elaboration or clarification, would be inconsistent with her membership of the military alliances like, for example, the SEATO. Nehru strongly reacted to this view. Collective defence was a dangerous doctrine, he said. If the entire world was to be divided between two big blocs, the inevitable result would be war. Why should we be hangers-on like this, he asked? It was an intolerable thought to him that the great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage only to degrade or humiliate themselves. The Five Principles were no rigid formula, but in Nehru's view if the Asian-African countries could form an area of peace, to that extent they would reduce the tension between the nations of the world. Ultimately, the final Declaration on the promotion of world peace and co-operation adopted at the Conference mentioned ten principles including the one on which Pakistan was so insistent, viz. respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the U.N. Nehru had some satisfaction that this was accompanied by acceptance of another principle which called for "abstention

from the use of arrangements for collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers”.

In his final speech at the concluding session of the Conference on 24th April Nehru made a passionate appeal for peace. “How can we solve our problems”, he said, “if peace itself is in danger? We have been backward, we have been left behind in the race, and now we have a chance to make good. We have to make good rapidly because of the compulsion of events. If we do not make good now, we shall fade away not to rise again for a long time to come”.

The results of the Bandung Conference gave deep satisfaction to Nehru. He was aware that the participants did not agree with each other on their approach to international affairs. Some of them were members of military alliances and deeply suspicious of the aims and objects of international communism. But the fact that all of them could agree on the terms of the final communique was itself a singular achievement. Speaking in the Indian Lok Sabha on 30th April, 1955, Nehru said that Bandung proclaimed the political emergence in world affairs of over half the world's population. He had a guilty feeling at not having invited Australia and New Zealand and therefore took the occasion to mention that he had asked the Conference to send its good wishes “to our neighbours in Australia and New Zealand for whom we have nothing but the most fraternal feelings as indeed to the rest of the world”. And “to those who are still dependent but struggle for freedom, Bandung presents them a hope to sustain them in their courageous fight and in their struggle for freedom”.

Bandung represented an important landmark in the growing friendship and understanding between India and China. Nehru, however, knew well that the key to peace in the Far East lay in a detente between China and the U.S.A. Chou En-lai's conciliatory statement at Bandung was an important first step, but public opinion in America was extremely sore on the detention of American airmen in China. The two Prime Ministers had more than one talk on this at Bandung. Nehru felt it would be useful if these were followed up in Peking by Krishna Menon who was fully in the picture. Accordingly Krishna Menon visited Peking in the second week of May. There Menon

had long talks with the Chinese leaders. On return to New Delhi on 30th May he declared that China was releasing four of the detained American airmen. Given goodwill, he added, the problem of the United States-China relations would be solved. Soon thereafter the Chinese Government officially notified the U.N. Secretary General who had also approached the Chinese leaders with a similar proposal that the four prisoners should be released. There was not sufficient recognition in America of Menon's contribution to this successful outcome or of Nehru's view that the helpful step taken by the Chinese Government should be followed up by some concrete evidence of American intention to see to a general relaxation of tension in the Far East.

In November-December, 1956, Chou En-lai paid his second visit to India. The first part of the visit lasted from November 28 to December 10. He then addressed Members of the Indian Parliament and visited several places of interest in India. Everywhere he stressed friendship between India and China and cordiality in Sino-Indian relations. The solidarity of millions of people of the two countries, he said, would become a gigantic moral and material force in stabilising the situation in Asia and America. He gratefully acknowledged India's firm support to the Chinese struggle for the unification of her territories and for the restoration to the Chinese People's Republic's rightful place in the United Nations. China, he said, would always support India in her defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity. There was no problem in international relations which in his view were not capable of solution in accordance with the Five Principles. "We believe that by adopting the Five Principles and the Bandung spirit, as our common starting point, we will be able to solve the problems that exist between our two countries, and to make greater efforts for the cause of peace in Asia and the world".

Wherever Chou En-lai went in India, hundreds of thousands of people hailed him enthusiastically with shouts of "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai"*.

* Indians and Chinese are brothers.

responded to these greetings with equal cordiality and for the next 2-3 years throughout India this particular slogan became the symbol of India-China friendship. Nehru had several long talks with the Chinese Premier during the first part of the visit. Chou En-lai then left on a tour of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and Pakistan. Nehru proceeded on a State visit to the United States of America at the invitation of President Eisenhower. Nehru had the advantage of knowing the Chinese leader's views on world problems in general and on problems of the Far East in particular. He regarded his visit to the U. S. A. as a mission of peace and hoped to remove some of the American suspicions about New China.

Nehru returned to India on the conclusion of his visit to the U.S.A. and Canada on 28th December, 1956. Chou En-lai arrived in Delhi two days later straight from Dacca. Nehru took his guest to see the Bhakra-Nangal Irrigation Project and on the journey to and back he had further long talks with the Chinese Prime Minister. Among the subjects discussed then and earlier in December were Malayasia, Hungary, Pakistan, Kashmir, Goa, Indochina, Sino-American relations and a general review of other world problems. Chou En-lai spoke at great length about Tibet and explained the policy of the Chinese Government. He said that Tibet had always been a part of China but never a province of China as Sinkiang was. Tibet was a separate and autonomous part having a special status which was more than that of a province. The policy of the Chinese Government was to have an autonomous region with considerable rights under the leadership of the Central Government. Local matters would be decided mainly by the Tibetans themselves and there was no intention to press for immediate domestic reforms. It was regrettable, the Chinese Premier said, that some people under the influence of foreign Governments did not want Tibet to be under the Central Government of China and talked about Tibetan independence. They were in touch with a group in Kalimpong with whom the U.S. agents were in constant touch. Nehru listened to Chou En-lai with attention. He said the Government of India were not aware of any illegal activities in India against China, but he gave the assurance

that his Government would never permit anti-Chinese activities in Kalimpong or anywhere else in India.

The two leaders also had discussion on India-China border. Chou En-lai referred to the so-called McMahon Line and said that he had examined it in connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this Line established by British imperialists was not fair, nevertheless the Chinese Government felt that they should give recognition to the Line, because it was an accomplished fact and because they were anxious to maintain friendly relations with both India and Burma. They, however, proposed to do so after consulting the Tibetans. Nehru welcomed this assurance and said that there were minor border problems elsewhere also and all these should be settled on the basis of established practice and custom as well as the watershed principle. Chou En-lai agreed that all the problems should be settled.

The Chinese Prime Minister listened to Nehru's analysis of the problems of the Middle East. On Hungary the two leaders held entirely different views. According to the Chinese Prime Minister, the Hungarian Army had disintegrated; there was chaos in the country and the choice lay between Soviet intervention and allowing Hungary to become allied with the Western powers. The Soviet people had to intervene in the interest of the Hungarian people and they were right in doing so. Nehru who had received first hand reports from the Indian representatives on the situation in Hungary thought that the great majority of Hungarian people were opposed to Soviet domination and wanted the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Soviet domination, he added, had also caused apprehension in many countries in Asia and Europe. The two leaders discussed the question at great length and agreed to differ in their estimates of the situation.

Nehru again urged the release of the ten American prisoners still held in China. No progress, he said, could be made with improvement in Sino-American relations unless the prisoners were released. Chou En-lai was unmoved by Nehru's plea. The time was still not ripe, he said, for further talks. If the Americans were genuinely interested in friendship, they must give practical demon-

stration of their good faith. The Chinese had allowed many American nationals to return home and released the majority of the American prisoners. But a large number of Chinese nationals who wanted to return home were prevented from doing so by the American authorities by resort to a variety of impediments.

In view of the subsequent developments in relations between China and Pakistan, it would be interesting to recall what Chou En-lai had said to Nehru about his talks with Premier Suhrawardy during the latter's visit to China and the Chinese Premier's visit to Pakistan. Suhrawardy had explained at great length to the Chinese Premier India's 'unreasonable attitude' in regard to Kashmir and assured him that Baghdad and SEATO Pacts were not directed against China. India had received more American aid than Pakistan, Suhrawardy said. Chou En-lai told Nehru that he had informed Suhrawardy that Baghdad and SEATO Pacts which were made under American control were aggressive, and although the Pakistan Premier had no idea of invading China, the United States might use Pakistan as a military base and endanger China. He had also advised the Pakistanis to solve their outstanding questions by direct discussion with India and told the Pakistani Prime Minister that taking the matter of Kashmir to the U.N. would not solve it. Suhrawardy had suggested that the Chinese Premier should intervene as an arbitrator. Chou En-lai had declined to do so saying that he had no power and no right to do so. The Chinese could only advise peace. Similar views were publicly expressed by the Chinese Premier at a press conference in Calcutta on December 9, 1956.

Nehru gave Chou En-lai a historical review of the Kashmir situation and the circumstances in which the Government of India intervened in October, 1947. As regards American aid to India, he said India had received only long term credits for foodgrains and for specific development projects, while Pakistan had received free military aid of an undisclosed magnitude. At this rate Pakistan's Air Force and Army would soon be stronger than India's.

On the conclusion of the first round of his visit Chou

En-lai addressed a big public meeting in Calcutta attended by about half a million people. He summed up his impressions in the following words—"During our visit in the past twelve days the achievements made by India in many fields have left deep impression on our mind. We find that India is more advanced than China in many respects. China should learn consciously from India. In the field of scientific research, we deeply feel that you have attached importance earlier than we to the development of that basic aspect that has a bearing on long term construction of the country, and you have made greater achievements in this field than we".

Chou En-lai arrived in India for the third time in three months on his way back from Kathmandu. On that occasion the Viswa Bharati University conferred on him D.Litt. (Honoris causa) at a convocation on January 30. Accepting the degree he said, "For several thousand years our two countries had received beneficial influence from each other which has never been imposed by one on the other. Our two countries have always lived together as friends and have never committed aggression on each other. It is seldom seen in world history that two great and neighbouring countries have maintained friendly relations with each other for such a long time".

The friendship and understanding generated by Chou En-lai's visit to India and Nehru's earlier visit to China was strengthened in the two following years by the interchange of numerous delegations between the two countries. A Chinese women's delegation led by Madam Soong Ching Ling, Sun Yat-sen's widow, extensively toured India from December 17, 1956 to 7th January, 1957. This was followed by a 38-member group of Peking Variety Theatre which gave performances at various places during a two-week tour of major Indian cities. Among other delegations from China were a cultural delegation, a delegation of the Union of Chinese Stage Artists, a military goodwill mission headed by a Chinese Marshal which visited military installations in various parts of India from 23rd January to 2nd March, 1958, and a delegation from the China-India Friendship Association. Of particular interest was the visit to India in August, 1958, of Yun Hua and

his mother Kuo Chin Lan, son and wife of Dr Kotnis who was a member of the Indian Medical Mission to China in 1938. Dr Kotnis died in China in the performance of his duty. They called on Nehru in New Delhi and were warmly received by him.

In the reverse direction a large number of delegations from India visited China at the invitation of the Chinese Government. These included, besides individuals, representatives of cultural groups, Young Men's Christian Association of India, All India Trade Union Congress, Indian film delegations, All India federation of educational associations, medical and teaching professions, India-China Friendship Association and Indian Youth Congress. A delegation of the surviving members of the former Indian Medical Team and their dependents reached Peking on 25th September, 1957, on an invitation from the China-India Friendship Association. Their leader Dr M. M. Atal who had headed the earlier medical team, died in Peking on 1st December, 1957. Among the important individuals who were guests of the Chinese Government were Professor P. C. Mahalanobis and Rahul Sankrityana, a well-known Buddhist scholar.

All the Indian visitors came back greatly impressed by what they had seen in China—the enthusiasm of an entire people for the development of their country, their honesty and simple living. The Foreign Office received from our Embassy in Peking enthusiastic reports on the new experiments in industrial and social progress that the Chinese Government had launched, whether it was steel making in backyard furnaces or the countrywide organisation of communes, and special teams were sent from India to study the projects. The streets of Peking and other cities continued to resound to the cries of 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' as these in Delhi, Calcutta and other cities of India, and the general impression in India was that nothing could ever come in the way of friendship between the two countries.

CHAPTER NINE

INDIA-CHINA BORDER DISPUTE

THE FRONTIER of India with China in the north extends over more than 2000 miles*. It is usually referred to in three sectors. The western sector marks the northern and eastern limit of Ladakh, a province of Jammu and Kashmir State, and the borders of the Punjab and Himachal Pradesh and is nearly 1000 miles. The middle sector has a stretch of 234 miles, while the eastern sector, loosely referred to as the Macmahon Line, extends a little over 700 miles. In the extreme western sector the frontier divides India from the Sinkiang province of China. The rest of the frontier marks the dividing line between India and Tibet. Along the entire length the frontier is based on custom and tradition and roughly follows natural geographical features marking the watershed in the High Himalayas. The eastern sector, apart from being sanctioned by custom and tradition, was specifically delineated in the map that was attached to the Simla Convention of April, 1914 signed by the plenipotentiaries of the British Government in India, China and Tibet. Nowhere is the frontier demarcated on the ground.

During the British days the Government of India exercised jurisdiction over Indian territory up to the customary frontier. The nature of administration, however, varied in the different sectors depending on terrain and other local factors. Thus, in the western sector where the territory on the Indian side is largely desolate without any permanent habitation, there was no question of any settled administration. During the summer months Ladakhi villagers visited the few pastures and salt mines lying there. Officials of the Government of Kashmir and Indian traders also visited these places from time to time and small border patrols used to be sent out from the nearest administered districts. This practice continued even after the transfer of power to Indian hands in August, 1947.

* This does not include 334 miles of the frontier west of the Karakoram Pass in that part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which is occupied by Pakistan.

In the middle sector administration extended, wherever feasible, upto the customary frontier. In the eastern sector, on the other hand, the British adopted a peculiar administrative pattern. The customary frontier in this sector lies along the watershed on the High Himalayan crests at heights varying between 4000 to 20,000 feet above the sea level. South of this line lay an extensive area, about 32000 sq. miles, inhabited by sparsely distributed tribal people. The British policy was to leave these people to their own resources more or less undisturbed. The British authorities were content with exercising a kind of loose political control over them intervening only where inter-tribal disputes caused or threatened serious bloodshed. In the parlance of those days this area was described as unadministered as distinguished from the administered area south of Himalayan foothills where the administrative pattern was similar to that in the settled districts elsewhere in India. In 1912-13 the British divided the unadministered tribal territory in the North-East into the two frontier tracts and placed them under two Political Officers, but until the end of the British rule there was no attempt to bring the territory under direct administrative control.

The customary frontier in the western and middle sectors was shown in the official maps of India published by the British Government of India, but until the late thirties the frontier in the eastern sector was shown as lying at the foothills of the Himalayan range. The reason for this was that in the early days of the British rule the external frontiers of India were conceived as lying at the limits of the administered areas. Even though the frontier in the Eastern sector was formally recognised at the Simla Conference of 1913-14 as lying at the watershed on the crest of the High Himalayas, it was not until nearly twentyfive years later that this line appeared in maps of India published under Government authority. This time-lag is explained by the peculiar history of the Simla Conference of 1913-14 and subsequent events.

By the time the 13th Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in 1912 from his self-imposed exile in India and resumed the temporal and spiritual Government of Tibet, the

Chinese had been thrown out of Tibet which thereafter virtually became independent. The British Government who were committed to the recognition of China's suzerainty over Tibet, subject to the Chinese acceptance of Tibetan autonomy, were anxious to see the outstanding issues between Tibet and China settled by an agreement so that peaceful conditions would return to a region lying immediately north of British India. They pressed both the Dalai Lama's Government and the Government of China to settle the disputed issues between them at a Conference in which British Government would also participate. This tripartite Conference opened in Simla on 8th October, 1913, and was attended by the properly accredited plenipotentiaries of the Chinese and Tibetan Governments and the British Government of India. During discussions which lasted till the following April one of the contentious issues was the extent of Dalai Lama's spiritual and temporal jurisdiction over the areas in Tibet immediately adjoining China proper. The British sponsored a proposal under which Tibet would be divided into two zones—Outer Tibet roughly West of the Yangtse where Chinese influence would be severely restricted and Inner Tibet immediately adjoining the border of China with Tibet which would be administered by Chinese officials subject to the exercise of spiritual authority by the Dalai Lama.

While the tripartite discussions were in progress, the British and Tibetan delegates separately discussed the delimitation of frontier between Tibet and India and agreed upon a line which later became known as the MacMahon Line after the name of the British plenipotentiary at the Conference. This Line was marked in red in the map attached to the Draft Convention emerging from the main Conference and the map as well as the convention were signed by the Tibetan, Chinese and British plenipotentiaries. Besides the frontier between India and Tibet, the map also showed the line of demarcation between Inner Tibet and China in red and the line of demarcation between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet in green. Article IX of the Convention stipulated that "the borders of Tibet shall be shown in red on the map attached hereto".

Within a few days the Chinese Government repudiated the signature of their representative but the objections which they listed in their memoranda of 24th April, 1st May and 13th June, 1914, were solely in regard to the lines of demarcation between Inner Tibet and China and between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. No objection was raised to the frontier between Tibet and India shown in the map. Since the Chinese Government failed to confirm their representative's signature, the British and Tibetan representatives exchanged letters of confirmation thereby making the Convention effective so far as the Governments of Tibet and India were concerned. The British, however, persisted with their efforts to secure Chinese agreement. In 1919 the Chinese Government suggested some modifications of the Convention with a view to a final settlement, but even then they did not seek any modification of the line marking the frontier between Tibet and India.

Partly as a result of the intervention of the 1914-18 war and more in the hope of securing a final settlement of the outstanding issues between China and Tibet, the British Government did not publish the Simla Convention with the attached maps nor did they take any step to show the MacMahon Line frontier in the official map of India. Finally in 1921, they informed the Government of China that as the Chinese had failed to confirm the Simla Convention, the British Government did not feel justified any longer in withholding their recognition of the status of Tibet as an autonomous State under the suzerainty of China thereby putting the final seal of British approval on the provisions of the Simla Convention. The Simla Convention with its attached map appeared in Volume XIV of Aitchison's *Treaties*, 1929 Edition, and in the next issues of the official map of India the international frontier in the eastern sector was formally shown as along the MacMahon Line.

Official Chinese maps continued to ignore the Simla Convention and the international border with India in the eastern sector was shown in these maps as lying at the Himalayan foothills. In the central sector there was no significant difference until late fifties between Indian and

Chinese maps. The frontier in the Western sector in Ladakh was shown differently in different Chinese maps but in every case the Chinese delineation^{*} differed widely from the delineation in the Indian maps. According to their maps, the Chinese claimed 32000 square miles of Indian territory in the East, 10000 to 14000 square miles in the west and a few hundred square miles in the central sector. Nowhere in these vast areas did the Tibetans or the Chinese exercise any administrative control, nor did they seek until recent years to resist, far less to oust, the Indian administration.

On assuming office as Prime Minister Nehru decided to bring the tribal areas in the east under a settled administrative system as elsewhere in India but with suitable modifications designed to meet the special needs of the tribal people. He was particularly anxious that they should share in the benefits of a welfare State which it was the Government's declared policy to create in India while enjoying the fullest protection of their cultural pattern. Administrative Divisions were accordingly set up throughout the area extending up to the customary geographical frontier as shown in the Indian maps. These were grouped together in what was called as the North East frontier Agency under the direct control of the Central Government at Delhi. When independent India adopted a new Constitution which came into force on 26th January, 1950, the North East Frontier Agency became territorially part of the State of Assam but was governed by the special provision made in the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. Nehru's own Department, the Ministry of External Affairs, was entrusted with administrative responsibility for the N.E.F.A.

Between January 1950 when the Chinese Army marched into Tibet and December 1953 when negotiations on a new Treaty on Tibet between India and China started in Peking, the Chinese made no difficulty about the exercise of Indian jurisdiction anywhere according to the traditional frontier shown in the Indian maps. It is possible that the Chinese took time to study the history of the minor frontier disputes that had arisen in the past between the Government of India and the Tibetan Government in Lhasa, but their

immediate preoccupation seemed to be to terminate the extra-territorial rights acquired by India in Tibet since the early years of the century. These they wanted to discuss without delay and Nehru himself was anxious to do so.

During the discussions proceeding the 1954 Agreement between India and China neither side raised the question of the frontier nor did the Agreement specifically refer to the frontier between China and India. Article IV of the Agreement mentioned a number of passes and routes by which traders and pilgrims would be free to travel between the two countries. All these lay in the middle sector of the frontier and the Government of India presumed that they marked the international frontier. This presumption was not supported by the letter of the Agreement and was repudiated by the Government of China when some years later the alignment of the Sino-Indian frontier became the subject of an open dispute between the two Governments. The Chinese then took the stand that the question of the frontier was not "ripe for settlement" in 1953-54 and the 1954 Agreement had no bearing on the international frontier.

Whether ripe for settlement or not, the Chinese authorities were determined not to let any frontier claim go by default. Within a few weeks of the signing of the 1954 Agreement the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi complained in a note on 17th July, 1954, that Indian troops had crossed the Niti Pass on the Uttar Pradesh border and entered Wu-ze in China. We in the Indian Foreign Office were taken by surprise. The Chinese did not tell us where Wu-ze lay but we suspected that the complaint might relate to a small area known to us as Bara Hoti, south of the traditional Sino-Indian boundary in the central sector. This plain lay south of the watershed in this region. Each summer the Indian authorities used to send a small border police force to the Hoti plain to keep a check on the Tibetans who moved down with their cattle for grazing in the area which contained the only pasture in that part of the Himalayas. The Government of India would raise no objection to the Tibetans making use of the pasture. That particular summer when the Indian party arrived on the spot, it found that a Chinese contingent had already entered the territory without Government of

India's permission and appropriate travel documents. Immediately the Indian force asked the Chinese to withdraw. In a note to the Chinese Embassy on 27th August, 1954, the Foreign Office stated that "such entry without appropriate documents was not in conformity with the Agreement signed between India and China regarding trade and intercourse between India and the Tibet region of China, nor in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India and the spirit of the joint communique recently issued by the Prime Ministers of India and China". The note expressed the hope that the Government of China would instruct the local authorities in Tibet not to enter Indian territory as the Government of India had asked the local Indian authorities not to cross into Tibet.

Nehru was surprised by the Chinese trespass in Bara Hoti, but he did not attach too much importance to the dispute and was prepared to attribute it to the excessive zeal of the local Chinese officials. He felt more concerned about the continued publication of maps of China under official authority showing extensive areas of India in the east and in the west as part of China. In October, 1954, he visited China as a guest of the Chinese Government and received a tremendous popular welcome. During the long and friendly talks he had with Chou En-lai he raised the question of the international frontier between India and China. He referred to the wrong border line between the two countries shown in the Chinese maps. This, he thought, was by an error but he added that he and his Government were not worried as the Indian boundary was quite clear and not a matter of argument. Chou En-lai replied that official Chinese maps were really reproductions of the old Kuomintang maps which the new Government had not had time to revise. Nehru did not press the point; he merely expressed the hope that the border line shown in the Chinese maps would be corrected before long. Many people, he said, took advantage of these old maps to argue that China had an aggressive intention against India or else such maps would not continue to be published.

Bara Hoti again became the subject of controversy in

the summer of 1955. That year, too, the Indian police party arriving at the spot found that a party of Chinese soldiers had already pitched their tents there. In a note presented to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi the Government of India said, "We should like to emphasise that such violation of our territory is not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India, nor in the spirit of the joint communique issued last year by the Prime Ministers of India and China". A number of other notes were subsequently exchanged between the two Governments but the Chinese definitely refused to accept the Indian contention.

Other Chinese intrusions followed. On 15th September, 1955, an Indian border patrol approaching Dam-Zan, a small place in Indian territory 10 miles south of the traditional frontier in the Uttar Pradesh, was met by a Chinese party who tried to prevent the Indians from proceeding further. The Indian Foreign Office sent a mild note of protest saying that the unauthorised presence of Chinese soldiers at Dam-Zan amounted to trespass and their action in trying to stop the Indian detachment from going further was a violation of the Five Principles. There was a similar intrusion at a place called Nilang on the same border where 12 Chinese soldiers were found armed with guns and equipped with telescope. Still another Indian note followed stating that if the Chinese troops were not withdrawn immediately, serious incidents likely to mar the friendly relations between India and China might follow. On 1st September, 1956, a party of Chinese armed personnel similarly took up position south of the Indian side of the border at Shipkila Pass on the Himachal Pradesh border. Nehru was still unconvinced that the Chinese had large territorial claims against India or that they would use force in settling their claims. He rather felt that the violations of Indian territory by the Chinese personnel were due to the expressive enthusiasm of the Chinese border force. He did not, therefore, want the Foreign Office to lose a sense of perspective or to indulge in strong language in notes to the Chinese.

Nehru brought up the border question again in the

long talks he had with Chou En-lai in Delhi in December, 1956, and January, 1957. There was a detailed discussion on the so-called MacMahon Line. Chou En-lai told Nehru that during the talks he had had with Premier U Nu on the Sino-Burmese border he had assured the Burmese Premier of his Government's desire to settle the problem satisfactorily and to accept the MacMahon Line so far as it marked the border between Burma and China. When the Simla Convention was signed, Burma was part of British India and for a length of 120 miles the MacMahon Line marked the border between Burma and Tibet. Whatever might have happened years ago, Chou En-lai told Nehru, in view of the friendly relations existing between China and India, the Chinese Government proposed to recognise the Indian border also along this Line, but before doing so they would like to consult the Tibetan authorities. Immediately after this talk Nehru recorded a minute, as he always used to do after any important talk with a visitor—foreign or Indian. This minute, later quoted by him in his letter of 14th December, 1958, to the Chinese Premier, was in the following terms—

“Premier Chou referred to the MacMahon Line and again said that he had never heard of this before. Though, of course, the then Chinese Government had dealt with this matter and not accepted that Line, he had gone into it in connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this Line, established by British imperialists, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which exist between China and the countries concerned, viz. India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this MacMahon Line. They had, however, not consulted the Tibetan authorities about it yet. They proposed to do so”.

In course of these talks Nehru suggested that some of the border issues which were causing irritation and ill-feeling between the two Governments out of proportion to their intrinsic importance might be settled by discussion by official representatives on both sides. Chou En-lai agreed. The Foreign Offices in both India and China took time to settle the venue and agenda of the discussions and

agreed that the Bara Hoti area should be discussed first. I was asked by Nehru to lead the Indian delegation. The Chinese delegation was led by the Chinese Ambassador in India, Pan Tsu-li. We met on 19th April, 1958, at New Delhi. An immediate difficulty arose. On the Indian side we suggested that there should be no ambiguity about the place in dispute. We said it was Bara Hoti while the Chinese insisted that the dispute related to Wu-ze. Were the two places identical? We defined the territory we had in mind by latitude and longitude and said that it was about $1\frac{1}{2}$ square miles. The Chinese delegation would not give us any information about the extent of the area in dispute, nor would they define it by latitude or longitude which the Ambassador blandly said were imperialistic terms. Arguments on this simple point went on in circles for a week. I then suggested that pending further discussions neither side should send its civil or military personnel to the area or seek to exercise control or possession over it. This also the Chinese representative refused to accept. The discussions lasted for 4 weeks without result and ultimately ended without our being any the wiser either about the location of Wu-ze or the basis of the Chinese claim. It was quite clear to me that for some undisclosed reason the Chinese were not willing to discuss the basis of their claim at that stage. It is interesting to recall that two years later, after the dispute between the two countries had taken a serious turn and attempts to settle it at Prime Minister's level had failed, the Chinese Government defined the area by mentioning the latitude and longitude of the place and laid claim to an area of nearly 300 square miles. In 1958 our first attempt to probe the Chinese mind on the question of the international frontier failed.

Our suspicion had already been roused by a serious violation of Indian territory at the extreme western sector of the frontier. In September, 1957, our Embassy in Peking sent us a copy of an official announcement published in the *People's Daily* of Peking stating that a road had been made from Yeh Cheng in Sinkiang to Gartok in Tibet and would be open to traffic in October. A rough sketch of the road was also published with the announcement. In the Indian Foreign Office we were not quite sure about the exact

alignment of the road but it looked as if it passed through Aksai Chin in Ladakh on the Indian side of the traditional frontier cutting off several thousand square miles of Indian territory. We, however, felt that before sending a protest to the Chinese authorities we should be sure of the alignment of the road. The area was uninhabited and by the time the report reached us, it was too late in the year to send a reconnaissance party, winter having already set in in those rough and desolate wastes at a height of 13000 to 15000 feet. We decided to wait until the next summer. We then sent out two patrol parties for investigation. An Armed police party proceeded towards the north and an unarmed party towards the southern extremity of the road. The journeys were long and arduous. Two months later the southern party returned to the base but there was no news about the other. The southern party brought back scrappy information about the road and Chinese activities in the area. Suspecting that probably the other party had been intercepted by the Chinese, I sent for the Chinese Ambassador on 18th October, 1958, and handed to him an informal note. It was a matter of surprise and regret, I said, that the Chinese Government should have constructed a road through indisputable Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the Government of India and without even informing the Government of India. I also drew the Chinese Government's attention to our missing patrol party and enquired if the Chinese Government had any information about them. We would be grateful, I said, for any assistance the Chinese authorities might find it possible to give to the party to return to its headquarters. I told the Ambassador that the Government of India were anxious not to give undue prominence to the incident and to settle the frontier disputes so that friendly relations between our two countries might not suffer.

We did not hear anything from the Chinese until 3rd November, 1958, when the Foreign Office in Peking handed over a memorandum to our Embassy alleging that Indian Army personnel had trespassed into Chinese territory on the Sinkiang-Tibet Road. The note added that "in the spirit of Sino-Indian friendship the Chinese Government had already ordered the military authorities concerned to

deport them from the Chinese territory to the Karakoram Pass on 23rd October". We were shocked that a friendly Government should not have informed us of the so-called intrusion which, according to them, had taken place nearly two months earlier, or of the arrest of our personnel. It was particularly shocking that the arrested people should be physically pushed across a Pass which at that time of the year was already on the way to being blocked by heavy snowfall. It was fortunate that the half-famished prisoners were discovered by an Indian search patrol which had been sent to the area as a precaution. No publicity was given to this incident as we did not suspect any hostile design against India. We were still hoping to settle our differences with China by negotiation.

For the same reason other similar violations of border territory were also kept from the public and the press. Thus, early in July, 1958, Chinese troops crossed into Indian territory in Eastern Ladakh and visited an old abandoned fort at a place called Khurnak. The Chinese intruded once again into the Bara Hoti area. In October when our personnel withdrew from two frontier outposts on the border of Uttar Pradesh, they were followed by Chinese personnel who immediately established their own outposts there though these were clearly within Indian territory.

In July, 1958, the *China Pictorial* magazine published a map of China in which the Sino-Indian border of China was indicated by a thick brown line. This map once again included large areas of Indian territory comprising four out of five Divisions of India's North East Frontier Agency and several thousand square miles in North and Eastern Ladakh within the territorial limits of China. A considerable area of Eastern and North-Eastern Bhutan was also shown as part of China. Nehru now decided that the time had come to take up the frontier issue formally with the Government of China. As a first step the Indian Foreign Office sent a note to the Chinese Embassy on 21st August, 1958, referring to Chou En-lai's earlier statement that the Chinese maps were based on old Kuomintang maps which the Government of People's Republic of China had not had time to correct. It was time, the note said, that necessary corrections were made as these maps were printed in an official press and

distributed by a Chinese official agency. On 3rd November our Embassy in Peking received a reply from the Chinese Foreign Office repeating Chou En-lai's earlier statement that "the reason why the boundary in Chinese maps is drawn according to old maps is that the Chinese Government have not yet undertaken a survey of Chinese boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned". The note proceeded to say that the Government of China would not make changes in its boundary on its own but "the Chinese Government believed that with the lapse of time and after consultations with the various neighbouring countries and a survey of the border regions, the new way of drawing the boundary of China would be decided in accordance with the results of the consultation and survey".

In this situation Nehru decided to write personally to Chou En-lai. In a long letter on December 14, 1958, he referred to the map published in the magazine *China Pictorial* and recalled his talk with Chou En-lai in December, 1956. "You told me then", Nehru said, "that you had accepted the MacMahon Line border with Burma and, whatever might have happened long ago, in view of the friendly relations which existed between China and India, you proposed to recognise this border with India also. You added that you would like to consult the authorities of the Tibetan region of China and you proposed to do so". Nehru said that he was puzzled by the Chinese Government's reply to the official Indian note on the subject, as he thought that there was no major boundary dispute between China and India. "You will appreciate that nine years after the Chinese People's Republic came into power, the continued issue of these incorrect maps is embarrassing to us as to others. There can be no question of these large parts of India being anything but India and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind of survey can affect these well-known and fixed boundaries. I am sure that you will appreciate our difficulties in the matter". "I venture to write to you on that subject", Nehru continued, "as I feel that any possibility of grave misunderstanding between our countries should be removed as soon as possible. I am anxious, as I am sure you are, that the firm basis of our friendship should not only be maintained

but should be strengthened”.

Chou En-lai's reply came towards the end of January, 1959. It was direct and firm. He repudiated Nehru's statement that the MacMahon Line represented the Sino-Indian boundary on the North East, but said that on account of friendly relations between China and India a friendly settlement could eventually be found for this section of the boundary line. He then referred to the Sino-Indian boundary in the western section and took exception to the delineation in Indian maps. He suggested that the two sides should temporarily maintain the status quo, “that is to say, each side keep for the time being border areas under its jurisdiction and not go beyond them”. “I need not reiterate”, he concluded, “how highly the Chinese Government and people value Sino-Indian friendship. We would never allow any dispute between our two countries to affect this friendship and I believe that India shares the same views”.

Nehru was surprised by the Chinese Premier's letter. He was no longer willing to remain content with verbal assurances. He, therefore, wrote a long letter to Chou En-lai on 22nd March, 1959. He dealt in great detail with the different sectors of the traditional frontier and pointed out that the delineation in the Indian maps followed the watershed on the crest of the High Himalayan range and in several parts it had the sanction of specific international Agreement between the two Governments. Appealing personally to the Chinese Prime Minister, Nehru said, “Our two countries evolved the Principles of *Panch Sheel* which have now found well-spread acceptance among the other countries of the world. It would be most unfortunate if this frontier question should now affect the friendly relations between our countries. I hope, therefore, that an early understanding in this matter will be reached”. The reply to this letter was received in September. In the meantime relations between India and China rapidly deteriorated after the Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa in March, 1959, and after an arduous journey crossed into India and sought political asylum. Chinese anger reached white heat when the Dalai Lama appealed to the United Nations in September. Despite repeated denials by India,

the Chinese convinced themselves that the troubles in Tibet had been stirred up by India and that the Dalai Lama was being aided and advised by the Government of India to carry on anti-Chinese propaganda. In Peking and Lhasa official spokesmen hurled personal accusations at Nehru. Thus Vice-Premier Chen Yi charged Nehru with having "adopted two-faced tactics which by permitting submission of the Tibetan question to the U.N. allowed the Dalai Lama to exceed by far what was permissible under international practice". In an editorial entitled "Our expectations", the *People's Daily* of Peking stated on 16th September, 1959, "It is regrettable that the Prime Minister Nehru whom we respect, instead of maintaining the wise attitude due from him, has been involved in the whirlpool. In the eyes of the right-wing politicians and M.Ps and even certain officials in India Chinese silence was a sign of weakness. Hence they were boldened beyond measures. They attacked China in an increasingly vicious manner and with fume and fury". The editorial demanded India's withdrawal from Chinese territory and an end of the anti-Chinese campaign.

The Chinese had apparently made up their mind to deal with India with a heavy hand. The Chinese border force intensified their activities all along the long frontier. For months they had been engaged in feverish preparations. The first serious armed inroad into Indian territory did not have to wait long. On 25th August, 1959, a strong Chinese detachment crossed into Indian territory at a distant outpost on the North East frontier at Longju and opened fire on the Indian border police, killing one man on the spot and seriously wounding another. The Chinese then out-flanked and over-ran the post. The Government of India lodged a strong protest which the Chinese firmly rejected saying in a note, "at the same time the Chinese Government wishes to reiterate : no violation of Chinese territory will be tolerated. All areas that have been invaded and occupied must be vacated. Any armed provocation will certainly meet with the Chinese frontier guards' firm rebuff".

Within a few weeks a much more serious attack followed, this time at the other end of the frontier in the

western section, at Kong Ka Pass in Ladakh, 40 miles within Indian territory from the traditional frontier. On 20th October, 1959, an Indian Police patrol party was suddenly attacked with mortar and hand grenades by a large Chinese force entrenched on a hill-top. More than a dozen Indians were immediately killed and some others received serious injuries. The leader of the party and 16 others were missing. The Government of India immediately took up the incident with the Chinese Government on the basis of the first reports brought in by a few returning survivors. Full details of the gruesome incident became known only after the Chinese released the captured Indian personnel some four weeks later. The leader of the Indian party who was among those released not only corroborated the details of the surprise attack, which the Government of India had already received, but also gave a graphic account of the interrogation and severe treatment to which he and other prisoners had been subjected to compel them to make statements in accordance with the Chinese version. Thus the leader of the Indian party was interrogated for 12 days for a total of nearly 70 hours. All the time he was kept on starvation diet and housed under atrocious conditions. This treatment continued until he repeated the statements placed before him by his captors. The Chinese recorded his statement and forced the prisoners to take part in a mock expedition while they made a film record. Photographs of the prisoners arranged in various poses were taken to show that they enjoyed full amenities while in Chinese custody.

In his letter of 8th September, 1959 to Nehru Chou En-lai dealt in detail with various sectors of the frontier and charged India with having created incidents all along the border. He warned Nehru that Indian attempts "to impose upon China its one-sided claims on the boundary question—will never succeed and such action cannot possibly yield any result other than impairing the friendship of the two countries, further complicating the boundary question and making it more difficult to settle". It was now quite clear that the Chinese were determined to use force in asserting their map claims. Nehru did not wait long to give a detailed reply to Chou En-lai's letter. In a

long letter on 26th September, he analysed in greater detail than before the factual basis of India's case and ended with the following words: "I must frankly say that your letter of September 8 has come as a great shock to me. India was one of the first countries to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China and for the last ten years we have consistently sought to maintain and strengthen our friendship with your country. When our two countries signed the 1954 Agreement in regard to the Tibet region, I hoped that the main problems which history had bequeathed to us in the relations between India and China had been peacefully and finally settled. Five years later, you have now brought forward, with all insistence, a problem which dwarfs in importance all that we have discussed in recent years, and I thought, settled. I appreciate your statement that China looks upon her south western border as a border of peace and friendship. This hope and this promise could be fulfilled only if China would not bring within the scope of what should essentially be a border dispute claims to thousands of square miles of territory which have been and are an integral part of the territory of India".

Although officially the Chinese Government placed the responsibility for the incident at Kong Ka Pass on India, they must have realised its seriousness. In a letter to Nehru on November 7, Chou En-lai suggested that armed personnel on both sides should withdraw 20 kilometers from the so-called MacMahon Line in the east and from the Line upto which each side exercised actual control in Ladakh in the west; both sides should also agree not to send armed patrol to the evacuated zones but maintain only civil administrative personnel and unarmed police there. The formula which at first sight would appear to be reasonable proved on closer examination by us impracticable and entirely one-sided in China's favour. The two sides did not agree as to the line of actual control in Ladakh in the west sector. India contended that between 1956 and 1959 the Chinese Army had pushed considerable distance into Indian territory, west of the traditional frontier, but nowhere had they yet reached the line claimed in their map. Withdrawal under the Chinese

formula would mean that China would move back from the territory recently occupied by them leaving it in charge of Chinese civilians. On the other hand India was expected to withdraw its border force not only from this area but also from an area which the Chinese had not penetrated. The position would be much worse for India in the east. There was no dispute about the facts of possession in that sector, Indian jurisdiction extending upto the MacMahon Line. In that mountainous terrain suitable location for border outposts would not be available 20 kilometers further south and in effect under the Chinese formula at many places Indian border outposts might have to move much more than 20 kilometers from the border thereby vacating large administered areas. India could not take such a risk with a hostile Chinese Army across the frontier. Nehru suggested that the North East frontier should be treated differently from the frontier in the Ladakh region. As there was no dispute about the line of administrative control in the northeast sector and neither country had any frontier outpost within sight of each other peace would be adequately maintained if both sides agreed not to send out armed patrol. In the northwest sector, however, as the line of actual control was itself in dispute, no agreement would be possible on withdrawal of 20 kilometers. Nehru, therefore, suggested that in this sector the Government of India should withdraw all personnel—civil and military—west of the line which the Chinese Government claimed as international boundary in their latest map, while the Chinese Government should withdraw their personnel east of the frontier line asserted by India. Since the two lines were separated by hundreds of miles, there would not be the slightest risk of border clashes between the forces on either side. The Chinese Premier rejected the suggestion. He would not agree to treat the two sectors differently and insisted that in the western sector the territory up to the border line shown in the Chinese maps was fully under Chinese control.

Discussions between the two Prime Ministers by correspondence reached a complete deadlock while the situation on the border was increasingly becoming serious. In this situation Nehru welcomed Chou En-lai's suggestion

for a personal meeting between the two Prime Ministers. For various reasons the meeting could not take place until April, 1960. Chou En-lai arrived in New Delhi on 20th April. Nehru received him with courtesy but the official reception presented a grim contrast to the wild scenes of enthusiasm witnessed during the Chinese Premier's earlier visits in 1954 and 1956-57. The visitor looked tense. The banquet speeches on both sides were also on a sombre note. Nehru said, "We meet here in a difficult and crucial moment in the world's history and in our own relations. For thousands of years the two great and ancient civilisations stand witnesses to our meeting and the hopes of hundreds of millions for a brighter future are tied in our endeavours. Let us pray for our success so that we may be true to the past of ourselves as well as the future that beckons to us. We shall endeavour to do our utmost so that our efforts may lead to success and to the maintenance of peace with dignity and self-respect of both our great nations". He quoted Buddha's famous saying that "the real victory is the victory of all which involves no defeat". The talks between the two Prime Ministers lasted 20 hours and except for the interpreters nobody else was present. Nehru was worried by the extremely rigid attitude of the Chinese Premier. There was no meeting ground between the two sides either about the interpretation of past treaties and negotiations or about actual control in Ladakh. Chou En-lai's main efforts were directed to equating the eastern sector with the western. He wanted Nehru to accept six "common points". The more important of these were—

1. There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides;
2. There exists between the two sides a line of actual control upto which each side exercises administrative jurisdiction; and
3. A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram mountains.

These suggestions cut across India's basic stand in regard to the international boundary. Acceptance (1) would

mean admission by India that there was no agreed traditional frontier between the two countries and the entire length of the frontier had to be discussed and delimited. Point (2) implied acceptance by India of the Chinese view that in Ladakh they were in control up to their map line which India had strongly repudiated. Point (3) also had similar implication; it also contained the hint that the Chinese Government might accept India's stand about the MacMahon Line frontier in the east if the Indian Government would accept the line in Chinese maps about the Ladakh frontier.

Nehru took his senior colleagues into the fullest confidence in regard to the talks as he had done earlier during the exchange of correspondence with the Chinese Premier. Significantly he asked Swaran Singh, one of his senior Cabinet colleagues, and not Krishna Menon, to carry on simultaneous talks with Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Chen-Yi, who had accompanied Chou En-lai. Chen-Yi was more direct and forthright than his Prime Minister and told Swaran Singh clearly that his country would never accept the Simla Convention and the MacMahon Line as the basis of any border settlement. "If the Chinese recognised the Simla Convention and the MacMahon Line", he said, "there would be an explosion in China. The Chinese people would not agree. Premier Chou En-lai had no right to do so". Swaran Singh pointed out that in their discussions with Burma the Chinese had accepted the MacMahon Line which for a length of 120 miles marked the international frontier between Burma and China. Chen Yi replied that "the line was agreed upon as a result of joint surveys. An agreed line similarly reached with India after taking into account the actual control and historical conditions would not necessarily mean that India would lose large parts of territory". Burma, according to Chen-Yi, conceded that China would not accept the MacMahon Line and this made it possible to bring about "a settlement which was reasonable and practical". The general impression left on the Indian side by Chen-Yi was that in the Eastern sector subject to some adjustments agreement could be reached on a boundary not very different from the MacMahon Line. As regards the western

sector, however, the Chinese attitude was extremely rigid. The Chinese claimed to be controlling the area according to their maps for two hundred years and alleged that there had been no dispute about it and that only recently the Indian Government referred to the Treaty of 1842 as the basis of their claim. This was entirely incorrect, Chen-Yi said.

An interesting talk took place between Morarji Desai, then Finance Minister and Chou En-lai and Chen-Yi. When Chou En-lai remarked that the border problem was the legacy of history which the two countries had to solve, Desai retorted that history had not left a legacy ; it was only during the past four or five years that the trouble had started and for this responsibility lay with China. Chou En-lai said that the situation had deteriorated since Dalai Lama's coming to India and added that the Tibetan question was a thing of the past and it should not be allowed to affect the settlement of the boundary question. To the visitor's complaint that Kalimpong had become a centre of espionage, Desai rejoined that among these spies there were not a few from China but the Government of India were determined to take action against objectionable and subversive activities by whomsoever they were carried out. Incidentally, some flutter was caused by a midnight meeting between Krishna Menon and Chou En-lai, which apparently took place on Menon's initiative, but the Foreign Office was not aware of what transpired at the meeting. Apparently nothing significant emerged.

The talks between the two Prime Ministers failed to resolve a single point of dispute. Hours were spent on discussing the position of the international frontier in the west and the facts of control but Nehru refused to accept the Chinese contention that they were in control of the entire area upto their map line. In a last minute endeavour to keep the channel of communication open, Nehru suggested that officials on both sides should meet to exchange factual data. The Chinese party said that they had brought no data with them. Difficulties arose even in drafting a joint communique. I met the Head of the Eastern Division of the Chinese Foreign Office. After a good deal of arguments agreement could be reached on

the terms of a simple communique. The Chinese officials wanted the six points mentioned by Chou En-lai to Nehru to be included in the communique; we refused to agree. Chou En-lai who was most anxious to publicise these points in India thereafter called a hurried press conference at midnight. Explaining the six points at the conference he observed: "As China was prepared to accommodate the Indian point of view in the eastern sector, India should accommodate China in the western sector.... We hope that the Indian Government will take towards the western sector an attitude similar to that which the Chinese Government had taken towards the eastern sector.....an attitude of mutual accommodation".

On the following morning, 26th April, Nehru went to the airport to see off the Chinese Premier. He was immediately surrounded by a large group of newspaper correspondents with questions on Chou En-lai's suggestion at the press conference. He firmly said that there could be no question of a barter.

The joint communique stated that the officials of the two Governments would meet alternately in each other's capital to examine historical documents, maps and other relevant material on which each side relied in support of its stand. Nehru had little hope that discussions by officials would help resolve a dispute which the two Prime Ministers had failed to settle after years of correspondence, exchange of notes and personal talks. Nevertheless, he wanted to go to the farthest limit in trying to understand the merits of the Chinese claim. The officials on both sides met first in Peking and later in New Delhi. The Chinese officials directed their efforts to making the Indian team agree to Chou En-lai's six points as the basis of discussion. These the Indian team refused to do. The Indian officials were surprised to find that despite Chou En-lai's statement in his letter of 17th December, 1959, to Nehru that the Chinese map published in 1956 correctly showed the traditional boundary between the two countries in the Ladakh sector, the map produced by the Chinese officials at the discussions included within China a further sizeable slice of Indian territory. In the central sector, too, the Chinese enlarged their claim in Bara Hoti

by including two other localities, which they had hitherto mentioned separately, so as to form a composite area of 300 square miles. A third brief meeting of the officials was held at Rangoon on 12th December, 1960, where the report on the discussions was formally signed. It could hardly be called a joint report. The agreed statement was confined to the first three pages; the remainder consisted of two separate voluminous reports by the two sides, each listing the evidence in its favour and commenting on that produced by the other. The Government of India lost no time in publishing the report of the Indian officials. Placing it before the Lok Sabha in April, 1961, Nehru expressed the hope—almost pathetically—that the strength and correctness of the Indian position might dawn on the Chinese Government's mind. "If so", he said, "I am going to try my best and see that it is appreciated by them and that they realise that they have done a wrong thing from which they should withdraw". The deadlock was now complete. The Chinese officials' report was not published by their Government until 18 months later.

Nehru has been blamed for keeping the facts of the violation of the border by China from the Indian public. He was criticised in Parliament and in the press for not taking the country into confidence when the construction of the Chinese road across Indian territory in Aksai Chin came to the Government of India's knowledge as early as 1957. Answering his critics he frankly told Parliament that he had not suspected that the Chinese were laying a serious claim to large areas of Indian territory. He thought that these were minor border disputes which could be settled by discussion and publicising the differences would not be helpful.

The Chinese had obviously moved with caution but extreme deliberation. When Nehru first discussed the Chinese maps with Chou En-lai in Peking in 1954 it is possible that the Chinese Government had not studied the question in detail. They did not, therefore, want to commit themselves in any way and put off detailed discussion by saying that the maps were only reproduction of those published by the previous Government. This might also explain their refusal for some years to specify

the boundary line by geographical features or by latitudes and longitudes. They contented themselves by saying that their boundary had been shown on their official maps. Their map lines in the west were continuously changing, moving further and further into Indian territory. They also took the precaution of building roads and other communication facilities as they pushed forward. They had an advantage in this area because India had no settled administration there. This area was also easier of approach from Tibet. On the other hand the Chinese were well aware that in the Eastern sector Indian administration extended as far as the MacMahon Line. There was no secrecy about it. Nehru said so openly as early as 1950. The Chinese, therefore, wanted to place themselves in a bargaining position by quietly moving forward in Ladakh and occupying as large an area as they could. Nehru was firmly opposed to accepting the Chinese contention that the frontier between the two countries had to be fixed by mutual agreement. If traditional frontiers were to be ignored in that manner, the door would be thrown open to the Chinese to lay all manner of claims along the entire 2000-mile frontier. This would be extremely risky in view of Chinese conduct since 1950. The assumption that the Chinese would have agreed to accept the MacMahon Line in exchange for agreement by India to let them retain Aksai Chin, as is suggested by some supposedly knowledgeable persons in India, is entirely baseless. At no time did the Chinese give any indication that they would forego any part of their map claim in the west. The discussions at official level regarding Bara Hoti in the summer of 1958, at a time when relations between the two countries were still friendly, clearly showed that the Chinese would not have agreed to forego their territorial claim to any area, however, small. Nehru was opposed to the surrender of what according to history, tradition and exercise of jurisdiction in the past was Indian territory. He was convinced that even if India gave in to the Chinese claim in Ladakh, other demands would not be long in coming. And Nehru was not a dictator in any sense. There were bitter feelings in Parliament, press and among the people over the Chinese action and attitude towards the international border and even Nehru would have found it

impossible to get the Parliament agree to the Chinese map line in Ladakh in return for the Chinese recognition of the MacMahon Line. Some leftist circles claiming inside knowledge have said that Nehru was in favour of a compromise by accepting the Chinese claim to Aksai Chin but was strongly opposed by his colleague Govind Ballav Pant, Home Minister, in the Indian Cabinet. As one closely associated with discussions within the Government I can say that such a proposal was not discussed at any time. The entire Cabinet was united in its opposition to any settlement on the basis of barter.

Would the Chinese attitude have been different if India had refused to give political asylum to Dalai Lama? There can be little doubt that the Chinese suspicion against India was roused by the warm popular reception accorded to the Dalai Lama when he visited India for the Buddha Jayanti celebrations in November-December, 1956, but this was nothing compared to the deep Chinese resentment at the popular demonstration in his favour when he arrived in India as a refugee in April, 1959. There was no doubt at any time in Nehru's mind that he was doing the right thing in allowing the Dalai Lama to enter Indian territory for asylum. The Chinese knew that it was the inherent right of a sovereign country to give political asylum to a foreigner as they had themselves done so in allowing the former Nepalese rebel leader, K. I. Singh, to live in Peking after the failure of the rebellion led by him in Nepal. In spite of the great sympathy for the Dalai Lama in India in 1959, Nehru told him firmly, that while in India he and his officials would not be allowed to indulge in any political activity. More than once the India Foreign Office repudiated the Chinese allegation that there was a Government of Dalai Lama functioning on Indian soil. There is no reason to think that the Chinese who were not convinced by Nehru's repeated assurances and practical demonstrations of friendship would have shed their suspicions against India if India had refused to give political asylum to the Dalai Lama. On the contrary, such refusal would be regarded by the Chinese authorities as evidence that their pressure was proving fruitful and it was only necessary to keep up this pressure to gain further concessions from India.

In retrospect it appears that from the time of Dalai Lama's visit to India in November-December, 1956 the Chinese definitely revised their attitude to India. They took the spontaneous popular acclaim received by Dalai Lama whenever he went in India as evidence of encouragement to him to assert an independent position with Government of India's support. Reports from our Embassy in Peking showed that there was a cooling off of Chinese attitude towards our Embassy from the middle of 1957. At Shanghai old Pakistani residents were receiving better treatment than the Indian residents. From about that time the Chinese press began to publicise small news items about India saying that India was giving up her nonaligned approach and placing herself within the American sphere of influence. Reports of disturbances in India were given publicity in the controlled Chinese press. Our Trade Agencies in Tibet met with increasing difficulties in discharging their functions. We also received information that Chinese representatives had started propaganda in Asian and African countries that the troubles in Tibet were due to Indian machinations.

Two long commentaries on Nehru's philosophy published by the editorial department of the *People's Daily* in May, 1959, and October, 1962, show that the Chinese had never shed their suspicion of India. The first article which was somewhat moderate in tone cited Indian diplomatic moves in 1950 when the Chinese began their march into Tibet and the impressive welcome given to the Dalai Lama as evidence of Indian interference in Tibetan affairs. It criticised Nehru's statements and remarks since the rebellion in Tibet and alleged that these were not in conformity with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. The so-called Indian bourgeoisie "which had inherited and was attempting to maintain a certain legacy from the British colonial rulers" came in for severe criticism but there was a grudging admission that Nehru was different from those in India who bore ill-will towards China. The second article suffered from no such inhibition. "Nehru's philosophy", it said, "had all along been expansionist. He wanted to establish a regional grouping with India at the centre of economical and political activities. He was represen-

tative of the Indian bourgeoisie and big landlords who had seized the fruits gained by the Indian people in their struggle against Britain". Nehru was accused of using violence to suppress the progressive forces within the country and in order to beg for U.S. aid the Indian Government allegedly resorted to every device ranging from anti-Communist campaign at home to provoking border conflicts with neighbours. With such deeply held suspicion against India it is most improbable that the Chinese could be appeased by the surrender of Aksai Chin or any other area claimed by them or that the Chinese attitude would have been different if India had refused to give asylum to Dalai Lama. Verily all the years Nehru had spent in building a bridge of friendship with China and trying to convince the Chinese leaders that India had no ulterior motive or interest in Tibet had been spent in vain.

Some elements in the Indian Communist Party repeated the Chinese allegation that Nehru's Government had kept up the frontier dispute to qualify for large-scale economic aid from America. This completely ignored the fact that when in the years 1950-56 relations between India and the U.S.A. were put to severe test by serious policy differences over Korea, the Japanese Peace Treaty, the crisis in Formosa, the Geneva settlement relating to Indochina, the U.S.A. sponsored military alliances like the SEATO and CENTO, India did not make the slightest compromise with her basic stand in international affairs in order to secure U.S. assistance for the First and Second Five Year Plans. There was far less reason to create a border dispute with a country for which India had repeatedly demonstrated her friendship since 1950 for the sake of American aid. Speaking in the Rajya Sabha on 20th September, 1959, at a time when Chinese propaganda against him was at its height, Nehru said, "In the final analysis the Chinese value Indian friendship only to a limited extent, but I repeat that we should continue to work for their friendship. To imagine that India can push China about is silly. To imagine that China can push India about is equally silly". These were not the words of a person deliberately seeking to create a dispute with China. It is, however, fair to add that although the Communist Party of India was critical of Nehru's action

in giving political refuge to the Dalai Lama and of the excitement over his arrival in India in March, 1959, the National Council of the Party adopted a resolution on 14th November, 1959, supporting the Nehru Government's stand that the traditional border in Ladakh should be accepted by China, and there being a dispute as to where exactly this border lay, there should be friendly discussions between the two Governments. As regards the MacMahon Line, the National Council felt that, whatever the past history, the fact could not be ignored that for several years this has been the frontier of India and the area south of the Line was a part of India and as such should remain in India. Party leaders leaned back as far as possible to keep the scale between India and China even. Thus Ajay Ghosh, General Secretary of the Party, returning from Peking where he led the Communist Party delegation at the Tenth Anniversary Celebration of the Chinese People's Republic, said at the Palam Airport that he had met Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai in Peking and both China and Russia were keen that the border dispute should be settled as quickly as possible. "I do not believe", Ghosh said, "that there has been aggression on any side, nor is there any desire for aggression on the part of any Government."

Some commentators in India and abroad pointed to the friendly border agreements China had signed with Burma and Nepal as evidence of China's sincerity in settling her border disputes with neighbouring countries. Nehru was happy that at least two of India's neighbours with whom India's relations were the friendliest had settled their differences with China. He himself had been pleading with Chou En-lai since 1956 for a friendly settlement with Burma but it took five years of discussion, often accompanied by bickerings, before the Chinese suddenly decided to sign the border agreement with Burma on 28th January, 1960, only a few weeks before Chou En-lai's visit to India in April, 1960. The Sino-Nepalese boundary agreement was reached in May 1960, during the visit of the Nepalese Prime Minister, B. P. Koirala, to Peking. By then relations between India and China had deteriorated seriously. The Chinese regarded their dispute with India as of primary importance and presumably wanted to show to the world, and Asian-African

countries in particular, how reasonable she was in reaching frontier agreements with other countries and the failure to reach an agreement with India was not her fault.

From the Chinese point of view the fact that Burma and Nepal agreed to discuss frontier delimitation with China was as important as the contents of the agreements. India had taken the stand that the traditional frontier should be respected and would not throw open to discussion the entire length of the frontier. It is likely that Burma and Nepal did not take a similar stand. Significantly the agreement with Nepal mentioned that "China would never adopt a great nation chauvinism toward Nepal".

It is interesting to speculate to what extent the worsening relations between the Soviet Union and China affected the Chinese attitude towards the Sino-Indian border problem. The Soviet authorities were extremely careful about expressing their view on the subject. On 2nd September, 1959, I called in the Soviet Ambassador for a discussion. I told him that the Chinese explanation that they had not yet had time to correct their maps did not appear convincing. It was one thing for a small length of the international border to be disputed but the Indian people deeply resented the Chinese action in showing thousands of square miles of Indian territory according to the traditional frontier as part of China in official maps. The Soviet authorities made the first public reference to the Sino-Indian dispute in a statement issued by the Tass on 9th September, 1959, after the bloody clash at Long-ju on the Eastern frontier. It said that western reports about incidents on the Sino-Indian border were designed to aggravate tension before Khrushchev's visit to the U.S.A. and to drive a wedge between India and China. Deploring the incident at Long-ju, the Tass report said—"The Soviet Union maintains friendly relations with the People's Republic of China and the Chinese and Soviet peoples are linked by unbreakable ties of fraternal friendship based on the principles of socialist internationalism. Friendly co-operation between the Soviet Union and India is successfully developing in keeping with the ideas of peaceful co-existence. The attempts to cash in on the incident that took place on the Indo-China frontier for the purpose of fanning the cold war and crippling relations

between the peoples are worthy of resolute condemnation". Nehru welcomed the statement describing it as an unusual one for the Soviet Government to make, in which a Communist country did not lend its full support to another Communist country, whatever the merits of the dispute. How deeply the Chinese Government resented the Tass statement became known four years later when ideological conflict between China and the Soviet Union came out in the open and a number of highly polemical statements appeared on both sides. The Chinese Government then described the Tass statement as "the first instance in history in which a socialist country instead of condemning the armed provocation by the reactionaries of a capitalist country condemned another fraternal socialist country".

A few weeks after the incident at Long-ju when a more serious clash took place at Kong Ka Pass in Ladakh, Khrushchev took the occasion of his address to the Supreme Soviet on 31st October, 1959, to deplore the incident and expressed the hope that such incidents would not be repeated and questions of the disputed frontier would be solved by friendly negotiation to the mutual satisfaction of both sides. To a correspondent of the Indian weekly, *New Age*, he said that the Sino-Indian border incident was "sad" and "stupid" and cited the settlement of the Soviet Union's border question to show how such questions should be dealt with. The following January Marshal Voroshilov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and F.R. Kozlov and Y. A. Furtseva, two members of the Party Presidium, came on a visit to India as State guests. At a news conference on 5th February, 1960, correspondents tried to draw out Kozlov who was also first Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers on Sino-Indian relations. He contented himself by referring to the Tass statement of September 1959 and Khrushchev's statement before the Supreme Soviet in October. During the talks with the visiting dignitaries and the officials accompanying them, the Indian Ministers and officials did not refer at all to the border question, not wishing to embarrass the guests. In private talks with Nehru the Soviet dignitaries expressed appreciation of this. Nehru had at no time thought of asking for Soviet good offices in settling the dispute with China.

He was anxious not to place them in an embarrassing position but wanted them not to misunderstand the Indian attitude. The Soviet Government anyway could not play a helping part in the settlement of the dispute as their relations with China rapidly deteriorated from 1960.

It now appears that China had accepted the principles of *Panch Sheel* with reservation. This came out during the ideological controversies with the Soviet Union. In the Chinese view external relations with socialist countries must be on a different basis from those with imperialist countries, and since Nehru "had inherited the mantle of British imperialism", there could be no co-existence with India.

According to the Chinese peaceful co-existence merely impeded the polarisation of world forces, socialism on the one hand and imperialism on the other. Countries like India professing to follow a policy of nonalignment merely served to confuse issues, and Nehru's India was a bad example to other Asian-African countries recently liberated from colonial rule. The Chinese were deeply resentful of Soviet neutrality in the border disputes with India and the massive Soviet economic aid to India. If the Indians thought they could defy China because of Soviet sympathy and assistance, they would know it to their cost. Nehru on his part did not make any attempt to capitalise on Sino-Soviet differences to secure Soviet support. He had no doubt that Chinese intransigence over the border problem was due to the traditional Chinese chauvinism and big-power complex and India had to face the problem on her own. This he mentioned in the Lok Sabha.

DALAI LAMA SEEKS REFUGE

WHATEVER THE Government of India might do to assure the Chinese Government that India had no political or any special interest in Tibet, Chinese suspicions were not to be allayed. The Government of India made elaborate arrangements to celebrate the 2500th Anniversary of Buddha's attainment of salvation in November, 1956, in collaboration with the UNESCO. Delegates were invited from all over the world and there was an impressive gathering in Delhi of leaders of different faiths and cultures from all parts of the world. A formal invitation to these celebrations, meant for the Dalai Lama, had been transmitted to the Chinese Government by the Indian Embassy in Peking towards the end of 1955. The Dalai Lama was happy to know of this invitation from our Consul-General in Lhasa and said he was keenly looking forward to his visit to India. However, in February, 1956, the Chinese Foreign Office told our Embassy in Peking that the Dalai Lama would not find it possible to come to Delhi owing to preoccupations at home. The Government of India expressed their disappointment and asked the Indian Consul-General at Lhasa to ascertain informally from the Dalai Lama whether he could not visit India even for a few days, and to tell him that his presence on such a unique occasion would be widely appreciated. He was surprised to know of the reply sent to us by the Peking Government and said he had not even been consulted by the Chinese authorities. However, the Chinese Government must have had second thought later and in July, 1956, the Chinese Embassy in Delhi informed the Foreign Office that both the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama would be glad to attend the celebrations.

The two Lamas arrived in Delhi on 24th November, 1956, but in separate planes, the Dalai Lama a little earlier than the Panchen Lama. Dalai Lama's was a familiar name in India. The Buddhists held him in special veneration and millions of people of other faiths knew of him as a mythical figure who combined in him temporal and religious

leadership of Tibet. He received a tremendous welcome in Delhi. Nehru was present at Palam to receive him. During the following weeks he visited a number of places considered holy by the Buddhists and everywhere large crowds greeted him with folded hands and sought his blessings. A shy youngman with a pleasant smile on his face the Dalai Lama carried himself with great dignity and there was plenty of evidence that he was wiser than his years. By contrast Panchen Lama who was slightly younger than the Dalai seemed unsure of himself. Each of the two Lamas had a retinue of teachers, counsellors and attendants with him. An elaborate system of protocol was observed. Both the visitors were accommodated in the spacious Hyderabad House which was then the official guest house of the Government of India in New Delhi. Thousands of people used to crowd round the Hyderabad House and on occasions it was difficult to control the crowds. We set up two tents for the two Lamas where they could give public audience to their admirers. While there was a rush of visitors to pay homage to the Dalai Lama, not many cared to see the Panchen Lama. The Chinese Embassy must have carefully noted the different treatment received by the two dignitaries. The Government of India did not have the slightest responsibility for the lack of attention from the public for the Panchen. Significantly the Chinese Embassy reminded us that the two Lamas were of equal importance.

Within a few days of the two Lamas' arrival in Delhi Chou En-lai himself arrived on a State visit to India. He spent three days in Delhi, November 28 to 30, and then visited other places in India. He then proceeded to Poland and after paying an official visit to Pakistan arrived in New Delhi for a two day stay on December 30, on his way back home. During his stay in Delhi on both the occasions Nehru had prolonged talks with him on various subjects. Principal amongst these were the crisis in Egypt and the Middle East, the situation in Hungary which had just seen a revolution crushed by Soviet military might, Sino-American relations and Tibet. Chou En-lai spoke at great length about Tibet. Historically, he said, Tibet had been a part of China but never a province of China as Sinkiang, for example. Tibet had always been a separate and autonomous part and

the Chinese recognised that the Tibetans had a well-defined cultural identity. Politics and religion in Tibet were interconnected and there were several sets of religious authority in the big temples with their living Buddhas. The policy of the Chinese Government was to let Tibet remain an autonomous region under the leadership of the Central Government. So far as local matters were concerned, they would be decided by the Tibetans themselves. The Chinese Government would fully respect their religion and for the time being were not thinking of any democratic reform in Tibet. A beginning would be made only when conditions were more favourable in future.

Chou En-lai proceeded to complain that some people under the influence of foreign Governments did not want Tibet to be under the Central Government of China and talked about Tibetan independence. These elements carried on their activities mainly from Kalimpong and received their instruction from some people who had returned from the USA. There was some trouble in Tibet lately, Chou En-lai said, but the Dalai Lama had pacified the trouble-makers. Chou En-lai then came out with the explanation that the Dalai Lama had at first refused the invitation to the Buddha Jayanti celebrations as he feared that during his absence there might be trouble in Lhasa. However, because of friendly relations between China and India the Chinese Government left it to the Dalai Lama to decide whether he could accept the invitation. After the Dalai Lama had accepted the invitation, the Chinese Government advised the Panchen Lama also to accept it.

Chou En-lai complained that while in India some of the Tibetan officials accompanying the Dalai Lama had come under the influence of the Kalimpong Tibetans led by the Dalai Lama's elder brother who had just returned from the U.S.A. He also complained that some local officials in India had been unfriendly in their speeches of welcome to the Dalai Lama calling Tibet a separate country and not mentioning China at all. The Mayor of Bombay, for example, Chou said, was guilty of this discourtesy.

Nehru assured the Chinese Premier that India had no political interest in Tibet. The Dalai Lama was venerated as a religious leader. There had been religious and cul-

tural intercourse between India and the Tibet region of China for centuries and in more recent years there was a substantial border trade between India and Tibet. This trade was to the mutual benefit of the two countries. So far as the Government of India was concerned, relations between India and Tibet were strictly governed by the 1954 Agreement. The Government of India had warned the Tibetans who had settled in Darjeeling that if they indulged in any political activities, they would be forced to leave India. Under the Indian Law, however, it was not possible for Government to take any action against anybody, not even a foreigner, so long as he kept within the bounds of law.

Chou En-lai had already spoken firmly to the Dalai Lama and warned him against listening to anti-Chinese elements. Chinese officials kept the Dalai under continuous pressure. Anxious to have Nehru's personal advice he saw Nehru a number of times, all by himself. Nehru told him that he would be ill advised to think or talk of Tibetan independence. If he had any such idea, he should clearly know that he could not depend on any significant assistance from outside. Nehru warned the Dalai Lama that any movement for independence would only bring in more suffering for his people. He should, therefore, concentrate on securing the maximum possible autonomy for Tibet. Nehru said he felt that in their present mood the Chinese would not push things to an extreme if the Tibetans themselves behaved with moderation. It was, therefore, in the Dalai Lama's interest to ask his immediate advisers not to indulge in irresponsible talks of throwing out the Chinese. Nehru told him clearly that the Government of India would not permit Tibetans in Kalimpong and Darjeeling to behave irresponsibly on Indian territory.

Some difficulty arose about arrangements for the Dalai Lama's return journey to Lhasa. He was keen on travelling by the land route through Kalimpong which was the traditional route of communication between India and Tibet. Chou En-lai was not willing to let the Dalai Lama visit Kalimpong. He told Nehru that according to his information the Dalai Lama might be forced by the Kalimpong Tibetans to stay on in India. He feared that if the Dalai

Lama visited Kalimpong, there might be some unpleasant incident. Besides the Panchen Lama was not keen on passing through Kalimpong as he apprehended discourteous treatment from the local Tibetans. Nehru assured the Chinese Premier that the Dalai Lama was free to choose his itinerary. Whichever route he would take, the Government of India would take all necessary steps to prevent the outbreak of any disorder anywhere on Indian territory. The Dalai Lama had at one time thought of spending a longer time in India and not returning to Lhasa immediately. When he mentioned this to Nehru, he was advised strongly against keeping out of his country. His future, Nehru said, lay with his people and it would not be right for him to stay back in India. Ultimately, the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa by the land route visiting Kalimpong on the way. There he received an enthusiastic ovation from huge crowds lining both sides of the road. The crowds studiously ignored the Panchen Lama. This difference in treatment could not have escaped the notice of the Chinese officials who accompanied the two religious leaders.

Within a few months of the two Lamas' return to Tibet reports received from our Consul-General in Lhasa showed that the situation in and around Lhasa continued to be uneasy. Local Chinese officials were more circumspect in dealing with Tibetans but the Tibetan people's mood of discontent was unmistakable. Some rebels from the Khampa area were also arriving in Lhasa and the Chinese became very suspicious of their activities. The Khampas had risen in open revolt against Chinese authority from the middle of 1956. They were people of Tibetan origin who lived in a mountainous area adjoining inner Tibet which was part of China proper. They resented Chinese attempts to control them and took to cutting lines of communication and inflicting heavy casualties on Chinese forces by surprise raids. All efforts by the Chinese Government to suppress the rebellion failed. As the trouble continued, the Chinese authorities convinced themselves that the rebel fighters were receiving encouragement and assistance from foreign sources. Their suspicion against Kalimpong Tibetans also deepened, although Kalimpong was hundreds of miles away from the rebel areas without any line of communi-

cation with the Khampa territory.

On 10th July, 1958 the Foreign Office in Peking handed a long note to our Embassy giving instances of subversive activities by Tibetan refugees in Kalimpong. The Government of India were requested to check these activities which, it was alleged, were being carried on by American and Chiang Kai-shek agents. The Ministry of External Affairs immediately ordered an enquiry into these allegations. We found no evidence of the so-called U.S. or Chiang Kai-shek agents in Kalimpong or elsewhere in Darjeeling nor could we find any organisations or associations bearing the names mentioned in the Chinese note. For some years the Tibetans settled in Darjeeling had two associations, but the aims of these two were religious, cultural and social.

Nevertheless some of the Tibetan refugees named in the Chinese note who had been living there with families for years were warned by the local authorities under New Delhi's instruction that if they indulged in any activities—political or other—which were likely to adversely affect the relations between India and China, the Government of India would take the severest possible action against them. All these facts we mentioned in our reply to the Chinese. Our note concluded with the following:

“The Government of India reiterate their friendship for the people and the Government of the People's Republic of China. They have no doubt that the Chinese Government's note is based on misinformation and they express the hope that, in the light of the facts now mentioned, the Government of the People's Republic of China will feel assured that India does not and will not permit any activity on its territory directed against the People's Republic of China and that the Government of India are determined to take action under the law of the country against those who indulge in any such illegal activities.”

The Government of India repeated their instruction to the local authorities in Darjeeling to be on guard against any possible illegal activities of the Tibetan refugees. The Chinese were not to be mollified. They soon expressed their displeasure in a most unusual manner. During his stay in Delhi the Dalai Lama had invited Nehru to visit Lhasa as a guest of the Tibetan Government. A formal invitation

was later received through the Chinese Government. The programme of the visit and other details were discussed between the Governments of India and China for months and it was agreed that Nehru would arrive in Lhasa in the autumn of 1958. Chou En-lai informed our Embassy in Peking that he would be present at Lhasa to receive the distinguished visitor. There were indications, however, in the summer of 1958 that Chinese interest in the visit had flagged and in August we were informed that conditions in Tibet were such that it would be unsafe for the Indian Prime Minister to visit Lhasa. Nehru who had been looking forward to this visit was disappointed. He decided to utilise the time set apart for Lhasa to pay a long-promised visit to Bhutan. Communications with Bhutan's capital in those days were extremely difficult. The only convenient land route passed through a tongue of Tibetan territory in Chumbi Valley in Tibet. For going to Bhutan the Indian Prime Minister, therefore, needed a Chinese visa. The foreign Office in Delhi made a request to the Chinese Embassy for such a visa but for weeks there was no response. This delay was unusual and obviously discourteous to the head of a friendly Government. Nehru was visibly irritated.

One morning he asked me to send his passport to the Chinese Embassy to force a decision from them. I demurred. It would be most unusual, I said, to adopt this procedure to get a Chinese Visa for the Indian Prime Minister. However, ultimately the Chinese Government authorised a visa and Nehru fulfilled his programme. The impression left on the Foreign Office was that the delay was deliberate and intended as a mark of Chinese displeasure.

In the second week of March, 1959, stray reports of disturbances in and around Lhasa appeared in Indian newspapers. This caused some excitement among the public and in Parliament. Anxious to prevent any anti-Chinese demonstrations in India Nehru made a statement in the Lok Sabha on March 17 appealing for calm. He declared once again that India had no intention of interfering in China's internal affairs and would do nothing to make the situation worse. There was still hope, he said, that the trouble in Tibet would be solved peacefully. The Foreign Office had already received some reports about the dis-

turbances in Lhasa from the Indian Consul-General. On the day Nehru made his statement in Parliament nothing was known about the Dalai Lama's whereabouts and it was assumed that he was still in Lhasa.

Parliament, however, continued to be in a tense mood. On 23rd March, replying to a motion for adjournment in the Lok Sabha, Nehru made a long statement on the situation based on the Consul-General's reports. He mentioned that various rumours in regard to the Dalai Lama caused excitement in Lhasa. About two weeks earlier a large crowd of Tibetans had entered the premises of the Indian Consulate-General to speak to the Consul-General about the rumours and their apprehensions about the Dalai Lama's safety. Three days later a large number of Tibetan women came to the Consulate and requested the Consul-General to accompany them to the Chinese Foreign Bureau to be a witness to their demands. The Consul-General refused to accompany them. On 20th March fighting suddenly broke out between Chinese troops and Tibetan elements. There was firing in the vicinity of the Consulate-General and stray bullets hit the buildings. The Consul-General and his staff had to keep indoors. The Chinese Foreign Bureau asked him and his staff to move to other buildings which, they said, they would place at his disposal. The Government of India instructed the Consul-General to stay where he was. Thereafter the Consul-General and his staff had no means of knowing first-hand what was happening. Stressing that this was a delicate and difficult situation and that nothing should be done to make it worse, Nehru told the Lok Sabha that India had no intention to interfere in the internal affairs of China with which we had friendly relations. India and China had signed the first *Panch Sheel* Agreement.

The first official news we had from the Chinese Government about these disturbances was on 22nd March when the Vice-Foreign Minister of China informed our Ambassador in Peking that an armed revolt had broken out in Lhasa. The local Tibetan Government, he said, under the instigation of "imperialists and foreign reactionary elements" had torn up the Agreement on the peaceful liberation of Tibet and began armed revolt. The

Chinese News Agency released on 28th March a Proclamation signed by Chou En-lai. It said that the Chinese Government had decided to dissolve the Tibetan local Government whose powers would be exercised by the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region. It also mentioned that the Panchen Lama would thereafter act as the Chairman of the Committee. On the same night a long news communiqué was issued in Peking by the Hsinhua News Agency giving details of the rebellion in Tibet. The Dalai Lama, it stated, had been abducted from Lhasa, but the rebellion in Lhasa had been smashed and the People's Liberation Army were engaged in mopping up the "rebel bandits" in other places in Tibet. The Chinese Government welcomed Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on 23rd March on non-intervention in China's internal affairs and considered his statement friendly. They, however, repeated the charge against Kalimpong describing the place as the "commanding centre of rebellion". They also criticised the discussions in the Indian Parliament and said that such discussion of the internal affairs of a friendly country like China was "impolite and improper". On the following day the Chinese Government released the texts of the letters which were exchanged between the Dalai Lama and General Tan Kuan-san, Head of the Military Government of Lhasa, before the Dalai Lama's flight from the city.

On March 30 I issued the following rejoinder to the Chinese allegations against Kalimpong :

"Asked for his comments on the description of Kalimpong as the commanding centre of the rebellion in the news communique an official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs said that a number of people from Tibet have been residing in Kalimpong and among them are some who arrived in the last three or four years. The Government of India have repeatedly made it clear to them that they should not indulge in any propaganda activity against a friendly Government. The last warning was given to them about six months ago and since then the persons have remained quiet. It was therefore entirely incorrect to say that Kalimpong was the centre of any rebellious activity. The check posts on the Indo-Tibet border are alert and

the strictest watch was maintained on movements between India and Tibet”.

Later the same day there was a motion for adjournment in the Lok Sabha. In reply Nehru made another long statement. He drew the attention of the House to the contradiction issued by the Foreign Office and answered the criticism in the Chinese statement of supposed interference by the Indian Parliament in Chinese affairs in measured words. He said, “We want to have friendly relations with the people of Tibet and we want them to progress in freedom. At the same time, it is important for us to have friendly relations with the great country China. That does not mean that I or this Government or this Parliament or anyone else should submit to any kind of dictation from any country however great it may be. It does mean, however, that in a difficult situation we should exercise certain measure of restraint and wisdom and not do anything in excitement which might lead our country into difficulties”.

On 31st March the Chinese Embassy circulated yet another report from the New China News Agency. On the same day the Secretariat of the Communist Party of India issued a statement criticising the Tibetan “serf owners who wished to prevent the dawn of modern enlightenment and equality in Tibet”. “All Indians”, the statement continued, “likewise sympathised with our friendly and great neighbour China which is meeting a difficult situation with the utmost regard for human considerations of Tibetan autonomy and the unity of the Chinese nation”. It supported the Chinese allegation about “shady happenings” in Kalimpong. Complimenting Nehru on the proper attitude he had taken on this question, it criticised the P. S. P. and the Jan Sangh who, it said, were attempting to spread anti-Chinese feelings in India. The statement concluded with “warm greetings to the Communist Party of China under whose guidance the People’s Government of China was leading the people of Tibet from mediaeval darkness to prosperity and equality”.

On the following day, April 1, there were again angry outbursts in the Lok Sabha against the Chinese Embassy’s repetition of the allegations after they had been repudia-

ted by the Prime Minister. The insinuations made by the Communist Party of India were also bitterly criticised. Nehru was out of Delhi on that particular day and all efforts by Home Minister Govind Ballav Pant and Lakshmi Menon, Deputy Minister of External Affairs, failed to satisfy the House. Nehru hurried back to Delhi and on the following day made yet another detailed statement on the situation in Tibet. He recalled his talks with the Chinese Prime Minister in 1956-57 and explained how there were obvious limitations under the Indian law on taking action against anybody on the basis of mere suspicion as the Chinese would like. Anxious not to add to the prevailing excitement and to prevent, if possible even at that stage, further worsening of relations with China, he said: "I want the House to deal this matter with dignity and restraint, because behind all these minor matters lie much bigger matters which we have to face to-day, tomorrow and the day after and we should not allow ourselves to be diverted from that major and difficult issue by relatively minor issues". Referring to the statement of the Communist Party of India, Nehru said he did not agree with 'a certain slant' contained in the statement but he did not take any serious view of it. He was already in possession of grave news. what this news was he did not reveal to the House.

When the news of the Dalai Lama's disappearance from Lhasa became known to the Foreign Office and was later admitted by the Chinese Government, we thought he had possibly gone into hiding in some remote place in Tibet. It was just possible, however, that he might seek refuge in India as he had intended to do in 1950 when the Chinese forces first marched into Tibet. There was, however, nothing the Government of India could do except to alert our frontier posts on the Tibetan border in the North East. On April 1 a wireless message was received in the Foreign Office via Shillong from one of our border check posts saying that an emissary of the Dalai Lama had arrived at the post on March 29 with information that the Dalai Lama was expected to cross the Tibet-India border on 30th March and would like to have political asylum in India. The same evening another message came inform-

ing us that the Dalai Lama with a small party had crossed the border into Indian territory on the evening of 31st March. Nehru asked me to keep these messages in my personal custody and not to let his movements be known until he was well within the Indian territory. The Prime Minister had already considered the question of political asylum in case the Dalai Lama made a request for it. A senior colleague of his, one in whom he had great confidence, did not like the fuss that was being made in India about conditions in Tibet and about the Dalai Lama, but Nehru strongly reacted against any suggestion that political asylum should be refused. It was the inherent right of a sovereign nation, he said, to give asylum to a political refugee so long as the refugee did not indulge in any political activities. He recalled Chou En-lai's statement to him in Peking in October, 1956. Nehru had then referred to the presence in Peking of the Nepalese political leader, K. I. Singh, who had found asylum there and mentioned to the Chinese Premier that the Nepal Government were feeling concerned. Chou En-lai replied that it was the accepted international norm to give asylum to a political refugee but Singh would not be permitted to indulge in political activities. The Government of India would impose the same condition on the Dalai Lama but there could be no question of denying him political asylum in India.

As always Nehru was anxious to take Parliament into his confidence at the earliest. He therefore made a brief statement on 3rd April announcing that the Dalai Lama had entered Indian territory. He had not told the House earlier as he was waiting for some details. The House greeted this statement with cheers and many members expressed anxiety about the Dalai Lama's safety in India. Nehru contented himself with saying that he would see that the Dalai Lama received respectful treatment.

On the same day I sent for the Chinese Ambassador and informed him that in accordance with international usage the Dalai Lama had been allowed to cross into Indian territory and to stay here. I assured the Ambassador that the Dalai Lama would not be allowed to carry on any political activity while on Indian soil. To the Ambassador the information about the Dalai Lama was

nothing new. The Peking Radio had already announced it on 31st March. This announcement had taken the Foreign Office by surprise. It had arrived ahead of the message from our own frontier post. It was possible, we thought, that the Chinese authorities in Tibet had intercepted the wireless message from our frontier post since the message was in ordinary code and not in secret cipher. There were no facilities for the transmission in secret code from these posts.

As the news of the Dalai Lama's arrival spread, hundreds of newspaper correspondents both Indian and foreign flew to Tezpur, the headquarters of the nearest plains district in Assam. Tezpur was a small town without any facilities of hotel and communication and we sent a senior officer from Delhi to make the best possible arrangements to look after the pressmen and other curious visitors and to protect the Dalai Lama from avoidable harassment by overenthusiastic admirers. A small tented township grew up almost overnight as hundreds of Tibetan refugees who were pouring across the border had also to be accommodated. It was the beginning of the monsoon in that part of India. The Tibetans, used to dry cold climate, were suffering intensely from heat and damp. Nehru decided that the Dalai Lama should move without delay to Mussoorie. A senior officer of the Foreign Service who had formerly served as Consul-General in Lhasa and knew the Dalai Lama was attached to his party as a Liaison Officer.

In Tezpur the Dalai Lama issued a statement giving an account of the circumstances in which he left his country and sought refuge in India. This statement was distributed among the newspaper correspondents by the Indian Liaison Officer. Peking immediately reacted by describing the Dalai Lama's statement as "a crude document full of lay reasoning, lies and loopholes". It reflected "the will of the imperialist aggressors" and criticised the imperialists and "the Indian expansionists". The Chinese also alleged that the statement was not made by the Dalai Lama but was imposed on him by others. We immediately issued a firm denial of these allegations. This, however, seemed only a matter of routine, the Chinese not paying

the slightest attention to our denial.

On April 24 Nehru proceeded to Mussoorie to meet the Dalai Lama. I accompanied him. Nehru had nearly four hours' talk with the Dalai Lama. There was nobody else except the Tibetan interpreter provided by the Indian Foreign Office and myself. The Dalai Lama spoke calmly and showed no trace of bitterness against anybody despite the physical and the mental strain through which he had passed.

The talk with the Dalai Lama had a strange effect on Nehru for the rest of the day. He was in a reflective and reminiscent mood. He told me how many years ago he was turned out of the Savoy Hotel by the management because a friend with whom he was dining was not formally dressed. He had to move out with his ailing wife. It was clear to me that time was taking its revenge that particular day. The old management had gone. When the Prime Minister arrived at Savoy for lunch, he was greeted by a large crowd including the entire hotel staff from the Manager to the humblest menial.

On April 27 Nehru told Parliament of the substance of this long talk: "He told me of the difficulties he had to face, of the growing resentment of his people and the conditions existing there and how he sought to restrain them, and of his feelings that the religion of Buddha, which was more to him than life itself, was being endangered. He said that up to the last moment he did not wish to leave Lhasa. It was only on the afternoon of March 17 when, according to him, some shells were fired at his palace and fell in a pond nearby that a sudden decision had to be taken to leave Lhasa. Within a few hours the same day he and his party left Lhasa and took a perilous journey to the Indian frontier". The Dalai Lama, Nehru said, did not speak about his own future. He was visibly most anxious about the fate of the Tibetans who had been crossing the border into Indian territory in large numbers. Nehru assured him that the Government of India would do whatever was possible to help them despite the serious refugee problem which it already had on its hands. He advised the Dalai Lama himself to rest and not to take any decision on his future in a hurry.

Dissatisfaction against India and Nehru mounted in

Peking. At the second National People's Congress one speaker after another indulged in severe criticism of India's so-called reactionary and expansionist policies. One of the most vocal critics was the Panchen Lama who said : "The reactionaries in India walking in the footsteps of British imperialists have always harboured expansionist ambitions towards Tibet and have carried out various forms of sabotage activities". At the Congress there were repeated warnings and threats to India. Simultaneously a virulent anti-India propaganda offensive was launched by the Chinese press and radio. It was alleged that the Dalai Lama had gone to India under duress and had been kept there against his wishes. The Panchen Lama firmly rejected the suggestion made earlier by Nehru that he was free to come to India to ascertain personally whether the Dalai Lama was under any form of control in India. The Tibetan question, the Panchen Lama said, could be solved only in Tibet.

On 26th April I sent for the Chinese Ambassador and spoke to him about the hostile propaganda which had been started against India in China. The attacks on India and her officials, I said, were unbecoming and unjustified and the allegations were utterly untrue. The Dalai Lama had been permitted to enter India at his request and was free to return to his country any time he wished to do so. The statements made by the Dalai Lama in India were entirely his own. The Government of India would be glad to give necessary facilities to any emissary which the Chinese Government chose to send to India to ascertain the Dalai Lama's wishes. Since much had been made of the Chinese criticism of the popular welcome accorded to the Dalai Lama, I said : "Because of the old context, the recent tragic events in Tibet had affected the people of India considerably, but it was made clear by the Prime Minister that there was no question of any interference in the internal affairs of Tibet. As the Government of the People's Republic of China are no doubt aware, there is by law and Constitution complete freedom of expression of opinion in Parliament and the press and elsewhere in India. Opinions are often expressed in severe criticism of the Government of India's policies as well as other opinions

with which the Government are not in agreement". I assured the Ambassador that the Dalai Lama would not be permitted to carry on any political activities from the Indian soil.

In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 27th April Nehru again reiterated the principles which, he said, would continue to govern India's policy. These were, *inter alia* ; (1) The preservation of the security and integrity of India ; (2) Our desire to maintain friendly relations with China ; and (3) Our deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. He added : "It would be a tragedy if the two countries in Asia—India and China—which had been peaceful neighbours for ages past should develop feelings of hostility against each other. We for our part will follow this policy but we hope that China also would do likewise and that nothing would be said or done which would endanger the friendly relations of the two countries, which are so important from a wider point of view of peace in Asia and the world".

But the Chinese were not to be mollified. On April 30, the *People's Daily of Peking* wrote : "We give a solemn warning to imperialists and Indian expansionists—you must stop at once ; otherwise you will be crushed to pieces under the iron fists of 650 million Chinese people". On May 16 late in the evening the Chinese Ambassador Pan Tsu-li called on me in the Foreign Office and began reading out a long written statement. As I had to leave office urgently, I wanted him to hand over the statement to me. He would not. There was nothing for me to do except to listen to him in patience. He criticised the welcome extended to the Dalai Lama by the Government of India and the talks which Nehru had with the Dalai Lama who was a "Chinese rebel". "All these statements and actions of the Indian Government, no matter what their subjective intentions might be, undoubtedly played an objective role of encouraging Tibetan rebels". Then came the most significant paragraph in the statement : "On the whole, India is a friend of China. This has been so in the past thousand and more years and, we believe, will certainly continue to be so in 1000, 10000 years to come. The enemies of the Chinese people lie in the East—the

U.S. imperialists have many military bases in Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and in the Philippines which are all directed against China. China's main attention and policy are directed towards the East, to the West Pacific region, to the vicious and aggressive U.S. imperialists and not to India or any other country in Southeast Asia and South Asia. Although the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan have joined the SEATO which is designed to oppose China, we have not treated these three countries as our principal enemy; our principal enemy is U.S. imperialism. India has not taken part in Southeast Asia Treaty; it is not an opponent but a friend of our country. China will not be so foolish as to antagonise the U.S. in the east and again antagonise India in the west. The putting down of the rebellion and the carrying out of democratic reforms in Tibet will not in the least endanger India.... . We cannot have two centres of attention, nor can we take friend for foe. This is our State policy. The quarrel between our two countries in the past few years, particularly in the last three months, is but an interlude in the course of thousands of years of friendship between the two countries and does not warrant a big fuss on the part of the broad masses and the Government of our countries". The statement concluded with the following words: "Our Indian friends, what is your mind? Will you be agreeing to our thinking regarding the view that China can only concentrate its main attention eastward of China but not south-westward of China, nor is it necessary for her to do so? .. Friends, it seems to us that you too cannot have two fronts. Is it not so? If it is, here then lies the meeting point of our two sides. Will you please think it over?"

The Ambassador's reference to two fronts was significant. The obvious suggestion was that it would be unwise for India to have unfriendly relations with both Pakistan and China. But the Government of India could not pay the price which the Chinese Government were demanding for friendly relations with China. Nehru was also irritated by the discourteous tone of the statement taken as a whole. He drafted the reply to the statement himself and I communicated it to the Chinese Ambassador on 23rd May. The

Government of India, we said, did not consider or treat any other country as an enemy country, however much they might differ from it. In particular, they endeavoured to cultivate the friendship of the Chinese people and the Government in spite of differences of opinion, and avoid interference with Chinese internal policy and affairs. They will continue this policy but this must not be understood to mean that the Government of India would discard or vary any of their own policies under any pressure from outside.

Matters were made worse by a statement made by the Dalai Lama on 20th June at a press conference in Mussoorie. He demanded the restoration of the pre-1950 boundaries of Tibet and claimed that the Tibetan people still regarded his Government as the real Government of Tibet. From the Foreign Office we issued a statement on 30th June making it clear that the Government of India were not prepared to recognise any separate Government of Tibet. "So far as the Dalai Lama is concerned, the Prime Minister has made it clear on more than one occasion that while the Government of India are glad to give asylum to the Dalai Lama and show him the respect due to his high position, they have no reason to believe that he will do anything which is contrary to international usage and embarrassing to the host country". There was no question of any Tibetan Government under the Dalai Lama functioning in India. Nehru privately advised the Dalai Lama to avoid embarrassing the Government of India by further statements of this kind.

Towards the end of August the Dalai Lama announced his intention to refer the Tibetan case to the U.N. He came to Delhi in the first week of September and implored Nehru to lend his support. The Prime Minister strongly advised him against such a step. Later a non-official resolution was moved in the Lok Sabha urging that India should take the Tibetan issue to the U.N. In a long speech Nehru reaffirmed the Government of India's attitude to the Tibetan question. He gave a historical account of Tibet's status and described the recent events. It was doubtful, he said, if from a constitutional or a legal point of view a reference to the U.N. would be valid." The People's Re-

public of China was not represented in the U.N. and since Tibet was not an independent State but under China's suzerainty, he was not sure if the Chinese could be accused of either violating the U.N. charter or committing aggression in Tibet. Apart from legal difficulties, a reference to the U.N., Nehru said, would serve no practical purpose. "All that will happen is an expression of strong opinions by some, other countries denying it and the matter being raised to the level of the cold war and probably producing reactions on the Chinese Government which may be more adverse to Tibet and the Tibetan people than even now. So the ultimate result is no relief to the Tibetan people but something the reverse of it".

The Dalai Lama, however, could not be dissuaded. On 9th September, 1959, the U.N. head-quarters received a long cable from him appealing to the United Nations for immediate intervention and requesting the General Assembly to consider on its own initiative the Tibetan issue which had been adjourned nearly nine years earlier, i.e. on 24th November, 1950. On 29th October the United Nations adopted a joint Malaya-Ireland resolution in which the General Assembly expressed grave concern at reports to the effect that fundamental human rights and freedom of the people in Tibet had been forcibly denied them, and called for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life. Forty five nations supported the resolution and nine opposed. Twentysix including India abstained. The Chinese must have laid all the blame on India for from then on they relentlessly pursued all their territorial claims against the traditional frontier.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

SUEZ AND HUNGARY

IN THE SUMMER of 1956 Nehru went to London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. Thereafter he visited Ireland, Greece, West Germany and France. On the last lap of his journey in Europe he arrived at Brioni, the Yugoslav holiday resort, on July 18. President Nasser who had been on an official visit to Yugoslavia from July 12 was already there having talks with his host President Tito. On July 13 Nehru joined them in these talks. It had been known for weeks that the three leaders would meet at Brioni and there was much speculation about the subject of their talks. A close rapport had grown up between the three since 1955 and they used to correspond regularly on world problems. Representatives of the world press had already gathered at Brioni. Nehru told them on arrival that he had come to meet old friends for discussions which, he hoped, would be fruitful. At the end of the talks the three leaders issued a communique which was largely drafted by Nehru. This traversed the familiar ground of peace, disarmament, non-alignment, mutual co-operation, avoidance of entanglement in military pacts, aid to undeveloped countries, etc. Nothing spectacular emerged from the discussions. Nehru and Nasser left for Cairo together on July 19 and in Cairo they continued their talks on the following two days. Nehru left Cairo on the 21st afternoon, spent the night at Beirut and returned to India on 22nd July.

On the evening of Thursday, July 26, the Liberation Square at Alexandria was crowded by hundreds of thousands of Egyptians who had gathered there to celebrate the third anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution. It was at this meeting that Nasser made the dramatic announcement about the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. "The Suez Canal Company", he said, "is an exploiting company. We shall build the high Aswan Dam by restoring our rights in the Suez Canal. We shall take the

income from the Suez Canal—100 million dollars a year—and build the high dam.”

More than a year earlier Egypt had received an offer of help from Western countries to build the high dam at Aswan. Nasser hesitated to accept the offer as he felt that it was tied with political strings. Months of discussion behind the scenes followed until in July 1956 the Egyptian Government announced that they would accept help from the Western countries to build the dam. The Egyptian Ambassador in Washington, Ahmad Hussein, who had returned home for consultation, returned to Washington on July 17 and announced his Government's decision. He was anxious, he said, to speed up the negotiations for a final agreement and would seek an early meeting with Secretary Dulles. This meeting took place two days later. Immediately thereafter came a curt announcement by Dulles that America had withdrawn her offer of help to Egypt. Britain followed with a similar announcement a day later.

News of the withdrawal of the American and British offer of financial assistance must have reached Nasser by the morning of July 21 when he was still having talks with Nehru at Cairo. If it did, he did not take Nehru into his confidence. As Nasser stated later, he had made up his mind to nationalise the Suez Canal in answer to the Western challenge on the evening of July 21. Nehru learnt of the Egyptian decision only from press reports after he had landed in India. He was taken by surprise but immediately realised the serious implications of Nasser's announcement. On July 31 he gave the Indian Lok Sabha an account of the talks he had had during his visits to the various countries in Europe and the Middle East, but he made no reference to the Suez dispute beyond saying that his talks with President Nasser had not related to the Canal or any aspect of the Anglo-Egyptian relations. They discussed common problems in Asia and developments in the Middle East such as the Baghdad Pact and colonial problems. Nehru frankly admitted that he came to know of the Egyptian Government's decision from press reports after his return to Delhi.

Nehru had not the least doubt of Egypt's right to

nationalise the Canal which lay entirely within its territory. The Anglo-French contention that Nasser had acted illegally was invalid in international law. The concession to the Canal Company was an agreement between Egypt as a sovereign State and a private company. It was subject to the Egyptian municipal law and Egypt had the sovereign right under international law to nationalise the Canal Company. The right to use the Canal was governed by the International Convention of 1888 but the decision by itself did not involve any breach of the Convention. On the other hand, the Egyptian Government reiterated its guarantee of free passage through the Canal. It was true that since the Arab-Israeli war of 1947 Egypt had denied Israel passage through the Canal. Since there was nothing new about this denial, it could have no connection with the decision to nationalise the Canal. World opinion had been reconciled for several years to this denial to Israel.

Nehru however took care to state in the Lok Sabha : "The way Egypt took hold of the Suez Canal was not our way. We follow a different way, but who am I to criticise others? If they had followed a different way, so many difficulties would not have arisen, but they had a right to follow their own methods." He regretted that both sides, U.S.A. and England on the one hand and Egypt on the other, had taken action without previous consultation with each other. Indeed he had no doubt that Egypt's decision to nationalise the canal was precipitated by the Anglo-American decision to withdraw their offer of assistance of finance for construction of the Aswan Dam. "More than the decision", he added "the way it was done hurt Egypt's pride and self-respect".

As soon as Nehru received the news of Nasser's decision, he sent telegrams to Nasser as well as to Anthony Eden and Eisenhower counselling moderation. Belligerent voices were already being heard in the United Kingdom and France. On August 2 Queen Elizabeth signed Proclamation Orders calling up specialised soldiers on the British Army's Reserve for emergency duties in the Eastern Mediterranean. In a statement on August 21 the British War Office announced that "many precautionary measures of military nature were being taken with the object of strengthening our position in

the Eastern Mediterranean area and our general ability to deal with any situation that may arise." The U.S. reaction was interesting and more subtle. The U.S.A. lined up with the U.K. and France but only up to a point. Addressing the American people on the television from the President's study in Washington in presence of the President himself, Dulles said that if the decision of President Nasser to exploit the Suez Canal was permitted to go unchallenged, it would encourage him to bring a breakdown of the international fabric upon which the security and well-being of all peoples depended. Dulles added, however, that while some people had counselled immediate forcible action by the Governments most directly affected, such action would be contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter and would undoubtedly lead to widespread violence endangering the peace of the world.

India was an important user of the Suez Canal through which passed 76% of her imports and 70% of her exports. The Government of India were therefore specially interested in peaceful operation of the Canal. In a special statement to the Lok Sabha on August 8 Nehru announced the Government's decision to accept an invitation from U.K. to an international conference on the Suez Canal to be held in London in August. Once again he expressed his concern about the dangerous consequences of any hasty action. "I would fail", he said, "in my duty to this House and the country and even to all the parties involved in this crisis and not least of all to Britain and France if I do not say that threats to settle the dispute or to enforce one's views in the matter of display or use of force is a wrong way. It does not belong to this age and is not dictated by it. It fails to take account of the world and Asia as they are today.... We deeply regret the reaction against the measures taken and express the hope that the parties will enter into negotiations and seek peaceful settlements. We also much regret that in the steps that have led up to this crisis there has been no exercise by one side or the other of their respective or common initiative to inform or consult one another." Nehru stated once more that the Canal issue had not been discussed between himself and President Nasser when they had met earlier. "Consideration of it and the

concerned decision must have been made later", he added.

The joint communique issued by the Western powers calling the August Conference stated that the declared objective of the Conference was to establish an international agency for the Canal. Nehru who was particularly anxious that India's participation in the Conference should not be misunderstood in Egypt and other nonaligned countries had sought assurance from the British Government that such participation would be without commitment to any particular course of action. India, he said, would not participate in an arrangement which infringed the sovereign rights of Egypt. Having received an assurance to that effect from the British, he was satisfied that India's participation in the London Conference would not prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt.

Throughout the period Nehru was in close touch with Yugoslavia, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia. He regretted that Yugoslavia and Burma which were substantial users of the Canal were not invited to the Conference, but did not wish to make an issue of this omission in view of the extreme gravity of the situation.

While preparations for the Conference were in progress, bellicose statements continued to be made in the U.K. and France. In a nationwide radio and television broadcast on August 8 Prime Minister Anthony Eden said: "If Col. Nasser's action were to succeed, each one of us would be at the mercy of one man for the supplies on which we live. We could never accept them. With dictators you always have to pay a higher price later on—for their appetites grow with food". Eden had read history a little too closely. Nehru was greatly disturbed by these bellicose statements and became most anxious that India should help to find a peaceful way out of the serious impasse that had arisen. There was no doubt in his mind as to who should represent India at the Conference. His choice fell on Krishna Menon of whose negotiating ability he had the highest opinion. From the Foreign Office Krishna Menon chose Secretary-General N. R. Pillai as his colleague. Pillai who knew Menon's abrasive ways only too well was unhappy but had no choice. Nehru attached the highest importance to the outcome of the conference. Writing to his sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit,

then High Commissioner in London, on the eve of the Conference he described the Suez Canal Conference as the most important conference that independent India would be attending.

The Conference opened in London on August 16 with 22 States participating. Nehru took the opportunity of his Independence Day broadcast in Delhi on the previous day to make a public appeal to the participants not to let the conference fail. Even if the London Conference was not successful, he said, a second and a third attempt might be made to solve it. Under no circumstances should the issue be tackled through the use of armed forces or threats. His instruction to the Indian delegation was in general terms, the main stress being on a negotiated settlement which would respect the Egyptian Government's sovereign right and guarantee uninterrupted navigation through the Canal for all nations in accordance with the 1888 Convention. Nehru was, of course, relying on Krishna Menon to produce a formula which all sides could accept without loss of face.

Menon took the earliest opportunity at the Conference to oppose the British suggestion that decisions should be taken by majority votes and communicated to the Egyptian Government. At his insistence the Conference agreed that the entire proceedings should be transmitted to Egypt. He then unfolded the Indian plan which was based on the following principles:—

- (1) Recognition of the sovereign rights of Egypt.
- (2) Recognition of the Suez Canal as an integral part of Egypt and as a waterway of international importance.
- (3) Free and uninterrupted navigation for all nations in accordance with the 1888 Convention.
- (4) Tolls and charges should be equitable and the facilities of the Canal should be available to all countries without discrimination.
- (5) The interests of the users of the Canal should receive due recognition.

The Indian delegation formally proposed that a consultative body of user interests should be formed on the basis of geographical representation. This body would have

deliberative, consultative and liaison functions. To give the new arrangement a suitable international status, it was proposed that the Government of Egypt should transmit to the United Nations annual reports of the Egyptian Corporation operating the canal. The United States with the support of four other States made an alternative proposal under which a convention would be negotiated with Egypt providing for the creation of a Suez Canal Board for operating, maintaining and developing the Canal. Egypt would give necessary facilities to this Board and any dispute arising from the operation of the Canal would be settled by an Arbitral Commission. The convention would also embody appropriate safeguards against any party violating it. This proposal received the support of 18 participants. The Conference decided to appoint a five-nation Committee headed by Prime Minister Robert Menzies of Australia to proceed to Cairo and present the plan to Nasser. Nehru who had not expected the Indian plan to be accepted was somewhat disappointed by the outcome of the Conference but he urged Nasser privately not to rebuff the Menzies Mission. In his view any attempt at conciliation deserved support and nothing should be done to create impediments in the way. He received unexpected encouragement from an announcement by President Eisenhower who said in a press conference in Washington that the United States would not in any circumstance support the use of force. This was at a time when the Menzies Mission was still in Egypt.

Nasser received Menzies courteously in Cairo in the first week of September. He refused, however, to accept the plan carried by Menzies saying that it was not in conformity with the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt. The Menzies Mission left Cairo with an empty hand.

Nehru felt it was now time for Egypt to take the initiative to prove to the world that so long as its sovereignty was not called into question, it was willing to give necessary guarantees about free use of the Canal. On his way back from the London Conference Krishna Menon had further talks with Nasser in Cairo. Nehru also was in close communication with Nasser. Soon after the departure of the Menzies Mission from Cairo, Egypt proposed* that all the nations which used the Suez Canal should meet and discuss the

creation of a negotiating body to consider questions such as freedom of navigation, development of the Canal and review of the 1888 Convention. Britain and France, however, had other ideas. With American support they proposed to set up a Canal Users' Association which would seek to operate the Canal and collect transit dues paying an appropriate share to Egypt. This was a clear violation of Egyptian sovereignty and Egypt denounced it. Indian opinion was strongly critical of this new Western move. In telegrams to Eden and Eisenhower Nehru urged further negotiations towards a peaceful settlement and emphasized the risk of war inherent in any attempt by the so-called Users' Association to operate the Canal against Egyptian objections. However, the 18 Nations which supported the Five-Power plan in the London Conference in August met again in London in the third week of September. India which had opposed the Five-Power plan was not invited to this conference. The participants issued a declaration proposing to set up a Users' Association which was formally incorporated on October 1 with 15 members.

Meantime Nehru continued to urge moderation on the parties concerned. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on September 13 he said that he had indicated to Prime Minister Eden and President Eisenhower India's view that the situation which emerged after the Menzies Mission and the statements made by the Egyptian Government accepting all international obligations and inviting negotiations opened the way to a settlement. He appealed to both the U.K. and the U.S.A. to consider the Egyptian offer. There was no question, he said, of appeasement of one side or the other as to what was to be sought and could in his view be obtained in a settlement satisfactory and honourable to all concerned. He expressed particular regret at the decision of the Western countries to withdraw their pilots from the Suez Canal. Privately Nehru implored Nasser not to take severe measures against the pilots who wanted to quit. Egypt had already sent an appeal to friendly countries for the services of pilots. Nehru urged the Indian port authorities to do all they could to spare the services of trained pilots for work in Suez and at short notice some pilots were made available from India.

On September 23 it was announced in Paris that Britain and France had asked the Chairman of the Security Council to call a meeting of the Council on September 26 to discuss the Suez Canal issue. India welcomed the announcement. She hoped that while discussions were in progress at the U.N., the situation would not be allowed to deteriorate. Egypt herself asked the Security Council on September 24 to consider the British and French action against her. Dag Hammarskjöld lost no time in announcing that the Security Council would meet on October 5 to consider the Suez issue.

The Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Egypt who had gone to New York to participate in the Security Council's meeting established private contact amongst themselves and began direct talks. Krishna Menon who was present in New York though India was not a member of the Security Council played a useful mediatory role in these private talks. On October 12 the three Foreign Ministers reported agreement on six principles as a basis for future negotiations.

These were :—

- (1) There would be free and open transit through the Suez Canal without discrimination, overt or covert ;
- (2) The sovereignty of Egypt would be respected ;
- (3) The operation of the Canal would be insulated from the politics of any country ;
- (4) The manner of fixing tolls and charges would be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users ;
- (5) A fair proportion of the dues would be allotted to development ; and
- (6) In case of disputes, any unsolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government would be settled by arbitration.

It was learnt at the U.N. headquarters on October 13 that the six-point plan embodied the principles underlying the Indian plan which had been formally presented to the three Foreign Ministers by Menon on October 10. Menon's mediatory efforts at last bore some fruit. He deser-

ved the fulsome congratulations which Nehru sent him in New York.

Speaking at a press conference in Calcutta on October 21 Nehru said that the acute stage of the Suez crisis was over, although many difficulties still remained. Over the Suez, he added, they had been on the brink of war twice, once right at the beginning and then three weeks later. India had made persistent efforts to resolve the crisis. As the result of numerous conferences which Krishna Menon had with Britain, French and U.S. Governments, a certain approach emerged. India previously drafted some tentative proposals but she did not wish to push them as she wanted the parties concerned to come to some agreement. Nehru was obviously pleased with the understanding reached by the parties. He was soon to be bitterly disappointed.

The Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Egypt were due to meet at Geneva on October 29 for further negotiations on the basis of the principles which were accepted by them in New York. It was exactly this day that Israel chose to launch a massive attack on Egypt. Two days later England and France sent an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel "to stop all warlike action by land, sea and air forthwith and to withdraw their military forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Suez Canal." A wave of deep anger passed over India when the news of Israeli aggression came on the air. Nehru who was to leave for Hyderabad on October 31 cancelled his programme. Later he held a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet and received in quick succession Malcolm Macdonald, High Commissioner for the U.K., the French Charge de Affaires, the U.S. Counsellor-Charge de Affaires, the Russian Ambassador and the Ceylon High Commissioner. He also asked the Foreign Office to issue the following statement:—

"The Government of India have learnt with profound concern of the Israeli aggression on Egyptian territory and of the subsequent ultimatum delivered by the U.K. and France to the Egyptian Government which was to be followed by an Anglo-French invasion of the Egyptian territory. They consider this a flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter, opposed to all the principles laid down by the Bandung Conference. The aggression is bound to have far-reaching

consequences in Asia and Africa and may even lead to war on an extensive scale. The Government of India appeal to the Governments concerned and trust that even at this late hour this aggression will be halted and all foreign troops withdrawn from Egyptian territory. They hope that the world community as represented by the UN will take a quick action to this end."

Nehru sent personal messages to Eden and French Premier G. Mollet and implored Eisenhower and a number of other Heads of States and Governments to intervene in the cause of peace. In a special message to Hammarskjöld he expressed his earnest hope that the United Nations would take strong steps to prevent the world from plunging into war and to demand withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egypt.

Addressing a meeting of Congress legislators and workers at Hyderabad on November 1, Nehru described the Anglo-French military action in Egypt as a clear and naked aggression. At a public meeting later the same day he said that if war broke out, India would not involve itself in it.

On November 2 a message came to Nehru from the Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin suggesting that an emergency meeting of the Bandung Conference should be called and Britain, France and Israel asked to end their intervention in Egypt and to withdraw their troops from the Egyptian territory at once. In a message to President Eisenhower, Bulganin suggested that the Soviet and American Military forces should jointly intervene in the conflict to stop aggression. Nehru did not like the proposed intervention. He feared that intervention by other countries with military forces would complicate the situation and might enlarge the area of conflict. For the same reason he disfavoured another proposal of Bulganin's to send Soviet volunteers to Egypt. Nehru was not opposed to a meeting of the Bandung countries but since a meeting could not be arranged at short notice, its deliberations could not affect the course of the grave events. The Swiss Government proposed that the representatives of the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference with the Prime Minister of India as a representative of the Bandung Conference should meet in order to try and save peace. Nehru welcomed the proposal but

it was rejected by the U.K. and France. The United States which shared India's indignation at the aggression on Egypt also did not react favourably to it. Hope now lay in quick action by the United Nations.

The Security Council met on October 31 in New York on the initiative of the U.S. to consider the situation arising from Israeli aggression. The Council had before it a draft resolution moved by the U.S. calling for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the armistice lines and calling upon all members to refrain from the use of force in the area. The U.K. and France vetoed the resolution. A similar Soviet resolution had no better fate. The Security Council having thus been rendered powerless, an emergency session of the General Assembly was called under the terms of the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution. The Emergency Session met on November 1. Britain and France had already launched concentrated bombing attacks on what they called military targets on Egyptian territory.

Serious disturbances had already broken out in Hungary and the Soviet Union which was a strong champion of Egypt was itself on the docks. Britain and France did their best to turn the attention of the General Assembly to the happenings in Hungary. Nevertheless, in the early hours of the morning on November 2 the emergency session of the General Assembly accepted a U.S. sponsored resolution which urged immediate ceasefire and asked all sides to withdraw behind the armistice lines, to desist from trespassing across these lines into neighbouring territory and to observe scrupulous supervision of the armistice agreement. Egypt expressed her readiness to accept ceasefire provided Israel did likewise. On the 4th November the Indian representative moved a 19-Nation Asian-African resolution which noted that all the parties concerned had not agreed to ceasefire or withdrawn their forces and urged full compliance with the earlier resolution. On the same day a resolution sponsored by Canada requesting the Secretary-General to submit a plan setting up a U.N. emergency force in the area to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities was passed by a large majority. In open defiance of the U.N., Britain and France landed paratroops

in Egypt on November 5. The British troops quickly captured Port Said.

During those crucial days the permanent representative of India at the U.N., Arthur Lall, functioned more or less on his own responsibility. The Foreign Office found it difficult to keep in touch with him. Information from the Indian Embassy in Cairo was also meagre. Ambassador Ali Yavar Jung who had come home on leave was asked to return to his post but in the general confusion in Cairo caused by the Anglo-French bombing, it was extremely difficult to maintain any contact with either the Indian Embassy or with the Egyptian Government. The Egyptian Ambassador in New Delhi had no information from home. The Ambassador was on the verge of a nervous breakdown and stories were current of the entire Embassy personnel having gone on a period of mourning. We in the Foreign Office did what little we could to keep up their morale but the situation was extremely confusing.

On November 5, Egypt announced the acceptance of the U.N. resolution for the establishment of an international police force. On the same day came the news of Bulganin's telegrams to Eden, Mollet and Ben Gurion which in effect read like an ultimatum to these three leaders to withdraw their forces from Egypt. Bulganin's letter to Eden ended with the following :

"The Soviet Government has already addressed the U.N. and the President of the U.S.A. to resort jointly with other U.N. member States to naval and air force intervention in order to end the war in Egypt and to curb aggression. We are determined to crush the aggression by the use of force and to restore peace."

The Soviet Ambassador handed over texts of Bulganin's letters to Nehru. On the following day, November 6, Eden announced in the House of Commons that he was ordering a ceasefire at midnight. The crisis had passed its peak.

Menon who had arrived in New York on November 5 kept up continuous pressure with the support of the Asian-African countries to compel the withdrawal of Anglo-French-Israeli forces from Egyptian soil. On November 16 in another long statement in the Lok Sabha on the Suez Canal conflict, Nehru recalled his criticism of the warlike measures.

adopted by the U.K. and France following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. He deplored the statements made by responsible leaders in the U.K. and France that the regime in Egypt must be changed and that in particular the head of the State and Government in Egypt must be removed. . He regretted that the invading forces had not yet been withdrawn and the powers concerned seemed to have no intention of withdrawing them. "The story of the past three and half months", he added, "ever since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company is full of tragic drama and events have happened which, I would have thought, could not possibly occur in this modern age. I find it a little difficult to deal with this unabashed aggression and deception. The explanations which have been given from time to time contradict one another and exhibit an approach which is dangerous to the freedom of Asian and African countries and to all peace-lovers."

Nehru was even more forthright three days later in another speech he made in the Lok Sabha during a debate on Foreign Affairs. "It is said," he observed, "the operations prevented the Russians from coming into the Middle East. I confess I do not see how it has done that. It has in fact opened the door through which they might come in the future. Just as the Baghdad Pact, which was made to protect the Middle East from the Soviet Union, really resulted in the Soviet Union taking far greater interest in the Middle East than they had done previously, this argument that aggression on Egypt had succeeded in keeping the Russians away is not proved at all. In fact, I think, it has made it easier for the Middle East to become the possible scene of a major conflict. Thus England and France are likely to lose more than Egypt has suffered." England and France completed the withdrawal of their forces from Egypt on 22 December, but Israel not before the first week of following March.

The Egyptian crisis provided habitual critics of India's Commonwealth membership with a golden opportunity to embarrass Nehru. India, they urged, should immediately sever connection with the Commonwealth of which England, an aggressor, was a leading member. During the debate on Foreign Affairs on November 20 in the Lok Sabha Nehru

rejected the Opposition plea for the severance of Commonwealth connection. "India", he said, "had already expressed herself strongly against Anglo-French aggression in Egypt and it should be wrong to cut away from the Commonwealth merely to show anger." "The Commonwealth had helped," he added, "and could help the cause of peace. Nevertheless, much would depend on how the world situation develops." He reiterated this view a few weeks later at a news conference in Ottawa on December 22. In spite of differences, he said, the Commonwealth was an association helping mutual understanding and world peace. There were so many disruptive influences in the world that he for his part was not prepared to break up an association that was already there.

The conference of Prime Ministers of Colombo countries, called in New Delhi to discuss the situation on West Asia, met on November 12-14. Those present besides Nehru were Bandaranaike from Ceylon, U Ba Swe from Burma and Ali Shastromidjojo from Indonesia. The Prime Minister of Pakistan had expressed his inability to come to Delhi on account of other preoccupations. By the time the Colombo Powers met, the Egyptian crisis was almost over and the Prime Ministers devoted more time to the events in Hungary over which feelings in India and other countries in Asia and Africa were agitated. Pakistan's absence from the Colombo Prime Ministers' meeting at New Delhi was apparently deliberate. Speaking at Lahore on December 2 Prime Minister Suhrawardy declared that he was not prepared to characterise the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt as a return to colonialism. In his view it was merely an attempt on the part of those powers to see that Suez Canal remained free for international navigation.

Although the armed conflict in Suez coincided in time with the violent upheaval in Hungary, there was no basic connection between the crises in the two countries. Nevertheless Nehru firmly believed that events would have taken a different course in Hungary in early November if the two leading Western Powers, England and France, had not started unprovoked aggression against Egypt.

To understand the events in Hungary in October-November, 1956, one has to look back at the developments in

the Soviet Union since Stalin's death in March 1953. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which met in Moscow in the latter half of February 1956 put the final seal of approval on liberalisation in the Soviet foreign policy which began after Stalin's death. At this Congress Khrushchev, who had already emerged as the most powerful man in the party Presidium as the First Secretary of the party, enunciated the new Soviet policy. This envisaged the possibility of peaceful co-existence of countries with different political ideologies and of the achievement of socialism by peaceful methods. No longer was war between the socialist and capitalist countries inevitable. In April 1956 the Cominform was disbanded though Khrushchev had stoutly defended it during his visit to India in December 1955.

Nehru welcomed the forces of liberalism set in motion in East European countries by the new Soviet policy. He had been greatly impressed by the Soviet leaders' solicitude for peace during his visit to the Soviet Union in June 1955 and during Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit to India six months later. The decisions of the 20th Congress confirmed his impression. In more than one public speech he welcomed the Soviet Government's liberal approach to world problems.

Reports of popular demonstration against the Soviet Union which took place in Poznan in Poland in June 1956 did not cause any concern or surprise in India. Such an upsurge was regarded as a natural reaction to the loosening of the chains which had hitherto tied the Central European countries rigidly to the Soviet Union. Gomulka's return to power in Poland on the crest of a wave of popular enthusiasm pleased Nehru. On October 24 Gomulka announced to a cheering group of hundreds of thousands of people in Warsaw that relations between the parties and countries of the socialist camp should be based on mutual confidence and complete equality of rights, reciprocal assistance and mutual friendly criticism, should the need arise for it. "Within the framework of these relations", he added, "every country should have full independence and sovereignty, the right to self-government and the right to have full responsibility". To a deafening burst of cheers the Polish Prime Minister

Cyrankiewicz announced that within the following two days all Soviet troops in Poland would be exclusively in their bases, Soviet warships would withdraw from Polish waters and Soviet troop movements in Poland would stop. "We shall not allow ourselves to be pushed off the road to socialism", he said. The Soviet leaders who had earlier adopted a bellicose attitude towards the events in Poland agreed to have further talks with the new Polish leaders in Moscow with a view to collaboration based on equality, equal rights and respect for independence. The crisis in Poland was thus over and it was hoped that this would set a pattern for the changes which would inevitably follow in other socialist countries in Central Europe.

Similar developments had also started in Hungary. Unfortunately the situation in that country quickly went out of control of the Government. On October 23 serious rioting took place in Budapest involving thousands of Hungarian citizens, Soviet troops and the notorious Hungarian Security Force, the A.V.H. The Stalinist leader Rakosi who had ruled Hungary with an iron hand for years fled the country and Imre Nagy, a former Prime Minister who had been jailed by Rakosi, returned to power as the new Hungarian Premier.

Nagy's first step as Premier was to call upon the Soviet troops to restore order. First official reports from Budapest described the civilian rioters as counter-revolutionaries. These reports were quickly followed by others giving grim accounts of the slaughter of thousands of unarmed citizens by Soviet tanks, fierce resistance by the ordinary Hungarian people in Budapest and other principal cities and murderous attacks everywhere on the A.V.H.

Nagy was obviously being pushed off his feet by the pressure of events. There was a widespread wave of anger and revolt throughout Hungary against Soviet control. The extreme nationalist elements supported by counter-revolutionaries and incited by calls to revolt from Radio Free Europe and clandestine radios outside the country wanted Hungary to come entirely out of the Soviet orbit. On October 26 the Budapest radio broadcast Nagy's declaration that the demand put forward by a workers' delegation that Soviet troops should leave Hungary by January 1, 1957, was justi-

fied. The Hungarian communist newspaper *Seczebad Nap* said on the 29th that the whole population of Budapest felt deeply wounded and insulted by the Soviet statement that the Budapest revolt was the result of underground work of British and American imperialists. The newspaper added that the greater part of the population of Budapest took part in the demonstrations on the 23rd evening either in person or in spirit.

India had no senior resident diplomatic representative in Budapest in those days. The Indian Ambassador in Moscow, K. P. S. Menon, was concurrently accredited to Hungary as a Minister. During the critical days he was away in Moscow and what with his own bad health and the disruption of communication between the Soviet Union and Hungary it was not possible for him to rush to Hungary while important events were happening in that country. The resident Indian Charge, K. A. Rahman, a junior First Secretary, was overwhelmed by the rush of events, but that was not the only explanation for the lack of any direct communication from him to the Foreign Office at Delhi during the first three or four days. Internal communications were disrupted and only in the first week of November Rahman could send messages to the Foreign office from Vienna. During those crucial days the Government of India had to depend almost entirely on Agency reports mostly of Western origin. These were not entirely dependable.

On October 30 the Soviet Government issued a statement on their general policy in Hungary as well as other States in Eastern Europe. They referred to the Warsaw Treaty under which Soviet forces were kept in different socialist countries in Central Europe and declared that they would withdraw their forces from Budapest immediately. This they apparently did on October 30. On 29th October Israel attacked Egypt, followed by the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt two days later. The Soviet forces greatly strengthened in armour returned to Budapest three days later and simultaneously large Soviet forces approached Hungary from the neighbouring countries. The common people in Budapest and elsewhere put up a fierce resistance against Soviet troops and armour. But they were powerless against Russian artillery and tanks which used their

fire power ruthlessly killing and wounding thousands of people and causing extensive damage to houses and property. Rahman's reports which were coming in steadily mentioned that in some areas the scenes of carnage and destruction were reminiscent of the havoc caused during the World War. *

There were accounts of many deeds of valour by young Hungarian men and women who had immobilised Soviet tanks with home-made bombs, soap sud spread on the road surface and other such ready-made devices. When those in front fell fighting, their places were immediately taken by others in the rear.

Early on November 4 while Russian tanks and artillery were engaged in a massive attack on Budapest, Premier Nagy appealed to the world for help. It soon became known that he had been ousted from his position as head of Government by his colleague Janos Kadar, a Hungarian patriot who had also been put into jail by Rakosi. Nagy had invited Kadar to join his cabinet when he assumed power. Moscow radio broadcast the text of a proclamation of the new Hungarian Government on November 4 claiming that the task of crushing the counter-revolution had been completed. It also said that Kadar who headed the new Hungarian Government opposed the discussion of the Hungarian situation either in the Security Council or the General Assembly. It was given out later both by the new Kadar Government in Budapest and the Soviet Government in Moscow that the Russian forces had re-entered Budapest in response to an appeal for help from the new Government.

While fierce fighting was taking place on Hungarian soil, the Security Council was locked in a bitter debate at New York on a motion by Britain, France and U.S.A. to discuss the situation in Hungary. Speaking during the debate on October 28 the Soviet delegate, Sobolev, described the Hungarian revolt as "an uprising of criminal Fascist elements" against the legitimate Hungarian Government. The

* When I visited Budapest as Ambassador in June 1961 I was horrified to see tell-tale evidence of indiscriminate firing by Soviet tanks. There were bullet marks on the walls of houses reaching up to the third or fourth storey. Even in suburban Buda, the fashionable residential locality, small countryhouses bore these marks and no attempt had apparently been made all these years to cover them up.

Hungarian Government, he said, had been constrained to halt the uprising with its own armed resources and had asked for help from the Soviet Union. The Hungarian system, Sobolev asserted, was based on the free and democratic will of the Hungarian toiling people trying to build up a new kind of society. It is possible that Sobolev had in mind Nagy's appeal for Soviet help when he first assumed power. The Council agreed to the Western resolution by 9 to 1. Yugoslavia abstained maintaining that while she was not in favour of interference in Hungarian affairs, she opposed the use of force there. The situation, however, rapidly worsened. If the Soviet Government were still of the view expressed by Sobolev, their announcement on October 30 that they would withdraw their forces could only be regarded as a tactical move to gain time by lulling the Hungarian authorities into a false sense of security while they would reorganise their forces and allow pro-Soviet elements in Nagy's Government to seize power.

In the Foreign Office at New Delhi events in Hungary took a second place to those in Egypt. Nehru was continuing his bitter attacks on the Anglo-French aggression in Suez. The facts of this aggression were clear as daylight. Egypt was an important non-aligned country and with its leader Nasser Nehru had established close friendly relations. The Anglo-French aggression appeared to him as a return of colonialist powers to an area from where they had been ousted. If this aggression was to succeed, who knew what would happen to other countries including India which had recently been liberated from colonial rule?

On the other hand Hungary was somewhat distant from India and the facts about the Hungarian upheaval were not very clear. Western press agencies which were the main source of news could not be entirely depended upon. Hungarian radio broadcasts were infrequent even before Nagy's overthrow. Rahman's reports which began to come in regularly after the first few days vividly described the people's resistance and ruthless operation by the Soviet forces. The reports were, however, not adequate for a total picture of the situation. Besides, Nehru was anxious not to make any statement critical of the Soviet Union without being sure of the facts. Aware of the liberalising forces set in

motion by the new Soviet leaders, he was taken aback by what appeared to be reversion to Stalinist brutality. Although this contradicted Soviet profession of peace and peaceful co-existence, the Soviet Government had taken a firm line against the Anglo-French aggression in Egypt and Nehru was anxious to avoid any public condemnation of the Soviet action in Hungary. He, therefore, refrained from criticising the Soviet Union in public.

Nehru's first public reference to Hungary was contained in his inaugural address to the General Conference of the UNESCO meeting in New Delhi on November 5, when he said: "We see today in Egypt as well as in Hungary both human dignity outraged and the force of modern arms used to suppress peoples and to gain political objectives". The official attitude of the Government of India was reflected in a long resolution passed by the All India Congress Committee which met in Calcutta on November 9. It expressed grave concern about the developments in Western Asia and Europe and expressed strong condemnation of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression in Egypt. It proceeded to express the hope that foreign troops would be withdrawn from Hungary and the Hungarian people would decide their own future by peaceful methods. There was no reference in this resolution to the Soviet action in Hungary. Some members of the A.I.C.C. criticised this omission. This prompted Nehru to explain at some length after the resolution had been adopted why the developments in Hungary were treated somewhat differently from those in Egypt. He referred to the letter he had received the previous day from the Soviet Premier Bulganin which gave a fairly long account of the happenings in Hungary. According to this letter Nagy's Government had lost all control over the situation and there was a good deal of killing. The Soviet troops which had withdrawn earlier on October 30 returned at the invitation of the new Government. On the basis of this letter Nehru said: "The Soviet Union has again stated that they went back to Budapest with great reluctance and they want to draw back as soon as possible, as soon as order has been established and then to discuss with the Governments the total withdrawal from these countries....It is not that we are afraid to express our views because of the fear of any

other country. Normally we do not run down others because that does not help. But on this question it is so complicated and because we want to help and not to hinder that we have followed this particular policy". Bulganin's long letter, Nehru added, might be a partial account but it helped him to have both sides of the case to form an opinion. The situation was not clear.

Nehru then referred to the liberalising forces at work in the Soviet Union after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and to the developments in Poland. He narrated the developments in Poland and Hungary. In Poland many changes even in the Government apparatus had taken place and the Government was functioning steadily. In Hungary, on the other hand, although the same forces might be at work, possibly because of lack of leadership a large-scale civil conflict had resulted. The Government in Budapest lost control over the situation and there was a great deal of killing of rival Hungarian groups. The Hungarian Government ceased to function. There appeared to be two factions the bigger of which formed a Government and invited the Russian forces to restore order. This the Russians did with a heavy hand.

Once again the Security Council proved itself powerless to deal with a serious situation. The Soviet Union exercised its veto against a U.S. sponsored resolution to discuss the situation in Hungary. The question was then taken up at an emergency special session of the General Assembly. The first resolution adopted by the Assembly on November 4 condemned the use of Soviet military force in suppressing the efforts of the Hungarian people to reassert their fundamental rights and called upon the Soviet Union to desist forthwith from armed attack on the people of Hungary and from any kind of intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary and to withdraw all forces without delay from Hungarian territory. It affirmed the right of the Hungarian people to have a government of their own choice and requested the Secretary-General of the U.N. to investigate the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary and report to the Assembly. The Soviet and Hungarian Governments were called upon to permit inquiry and free travel in Hungary by the Secretary-General's nominees. Krishna

Menon had not yet arrived in New York. The permanent Indian representative, Arthur Lall, abstained on the resolution. In fact, he was not at his seat when the voting took place. This was not surprising as he had not received any instruction from the Foreign Office. Whatever the explanation for Indian abstention, India which had been ardently championing Egypt's cause in the Suez conflict was immediately accused of following a double standard between Western imperialism and Soviet domination of a similar kind.

Krishna Menon arrived in New York on November 5. As soon as he landed at the airport, there was an angry exchange of words between him and an American businessman who asked him why India did not take a stand against Russia while she opposed Britain and France in the Middle East. Menon waved his cane and said, "This will be answered in the right place. I am not accountable to your country." The next resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 9 called upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Hungary, proposed holding free elections in Hungary under the auspices of the U.N. and reaffirmed the earlier direction to the U.N. Secretary-General to investigate and report on the situation in Hungary. Menon who participated in the discussion strongly criticised that part of the resolution which called upon the United Nations to hold an election in Hungary. Hungary is not a colonial country, he said ; it was represented at the United Nations. Would any other member-country permit elections in its territory under U.N. supervision ? He supported his argument by resorting rather disingenuously to the contention that the General Assembly should not go ahead with further steps without waiting for the report of the Secretary-General asked for in the November 4 resolution. He was well aware that the Hungarian Government had refused to permit any investigation by the Secretary-General of the U.N. and no report could be expected from the Secretary-General. The resolution was adopted on November 9 by 48 votes against 11 with 16 abstentions. India with Russia and other Communist countries opposed the resolution.

The Indian vote against the resolution was bitterly criticised in many countries not least in India. Speaking at

Bombay on November 11 Jayaprakash Narain repeated his charge that India had applied a double standard in regard to Egypt and Hungary which to say the least was unworthy of the country. The sooner we renounced the double standard he said "the better for India, for the people of the world and for goodwill among nations." One or two of Nehru's senior Cabinet colleagues also felt unhappy about our attitude to the Hungarian situation. Home Minister Govind Ballav Pant enquired of the Foreign Office informally whether Menon voted against the resolution in accordance with the Government's instruction. In fact, no instruction had been sent to Menon from Delhi. He took the responsibility of opposing the resolution in anticipation of Nehru's approval.

Nehru realised the depth of feelings in India over India's opposition to the November 9 resolution on Hungary. At his instance the Lok Sabha Secretariat circulated to members of Parliament a copy of the General Assembly's resolution and texts of Krishna Menon's speeches in the Assembly on November 8 and 9. In a long statement in the Lok Sabha on November 16 on developments in Egypt and Hungary he said referring to Hungary : "It is possible that what happened in one country produced its reactions in the other, and the two taken together created a very serious international situation. But it is well to remember that although both deserved special attention, the nature of one differed from the other. Neither can be held to justify the other. What were the differences? In regard to Hungary the situation was obscure for some days and it was only gradually that the story of the actual events that have taken place there became known." He added, "There was no immediate aggression in Hungary in the sense of something militarily happening as there was in the case of Egypt. It was really a continuing intervention of Soviet armies in Hungary based on the Warsaw Pact. The fact is that as subsequent events have shown, the Soviet armies were there against the wishes of the Hungarian people."

He returned to the subject in greater detail during a debate on foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha on November 19 and 20. "The occurrence in Hungary took place at a moment", he said, "when suddenly the international situa-

tion became very much worse and India had to be a little surer and clearer as to what had actually happened and what the present position was. Therefore, we were a little cautious in the expression of our opinion in regard to facts although not in regard to the general principles that should govern the conditions there." Right from the very beginning, he said, he had made it clear in regard to Hungary or Egypt or anywhere else that any kind of suppression of the patriotic elements and the freedom of the people was an outrage on liberty. Foreign forces, he added should be removed both from Egypt and Hungary, although the two cases were not parallel, and the people of Hungary should be given an opportunity to determine their future.

Nehru then proceeded to defend Krishna Menon's action in voting against the resolution of November 9. The resolution, he explained in detail, consisted of 9 paragraphs. The first five formed the preamble while the other paragraphs were operative. Voting on each paragraph was separate. India abstained on all the five paragraphs of the preamble. The particular operative part to which India objected read as follows:— ".....considers that free elections should be held in Hungary under U.N. auspices as soon as law and order have been restored, to enable the people of Hungary to determine for themselves the form of government they wish to establish in the country." Because of this paragraph India voted against the resolution as a whole. In his view, "any acceptance of an intervention of this type of foreign supervised elections seemed to us to set a bad precedent which might be utilised in future for intervention in other countries." There were several interpellations. Irritated by these Nehru proceeded to defend Krishna Menon even more strongly. "The voting on the particular resolution," he said, "was entirely in consonance with the Government of India's general policy and instruction. It seemed to Government that this resolution, apart from the basic objection, would not prove helpful to Hungary at all. We were trying to get the Soviet forces withdrawn from Hungary. What was proposed in the resolution would come in the way of withdrawal and an attempt thereafter to intervene with armed forces would have led to a major conflict." On the following day the

text of a public speech delivered by Tito a few days earlier reached Nehru. Winding up the debate on foreign affairs that day he quoted appreciatively from it with the remark that "the Government of India are guided by the Yugoslav appraisal of the situation in Eastern Europe". Nehru added, "It appears that the tragic happenings in Hungary would have taken a different turn if Britain and France had not committed aggression in Egypt. Happenings in the two countries marked an intensification of the cold war and the Soviet Government appeared unwilling to take any risk on the Hungarian border."

Despite his strong defence of Menon in public Nehru sent Menon a telegram asking him not to vote against any other resolution on Hungary without specific instruction from Government. This had its effect. Although Menon opposed another U.S. sponsored resolution on arrangements for emergency relief to refugees from Hungary on the ground that it referred to some political aspects which, in his view, were irrelevant, in the final voting he abstained. A third resolution which called for large scale and immediate aid for the Hungarian people was supported by him.

Nehru had an unerring instinct for sensing public opinion. In view of public criticism in India of some aspects of our attitude in the United Nations on the Hungarian question he fully associated himself with the condemnation of Soviet action in Hungary at the conference of the Prime Ministers of the four Colombo countries, India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia, who met in Delhi on November 14. In a resolution adopted at this meeting the Prime Ministers regretted that the Soviet forces which had been withdrawn in accordance with the policy laid down in the statement issued by the Government of the U.S.S.R. on October 30 were re-introduced at Budapest a few days later. The Prime Ministers considered it the "inalienable right of any country to shape for itself its own destiny, free from all external pressures." They expressed the view that the "Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Hungary speedily and that the Hungarian people should be left free to decide their own future and the form of government they will have without external intervention from any quarter." The Prime Ministers "have watched with interest and appreciation

the new forces towards democratisation at work in the countries of Eastern Europe. They welcome the peaceful change brought about in Poland. Unfortunately the process of change in Hungary was accompanied by violence which not only led to misery and destruction but also came in the way of that very process."

The Government of India informally advised the Hungarian Government to permit the U.N. Secretary-General to visit Budapest and expressed the same view to the Soviet Government in Moscow. Ambassador K.P.S. Menon was instructed to speak personally to the Hungarian leaders at high level. Menon had several talks with Kadar at Budapest. The Hungarian Government however would not relent. They took the stand that they had no objection to the visit of the Secretary-General in principle but insisted that it should take place later. They were strongly opposed to any United Nations observers going to Hungary. This would be an infringement of their country's sovereignty, they said.

Feelings in the Indian Parliament continued to be agitated over the question of Hungary. With the exception of the communist members of Parliament, others on the opposition benches were critical of the Government of India's failure to support the Hungarian case in the U.N. These feelings were shared by a large number of the Congress M.Ps. and influenced India's decision at the following session of the General Assembly in December 1956 and January 1957. A resolution of December 12 declared that by using its armed forces against the Hungarian people the Soviet Government was violating the political independence of Hungary. It condemned this violation and reiterated the call to the Soviet Union to desist from any form of intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary, to withdraw Soviet forces under U.N. supervision and to permit re-establishment of political independence of Hungary. In opposing the resolution Menon said: "My Government does not want in the present context of existing circumstances in the world—although it does not conform to its own policies—to go into the question of withdrawal of foreign forces in the sense of foreign forces which are tied to defence alliances in the context. India's objection was to the use of

Soviet forces in the Hungarian internal affairs. It might have been justified if there had been a coup d'etat, but what had happened in Hungary was a national uprising, and the use of Soviet forces to suppress it was not appropriate." He abstained when the resolution was voted upon.

Menon's statement had immediate repercussions in the Rajya Sabha. On December 13 asked by H.N. Kunzru, a senior Member of the Upper House, Nehru once again supported Menon saying that while India held to the basic principle that all foreign forces must be withdrawn from every country, Government did feel that it would not be legitimate to press the point at that particular juncture in Hungary. The Government of India were not pressing the general proposition which had to be implemented in a number of countries, but were pressing the immediate issue of Hungary and the withdrawal of foreign forces from there.

Nehru did not exactly answer Kunzru's criticism nor did he define who was to decide whether a revolution was a national uprising or a coup d'etat. He, however, mollified opposition to some extent by mentioning that there was no doubt from the reports of Ambassadors Khosla and K.P.S. Menon that the revolution in Hungary was a national one and was widespread. There were elements in it which might be called counter-revolutionary or reactionary ; there were also elements which came from outside. But those formed a small part ; essentially it was a national movement in which the great majority of industrial workers and students took part. That, he said, was a basic fact. He gave the figures of the dead as 7000 Hungarians and 25000 Russians. It was unfortunate, he added, that the Hungarian Government was not allowing the U.N. Secretary-General to visit Hungary. The natural inference from this was that the people began to think that the charges brought against that Government about the deportation of Hungarian nationals were true or partly true. Nehru proceeded to describe as most unfortunate Nagy's arrest in violation of the agreement between the Kadar Government and the Yugoslav Government guaranteeing his safe return home. While he was returning home from the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest where he had earlier found

asylum, Nagy was arrested by the Soviet forces and sent to Rumania.

Nehru continued to feel unhappy about Hungary. There was little the Government of India could do to influence the rigid attitudes of the Hungarian and Soviet Governments. When Premier Chou En-lai visited India towards the end of November 1956 and again for a few days at the end of December, Nehru had long talks with him on Hungary among other subjects. The Chinese premier who had interrupted his Indian tour to visit Poland and Hungary fully supported the Soviet stand on Hungary. In his view whatever the past mistakes of the Soviet Government, a crisis arose in which Nagy asked for the help of Western powers. The country was in chaos and the Soviet Government had the choice either of intervention or of letting Hungary become an ally of the Western powers. In the Chinese view the Soviet Government were right in intervening. Nehru argued that Nagy might have erred, but the situation then in Hungary was deplorable and in effect the Soviet Government were dominating the scene there and the Kadar Government counted for little. This, Nehru said, had produced reaction in many Asian and African countries against the Soviet Union. This was unfortunate seeing that the Soviet Government appeared to be keen on a detente in international affairs. The two leaders argued at length but without either of them convincing the other. Chou was firmly of the view that while relationship between socialist countries had got to be improved, if any imperialist power came in, then they all must unite. He said that China was displeased with Yugoslavia for giving asylum to Nagy. "We would only give moral support but no political asylum. Of course, we will not say this openly—for that will make matters worse."

In the following months reports continued to reach New Delhi of the sullen opposition of the Hungarian people to Kadar and his Government. The economic situation of Hungary however rapidly improved thanks to the large-scale economic and financial aid given by the Soviet Union and in time the rigour of the Hungarian regime softened. Interest in Hungary suddenly revived among the ordinary people of India with press reports of Nagy's execution after a

secret trial in June 1958. Nehru expressed his shock at the execution in his press conference on July 3 and said he was worried about its consequences. He expressed the hope that it would not reverse the move towards decreasing world tension and set back efforts to increase international understanding.

There were repeated requests by Kadar's Government to raise the status of diplomatic representation between the two countries to embassy level. One way Nehru chose to express his continued unhappiness over the situation in Hungary was to refuse these requests. The representation was raised to the level of embassy only in December 1959.

CHAPTER TWELVE

INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

IN THE AUTUMN of 1927 Nehru and his father visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Government to attend the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. On the conclusion of his visit he wrote a number of articles to *The Hindu* of Madras which were later published under the title *Soviet Russia*. Nehru was greatly impressed by what he had seen in Russia. "For us in India", he said, "the fascination is often greater and even our own self-interest compels us to understand the vast forces which have upset an old order of things and have brought in a new world into existence where values have changed and old standards have given place to new. Russia interests us because it may help us to find some solution for the great problems which are faced by our country today. It interests us especially because conditions there have not been and are not even now very dissimilar to conditions in India. Both of us are agricultural countries and with only the beginnings of industrialisation and both have to face poverty and illiteracy. If Russia finds satisfactory solution for these, our work in India is made easier".

Political and economic equality of all sections of people and an end to all manner of exploitation were Nehru's watchwords for free India and the success already achieved by the Soviet Union in these respects greatly appealed to him. Addressing the All Bengal Students' Conference on September 19, 1928, he said, "I wish to tell you that though personally I do not agree with many of the methods of the communists—and I am, by no means, sure to what extent communism can suit present conditions in India—I do believe in communism as an ideal society for essentially—it is socialism; and socialism, I think, is the only way if the world is to escape disaster. And Russia, an outcaste like ourselves from nations and much and often erring in many respects, stands today as the greatest opponent of imperialism". But Nehru was not an uncritical admirer of Soviet Russia. Writing in June 1936, he said, "I believe in basic

economic theories which underlie the social structure of Russia. I think also that Russia has made the most remarkable progress culturally, educationally and industrially and even spiritually if I may use the word in its real sense. But, nevertheless, I do not accept or approve of everything that has taken place in Russia and I do not, therefore, propose to follow blindfold the example of Russia. Therefore, I prefer to use the word socialism rather than communism because the latter has come to signify Soviet Russia."

Nehru closely watched the changes that were taking place in Europe in the thirties. He was appalled by the large scale purge of many well-known political and military leaders in Russia. He was equally disturbed by the rise of fascism in Germany and the outbreak of civil war in Spain. In all these he saw unmistakable signs of war clouds gathering in Europe. The Russian-Finnish War of 1939 and the Russian-German Pact of 1939 quickly followed by the German invasion of Poland with Soviet acquiescence deeply shocked him. He would not allow his appreciation of the new order in Russia to influence his judgment of Soviet aggression in Poland. Writing in the *National Herald* on 19 January 1941, he said, "For us to advocate and to defend Soviet aggression or even to acquiesce in it passively is to do great disservice to socialism. There are those who have made it their creed to defend every activity of the Soviet Government and who consider it a heresy or *lese-majeste* for any one to criticise or condemn any such activity. That is the way of blind faith which has nothing to do with reason. It is not on that basis that you can build up freedom here or elsewhere. Integrity of mind and sincerity of purpose can be given up only at peril to ourselves and our cause. We are not tied down to any decision made for us elsewhere. We make our own decisions and thrash our own policies".

He summed up his attitude to Russia in the following words on a subsequent occasion: "It has never been easy for any one to be neutral about Russia. There has been either open-mouthed admiration and enthusiasm or bitter hatred. Both attitudes were inevitably wrong and yet both could be understood. For hatred was natural among those who clung to vested interests and ancient privileges and saw

in Russia the uprooter of both. Enthusiasm for a new order based on a juster and more scientific economic system filled the minds of those who were aware of the conflict and misery of the old order. The tremendous step made the enthusiasts overlook and excuse many of the errors that accompanied it. That was right for what accounted most was basic change in Russia, and yet it was no good turn to her to accept unthinkingly everything that came after her. No people can prosper if they go complacent or avoid all criticism”.

By 1946, it became quite clear that Britain would have to withdraw from India. In September that year Nehru became Vice-President of the interim government of India and member in-charge of India's external relations with other countries. In that capacity he attached great importance to establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union without delay. Within a few months he designated his sister Vijayalakshmi Pandit as the first Ambassador of India to the Soviet Union much against the opposition of his Muslim League colleagues in the Viceroy's Executive Council. The Soviet leaders, however, appeared to have mental reservation about the reality of the transfer of power from British to Indian hands in August, 1947. The Moscow press published a series of critical comments on the Indian Government in 1948 and 1949. An oft-quoted article is one in the *New Times* of 10th August, 1948, entitled “India's Hypocritical Dynasty” in which Nehru was accused of directing his country's affairs with the support of war-mongers and of trying to cut out the Indian people from their natural allies and liberty loving peoples. Cold war blasts were then raging in full force over Europe and the strong measures taken by Nehru's Government in 1949 against communist rebels in Telangana could not have endeared him to Stalin. Months earlier Soviet distrust of Nehru had been revealed in the report placed before the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Asian Relations Conference held in Delhi in March, 1947. One of the objectives of the Conference, the report said, was to make India a centre of Pan-Asiatic movement. “As is well known, imperialist Japan had formerly declared herself as the centre of Pan-Asian culture in order to justify Japanese expan-

sion. Now someone is dreaming of exploiting this Japanese heritage in his own interest”.

It is possible that Soviet views on India were influenced by the critical attitude of the Indian communists towards Nehru's government in 1948-49. The Communist Party of India was strongly critical of Nehru's foreign policy in those days and accused the Indian Government of seeking to preserve the crumbling social order in India by an alliance with British imperialists. At its second session in Calcutta in March, 1948, the party accepted the thesis that the bourgeoisie which was in power in India was handicapped in taking a neutral attitude in the conflict between the reactionaries and capitalists on the one hand and progressive and democratic elements on the other. Individual communists who lent their support to Nehru Government in the period following the transfer of power in August, 1947, came in for strong criticism at the Calcutta session of the party and were accused of leading the party into reformism.

Reports from the new Indian Ambassador in Moscow were none too encouraging. The Ambassador was treated with polite indifference by the Soviet Foreign Office and relations between the Foreign Office and the Indian Embassy were entirely formal. Nehru refused to be discouraged. When Mrs Pandit relinquished charge of the Embassy in March 1949, he selected his close personal friend, the distinguished Indian savant Dr S. Radhakrishnan, to succeed her. Radhakrishnan had achieved international reputation as an eminent scholar and philosopher and represented the finest in Indian culture. He was not a politician and had no particular prejudices or predilection. He would say things which another in his place more practised in the art of diplomacy would have left unspoken. He was held in high esteem in Moscow's diplomatic circle and inspired respect in the Soviet Foreign Office. He achieved the distinction, somewhat rare in those days for foreign ambassadors in Moscow, of having been received by Stalin.

Gradually there came a change in the Soviet Government's attitude to India. This process must have been helped by the independent line taken by India at international gatherings, particularly in meetings of the Security

Council and the General Assembly of the U.N. The first significant change in the Soviet attitude was noticed in January 1952. The Soviet Representative who had hitherto refrained from participating in the discussions on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council attacked the United States of America and the United Kingdom for trying to convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and a military base. Speaking in the Security Council debate on Kashmir the Soviet delegate Jacob Malik said that the Security Council's Resolution of March 31, 1951 criticising the convening of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly revealed the intention of the Anglo-American bloc. About that time the Soviet press also began to praise India's policy of promoting peace in the world.

Stalin's death in 1953 marked the end of the rigid phase in the Soviet Union's relations with other countries and the beginning of an era of liberal and humane policy in all spheres. Relations with India markedly improved in the following years. The Soviet leaders paid high tributes to India and to Nehru personally on the fifth anniversary of the Indian Republic. In February 1955 an agreement was signed between India and the Soviet Union under which the Soviet Government agreed to build a modern iron and steel plant at Bhilai in Central India. This was the first major project of economic assistance by the Soviet Union to a non-socialist country. The Soviet Government also extended an invitation to Nehru to visit their country. Nehru gladly accepted the invitation and arrived in Moscow in June 1955 to a tumultuous welcome from Soviet leaders and people. Huge crowds lined both the sides of the road from the airport at Moscow to the Kremlin. *The New York Times* correspondent reported from Moscow that the scene was incredible. Foreigners were amazed and the Russians themselves said that they had never seen anything like it before. Similar scenes of popular welcome were witnessed throughout the two weeks Nehru spent in the Soviet Union, in the heart of the European Russia as well as in the outlying Asian Republics. His hosts paid him a unique compliment by showing him round their secret atomic power station.

Nehru was greatly impressed by what he had seen in

the Soviet Union. He was particularly struck by the revolutionary changes that had come over the life and conditions of what were primitive peoples hardly three decades back in the Central Asian Republics. He was convinced that the Soviet people desired nothing more than peace. They had built up a great country by hard and unrelenting labour and now that the fruits of their toil were coming in, they would not throw them away by war. Nehru summed up his impressions in his speech at the Dynamo Stadium in Moscow on 21 June, 1955. "Wherever I have gone in the Soviet Union", he said, "I have found an intense urge for peace. I believe the vast majority of people in every country long for peace, but fear of others often clouds their minds and makes them act in a different way. It is this fear and hatred that we must shed and try to cultivate the climate of peace. Out of war or threat of war or continuous preparation for war no peace can emerge. I should like to congratulate the Government of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people for the steps they have taken in recent months which have lessened world tension and have contributed to the cause of peace". In a farewell speech charged with emotion at the airport in Moscow on June 23, he said that he was leaving Moscow richer and poorer, richer because he was taking with him unforgettable memories, and poorer because he was leaving a part of his heart behind.

While in the Soviet Union Nehru had several talks with the Soviet leaders, particularly Premier Bulganin and First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, N. S. Khrushchev. These discussions ranged over a variety of subjects including disarmament, situation in the Far East and in East Asia and implementation of the Geneva Agreement on Indochina. In a joint statement issued on the conclusion of the visit Nehru and Bulganin affirmed that the relations between their two countries would continue to be guided by the principles of *Panch Sheel* (five principles). In observance of such principles by nations in the conduct of their mutual relations, they said, lay the main hope of fear and mistrust vanishing from their minds and thus of warding off world tensions.

The warm reception which the Soviet people gave to

Nehru was greatly appreciated by the people of India. In the West, however, there were misgivings. The American press was particularly critical. *The New York Times* regretted in an editorial on June 12, 1955, that Nehru had been "successfully mouse-trapped". He was criticised for being a party to a communist spectacle in which the communist world was represented as the real exponent of relaxation of tension and the United States and its allies as warmongers. Some press comments went to the length of suggesting that India had compromised her policy of non-alignment. Despite the changes in the Soviet policy in the post-Stalin period Americans were distrustful of the Soviet Union and did not believe that there was any basic change in the Soviet foreign policy. The change, if any, was in their view merely one of tactics. What happened in India in the following months only added to American irritation.

In November, 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev arrived in Delhi as guests of the Indian Government. This was the first visit of front-ranking Soviet leaders to a country outside the socialist bloc. Elaborate preparations had been made in New Delhi to give them a fitting reception. Nehru personally went into every detail of the arrangements and left nothing to chance. A small committee with Mrs Indira Gandhi as chairman was set up to co-ordinate the arrangements for reception and other public functions. The programme of visits to various places in and near Delhi was widely publicised in rural areas by leaflets and beat of drums. Special trains to Delhi were arranged for sight-seers from outlying places and 40,000 school children were brought in special transport to the airport to greet the visitors on arrival. Thousands of Indian and Soviet flags of all sizes decorated the route from the airport to the President's house. A crowd of nearly 50,000 greeted the Soviet visitors when they came out of the plane at Palam with full-throated cries of 'Hindi-Russi-bhai bhai'—'Indians and Russians are brothers'. Another half a million people had gathered on the six mile route from the airport to the Rashtrapati Bhavan completely disrupting all traffic arrangements. Nearly a quarter million people attended the open-air civic reception to the Soviet leaders at the Ramlila Grounds. Similar enthusiasm was seen later at every im-

portant place visited by the two leaders during their stay in India.

Welcoming the guests at Palam Nehru said that the two visitors represented more than a meeting of leaders of two great countries. This was, he said, something deeper and far-reaching, namely the meeting of two great peoples. The mountains that the visitors traversed between Tashkent and Delhi which hitherto were a barrier between the two countries were becoming a link between them. He referred to the Gandhian heritage of goodwill and avoidance of hatred and violence. It was in that spirit that the Indian people approached the great Soviet people. Although India was determined to rebuild the country along a socialistic path of its own choosing, she could profit by the advance made in the Soviet Union. In all his speeches Nehru reiterated the Indian stand on military pacts and cold war emphasising that India eschewed violence and sought to achieve her objectives by peaceful means.

The Soviet leaders fully reciprocated Nehru's sentiments. Addressing a crowded meeting in the Central Hall at Parliament House, Bulganin said, "The Soviet Union is against the policy of creating military blocs which have already been created. We propose to create a system of collective security in Europe in which all European States as well as the U.S.A. could participate. The proposal which I had made last year met with objections from the Western Powers as destroying the North Atlantic Bloc which allegedly was created for defensive purposes." The Soviet Union, he added, had expressed the wish to participate in NATO but the Western Powers refused to agree.

Scenes of unprecedented enthusiasm greeted the leaders when they arrived in Calcutta. There were milling crowds all along the nine mile route from the airport to the Governor's residence in the city where the visitors were to stay. On the way the visitors' car broke down with people pressing on all sides and ultimately they were rescued by a police van in which they arrived incognito in the Government House. A distinguished assembly which were waiting to receive the visitors were surprised to see them come out of a closed police van and walking on to the traditional red carpet spread for them.

Khrushchev delivered what the Indian people considered the most significant speech of the Indian tour at a public reception at Srinagar in Kashmir on December 10. The visit to Kashmir was arranged at the special request of the Soviet leaders. They had indignantly rejected a suggestion received privately from the Government of Pakistan that they should avoid going to Kashmir. Speaking at a reception at Srinagar Khrushchev said, "It made us very sad when imperialist powers succeeded in bringing about the division of India into two parts, India and Pakistan. Indeed, before the Indian people achieved independence, there was only one India. The division of India into two parts was not brought about in the interests of the people of India. It was precisely for this reason that religious passion of the people of India was roused even though the question of religious belief had never been an important factor in the formation of this or that State....The question of Kashmir as one of the States of the Republic of India has already been decided by the people of Kashmir. This is the people's own affair. While in the Republic of India we find an ally in the struggle for peace and peaceful settlement of unsettled problems, unfortunately we cannot say the same about Pakistan. The present Government of Pakistan openly confesses its close ties with the American monopolist circles. They were among the first to initiate the notorious Baghdad Pact which was not created in the interest of peace. They have allowed military bases in their territory in the immediate neighbourhood of the frontiers of the Soviet Union."

These words were received with great satisfaction throughout India. Equally appreciated was the Soviet leaders' unqualified support to the Indian view point on Goa. At a news conference on December 14 they said, "It is well known that Goa is an Indian territory. Everyone knows that the population of this territory linked by unforgettable, deep blood ties with their motherland cannot imagine their existence separated from India. We are convinced that this question will be settled to the benefit of the Indian people, whether the colonisers want it or not. The colonisers will have to go from the foreign land."

The visitors repeatedly mentioned the identity of Soviet

and Indian views on many international issues and paid high tributes to India's policy of promoting international peace and security. They referred appreciatively to India's part in securing a peaceful settlement in the Korean war, the Indochina conflict and the crisis in the Formosa Straits, India's opposition to military pacts and alliances and her persistent efforts to secure a just solution of the claims of the People's Republic of China. "We think that India is a great power", Khrushchev said, "and to her must belong one of the first places among the great States of the world".

Still another tenet of Nehru's foreign policy, peaceful co-existence between nations and countries with different political, economic and social ideologies, received full support from the Soviet leaders. In the words of Bulganin, "Let us compete in building up each other's country and proving which system is better; let us compete in a friendly way and without war. This is a sincere offer. It is not propaganda."

The question of Soviet-Indian economic collaboration came up during the discussions. Earlier one of Nehru's advisers, Prof. P. C. Mahalanobis, had suggested that the draft Second Five Year Plan which was then being formulated should be placed before the Soviet leaders with a view to exploring possibilities of Soviet-Indian collaboration in implementing the Plan. Nehru did not agree with this suggestion. He did not want to embarrass the guests. It was for the Government of India, he felt, to decide which particular projects needed foreign collaboration, and how best it should be secured. The Plan was, however, discussed in a general way with high Soviet officials in the party. The Soviet leaders promised support and assistance to India's economic development in every possible way.

During one of his long talks with the guests, Nehru raised the delicate subject of relations between the Soviet Communist Party and the Communist Party of India. He spoke frankly about the policy and functioning of the Indian Communist Party and referred to the suspicion in certain circles that the Indian party was receiving support and encouragement from the Soviet party in their policy of opposition to the Indian Government. Khrushchev was equally frank. The Soviet people had sympathies with

communists in other parts of the world, he said, but they did not give any help to these parties. He had not met Ajay Ghosh. Communism, Khrushchev added, grew out of social conditions. Even if the Soviet Party wanted to, it could not prevent the growth of communist parties elsewhere.

Nehru also referred to the continued Soviet support to the Cominform and the misgiving it generated in other countries. Khrushchev said he was aware of this feeling but did not go into detail. However, at a news conference at New Delhi on December 14, the two Soviet leaders referred to the Cominform and said that it included the Communist parties of a number of independent countries and pursued the aim of exchanging information and opinion on the struggle of the working class for their liberation. Cominform, they added, created trouble only for those who wanted to maintain for ever the old obsolete system of exploitation of man by man. "We stood and shall stand", the Soviet leaders said, "for the strengthening and development of the international cooperation of the working people which is aimed at defending the vital interests of the working people and fight for the cause of peace". It is interesting to recall that not many months passed before the Cominform was formally dissolved.

Thanks to the close rapport established between Nehru and the Soviet leaders a solution was found for a difficult problem while the leaders were still in India. The Security Council was then in session in New York considering applications for admission to the United Nations from 18 countries. These were People's Republic of Mongolia, Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Japan, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos and Spain. An informal understanding had already been reached among the big powers that all the 18 would be admitted, but in the Security Council Kuomintang China vetoed the application of the People's Republic of Mongolia. In reply the Soviet Union vetoed the applications of 13 non-communist States. Krishna Menon, who was then in New York, sent an urgent telegram to Nehru asking him to urge the Soviet leaders not to press their disagreement over the admission of one or two countries to the point of keeping

out a large number of other countries which were fully qualified for membership. Nehru spoke to Bulganin and Khrushchev and new instruction must have been sent by them to the Soviet delegate in New York, for on the following day the Soviet representative maintained the veto only against Japan and this must have been a reply to the U.S. veto on the Mongolian Republic. The other 16 countries were admitted to the U.N.

It was agreed that at the end of the Soviet leaders' visit a joint statement should be issued by the Prime Ministers of India and the Soviet Union. The first draft was produced by the Soviet side. It contained the well known Soviet views on world problems. Hours of discussion between the Indian and Soviet officials followed. Gromyko who was then Deputy Foreign Minister took the leading part in these discussions on behalf of the Soviet delegation. Ultimately a draft emerged which reflected the Indian points of view as well as those of the Soviet Union. Gromyko's knowledge of details on every international issue was amazing. We on the Indian side were pleasantly surprised to see that he did not give the slightest evidence of rigidity with which his name was generally associated. It was obvious that he had Khrushchev's fullest confidence.

It is interesting to recall that in finalising the programme for the guests we in the Foreign Office had some doubt as to the exact precedence between Bulganin and Khrushchev. Informal enquires from the Soviet Embassy elicited the information that as First Secretary of the Party, Khrushchev's status was at least equal to, if not higher than, that of the Prime Minister. Khrushchev himself dispelled any doubt about this soon after he landed on Indian soil. He took the leading part in discussions with Nehru and other Indian leaders taking little notice of Bulganin at his side. On a number of occasions as Bulganin was explaining a point, Khrushchev would stop him and explain the Soviet Government's view himself. At formal functions he accorded precedence to Bulganin, but the two visitors divided between themselves the task of replying to addresses of welcome at various functions.

Travelling through India Bulganin and Khrushchev used hard-hitting words in their public speeches against the Wes-

tern powers, particularly America. They criticised the Western attitude to the colonial question and racial discrimination and strongly attacked America for her support to military pacts. Speaking in Calcutta to a vast audience Khrushchev referred to the joint statement on Goa issued by Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State and Portugal's Foreign Minister Cunha. On Dulles's subsequent comment that Goa had been with Portugal for 400 years, Khrushchev said, "However many years might have passed, what is stolen remains stolen and must be returned to whom it belongs by right with interest if there is any conscience, of course". These words were drowned in roars of applause.

Press comments in the U.S.A. and other Western countries left no room for doubt that the repeated attacks on Western policies deeply offended public opinion in those countries. Their bitterness was in part directed towards India and Nehru. It was suggested that by allowing Soviet leaders to attack countries friendly to India on Indian soil Nehru associated himself with these attacks. Typical of criticisms in the U.S. press was an editorial in *The New York Times* of December 15, 1955. The joint statement signed by Nehru and Bulganin, the editorial said, and Nehru's toleration of the Soviet leaders' attacks on Indian soil had aligned him so closely with Soviet policy as to put a large question mark against his professed neutrality. Nothing could be further from the truth. Nehru, of course, welcomed the unambiguous expression of Soviet support to India on Goa and Kashmir. He was also pleased with the Soviet leaders' expression of support to peaceful co-existence among nations and their criticism of colonialism and racial inequality. He was not, however, happy with the harsh expressions used by the Soviet leaders in their attacks on the policies of other countries. But he could hardly advise the guests as to what they should or should not say in public. He did mention in a private talk with Khrushchev that harsh words created unnecessary bitterness. Khrushchev immediately replied that he believed in hitting back hard where attacked: "Otherwise the attack would grow worse".

Nehru had Western criticisms in mind when presiding over a civic reception to the Soviet guests in Calcutta he

said, "No one should object to friendship and cooperation between others. It is hatred and violence and hostility that we should dislike and avoid." He added that he could not understand why the welcome given to the Russian guests had alarmed some of India's friends in other countries. India's basic policy was not to join any military alliance but to cooperate with all in the quest of peace and security and human betterment. At a subsequent farewell speech he emphasised that friendship with the Soviet Union did not mean a break in the friendly relations with other countries.

Feelings in the Western countries were not to be easily mollified. Critics pointed that India was being naive in accepting the Soviet condemnation of military alliances at its face value. What about the Warsaw Pact which had been sponsored by the Soviet Union and of which it was a prominent partner? Nehru opposed military alliances of any kind whether the Warsaw Pact or the NATO or the Baghdad Pact. But he felt that the Soviet leaders' open condemnation of military alliances despite their membership of the Warsaw Pact should be welcomed as something positive. He was clear in his own mind that the salvation of the East European countries lay in the reduction of tension in the relations between the great powers. Only then would Soviet authorities agree to the withdrawal of their forces and military installations from other countries in East Europe.

In February 1956, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met in Moscow. Within a few weeks details of speeches made by Khrushchev and Mikoyan at the Congress condemning Stalin and the cult of Stalinism became known throughout the world. In quick succession the Soviet Government announced a number of measures to reduce international tension. They had already agreed upon the terms of the Austrian Peace Treaty and re-establishment of friendly relations with Yugoslavia. The Soviet Government had announced the previous year a cut in their armed forces by 640,000 men. A further cut of one million two hundred thousand was announced on May 14, 1956. This was followed by a statement on January 6, 1958 of the decision to make another reduction of 300,000

men. Nehru welcomed these measures as significant contributions to peace and appealed to the Western powers to recognise the importance of the changes in the Soviet Union and not to discourage these trends by carping criticism.

In the second week of December 1957 Prime Minister Bulganin sent letters to President Eisenhower and the Prime Ministers of Britain and France drawing their attention to dangers arising from a continuing arms race and American plans to instal rocket bases in West Europe. The Soviet Government, Bulganin said, was ready to discuss this and other matters of interest at a meeting of heads of Governments. Nehru who had been anxiously watching the negative results of the talks on disarmament among the big powers welcomed Bulganin's proposal; so did the Chinese Government. However, not much progress was made. In this situation the Soviet Government announced in the third week of January 1958 that they intended to call within two or three months a Conference of heads of Governments to consider a series of definite proposals to ease world tension. Accordingly Bulganin wrote to President Eisenhower and heads of seventeen other governments including India. He proposed that apart from the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, India, Egypt, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Sweden and Austria should be invited to participate in the summit meeting. Nehru welcomed the Soviet proposal. He had already written to Eisenhower and Bulganin on November 28 appealing to them to take effective measures for easing of world tension. In his reply to Bulganin on his latest proposal Nehru expressed his conviction that the only way to achieve results was to approach these vital questions in the real spirit of peace and cooperation in accordance with the resolution on peaceful co-existence recently passed by the U.N. He would be happy, he said, to associate his Government with the proposed summit meeting and help in any steps that would further the cause of peace. But, he added, "it will be appreciated that the urgent need today is for an agreement between the Soviet Union and the USA about a proposal for the conference."

The USA was opposed to an immediate summit meeting of the kind proposed by the Soviet Government. Eisenhower expressed his readiness to meet the Soviet Premier

but considered it essential that prior to the meeting Foreign Ministers on both sides should discuss the complex issues so that these could be presented in a form suitable for decision by heads of Governments. This view was shared by Hammarskjöld. The Russian leaders were disappointed. In a broadcast on January 10 Moscow radio said that the suggestion for a Foreign Ministers' meeting before the summit talks would compromise the very idea of negotiation.

In the following months there was an exchange of correspondence on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers' Conference between the Soviet Union, the USA, Britain and France, but no definite progress could be made. Nehru, therefore, issued another appeal on April 29 for a summit meeting without delay, but this appeal also went unheeded by the Western powers.

On March 27 Khrushchev was elected Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. In paying a tribute to him Voroshilov, the Soviet President, said that Khrushchev's name was inseparable from the Soviet Union's great achievements in the pursuit of peace through his foreign policy. He added that the Soviet Union struggled for a stable world peace and it would not be an exaggeration to say that peoples the world over knew Khrushchev as the staunchest, the most-remembered and indefatigable fighter for peace against the threat of a new war and for peaceful coexistence. These compliments were not undeserved. It was an open secret that Khrushchev had for quite some time been exercising commanding control over Soviet foreign policy. His formal election as Prime Minister meant that Soviet efforts at peaceful solution of international problems would be continued. Nehru gave expression to this hope in his congratulatory message to Khrushchev.

Within a few weeks the world faced a grave crisis in West Asia. The trouble began in the Lebanon on May 8 with the murder of the editor of the *Daily Telegraph* of Beirut, who was an outspoken critic of the pro-Western policies of the Lebanese Government and an ardent supporter of Nasser. Fierce fighting ensued between Government forces and opposition elements throughout the country and within a few days the Lebanon was plunged in a bitter civil war. The Soviet Government issued a state-

ment against interference by other powers in the domestic affairs of the Lebanese. This was followed by a statement by Dulles at a news conference at Washington. He drew attention to the provision in the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East which declared that independence of the countries of the Middle East was vital to the United States. This, Dulles said, gave the U.S. a mandate for action if peace and security there were endangered from any quarter. The Lebanese Government themselves complained to the U.N. Security Council against Egyptian support to rebel elements within the country. After heated discussions in a number of sessions the Security Council decided on June 11 to send a team of U.N. Observers to the Lebanon to prevent infiltration of outsiders and smuggling of arms into the troubled State. The U.N. also decided to send a three-member observation group including India to the Lebanon. Nehru selected Rajeshwar Dayal of the Indian Foreign Service as the Indian representative in this group.

The U. N. presence served to stabilise the situation somewhat. However, the situation not only in the Lebanon but also in other West Asian countries rapidly deteriorated when a military coup at Baghdad in July 1958 resulted in the assassination of King Feisal and the entire Iraqi royal family. This was quickly followed by the landing of American marines in the Lebanon on July 15. Earlier that day President Eisenhower announced that the marines were landing "to protect American lives and to encourage the defence of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity." He added, "We now see in the Middle East the same pattern of conquest with which we became familiar during the period 1945-50. This involves taking over a nation by means of indirect aggression". Two days later British paratroopers landed in the capital of Jordan aboard giant transport planes from Cyprus. The landing was ostensibly in reply to a request from King Hussein.

Immediately after the landing of the American marines in the Lebanon Sobolev, the Soviet delegate at the United Nations, introduced a resolution in the Security Council describing the despatch of American troops to the Lebanon as "an act of aggression which threatened to plunge the whole world into war" and demanding imme-

diate withdrawal of the marines. On July 17 the Soviet Union submitted another resolution in the Security Council demanding withdrawal of the British troops from the Jordan. These proposals were rejected by the Council. While discussions were proceeding in a heated atmosphere in New York, the UAR and the new regime in Iraq signed a Mutual Defence Agreement on July 19. President Nasser declared that his country would give Iraq all the arms it might require "for the defence of Iraq, the defence of the UAR and the defence of Arab nationalism".

In this critical situation Khrushchev sent letters to Eisenhower, MacMillan, de Gaulle, Nehru and Hammar-skjöld on July 19 calling for a summit conference on July 22 of the heads of Governments of the USSR, USA, France, Britain and India to curb the military conflict which had started. In his letter to Nehru, Khrushchev said, "People of the Soviet Union know India as one of the biggest States whose voice is heard by countries not only of Asia but of the whole world. The Soviet Government hopes that she would do everything possible to contribute in all ways to the quest of the collective efforts of peace-loving States to prevent the approaching catastrophe while it is possible to prevent it." He asked for India's support to the proposal and her active participation as "India could make an invaluable contribution to the cause of maintaining peace."

Nehru welcomed Khrushchev's initiative and lost no time in sending a reply by telegram on July 20. He welcomed peaceful approach by negotiation through the U. N. or the Security Council or otherwise, with a view to helping the U. N. to take steps to end the conflict in the Near and Middle East and Egypt. He added, "If there is an agreement about the holding of such a Conference, it should not be difficult to fix a suitable venue and an early date. We shall gladly offer our services in the cause of peace if they are needed."

Nehru gave his own appreciation of the developments in Iraq at a public meeting in Allahabad on July 15 and observed that the military coup in Iraq was an indication of growing Arab nationalism. The following day at a meeting of the students of the Allahabad University he expressed the view that if outside powers intervened in

the internal affairs of Asian and African countries, there was a danger of total annihilation of humanity. Because of one outside power entering the area, he said, other powers were bound to jump in. India which had delayed recognising the new regime in Iraq despite Krishna Menon's urging announced recognition of the revolutionary government on July 23. Nehru had no doubt that the events in Iraq could not be reversed except by war between big powers and even the outcome of that war would be uncertain. He hoped that the recognition of the new government by nonaligned countries in Asia and Africa would help stabilise the situation and expressed to the big powers his concern at the latest developments. He specially welcomed the Soviet diplomatic move to transfer the venue of discussions between the contending powers to the U. N.

The U. S., however, had other views. Eisenhower declined to accept Khrushchev's proposal for a summit conference. Such a conference would detract from the authority and prestige of the United Nations, he said. On the other hand de Gaulle expressed his readiness to consider the proposal but said he would not attend a U. N. summit conference in New York. MacMillan suggested that the Security Council should meet to consider the situation and this meeting should be attended by heads of Governments of the member countries of the Council.

In view of the American opposition to the summit conference Khrushchev accepted MacMillan's suggestion. He insisted, however, that India should participate in the meeting of the Security Council. "The participation of India would be very useful, even more useful than the participation of some of the so-called permanent Members who in fact do not represent anyone. We consider it essential that the representative of India in the person of Mr. Nehru should take part in the Security Council meeting." American prejudice against Nehru's policies was, however, too deep rooted for Eisenhower to agree to India's participation. The President said that such participation by India which was not a member of the Security Council would not be in accordance with the U. N. Charter. Official circles in Karachi let it be known that Pakistan

would protest if the USA invited India to any summit conference. The feeling in India was that Pakistan's opposition must have influenced the attitude of the U. S. Government. This was supported by Dulles's statement at a news conference on July 31 that if India were to be invited to the summit conference, many other countries would have to be invited and the conference would then become unmanageable.

Nehru was not discouraged. He was not anxious to participate in a big power conference, far less to force himself on one. He was, however, most anxious to see the heads of the two big powers, the U. S. and the Soviet Union, meet and discuss the critical situation in West Asia. The proposal for a head of government meeting was revived by de Gaulle who suggested a venue in Europe, preferably Geneva. Khrushchev immediately accepted the proposal and Eisenhower also expressed his readiness to attend a summit meeting in Europe on or about August 12. Lest, however, Russia might once more raise the embarrassing suggestion of India's participation, the U. S. President expressed great concern for the smaller powers of the world. "They should not be ignored", he said, adding "History has certainly given ample proof that a nation's capacity to contribute to the advancement of mankind is not to be measured by the number of divisions it can put in the field. We must be aware, as I am, of the many very specific proposals made these last few years by the so-called smaller powers which have been of great value to all of us". This touching recognition of the role of smaller powers was not taken seriously in India.

Ultimately no summit meeting took place. Nehru was deeply disappointed and remarked at a news conference that the "summit had disappeared in the clouds". While it might be uncharitable to attribute American opposition to India's participation to their disapproval of Nehru's policy, it was no secret that the State Department under Dulles was most unhappy at Nehru's criticism of U. S. policies in West Asia. Undeterred Nehru continued to press for withdrawal of foreign troops from West Asia. Initiating a debate in the Lok Sabha on August 19, he disagreed with the Western note favouring conditional

withdrawal of troops from the Lebanon and Jordan. "Some of the resolutions" (at the U. N.), he said, "ignored the basic condition that there could be no peace in the area until foreign troops were withdrawn and Arab nationalism was recognised". Replying to the debate the next day he defended his acceptance of Khrushchev's invitation to the summit talks. "It was wrong to imagine", he said, "that India was anxious to be present at the summit talks. It had merely expressed its willingness to be present if both sides agreed and if it was convinced that its presence would be helpful".

One question that caused some temporary misunderstanding between India and the Soviet Union had no relation to world issues or East-West differences. Following the disturbances in Hungary in the autumn of 1956 relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union which Khrushchev had done so much to repair since Stalin's death came under severe strain. Rapid deterioration set in on the publication of the programme which the Yugoslav Communist Party considered at its Seventh Congress on April 22, 1957. The Yugoslav programme rejected the view that the communist parties had a monopoly over every aspect of the movement towards socialism. "Rivalry between the power blocs", it said, "was responsible for international instability ; so also division of the world into spheres of influence which was decided upon at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam". The Soviet Communist Party took serious exception to the Yugoslav formulation that Marxist thought had not kept pace with the advances of the present society. It also actively opposed the Yugoslav view that socialist programmes should be concerned with problems relating to the development of a socialist society and the withering away of the State and not adhere to centralisation of powers. The Yugoslav Congress was boycotted by almost all foreign communist parties and as a mark of its displeasure the Kremlin called off a ten-day State visit which President Voroshilov was to make to Yugoslavia. Khrushchev strongly attacked Yugoslav revisionism in a speech on June 3, describing Yugoslavia as the Trojan horse of imperialism. China had already taken the field three days

earlier accusing Marshal Tito of seeking to create a split in the international communist movement.

Relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia came under severe strain. The Soviet Government suspended the long term economic aid of three hundred million roubles which she had promised to Yugoslavia, thereby forcing Tito to seek credits from the Western countries. Nehru was unhappy at this turn of events. Since December 1954 when President Tito paid his first visit to India, Nehru and the Yugoslav leader established close personal relations with each other. In the following years they used to write to each other regularly and exchange views on international developments. Yugoslavia fully subscribed to *Panch Sheel* to which Nehru attached great importance and actively followed it in its relations with other countries. Nehru attached particular importance to Tito's views on developments in East European countries.

India wanted to keep on friendly terms with both Russia and Yugoslavia and Nehru did not wish to be misunderstood by either country. He also feared that the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute would cause a setback to the liberal trends in Soviet foreign policy. He conveyed to the Soviet authorities through various channels his disappointment at this unfortunate turn of events. The Soviet leaders apparently did not appreciate Nehru's concern. About the middle of May the Soviet Press Attache in Belgrade enquired of India's Press Attache why India was interfering in Russo-Yugoslav relations. About the same time Khrushchev also spoke to our Ambassador in Moscow expressing the hope that India would permit the Soviet Union to solve its ideological dispute with Yugoslavia in its own way. Nehru was somewhat taken aback. In telegrams both to Moscow and Belgrade he affirmed the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. It was some time before relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union began improving but China continued to denounce Yugoslavia with mounting intensity. Having recorded his mild protest against what he considered Indian interference in Russia's relations with Yugoslavia, Khrushchev accepted Nehru's assurance

and Soviet authorities did not raise the matter again.

The Soviet Government must have been aware of the increasing acerbity in the relations between India and China over their common border, but scrupulously avoided any discussion of the merits of the dispute even informally. India, too, did not make any special effort to seek Soviet support or explain its case to any other country until two years later. Indeed, Chinese intransigence did not become clear until receipt of Chou En-lai's letter of January 1959 to Nehru. Even then Nehru hoped that the Chinese would be open to argument on merits and did not think that intervention by other parties would help. Once or twice Khrushchev referred to the dispute in informal talks with Ambassador Menon in Moscow and one or two visiting Indian dignitaries and suggested that the differences should be amicably settled and not allowed to affect the relations between the two countries. The Soviet leaders, however, did let it to be known that they would have been happy if Dalai Lama had not been given asylum in India and so much prominence had not been given to the happenings in Tibet and Dalai Lama's movements and activities within India. They were careful not to refer to this even in Khrushchev's personal correspondence with Nehru on a variety of subjects. The only occasion on which the Soviet authorities expressed any view in public was in November, 1959, when a serious clash took place between an Indian border patrol in Ladakh and the frontier armed forces of China in course of which the numerically small Indian force suffered severe casualties. Tass then released a statement deploring the incident and expressing the Soviet Government's hope that the dispute would be amicably settled. The Chinese must have been greatly displeased even with this harmless statement but the extent of their annoyance did not become known until several years later when the ideological differences between Soviet Union and China began to be discussed in public with increasing acrimony.

Since 1954 the Government of India became greatly concerned at the continuing flow of American arms to Pakistan. Information received by Government indicated that the Pakistan Army would attain parity in strength

of armament with the Indian Army by the end of 1957. The question of requesting the Soviet Government for supply of arms was considered from time to time in the higher Government circles in Delhi since the end of 1955. Responsible people including members of Parliament were urging Government not to remain entirely dependent on Britain for our requirements of arms. After all, they said, Britain was a close ally of the USA and a fellow member with Pakistan of the SEATO and CENTO and could not be depended on in an emergency. It was suggested by some that India should request the Soviet Union for long range bomber planes. Nehru would not be rushed. He was well aware of the implications, political and military, of purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. The British Government must have received information from their own sources of discussion within the Government of India. In March, 1956, Mountbatten, then First Sea Lord in the British Navy, arrived in India ostensibly on an official visit as head of the British Navy. Nehru and his colleagues warmly received him as an old friend and showed him all the courtesies due to an ex-Governor General who had played a notable part in the transfer of power from British to Indian hands. In his private talks Mountbatten strongly advised Nehru against getting arms from the Soviet Union. Nehru listened to him with patience and courtesy but made no commitment. He made Government of India's position clear in a speech to the Lok Sabha on May 30, 1957.

The Government of India, he said, must be free to buy the arms it needs from the best sources available. Thereby he kept his option open. In fact no request for military supply of any kind was made to the Soviet Government until 1961. By then the dispute with China over India's northern border had taken a serious turn, and there was considerable anxiety about the security of that border. Indian armed forces were badly in need of helicopters and planes which could operate on the Himalayan heights and Soviet Union was the only possible source of supply. A formal request for these was made to the Soviet Government and this request was considered by the Soviet authorities with sympathy and promptitude.

The post-Stalin years saw a strengthening of trade and

economic relations between India and the Soviet Union. The first agreement of the kind between the two countries was a barter deal in 1951 under which Russian wheat was to be exchanged for Indian tea and jute manufactures. 1953 saw the signing of a trade agreement for the exchange of a wide range of goods produced in the two countries. A special feature of this agreement was that trade would be financed in Indian rupees so that no foreign exchange liability for India would be involved. The agreement also provided for Soviet technical assistance for India's development programmes and the planning and execution of a number of Indian projects. Then in February, 1955, an agreement was signed for the construction of a steel plant by the Russians at Bhilai with a capacity of one million tons of steel ingots and 750000 tons of rolled products. In the following years the Soviet Government promised aid for a number of other important projects of basic importance to Indian economy and frequent visits were exchanged between industrial, trade and technical delegations and personnel of the two countries. The scale of the Soviet economic and technical aid, however, was small compared with the total economic and financial assistance received from the United States and other Western countries. Nehru's critics, both at home and abroad, used to say that he was more fulsome in praise of the relatively limited assistance from the Soviet Union than of the much larger volume of assistance from Western countries. This was based in part on general distrust of Indo-Soviet cooperation in some circles in India and abroad and on the suspicion that in publicly expressing appreciation of Soviet aid Nehru was gradually leading the country towards the Eastern bloc. Nehru's views on foreign aid in general were clear and consistent. In December, 1952, long before any question of aid from the Soviet Union was mooted, he said, "I am quite clear in my mind that I would rather wish that our advance was slower than that it should be dependent on aid from other countries. Having said that, I really do not see why we should be afraid, provided we are strong, which obviously enables us to go more rapidly ahead.....I do not see any reason why we should prefer not to take aid even though that aid does not influence our policy, or our activities in the

slightest". He reiterated this view in a statement made in the Lok Sabha on February 25, 1955. Soviet economic aid had one special advantage over similar aid from the United States. It did not provide any occasion for foreign criticism of Indian policies nor did it have to run the gauntlet of the legislature of the donor country every year. Every time foreign aid Bills were discussed in the U.S. Congress, individual Congressmen who were critical of India's foreign policy took the opportunity to express themselves harshly about India and her leader.

Moreover, Soviet economic aid was confined to projects in the public sector thereby enabling the Government of India to strengthen industries in some key sectors of economy. Many people in India believed—and this belief was shared by Nehru—that had it not been for the offer of substantial economic and technical aid by the Soviet Government to certain key industries, Western countries would have dragged their feet in examining Indian requests for aid for the Second Five Year Plan.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ADDRESSING THE EAST and West Association, the Foreign Policy Association, the India League of America and the Institute of Pacific Relations in New York on October 19, 1949, Nehru who was on his first visit to U.S.A. said, "And may I say in this connection that I am grateful not only for this occasion but even more so to all the Americans who, in the course of the past many years, sent us their goodwill, and not only sent us their goodwill, but gave us their active support in the struggle for our freedom. It was very heartening to us in those days of struggle and conflict and ups and downs to hear the voices of goodwill and friendship and sympathy from America. I remember that on the last occasion, beginning of my last term of imprisonment, a number of very distinguished citizens in America issued a manifesto—and I think it was addressed to the President of the U.S.A.—appealing to him to take some action in regard to India. May I also say that all of us in India know very well, although it might not be so known in public, what great interest President Roosevelt had in our country's freedom and how he exercised his great influence to that end".

The diplomatic papers of the United States Department of State since published give details of the efforts made by President Roosevelt to persuade Churchill to grant freedom to the people of India. Churchill was adamant. In a personal telegram to President Roosevelt on March 4, 1942, he said, "We must not on any occasion break with the Muslims who represent a 100 million people and the main army elements on which we must rely for the immediate fighting. We have also to consider our duty towards 30 to 40 million untouchables and our treaties with the princely states of India, perhaps, 80 million. Naturally we do not want to throw India into chaos on the eve of invasion". Roosevelt replied in a long telegram on March 20, suggesting that a temporary Government might be set up in India, aided by a small representative group covering different castes,

occupations, religions and geographies and this group should be recognised as a temporary dominion Government. Louis Johnson, the President's Personal Representative in India, had already taken a hand in the negotiations which Sri Stafford Cripps had started in India with the leaders of various Indian political parties and others and were then on the verge of a breakdown. In a last minute appeal to Churchill, the President asked him to postpone the departure of Cripps from India "until one more final effort has been made to prevent a breakdown in the negotiations", adding, "American public opinion cannot understand why, if the British Government is willing to permit the component parts of India to secede from the British Empire after the war, it is not willing to permit them to enjoy what is tantamount to self-government during the war". But this appeal arrived too late ; Cripps had already left the shores of India. After the failure of the negotiations with Cripps, Nehru sent a long message to Roosevelt on April 13, 1942, recalling the struggle of the Indian people to achieve independence. He said, "The peril of today made us observe above everything else that an opportunity should be given to us to organise a real national and popular resistance to the aggressor and invader. We are convinced that the right way to do this would have been to win the freedom and independence to our people and ask them to defend it. That would have lighted a spark in millions of hearts which would have developed into a blazing fire of resistance which no aggressor could have faced successfully". Nehru assured the President that the sympathies of the Indian people were with the forces fighting against fascism and for democracy and freedom. With freedom in their own country those sacrifices could have been translated into a dynamic action. He ended his message with greetings and good wishes to the President "on whom so many all over the world look for leadership in the cause of freedom". Neither Johnson's efforts nor President Chiang Kai-shek's intervention in July could persuade the President to take a more active interest in India's cause. The British had made up their mind to resist pressure from whatever quarters it might come and Roosevelt did not wish to embarrass an ally while both were engaged in a deadly struggle with Germany and Japan.

It is an irony of history that despite the American people's active sympathy with the Indian people's struggle for freedom, almost from the morrow of India's independence misunderstanding began to cloud the relations between the two countries. The main reason for this lay in the differing attitudes of the two countries to international communism. To the U.S. the main problem of the post-war years was to resist what they considered efforts of international communism under Soviet leadership to overthrow democratic institutions all over the world. Other issues like colonialism and racial discrimination to which the new Government of India attached so much importance were of secondary importance to them. The primary aim of the U.S. foreign policy in the immediate post-war years was to contain communism within the borders of those countries in Europe in which the Soviet Union had already secured a dominating position. Nehru was not obsessed with international communism although his Government was itself engaged in combating communist uprising in some parts of India. He regarded his first task as raising the economic living of the underfed millions in his country ; in his view all the energies of his Government must be directed to that end. He was firmly convinced that communism could not be contained by force alone. It could be combated only by removing its breeding ground—want, poverty and disease. The Americans convinced themselves that Nehru had an inadequate appreciation of the menace posed by international communism and his neutral attitude was providing comfort to forces which were determined to subvert orderly governments. This basic difference in their attitudes was a source of serious misunderstanding between the two countries and continued to plague their mutual relations in the following years.

Within a few months of his assumption of office as Prime Minister in August, 1947, Nehru received an official invitation to visit the U.S. as a guest of Government. He did not wish to go out of the country immediately. He had many pressing problems on his hand arising from the partition of the country. Not until May 19, 1949, did he declare his willingness to accept the invitation. The visit which was fixed for October was officially described as one of goodwill.

Press comments in America suggested that the U.S. Government wished to understand Nehru and his policies at first hand and referred to the impending collapse of the Kuomintang regime in China. Nehru had no illusion about the developments in China. Whatever his appreciation of Chiang Kai-shek's sympathy with the Indian people during her struggle for freedom against the British, Nehru considered that the developments then taking place in China were inevitable. An immediate irritant in the Indo-American relations was provided by the manner in which India's request to the U.S. Government for a dollar loan to purchase 1.5 million tonnes of wheat was being treated in America. This request provided American Senators and others who disliked Nehru's foreign policy to read homilies to India on the foreign policy of her Government. The request met with resistance in the American Congress aided by an active anti-Indian campaign started by the Pakistan Embassy in Washington. Nehru was greatly annoyed. He resented any suggestion that the Government of India should try to conciliate public opinion in America by re-adjusting some aspects of his foreign policy in emphasis, if not in substance. He was the last man to accept dictation from any quarter.

While in the U.S. Nehru took every opportunity to explain his Government's policies to the American people. "The objectives of foreign policy", he said, "are the preservation of world peace and the enlargement of human freedom". "India may be new to world politics and her military strength insignificant in comparison with that of the giants of our epoch, but India is old in thought and experience and had struggled for trackless centuries in the adventure of life. We are neither blind to realities nor do we propose to acquiesce in any challenge or menace to freedom from whatever quarter it may come. Where freedom is in danger or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral. The great democracy of the U.S.A. will, I feel sure, understand and appreciate our approach to life's problems because it could not have any other freedom or a different ideal. Friendship and co-operation between our two countries is natural. I stand here to offer both in the pursuit of justice, liberty and peace. But I make it quite clear that we do not seek

any material advantage in exchange for any part of our hard-won freedom". Significantly neither in public nor in his private talks with the American leaders did Nehru refer to the request for wheat-loan. It is interesting to recall that Russian press which had earlier accused Nehru of making a deal with Anglo-American imperialism intensified the virulence of its attack on him after his visit to the United States.

The Americans were not unaware of the reasons for the downfall of the Kuomintang regime. The White Paper on China issued by the State Department in August, 1949 revealed the weaknesses and the incompetence of that regime and brought out clearly that nothing that the Americans could do would have saved Chiang Kai-shek's Government from collapse. They had lingering hopes, however, that the new Chinese Government might not start its career with an open attack on American policies. These hopes proved illusory. The new Chinese leaders lost no time in attacking "American imperialists" and praising the Soviet Union. Public opinion in the United States was particularly angered by the severe treatment to which a number of U.S. nationals were subjected by the new authorities. In this frame of mind the U.S. public and Government did not take kindly to Nehru's plea for the acceptance of realities in China by recognising the new Government. Nehru firmly believed that no problem in East Asia could be solved without recognising the fact of the existence of new China. He, therefore, lost no time in according his Government's recognition to the new regime on December 30, 1949. India, of course, had special reasons to establish friendly relations with a neighbouring country with which it had a common border of more than 2000 miles and with which for the past 3000 years it had had cultural and trade intercourse.

Nehru's repeated insistence on the recognition of new China by the Western powers more particularly the U.S.A. came in for adverse criticism in the Western countries. These criticisms became increasingly more bitter as America became locked in a deadly struggle with communist Chinese forces in Korea. Nehru was most anxious that the war should be brought to an end with the least possible delay and until that could be done, the conflict should be localised.

He, therefore, suggested that either within the Security Council or outside, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China with the help and co-operation of other peace-loving countries should find a basis for ending the conflict and for a permanent solution of the problem of Korea. This was regarded in the U.S. as an attempt to appease aggression. Nehru who was aware of this criticism told the Indian Parliament on July 31, 1950 that "this suggestion was not intended to condone aggression or to weaken the authority of the U.N." "It was made", he said, "to add to the strength and moral force of the Organisation and to facilitate the early termination of a dangerous situation".

After the defeat of the U.S. 8th Army in the battle of the Chong Chong river President Truman declared a national emergency and on December 1, 1950, announced that he was thinking of using the atom bomb in Korea. This caused consternation in most countries of the world including some of U.S.'s allies such as Britain. Nehru, however, had not lost all hope. He urged moderation on all parties and instructed the Indian representative in the U.N. to persist with his efforts to secure an agreed settlement of the dispute. These efforts did not succeed for the time being.

By the middle of 1951, the two warring sides realised that the war had reached a stalemate and total success was beyond the reach of either. The Military Commands of the two sides started armistice talks on July 8, 1951, but agreement on a provisional cease-fire could not be reached until November 27. Not until June 8, 1953, did the Military Commanders of the two sides reach an agreement on the question of repatriation. In addition to the countries mentioned in the earlier resolution of the General Assembly, India was invited to join the Commission as its Chairman. The agreement provided that if the Political Conference failed to reach agreement on the disposition of those prisoners who had not voluntarily elected for repatriation, they would be returned to civilian status and released in a neutral territory.

No agreement could, however, be reached on the composition of the Political Conference. The U.S. continued to remain suspicious of India. In an attempt to keep India out of the Political Conference it was suggested by the U.S. that

participation in the conference should be limited to the countries who had taken part in the Korean war. North Korea and China on the other hand proposed that a number of neutral Asian nations including India, Indonesia, Burma and Pakistan should also be invited to the conference, and that the venue of the Conference should be New Delhi. Some of America's allies, for example, Australia, Canada and New Zealand also desired India's participation in the conference but this was strongly opposed by the U.S. and a number of other countries who were under U.S.'s influence. Nehru who was anxious for the success of the conference let it be known that India would attend the conference only if her presence was desired by the major powers concerned and advised against the issue being forced to a division in the General Assembly. No agreement could be reached on the composition of the Political Conference and the idea seemed dead for the moment.

India's task as Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was not easy. She was criticised in turn by the Chinese People's Republic and the Americans. Syngman Rhee, the South Korean President, took a particular dislike to Indian activities concerning the Korean War. He indulged in frequent bellicose statements against India. In an obvious attempt to complicate the situation the South Korean guards, who must have received private instruction from their Government, allowed 25000 North Korean prisoners to escape from a camp in South Korea. Two more outbreaks involving more than 2000 prisoners took place later. To prevent such unauthorised escape a suggestion was mooted that the Indian guard at these prisoners of war camps should be strengthened by bringing fresh troops from India. Rhee immediately declared that he would oppose the landing of any fresh Indian troop on South Korean soil. The situation took a grave turn when on October 1, 1953, the Indian troops were obliged to fire in self-defence on rioting prisoners in some of the camps. There was a serious risk of the Indian guard at these camps being overwhelmed by South Korean Army and civilians. These developments caused great indignation in India. Nehru severely condemned the South Korean Government and called upon the U.N. Command to ensure the safety of the Indian troops. The U.N. Command

in Korea was virtually controlled by the U.S. and the feeling in India was that the U.S. Government was not doing what it could to check Syngman Rhee's irresponsible conduct and utterances. Feelings were assuaged to some extent by an announcement by the U.S. Government that the U.N. Command accepted responsibility for the safety of all U.N. personnel in Korea including, of course, Indian security forces and other Indian personnel.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission wound up its labours on February 25, 1954. In the absence of any directive from the Political Conference which did not meet at all the Indian Chairman decided to restore to their original custody those prisoners to whom explanations could not be given by the date the mandate of the Commission terminated. This step was criticised in the American press. President Eisenhower, however, paid a generous tribute to the Indian officers and men who had served in Korea. He said, "No military unit in recent years has undertaken a more delicate peace time mission than that faced by the Indian forces in Korea and the confidence inspired by the exemplary conduct, fairness and firmness shown by the Indian officers and men and by the two able Commanders Lt. Gen. Thimayya and Maj. Gen. Thorat who did much to alleviate the fears and doubts of prisoners.... They deserve the highest commendation". Those words served to soothe ruffled Indian feelings in some measure. On the whole, however, the Korean war left a legacy of misunderstanding on both sides. The Americans felt that Nehru leant over backwards to justify Chinese and North Korean moves while Indians had the feeling that bloodshed in Korea among the war prisoners could have been avoided if the Americans had had better appreciation of the realities of the situation and sufficiently curbed the irresponsible utterances of Syngman Rhee.

India's attitude to the Uniting for Peace Resolution was also misunderstood in the U.S.A. Referred to as the Acheson Plan it was accepted by the General Assembly on November 3, 1950, with 52 countries voting in favour, 5 communist States against and 2 members including India abstaining. The resolution provided that in the event of a threat to peace or breach of peace or act of aggression, if the Security

Council failed to exercise its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, because of lack of unanimity among the permanent members, the General Assembly should take up the matter and make recommendations for collective measures. The resolution also provided for the setting up of a Peace Observation Commission which would give prompt and objective information about any dangerous situation. The Soviet Union strongly opposed the resolution contending that it violated the principle of unanimity among the Big Five embodied in the United Nations Charter. India shared this doubt about the legal validity of the resolution. In an outspoken comment on October 5, 1950, Nehru remarked, "It seems like converting the U.N. into a larger edition of the Atlantic Pact and making it a war organisation more than one devoted to peace". In his view the forces earmarked by the member States for use by the U.N. in terms of the resolution would in practice be at the disposal of the leader of the dominant bloc headed by the U.S.A. This would be against the interest of peace. Since India did not wish to take part in the cold war which inspired the resolution, she abstained in the final vote at the U.N. Consistently with this attitude India also subsequently refused to support the Collective Measures Committee which was set up under the resolution. The Western powers were not convinced by the Indian arguments and attributed India's attitude to a basic distrust of America and her allies and an anxiety not to hurt Soviet feelings.

The problem of Formosa provided still another irritant in the relations between India and the U.S.A. Under the Potsdam Agreement, Formosa was to be incorporated in China on the conclusion of the Second World War. In fact Chiang Kai-shek incorporated Formosa as a Province of China in 1945 with the Allied Powers' agreement. In 1949 when his regime collapsed on the mainland, the remnants of his army and his rump Government took refuge in Formosa. The U.S. Government continued to regard Chiang Kai-shek's regime in Formosa as the legal and legitimate Government of China entitled to represent China in the U.N. India which recognised the new People's Republic of China considered the U.S. attitude absurd. The future of Formosa, in the

Indian view, was an internal issue in the Chinese Civil War, and no outside power should intervene in the struggle for its possession between the contending forces. Nehru repeatedly expressed this view in public and in official communications to the U.S. Government. In the beginning the U.S. view did not seem inflexible. In a statement issued on January 5, 1950, President Truman declared that the U.S. accepted Chinese authority over Formosa and had no intention of getting involved in the Civil War in China. However, the outbreak of war in Korea led to a radical change in the U.S. attitude. According to American strategists, Formosa in the hands of the Chinese communists would mean a big gap "in the natural defence line for the U.S.A. in the Pacific" as General MacArthur described it.

On June 27, 1950, President Truman announced the sending of Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa from attack from the mainland and simultaneously warned Chiang Kai-shek against attacking the mainland from Formosa as a base. Nehru continued to plead for a peaceful solution of the Formosan problem. The only just and equitable solution, he said, was that Formosa should be under the control of New China. He repeatedly urged that the decisions arrived at in Cairo and Potsdam to which the U.S. was a party should be implemented. Mainly at his insistence the final communique issued by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in January, 1951, contained a declaration that the problem of Formosa should be settled with due regard to international obligations, the time and manner of the return of Formosa to mainland China to be settled through peaceful negotiations.

Formosa figured again in the discussions between U.S.A. and India on the draft Japanese Peace Treaty. The draft Treaty left the future of Formosa undetermined. India felt that to do so in the face of past international agreements in a document which attempted to regulate the relations of Japan with governments that had been engaged in the war against her was not either just or expedient.

Early in September, 1954, a grave situation arose in the Far East. The Chinese Government started heavily bombarding the Quemoy island group. This was followed by an attack from the mainland on the Tachan island

group in November. The U.S. Government immediately reacted by entering into a Mutual Defence Treaty with the Formosa regime. The U.S. Congress authorised the use of American forces for the protection of Formosa and Pescadores and "for the security and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as the President judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defence of Formosa and Pescadores". Describing the situation as grave, Nehru considered it absurd that the U.S. Government should have intervened for the protection of a group of islands which lay only a few miles off the Chinese mainland. The U.S. Government must have realised the absurdity of the situation when they assisted the withdrawal of Chiang Kai-shek's forces from the Tachan island group. Nehru suggested that as a first step the Chinese Government should be allowed to take over the off-shore islands, Quemoy and Matsu group in particular. "No country can tolerate an enemy sitting 10 miles from their shore, bombarding them all the time. It is an intolerable situation", he said.

During the Asia-African Conference at Bandung in April, 1955, Nehru had several talks with the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai on the situation in the Far East. The Chinese were obviously anxious to impress the leaders of the Asian-African countries assembled at Bandung with the peaceful approach of New China to the settlement of all politically explosive issues. Following his talks with Nehru, Chou En-lai issued a statement at Bandung on 23rd April, 1955, saying that China did not want a war with the U.S. and was prepared to negotiate with the U.S. on the relaxation of tension in the Far East specially in the Formosa area. Nehru extended a warm welcome to the statement. He urged the parties to get together and not work through intermediaries. The U.S. Government's reaction, however, was not helpful. They wanted the Formosan regime to participate in the talks and insisted on the Chinese People's Republic agreeing to an immediate ceasefire. These terms were not acceptable to the Chinese Government.

Although nothing came out of the Chinese Premier's



Farewell to The U.N. General Assembly Session, 1960



With Ho Chi Minh at a Forest Camp in North Vietnam

initiative for the time being, Nehru continued his efforts to create a better atmosphere for negotiations between the U.S.A. and China. On May 2, he sent Krishna Menon to Peking to continue the talks initiated with Chou En-lai at Bandung. Menon who spent 10 days in China declared on return that the Chinese were returning four of the 11 U.S. airmen detained in China. For once Dulles thanked Nehru for securing the release of the American airmen. In the following weeks Menon continued his exploratory talks in London, Ottawa and Washington trying to convince the Western leaders of Chinese sincerity in seeking a peaceful solution of the Far Eastern crisis. A de facto ceasefire had already come into force in the Formosa Straits. Early in August the Chinese Government released 11 more American airmen. Unfortunately, there were no reciprocal gestures from the U.S.A. but in the improved atmosphere the Governments of the U.S. and China agreed to open talks at ambassadorial level at Geneva on the repatriation of civilians of one country detained in the other, who were willing to return to their homes and on the settlement of other outstanding issues.

The Chinese kept the Indian Foreign Office generally informed of the progress of these talks. Nehru expressed the hope that the Geneva talks would prepare the ground for negotiations between the two countries at the level of Foreign Ministers and continued to stress that the root cause of the trouble in the Far East was non-recognition of the People's Republic of China by the U.S.A. and the denial to the People's Republic of its rightful place in the United Nations.

Formosa became a threat to world peace again in August, 1958. On August 27, Peking Radio declared that the Chinese People's Army were determined to liberate Formosa as well as the offshore islands adding that landing on Quemoy was imminent. The same day in Washington President Eisenhower told a news conference that the U.S. was not going to desert its responsibilities to the Kuomintang Administration. Following further verbal exchanges between the U.S.A. and the People's Republic of China, the American Commander in the Taiwan area announced joint amphibious manoeuvres by the units of the American

Seventh Fleet and the Kuomintang Fleet on September 5. This was an obvious provocation to the Chinese and the Soviet Union did not delay making its own intention clear. In an editorial on August 21 *Pravda* warned the U.S. that the Soviet Union would go to the aid of its ally in the event of a clash over Formosa. Another editorial on September 5, threatened a devastating swift counter-blow if the U.S. would intervene with direct military action in the Far East. Early in September Dulles announced after a talk with Eisenhower that the President would not hesitate to intervene in case of a Chinese attack on Quemoy and other foreshore islands if he judged this necessary for the security of Formosa.

Nehru was greatly concerned about these threatening developments. In his monthly news conference on September 7, he again explained India's view on Quemoy and Matsu. The Chinese Government, he said, could not tolerate the existence of Kuomintang bases within 12 miles of the mainland. On September 8, Khrushchev sent a new note to Eisenhower conveying a warning that Russia would regard any attack on China as an attack on the Soviet Union. However, tempers on both sides began to cool down. In an official statement reiterating the Chinese claim to Formosa, Peking indicated that the Chinese Government was still willing to negotiate a Far Eastern settlement. This was followed by officials in Washington pointing out that the U.S.'s offer to resume negotiations with China was outstanding since July 28. Within a few days the U.S.A. and China agreed to shift the ambassadorial talks to Warsaw. This was to be the last Formosan crisis for some years. It is possible that both sides were indulging in a war of nerves. Nonetheless these angry exchanges caused serious alarm in India. Nehru continued to press the leaders of the U.S.A., China and the Soviet Union, in public and in private, for a calm and dispassionate discussion of the issues involved.

The greatest mischief to Indo-American relations was done by the U. S.-Pakistan military pact. Towards the end of 1952, it became known that U.S.A. was trying to set up a Middle East Defence Organisation which would include Pakistan. This information was received with much

alarm in India. Nehru who was opposed to military alliances of any kind announced that Pakistan's membership of the proposed organisation would be a matter of particular concern to India as "it would affect all kinds of balances and equilibriums in India, Pakistan and South Asia"; it would bring war nearer the doors of India. The vast majority of Arab people, he said, were also opposed to a defence organisation in their area which was to be dominated by Western powers. They wanted to keep away from the cold war between the two power blocs. Cold war was bad enough; a military alliance would increase the danger of a hot war. Ultimately the proposal to set up a Middle East Defence Organisation fell through.

Dulles who was the author of the proposal would not, however, rest content. He was anxious to organise the northern tier of defence, as he described it, consisting of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan against the expansion of communism towards the south. To this end discussions were started on bilateral military assistance between U.S. and each of these countries. India had little information about these discussions until November, 1953, when *The New York Times* published a despatch from its correspondent in Karachi stating that the Governor General of Pakistan, who would be visiting Washington ostensibly for health reasons, would discuss the possibility of a military alliance between his country and the U.S. with President Eisenhower. Similar reports appeared in other American newspapers. Nehru expressed grave concern at these reports. An alliance of this kind in his view would have far-reaching consequences on the whole structure of things in Southern Asia and especially on India and Pakistan. There were half-hearted denials and contradictions of *The New York Times* from official sources in Pakistan and the U.S. Nehru made a spirited attack on the proposed military pact between Pakistan and U.S. in a debate in the Indian Lok Sabha on February 22, 1954. He referred to the danger of the return of Western colonialism to Asia in another garb and warned that the pact would change the content of discussions on the settlement of India-Pakistan disputes, more particularly of Kashmir. Indian anxiety was not relieved to any extent by clarifica-

tion by the U.S. that there would be no U.S. bases on Pakistan as part of the deal. She was convinced that if Pakistan was armed with modern military weapons by U.S., these would be utilised to secure a military solution of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan's rejection of India's offer of a no-war declaration between the two countries strengthened Indian suspicion.

Official U.S. attitude to the Indo-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir was always less than sympathetic to India. Since January, 1948, when India took the Kashmir case to the Security Council, the U.K. and the U.S.A. repeatedly sponsored and supported resolutions which took no account of India's complaint that Pakistan had committed aggression in Kashmir which had become part of Indian territory in accordance with proper constitutional procedures. In their anxiety to hold balance between India and Pakistan the Western powers invariably treated the aggressor and the victim of aggression equally. It was widely believed in India that while the motives of the U.K. and U.S.A. might not be the same, both were anxious to please Pakistan which accepted their scheme of global defence against international communism. Kashmir had an important strategic situation and in the hands of Pakistan would be a valuable asset to Western powers in relation to Russia and China.

Officially the object of the U.S. military aid to Pakistan was to enable her to defend herself against communist attack from the north. There was a so-called power vacuum in the region which, it was said, the U.S. aid would serve to fill. Pakistani leaders, however, hardly concealed their motive for securing large-scale military assistance from America. In a candid interview with the *U.S. News and World Report* (January 15, 1954), the Prime Minister of Pakistan referring to U.S. military aid to his country said, "At present we cannot get a settlement mainly because India has greater military strength and Nehru is not interested in settlement. When there is equality of military strength, then I am sure there will be a greater chance of settlement". Newspapers in Pakistan, less inhibited than Ministers of Government, were more forthright in expressing similar views. Both then and subsequently Pakistan

officials assured the Soviet Government that the aid agreement with America was not intended against the Soviet Union. In March, 1956, A. Mikoyan, Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister, arrived in India on a brief visit. On his way out to Delhi he had met Pakistani Government leaders in Karachi. They assured him that Pakistan did not have anything against the Soviet Union. Their object in securing military assistance from the U.S.A. had nothing to do with that country.

Nehru carried on a relentless campaign against the proposed pact. A pact of this kind, he said, was not merely against the freedom of India but against the freedom of the whole of Asia. It would mean the return of Western colonialism in another garb to a region which had only recently shed its colonial fetters. It was an anti-Asian step. He summed up his views in the following words in a public speech in January, 1954: "By accepting foreign military aid Pakistan becomes part of a great group of nations lined up against another. She becomes potentially a war area. The mere fact that war is likely to come to our frontiers is grave enough. The other fact that this aid might possibly be used against India cannot be ignored. The aid would bring cold war nearer India's borders and if a shooting war developed, it would expose India also to peril. To the extent Asian countries became involved in the two great blocs, to that extent the danger of war would spread in the world. It was a wrong step from the point of view of peace or the removal of tension".

In New Delhi the U.S. Ambassador was left in no doubt of the strong feelings in India on the subject. The same feelings were conveyed to Government leaders in Washington. Meantime harsh criticisms of the pact cutting across party lines continued in the Indian Parliament and Indian press. There was hardly any other issue on which public opinion in India was so united. But this had little effect on U.S. policy. In the first week of February, 1954, the U.S. National Security Council formally decided to offer military aid to Pakistan. This was followed by the announcement of a decision by Turkey and Pakistan to study methods of closer collaboration in political, economic and cultural spheres as well as in

“strengthening peace and security in their own interest as also that of all peace-loving nations”. Shortly thereafter Pakistan formally requested the U.S. for military assistance. This request was promptly granted. On February 24, the U.S. Ambassador in India delivered a letter from President Eisenhower to Nehru, “I want you to know directly from me”, Eisenhower said, “that this step does not in any way affect the friendship between our two countries.....And I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression”. The President assured Nehru that America would continue its economic and technical aid to India and added, “If your Government should require military aid of a type contemplated by our Mutual Security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetic consideration”. With the letter the President enclosed a statement explaining the purposes and requirements of mutual security legislation. The equipment provided under this law was to be used solely to maintain the recipient country’s internal security and for its legitimate self-defence. The recipient country “must undertake that it will not engage in any act of aggression against any nation”. This undertaking would, it was stated, provide adequate assurance to all nations.

Nehru sent a brief reply to the President. He did not enter upon direct polemics with the President at that stage, but in a statement before Parliament he repeated his objections in detail to the new agreement. He was quite convinced, he said, that the U.S. President had no ill will towards India, but it was not a question of motives but of consequences of the action of his Government. The aid was intended to strengthen Pakistan’s defence, but from which quarter was Pakistan apprehending aggression? As far as India was concerned, Pakistan had repeatedly rejected India’s offer of a no-war declaration. The only result of American action had been to introduce greater uncertainty and tension in this part of Asia. The Presi-

dent must have meant well in assuring India that if Pakistan used military aid received under the agreement for aggression against another country, he would thwart the aggression, but "we know from past experience", said Nehru, "that aggression takes place and nothing is done to thwart it. Aggression took place in Kashmir six and a half years ago with dire consequences. Nevertheless the U.S. have not thus far condemned it and we are asked not to press this in the interests of peace. Aggression may take place again and be denied.....Later long arguments will be carried on as to whether it was aggression or not. The military aid given by the U.S. to Pakistan is likely to create the conditions which facilitate and encourage aggression". Nehru bitterly reacted to the suggestion that the U.S. would be prepared to consider sympathetically a request for military aid from India. The President had done less than justice to India or himself. "If we object to military aid being given to Pakistan, we would be hypocrites and unprincipled opportunists to accept such aid ourselves".

If Nehru was bitter, more so were other Indian leaders and the Indian press in general. It is particularly unfortunate that the brunt of this bitterness and anger had to be borne by Ambassador Sherman Cooper, a very gentle and friendly person, who was highly respected in India. No country could have sent a better Ambassador abroad, but he had to face hostile questions all over India. In an hour-long interview, at which I was present, Krishna Menon lashed the Ambassador with his bitter tongue. No gun had yet been discovered, Menon said, which could fire in only one direction. Of what use was the President's sweet assurance in the face of frank statements by Pakistani leaders for securing American arms and equipment?

The timing of the aid agreement was particularly unfortunate. Nehru had met the Prime Minister of Pakistan in Karachi in July, 1953, in a friendly atmosphere to discuss questions connected with a possible Kashmir settlement. These discussions were resumed in a second meeting in August in New Delhi. In the subsequent correspondence the two Prime Ministers discussed a number of details and there were indications of willingness on both

sides to find a mutually acceptable formula. The intervention of U.S. military aid by producing what Nehru called "a qualitative change in the situation" virtually put an end to these discussions.

Other measures integrating Pakistan into Western military alliances followed. In April, 1954, Pakistan signed with Turkey a Mutual Assistance Pact. This was the forerunner of the Baghdad Pact which was joined by Iraq, Iran and the United Kingdom. The U.S.A. participated in the Pact in all but name. In September, Pakistan joined the SEATO. Significantly, while signing the Treaty the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated that it was aimed against aggression from any quarters, not merely from communists. Lest his meaning might not be clear, he added that the Treaty covered aggression by India against Pakistan. A few months later, in July, 1955, Pakistan formally became a member of the Baghdad Pact. Nehru bitterly criticised Pakistan's membership of these military alliances. As he said, "the press and the public leaders in Pakistan clearly stated that that country had joined these alliances because they were apprehensive of India and, therefore, wished to strengthen themselves against Indian aggression". This was a reflection on India, apart from the other implications of these alliances for the relations between the two countries. For herself Pakistan lost no time in utilising its membership of the SEATO and the Baghdad Pacts by raising a discussion on the Kashmir issue at the meetings of the Councils of these organisations although Kashmir could have no possible connection with communist aggression against the member countries. India lodged various protests with the U. K. and the U.S.A. These had little effect except that further attempts by Pakistan to discuss Kashmir at later meetings did not receive any encouragement from them.

Indian fears of the consequences of the United States agreement to supply military aid to Pakistan were revived in 1958. Following the revolution in Iraq in July, 1958, which resulted in the murder of the Iraqi King and the extinction of the entire Royal family, the Baghdad Pact Council met in London. At this meeting a declaration was

issued on behalf of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the U.K. and the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, containing the guarantee that "the U.S. in the interest of world peace, and pursuant to existing Congressional authorisation, agrees to co-operate with the nations making the declaration for their security and defence and will promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this declaration".

In pursuance of this declaration, three agreements were signed on March 5, 1959, between the U.S. on the one hand and Turkey, Iran and Pakistan on the other. Article I of the agreement with Pakistan provided that the U.S. would assist the Government of Pakistan at their request in case of aggression against Pakistan by such appropriate action including the use of armed forces. According to a statement issued by the State Department, the agreements were fully consistent with the then existing Congressional authorisation notably the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended and the joint resolution of the U.S. Congress of March 9, 1957, and reflect previously communicated policies of the U.S. with respect to aid to countries desiring to give effect to this co-operation.

In conveying this information to the Foreign Office Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker who had succeeded Sherman Cooper said that the agreement was limited to aggression by communist countries. The Government of India's feelings were expressed by Nehru at a news conference on March 6. Whatever might be the understanding, he said, events often tended to develop in such a way that issues got blurred and people were caught in a tangle. He pointed out that even in the border firings arms supplied by the U.S. had been used by Pakistan. It was not in any one's power to stop certain consequences flowing from it.

Asked by the U.S. journalists in Washington Lincoln White, the White House spokesman, remarked that the U.S. was guaranteeing defence in case a signatory was the victim of communist aggression. He added, "I do not wish to forecast what action we would take in the event India attacked Pakistan. There are other commitments like under the SEATO and under the Baghdad Pact". The bilateral agreements, he said, were consistent with the joint re-

solution of the U.S. Congress of March 9, 1959, the so-called Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East.

Placing a statement before both Houses of Parliament on March 13, 1959, Nehru said, "We have repeatedly stated and it is our firm policy that we will not take any military action against Pakistan or any other country except in self-defence. We are sure that the Government and the people of the U.S. have nothing but goodwill for us and that they will not be parties to any agreements formal or informal, open or secret, which may threaten the security of India". However, fear that Pakistan's real objective was to acquire military strength with U.S. assistance so as to be in a position to try conclusions with India over unsolved India-Pakistan disputes persisted and this hampered full understanding between India and the U.S.A. despite their common approach to a variety of international issues. India did not fail to take note of the Soviet Government's description of the agreements as "a new aggressive plot against peace and security in the Middle East".

Another question that caused considerable misunderstanding between India and U.S. was that of Goa, the small Portuguese colony on the Indian mainland. France had parted with its sovereignty over the French possessions in India after prolonged negotiations with the new Government of India. Similar peaceful negotiations tried with Portugal were rebuffed by the Portuguese Government. By a legal fiction Portugal treated Goa and several other small pockets of territory in India as part of Portuguese metropolitan territory, and there could be no question, Portugal told India, of discussing the future of such territory. The feeling in India was that Portugal was encouraged in her intransigent attitude by her membership of the NATO. As Nehru remarked, it was incredible that any country in the world, least of all the U.S.A., could support the existence of a small colonial pocket on the territory of free India. The Government of the U.S.A. denied that their membership of the NATO imposed any responsibility on them for the protection of the colonial territories of other member countries. They admitted, however, that Portugal was entitled to consult the other members of the NATO about her overseas possessions. In the face of Portugal's stubborn

refusal to discuss the future of Goa, some Indian leaders decided to launch a peaceful resistance movement in the territory in August, 1955. The American press took the occasion to criticise India for having created a situation in which violence and bloodshed were bound to take place. Important newspapers in America lent their hospitable columns to Portugal's propaganda against India. In December 1955, the Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev, visited India. At several public meetings they denounced Portugal's colonialism on the Indian sub-continent. They also expressed the fullest support of the Soviet Government to the Indian standpoint on Kashmir. These declarations were loudly acclaimed throughout India but apparently had a contrary effect on public opinion in the U.S.. Official American circles were irritated by these expressions of unqualified Soviet support to the Indian stand on Goa and Kashmir coupled with the denunciation of Western attitudes to these issues. It was unfortunate that at such a time Dulles issued a joint statement on Goa (December 2, 1955) with Paul Cunha, Foreign Minister of Portugal, who was then visiting the U.S. The joint statement referred to the allegations by the Soviet leaders in India concerning "Portugal's Provinces in the Far East". According to the signatories the statements of the Soviet leaders did not contribute to peace and they deplored the efforts to foment hatred between the East and the West and to divide the people. This joint statement supporting Portugal's claim that Goa was a Portuguese province was bitterly criticised in India. Ambassador Cooper, who had been patiently trying for many months to convince the Indian Government that the U.S. had not taken any side in the Goa controversy, found himself in an unenviable situation. Dulles compounded his indiscretion by mentioning at a press conference two days after the issue of the joint statement that Goa had been a Portuguese province for 400 years and that the citizens of Goa enjoyed the full rights of Portuguese citizenship. He even chose to think that the Indian Government had not disputed the status of Goa as a province of Portugal under the Portuguese Constitution. Lest there might be any doubt on the attitude of the U.S., Dulles added that the joint statement with Portugal Foreign Minister had

not been lightly issued ; the authors had given very careful consideration to their statement before making it.

The Government of India lodged a vigorous protest with the U.S. Government against the joint statement pointing out that the statement was at variance with facts and completely disregarded the strong feeling of the Government and the people of India on the question of Goa. In their view the problem of Goa was not created by the Soviet leaders but by continued Portuguese refusal to relinquish their colonial hold on a small territory on Indian soil while the rest of the sub-continent had thrown off British colonial yoke. It was also mentioned that free India would never recognise the status of Portuguese colonies in India as provinces of the metropolitan territory. India resented the suggestion that the Soviet leaders' statements were intended to incite use of force in Goa. The U.S. Government replied that the joint statement did not signify any departure from American policy in respect of Goa, and that the mention of the words 'Portuguese Provinces' had no international significance as between the Indian and Portuguese Governments. The Foreign Office in Delhi considered the American reply as entirely unconvincing and lost no time in sending another note to Washington expressing the Government of India's deep regret that the U.S. should have taken a position without warrant in a matter of such vital concern to India.

In March, 1956, Dulles passed through Delhi on his way back home from Karachi where he had gone to attend a meeting of the SEATO Council. Nehru received him at the airport and treated him with friendly courtesy. The two statesmen later spent several hours in private talks. A joint statement issued on the conclusion of these talks contained no indication that the two leaders had discussed Portugal. In fact, however, Dulles assured Nehru during his talks that in subscribing to the joint statement with the Portuguese Foreign Minister the U.S. Government had no intention of supporting Portugal against India. Nehru accepted the assurance at its face value but pointed out that nevertheless it was so interpreted by the Portuguese authorities. He left Dulles in no doubt that India would not tolerate the existence of the last remnant of foreign

colonialism on her territory. In public Dulles was moderation itself. He complimented India on her contribution to world peace and said that there was no dispute or controversy between the two countries. He took the occasion to renew the old invitation from Eisenhower to Nehru to visit the U.S. as the President's guest. Nehru accepted the invitation with pleasure, but the visit which was scheduled for the first week of July had to be postponed because of the President's illness.

Besides Goa another question on which the views of India and U.S. widely diverged was the plan for the international control of atomic energy which on America's initiative was accepted by the General Assembly of the U.N. Under this plan an international Agency would acquire ownership of all source material from the moment it was removed from its place of deposit. The Agency would have the authority to determine in each case whether it would itself own and manage any source material refinery or would licence its operation. A thorough inspection of any part of the territory of any State unhindered by national or local laws was an integral part of the plan. Nehru vigorously opposed the proposal. A country's sovereign right over source material, he said, could not be handed over to any international agency. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on July 23, 1957, he emphasised that atomic energy for peaceful development was far more important to the underdeveloped countries of the world than to the developed ones. And if the developed countries had the power, they might stop the use of atomic energy everywhere, including their own countries. They did not need so much power, but smaller countries suffered. A more fundamental objection was that the international Agency might become "a tool in the hands of a great power or a power bloc".

The Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in the autumn of 1956, for once, found India and U.S. ranged on the same side. Dulles was as vigorous as Nehru in criticising U.K., France and Israel although two of them were close allies of the U.S. At the meeting of the Security Council on October 29, 1956, the U.S. sponsored a resolution calling for immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of the Israeli forces behind the armistice line. This was vetoed

by the U.K. and France. The General Assembly later met on November 1 in accordance with the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution. The Indian representative strongly supported the U.S. draft resolution urging immediate cease-fire by all parties and halting movement of military forces. Throughout the crisis the two Governments kept in close touch with each other. In England and France both India and America were accused of trying to appease President Nasser. When the cease-fire came into effect, Nehru advised Nasser in private not to alienate opinion in the U.S.A. and other countries which condemned the aggressors. The Indian public widely acclaimed the part played by the U.S. during this crisis and the memory of bitterness over Goa faded for the moment.

Unfortunately the Hungarian tragedy once again revived the misunderstanding between the two countries. There was great appreciation in the U.S. of Nehru's first comment on happenings in Hungary at a press conference on October 25, 1956. Nehru then stated that what was happening in Hungary was a national upsurge and suggested withdrawal of the Russian forces from Hungarian soil. Addressing the ninth General Conference of the UNESCO which met in New Delhi on November 5, 1956, Nehru said, "We see today in Egypt as well as Hungary both human dignity and freedom outraged and the use of modern arms to gain political objectives. Old colonial methods which, we have thought in our ignorance, belong to a more unenlightened age are being revived in Africa". At a meeting of the All India Congress Committee a few days later he reiterated his view that the Hungarian people should decide about themselves without any external pressure. This satisfaction in America with the Indian attitude did not last long. India found itself unable to support a resolution in the U.N. General Assembly which amongst other things requested the U.N. Secretary General to investigate the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary, to observe the situation directly through representatives named by him and to report to the Assembly. In the Indian view this would amount to foreign intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign State. India also opposed another resolution which proposed that free elections should be held in Hungary under

the auspices of the U.N. Nehru explained that India's main objective was to work for the Soviet withdrawal, but the cold war aspect introduced in the resolution would not promote this objective. This argument did not convince American opinion.

Despite Hungary, the favourable impression in India generated by the firmness shown by the U.S. against its allies during the Suez crisis created a favourable climate for the Indian Prime Minister's visit to the U.S. Eisenhower received Nehru with much warmth and cordiality and spent hours in private talks with him. One of the highlights of the visit was an inspiring radio and television address by Nehru to the American people. He took the opportunity to explain the main features of India's foreign policy. Non-alignment, Nehru said, did not mean passivity of mind or action. It did not mean submission to what India considered evil. It was a positive and dynamic approach. Each country had the right to decide its own policy and way of life. The address made on the whole a good impression on the American people, and for once the American press was full of praise for Nehru and his country. At a farewell speech at the Washington airport Nehru said that the talks between the two leaders created "those bonds of the mind which are far closer than any other bond". He returned home impressed by Eisenhower's sincerity and earnestness. Relations between the two countries became more cordial than that at any time before, since independence.

Throughout the years I worked with Nehru I used to hear complaints from many Americans, official and non-official, that the Prime Minister was not sufficiently appreciative of the massive economic aid that the U.S. had been giving to India. Many other Western friends of India thought likewise. Escott Reid, High Commissioner of Canada, who was a sympathetic observer of events in India, showed me a telegram he had received from Lester Pearson sometime in December, 1955. In this telegram Pearson had remarked that the Soviet Union got more credit from Nehru by sending seven petroleum geologists at Government of India's cost than the Western countries had ever received despite scores of specialists they had sent to India at their own expense. One must make allowance for the fact that

the telegram was sent at a time when the tumultuous welcome given to Bulganin and Khrushchev by Indians under Government's active encouragement had irritated people in Western countries. Even otherwise the Americans contrasted Nehru's frequent appreciation in public of the Soviet aid for the steel plant in Bhilai with his economy of words in public references to the much larger volume and variety of aid from the U.S. It must be said in fairness that this feeling was not entirely baseless. Not that Nehru was unappreciative of the economic assistance given to India by the U.S. He was, however, irritated by frank references in the American press and in official statements to the motives for such aid. The official American view was expressed by Dulles before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 25, 1955. He said that American help was not given as a reward to countries for doing what the U.S. wanted, but the purpose of the aid was "to help towards the worldwide defeat of international communism and in this the U.S. could sometimes get help from countries which were not in agreement with it". As far as India was concerned, Dulles said, it was important that she be helped in making its Five Year Plan a success as India was attempting to demonstrate that its people's economic conditions could be improved by means other than communism. "It would be shortsightedness not to help in the development of the Indian Plan to demonstrate the ability of their free society against that of the neighbouring society of Communist China". The Soviet leaders were more astute. They made it appear that their aid was entirely selfless, designed to help India to stand on its own feet without having to depend on any foreign country. Khrushchev took personal interest in the Soviet-financed projects in India and would write to Nehru direct to remove impediments in the way of their quick completion. This created a favourable impression on Nehru. There was also a feeling in some circles in India, which Nehru also shared, that if the Soviet Union had not come forward with offers of large-scale economic aid, during the Second Five Year Plan, the Western countries would not have opened their purse strings as generously as they did. Indian opinion was moreover offended by comments and criticisms in the American press that despite massive econo-

mic assistance received from America Nehru was always inclined to take the side of the Soviet Union in any dispute between the power blocs.

It was widely believed in America that Krishna Menon with his leftist views was deeply prejudiced against the U.S. The fact that he enjoyed Nehru's confidence in a special measure made most Americans unhappy. It was informally suggested to Nehru by a number of Congress Members of Parliament that he might select some other representative to lead the Indian delegation to the General Assembly. Nehru resented these suggestions. He was the best judge of who should represent India; Menon was not India's Ambassador to the U.S. and no question of approval or disapproval by the U.S. should arise. He rejected the implication that the Indian representative, whoever he might be, could take a stand on any issue before the U.N. on his own. Unfortunately Menon did not always measure his words when speaking in public and often introduced unnecessary bitterness in criticising U.S. policies in the forum of the United Nations. The unpopularity which he thereby earned in the U.S. reflected to some extent on the Prime Minister himself.

Some persons who had access to Nehru did not miss any opportunity to create anti-American prejudice in his mind by playing up some maladroit activities of one or two official U.S. agencies in India, for example, the USIS. The Foreign Office was fully aware of the clandestine activities of a number of foreign Missions in India, and it would not be right to say that Nehru thought that only the Americans indulged in such activities. Nevertheless U.S. agencies, more numerous than others, attracted wider public notice. Incidentally, suggestions in American newspapers that cabinet ministers like Morarji Desai or S. K. Patil were possible future prime ministers of India irritated Nehru; such publicity did not do any good to the ministers themselves.

No country could have sent two abler representatives to a foreign country than Ambassadors Sherman Cooper and Ellsworth Bunker. Nehru was impressed by their sincerity and honesty of purpose and they contributed a good deal to softening feelings against U.S. policies in India during the difficult years between 1954 and 1959.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

1960—A YEAR OF BLASTED HOPES

1960 OPENED WITH bright prospects of detente in international relations. Nehru was happy that the two giants—USA and USSR—were at long last willing to speak to each other in a spirit of accommodation. He had felt convinced for some time that there was no hope of any progress with disarmament and East-West talks on a number of other world issues unless the two countries were willing to reach an understanding with each other. Khrushchev who was in close touch with Nehru throughout visited the USA in September 1959 and was apparently satisfied with his talks with Eisenhower at Camp David. This led him to drop the time-limit he had sent earlier for negotiating a new status for West Berlin. The Western powers reciprocated by agreeing to a summit meeting of the Big Four. The date of this meeting was finally fixed for May 16, 1960.

President Eisenhower arrived on a four-day visit to Delhi on December 10, 1959 to receive a tumultuous welcome from more than a million and a half people of Delhi and surrounding villages. He created a deep impression on Nehru. Despite the generous American assistance, financial and economic, to India, Nehru had always a misgiving in his mind about the soundness of American approach to world problems. In particular he distrusted their adherence to military pacts in West Asia and Southeast Asia. To these he attributed much of the uncertainty and tension in these regions. Eisenhower was at his friendly best in his talks with Nehru. His appreciative references to Indian progress warmed the hearts of members of Parliament. Addressing them on December 10 he referred to India "as a triumph that offsets any world failure of the past decade; a triumph that, as men read our history a century from now, will offset them all." Nehru on his part conveyed to the President, Soviet anxiety to explore ways to an understanding with the West on disarmament, nuclear tests and other world problems.

India continued to have troubles with China. The crisis in the relations between the two countries deepened during 1959. Nehru, however, was still not without hope about finding a peaceful solution of the border dispute. In his speeches in Parliament and elsewhere he preached patience while reaffirming his determination to protect the territorial integrity of the country. He had no doubt in his mind that the problem could not be solved by war. In an interview in December 1959 recorded for transmission by the Columbia Broadcasting System he said that if there should be actual war over the border, it could not be limited "because it was patent to me that certainly we do not expect to go about conquering China and I do not think that however strong China may be, it will succeed in conquering India." Discussions between India and China had not yet reached a point of no return. Chou En-lai was expected in Delhi for personal talks with Nehru in March, 1960. There was much scepticism among some of Nehru's senior colleagues and many members of Parliament about the outcome of these talks, but Nehru was not yet entirely without hope.

Relations between the Soviet Union and China were apparently cordial and if there was any misunderstanding between them over world issues, there was no outward expression of it. In their New Year message of 1960 to the Chinese the Soviet leaders stressed the unshakable unity between Russia and China. The Chinese leaders in their reply cordially thanked the Soviet people for the massive assistance which they had given to China for socialist construction adding: "The close solidarity of the peoples of China and the Soviet Union conforms to the interests of the peoples of these two countries and is a reliable guarantee of the progress of mankind, of people throughout the world." This was more than a formal expression of friendship.

A summit conference of the big powers was a pet idea of Khrushchev's first formulated by Bulganin, then Soviet Premier, in the third week of January 1958 in his letters to Macmillan, Eisenhower and heads of governments of 17 other countries including India. Russia, Bulganin said, intended to call within the following two months a conference of the heads of governments to consider a series of

definite proposals for relieving world tension. He suggested that apart from the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, India, Egypt, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Sweden and Australia should attend the conference. He added that Russia would not oppose attendance by a smaller number of States if that was the general view. In his letter to Nehru Bulganin said: "A successful summit conference with the participation of one of the biggest countries of Asia and the world—the Republic of India—and the consequent relaxation of international tension would also facilitate to strengthen the zone of peace in Asia, for whose establishment you personally, Mr. Nehru, have exerted no little effort, would bring about a detente in Southeast Asia and the Middle East and open up new prospects for the strengthening of the national economy, for the raising of the living standard of countries which have recently gained their independence. This is why the participation of India, and of you personally, in the top-level conference would exert the most benign effect on its decisions, thereby serving the interests of the great Indian people and of other nations interested in peace and progress".

In his reply published on February 5 Nehru said, "So far as we are concerned, we will be happy to associate ourselves with and to help in any step which seems to us to further the cause of peace. But you will appreciate the need today is for an agreement between the Soviet Union and the USA about a formal conference".

The first reaction of the Western powers to the Soviet proposals was rather cool. Nevertheless both sides kept up exchange of notes on details until a critical situation arose in the Middle East with the revolution in Iraq on July 14 which was followed by the landing of the U.S. Marines in the Lebanon on the following day and of the U.K. troops in Amman. Khrushchev immediately suggested a summit get-together with Nehru as one of the participants to discuss the crisis in the Middle East. This proposal was rejected by the USA. A few months later, on November 27, Khrushchev launched the Berlin crisis demanding of the Western powers to quit Berlin. This was a typical Khrushchevian way of putting pressure on his opponents for an ulterior purpose as later events showed.

1959 saw a series of high level visits between the Western countries and the Soviet Union. First was Mikoyan's visit to the USA on January 4. Macmillan went to Moscow on February 21 on a scouting mission to test the value of face-to-face talks with Khrushchev on major issues. By March 26, the Western powers accepted the idea of a summit meeting, which Khrushchev had revived in the meantime, if sufficient progress was made by the Foreign Ministers in their conference due to open in Geneva in the second week of May. Although the Conference recessed on June 19 without an agreement on Berlin, the Soviet Government eased the time limit. Then followed F. Kozlov's visit to U.S.A. on June 18, Vice President Nixon's visit to Russia on July 23 and finally Khrushchev's own visit to the United States in September. The way to the summit seemed clear with Khrushchev's final agreement to the Western proposal for a meeting in Paris on May 16, 1960. Nehru who looked forward to a successful outcome of the talks at Paris welcomed the Soviet decision on February 14, 1960, to cut their armed forces by one-third. This unilateral decision by the Soviet Government was welcome as a token of Soviet earnestness about reaching a firm understanding with the West on the question of disarmament.

Suddenly on February 29, 1960 Khrushchev revived his threat to turn over control of Western access to Berlin to the East German authorities if the West would not come to terms on the future status of the city. Nehru did not take the Soviet threat at its face value. It was obviously intended to keep up pressure on the West and not to be taken as a new Soviet decision to return to a rigid policy in dealing with the Western powers. The Disarmament Conference which opened in Geneva in the middle of March proceeded in a businesslike manner, both the Western powers and the Soviet Union offering their plans. It soon became clear that both disarmament and the problem of Berlin would have to be dealt with at the summit meeting. The atmosphere of negotiations was visibly improved by the concessions made by the Soviet delegation at the talks in Geneva on a nuclear test ban. At long last there was cause for cautious hope of an agreement in the long-drawn-out discussions between the two opposing blocs.

Then happened a strange incident which dashed the hopes of peace-loving people all over the world. On May 5, 1960, Khrushchev announced in the Supreme Soviet that an American U-2 plane had been shot down over the Soviet Union four days earlier. He roundly accused the Western powers of trying to sabotage the summit conference scheduled to open in Paris on May 16. He disclosed that a similar violation had taken place on April 9 and said, "these were very bad preparations for the summit talks." On the same day a spokesman of the State Department in Washington said that the "National Aeronautics and Space Administration—NASA—had informed the Department that an unarmed U-2 weather research plane based on Adana in Turkey had been missing since May 1. The pilot of the plane, according to NASA, was a civilian. The instrumentation carried by the U-2 permits obtaining more precise information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds and wind shear".

On the following day President Eisenhower ordered an inquiry into the disappearance of the plane which was again described as on a peaceful meteorological mission in Eastern Turkey. The press officer of the State Department, Lincoln White, issued a statement the same day according to which "it is entirely possible that having a failure in the oxygen equipment which would result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic control for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet air space". This myth of an American plane on meteorological mission was graphically exposed by Khrushchev on May 7 when he revealed in the Supreme Soviet that the pilot of the plane, Gary Powers, was alive. There was ample evidence, Khrushchev said, that he was on a spying mission and he would be tried as a spy. Reading out the American statement on the U-2 incident to the Supreme Soviet Khrushchev added that "the version put out by the Americans was a complete lie and the man who put it up counted on the pilot being dead".

On May 7 the State Department issued another statement. It admitted that the flight was unauthorised and added: "It is certainly no secret that in the state of the world today intelligence activities are practised by all

countries and post-war history certainly reveals that the Soviet Union has not been lacking behind in this field. The necessity of such activities, as measures for legitimate national defence, is enhanced by the exercise of secrecy practised by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world It is in relation to the danger of surprise attacks that planes of the type of unarmed civilian aircraft have made strides on the frontiers of the free world for the past four years." A Washington despatch added that the statement was issued with President Eisenhower's personal approval after hours of conference with Secretary Herter and others. President Eisenhower elaborated this point in his news conference on May 11: "No one wanted another Pearl Harbour and this meant that the United States must have knowledge of military forces deployed down the world, specially of those capable of massive surprise attacks." Secrecy in the USSR, he added, made intelligence gathering operations essential. The pretence that Powers's flight was unauthorised was completely given up by the President in his broadcast to the American people on May 25. "As President, and as Commander-in-Chief charged with direction and operational activities of the air and armed forces and their subordinate services," he said, "I take full responsibility for approving of the various programmes undertaken by our Government to secure and evaluate military intelligence. It was in the prosecution of one of these intelligence programmes that the widely publicised U-2 incident occurred."

Meantime there was angry reaction throughout the Soviet Union. The wreckage of the plane was exhibited in the Gorky park at Moscow and hundreds of thousands of people crowded round this visible evidence of the American spying activities over their country. Khrushchev himself made a surprise appearance in the Gorky park and at an impromptu news conference gave the warning that if there were any more spying flights over Russian territory, the USSR would destroy the bases from which they had come. That would mean war, he said.

Many responsible people in America were critical of the episode and the Administration's handling of it. *The New York Times* summed up the case as a costly diplo-

matic defeat and said that "the timing of the flight before the summit conference was political stupidity." "The American people," it added, "had the right to expect that changes would be made which would prevent a recurrence of such gross miscalculation."

The U-2 incident was strongly condemned in India and other nonaligned countries. Full details were given to Nehru by Khrushchev in a personal letter but there was no indication of the Soviet leader's attitude to the summit conference which was due to meet in a few days. Khrushchev arrived in Paris on May 14. In a statement at the airport he said, "The Soviet Government would do all in its power to make the conference a success and relieve tensions in the world. The summit meeting will be of extreme importance for peace. We shall have to examine problems of an urgent nature for peace and we shall examine them carefully and fully." On the following day he called on Macmillan and de Gaulle for private talks. On May 16 the four leaders, Khrushchev, Eisenhower, de Gaulle and Macmillan, had a preliminary meeting. At this meeting Khrushchev bitterly criticised the violation of Soviet territory by the American aircraft and stated the conditions under which he would be prepared to participate in the conference. The USA must declare that in future the USA would not violate the State borders of the USSR with its aircraft and that it deplored the provocative actions taken in the past and would punish those directly guilty of such actions. He also withdrew his invitation to Eisenhower which the President had already accepted to visit the Soviet Union on June 10. Eisenhower stated in reply that he had gone to Paris to seek arrangements with the Soviet Union which would eliminate the necessity of all forms of espionage including overflights, but he would make no restitution on the lines proposed by Khrushchev. Thereafter all efforts of Macmillan and de Gaulle to save the conference failed. These two leaders met on May 17 to draw up the funeral oration. In an official communique which was released on the following day they regretted that the discussions which were so important for world peace could not take place. They affirmed their readiness to take part in such nego-

tiations at a suitable time in the future. Khrushchev was unmoved. He had already informed newsmen that he would not attend the summit meeting until Eisenhower expressed regret over the U-2 incident. Thus the hopes centering on personal discussions between the Soviet leader and the leaders of the three leading Western countries came to nought.

Nehru was disappointed but did not give way to despair. He told newsmen in Cairo on May 18 that he was unhappy at the failure of the summit talks but advised calm in facing world problems since, as he put it, an angry approach would not do any good. The big four, he said, would have to try again in better circumstances.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the USA were subjected to further strain by yet another plane incident early in July. The Soviet Government announced on July 11 that an American RB-47 plane operating from a base in Britain was shot down over Soviet territorial waters in the Barents sea on July 1. Two survivors were rescued by the Soviet authorities. Earlier the U.S. authorities had announced that one of its reconnaissance aircraft while on an electro-magnetic survey over the arctic region had been missing and search for it had proved unavailing. An exchange of bitter notes followed. The Soviet Government protested strongly to the Governments of the USA, UK and Norway. The note to the USA recalled the U-2 incident and said that the action of the US Government constituted a deliberate violation of the generally accepted norms of international law. It was a policy aimed at increasing war danger and the US Government and people were warned of the possibility of war. The US authorities, on the other hand, described the shooting down of the RB-47 as a wanton act and expressed their readiness and willingness to take the matter to the U.N. In a counter-protest they maintained that the plane was never within 30 miles of Soviet territory. The U.K. Government stated in their reply that the Soviet Government bore a heavy responsibility for the shooting down of the RB-47 plane. Macmillan, however, announced in the House of Commons that he was taking up with the US President the arrangements

under which US planes operated from British bases. The venue of the controversy was then shifted to New York where the Security Council met on July 22 to consider a formal complaint from the Soviet Union. As expected, the Council rejected the Soviet bid to condemn the USA for the incident while the Soviet Union exercised its eighty-eighth veto in rejecting the US proposal to set up an international commission to investigate the incident.

The summit conference failed and the problems which were responsible for world tensions remained. Principal amongst these was the question of disarmament. Towards the end of August Khrushchev suggested in a personal letter to Nehru that the 15th session of the General Assembly should be attended by heads of states and governments. He wrote to other governments also with the same suggestion. India's first reaction as that of a number of other countries was lukewarm. In his reply to Khrushchev Nehru said that he had a busy schedule in September and was not sure that he could go to New York. He did not, however, rule out the proposal entirely. Leaders of several other nonaligned countries—Nasser and Dr Soekarno in particular—took up the suggestion more seriously and made informal soundings of the Indian Foreign Office. Similar replies were given to them. However, as September wore on, it became clear that more and more heads of governments and states were prepared to attend the General Assembly session. Khrushchev had already announced his plan. So had several East European leaders. Nehru was due to visit Karachi from September 19 to 23 to sign the Canal Water Treaty with President Ayub. By the middle of the month it became clear to him that he also had to go to New York. His absence from the General Assembly session which was being attended by a number of leaders from Asian-African countries would give rise to adverse comments. It was still not very clear to him what useful purpose would be served by the presence of so many leaders in New York.

The Prime Minister left Delhi for New York on September 24 with a small party of four—myself, his Principal Private Secretary and two personal assistants. Soekarno had already arrived in New York in a special plane with

a team of nearly 50 including Aidit, the leader of the powerful Indonesian Communist Party and Gen. Nasution, Defence Minister. Most other heads of Asian and African Governments were also accompanied by large teams of advisers.

Immediately after arrival in New York Nehru became absorbed in a round of ceaseless activities. He received an almost continuous stream of heads of governments and leaders of delegations from other countries in his suite at Hotel Carlyle. Within two days of his arrival Nehru invited all Foreign Ministers and heads of delegations to a dinner. Almost everybody who received the invitation turned up. There was some objection to an invitation being extended to Mrs Golda Meir, Israeli Foreign Minister. It was said that if she was invited, heads of the Arab delegations would keep away. Nehru refused to exclude the leader of only one delegation. In fact, Mrs Meir's presence did not cause any trouble, but throughout the evening she was quiet and did not push herself forward.

The general debate in the Assembly had already started. Nehru attended the Assembly session for the first time on the morning of September 26. By then Khrushchev and Eisenhower had already addressed the Assembly. Nehru lost no time in having detailed talks with the heads of nonaligned countries and more particularly with Nasser, Soekarno, Tito and Nkrumah. On the 26th he called on President Eisenhower at Waldorf Astoria and had a long talk with him. Eisenhower said he did not know how to deal with Khrushchev and what Khrushchev wanted. He was anxious to have talks with the Soviet leader but the latter kept on hurling abuses at him.

The atmosphere in the U.N. building was electric. Many heads of governments were waiting in the queue to address the General Assembly. Among them Prince Sihanouk made a very good and constructive speech ; so did the Crown Prince of Morocco. Sekou Toure was impressive, but the most remarkable performance was that of Fidel Castro. He spoke extempore for four hours with only a sheet of paper before him and he constantly emphasised his points by wide movement of hands and expressive gestures. Indeed, he was the only speaker who did not read

out his opening speech from a manuscript. Castro received frequent applause from the Assembly and from the gallery. Khrushchev sat through the entire speech cancelling an evening engagement with Nehru.

Macmillan was in his best parliamentary form. As he was being applauded by the House, Khrushchev began pounding the table in front with his hands. Once Khrushchev jumped from his seat and shouted at Macmillan. The latter stopped and icily remarked: "I would like that to be translated", and continued as if nothing had happened. A little later during another round of applause Khrushchev began to strike the table in front with his shoes. His mannerism drew unfavourable comments from even sympathetic delegations, but he did not seem to care. Prime Minister Diefenbaker of Canada made an extremely provocative speech directed against the Soviet Union. Menzies's performance was upto expectation—entirely in support of the viewpoints of the UK and the U.S. Nash, Prime Minister of New Zealand, was not impressive but spoke with sincerity. The East European leaders seemed to speak in one voice and almost in the same words.

Nehru himself did not address the General Assembly until October 3. It was a brief speech and well received. He emphasised the urgent need for disarmament. "If within the following three or four years", he said, "effective disarmament was not agreed to and implemented, then it might be too late and all the goodwill in the world would not be able to stop the drift to certain disaster". Consideration of this vital problem, he urged, must not be delayed or postponed. He directed his appeal to the United States and the Soviet Union, two great nations which in his view held the key to war and peace. Theirs was a great responsibility, he remarked. He added that every country small or big is concerned in the matter of peace and war and, therefore, every country must shoulder the responsibility and work to that end.

As the general debate in the Assembly progressed, the nonaligned powers became more and more aware of the intensity of the cold war. The relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were extremely strained with frequent exchange of abuses and acrimonious retorts joined by some

of their allies. In such an atmosphere constructive discussion of any of the serious items on the agenda was out of question. None felt this more bitterly than Tito. He was due to leave New York in two or three days' time. On the afternoon of September 30 he sent his Secretary-General Mates to convey to Nehru his strong feelings on the subject with a suggestion that they might meet at the Yugoslav Permanent Mission the same evening. Others invited were Nasser, Nkrumah and Soekarno. At this meeting it was decided to give notice of a joint resolution sponsored by the five countries. A draft was prepared by Fawzy and Krishna Menon. Copies were sent to the President of the Assembly and to Eisenhower and Khrushchev in formal letters signed by all the five leaders. The draft read as follows:—

“The General Assembly deeply concerned with the recent deterioration in international relations which threatens the world with grave consequences,

Aware of the great expectancy of the world that this Assembly will assist in helping to prepare the way for the easing of the world tension,

Conscious of the grave and urgent responsibility that rests on the United Nations to initiate helpful efforts,

Requests, as a first urgent step, the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to renew their contacts interrupted recently, so that their declared willingness to find all solutions of the outstanding problems by negotiation will be progressively implemented.”

It soon became obvious that the Americans and the Western powers generally did not like the resolution. Many took it to be an attempt to coerce President Eisenhower to meet Khrushchev without any amends by the latter for the personal abuses he had poured on the President. It is possible that the Western powers did not also like the idea of keeping out England and France from the talks; they were to have participated in the abortive summit meeting at Paris. Prime Minister Menzies led the opposition to the five-power move. He and Macmillan went to Washington for discussions with the President and the State Department. Nehru moved the five-power

draft in the General Assembly formally on October 3. The resolution, he said, was a simple one and did not seek to prejudge any issue or to bring pressure to bear on any country or individual. Its aim was merely to avoid a deadlock in the international situation and the Assembly could not allow itself to be paralysed in a matter of such vital importance. While the responsibility for the deadlock had to be shared by all, in the circumstances then prevailing a great deal depended upon the United States and the Soviet Union. "If even a small step can be taken by them, the world would heave a sigh of relief", Nehru said adding, however, "We do not expect that by the renewal of contacts between these two great countries, some solution is likely to emerge". Nehru referred to the letter that Eisenhower had sent to the five leaders on the previous day. The American President, he thought, had not wholly rejected the idea embodied in the draft resolution. "We are dealing with the future of humanity", Nehru said, "and no effort which might perhaps improve the present situation should be left undone".

The debate on the five-power draft resolution took place on October 5. A small amendment was introduced by the authors replacing the word "requests" in original operative paragraph by the words "expresses the hope", the obvious intention being not to appear to put any pressure on the two leaders.

Menzies introduced an amendment which sought to replace the operative paragraph in the five-power draft resolution by one which would have the Assembly express the belief that much benefit for the world would arise from a co-operative meeting of the heads of governments of the four nations, France, USSR, UK and US in relation to those problems which particularly confronted them. It was a specious amendment and completely ignored the spirit underlying the five-power draft. Nehru was extremely irritated. He intervened to point out that the amendment was "a jumble of words conveying no meaning or a wrong meaning". It was not one of four nations trying to settle problems common to them or even of a small group of nations trying to settle the problems of the world. Nehru criticised Menzies for treating "in a trivial way" a ques-

tion so important and vital as the fate of the world. "There was no trickery", Nehru said, "in their resolution; there was patience in it. The Australian position was, however, an untenable one verging on absurdity." I felt as Nehru was continuing his bitter attacks on Menzies as if he was addressing the Indian Parliament and not the General Assembly. Even Krishna Menon felt awkward and remarked later that the Prime Minister need not have gone that far in criticising Menzies. The latter kept quiet. His amendment was rejected by 5 votes in favour, 45 against and 42 abstentions. It received only the support of Canada, France, UK and the US besides his own.

Then a strange development took place. The Argentine representative asked for a separate vote on the words "the President of" and "the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of" in the operative section of the five-power draft. Herter, the American Secretary of State, supported the Argentine amendment. He said that the five-power draft for which America had great sympathy would be greatly strengthened if it did not refer to individuals "who may be gone tomorrow", but only to the Governments. Nehru opposed the move. After all, he said, contacts between the two countries U.S. and U.S.S.R. had not been interrupted. The object of the resolution was to persuade the heads of the two Governments to re-establish personal contact for discussions on world issues.

There was a prolonged and heated debate on the procedural issue—whether a separate vote could be taken on any part of the resolution in the manner proposed by the Argentine delegate. The ruling of the President was in the affirmative despite objections of India and other sponsors. Accordingly the Argentine move for a separate vote was put to the House which approved of it by a majority of one. Further procedural wranglings followed. Ultimately the Argentine amendment was voted on. The result was 41 in favour of retention of the two phrases in the five-power resolution which the Argentine amendment would omit, 37 against and 17 abstentions. As the paragraph failed to receive the required two-thirds majority, the entire resolution became ineffective. It is interesting to note that amongst the nonaligned countries Afghanistan

abstained; so did USSR and other East European socialist countries.

After a brief recess during which the sponsors of the resolution held consultations amongst themselves, Nehru informed the Assembly that with the changes made in the resolution it had lost its main purpose and the sponsors would therefore like to withdraw it. The discussions ended at an hour well past midnight.

Nehru lost further interest in the discussions of the General Assembly. It is only fair to add that even if the five-power resolution were passed, Khrushchev would probably have declined to meet Eisenhower without some expression of regret for the U-2 incident. He said so in his reply to the letter of Nehru and other sponsors of the five-power resolution. He was ready, he said, to open negotiations with the U.S. Government if they had the courage to condemn the action that had led to deterioration in the Soviet-US relations. Since, however, the Americans and their allies took the lead in opposing the five-power resolution, they got all the blame for the failure of the resolution from its supporters and the general impression was that the proposed meeting did not materialise because of opposition by America and her allies.

One person who behaved with great dignity throughout the session of the General Assembly was Secretary General Hammarskjöld. He was subjected to bitter personal attacks by Khrushchev who insisted that there should be three Secretaries General—one from the Western bloc, one from the Eastern bloc and a third one from the bloc of non-aligned countries. All manner of sins were alleged against Hammarskjöld. Referring to the Congo Khrushchev said in his opening address that the Assembly should give “a rebuff to the colonialists and call Hammarskjöld to order so that he should not abuse his position as Secretary General”. Hammarskjöld repeatedly repudiated the charges against him. He said he would not quit the responsible position he held in a huff and thereby bring the United Nations to a nought. Nehru essentially sympathised with Hammarskjöld's position. Addressing the General Assembly on October 3 Nehru said, “In so far as executive action was concerned, it would not be desirable

for the executive to be weakened when frequent and rapid decisions had to be taken. That would mean an abdication of the responsibilities undertaken by the United Nations". He added, "If the executive itself is split up and pulls in different directions it would not be able to function adequately or with speed. For that reason the executive should be given authority to act within the terms of the directions issued. At the same time the executive has to keep in view all the time the impact of various forces in the world, for we must realise that unfortunately we live in a world where there are many pulls in different directions." The Secretary-General, Nehru suggested, might consider what organisational steps should be taken to deal adequately with this situation. Nehru was opposed to any attempt to bring about structural changes or amendments of the Charter, as such amendment was not practicable in the conditions then prevailing.

Many delegates expressed great concern about the situation in Congo. In his opening speech Khrushchev asked that the troops of Asian and African countries only should be left in Congo with the consent of the democratically elected Government of Lumumba. Nkrumah asked for the establishment of a strong command with clear directions to support the legitimate Government with Kasavubu as President and Lumumba as Prime Minister with jurisdiction throughout the whole of Congo. Nehru's own remedy for Congo was for the United Nations to help the elected Parliament to meet and function so that the problems of the country could be dealt with by the people's representatives. The functioning of Parliament might help in ironing out internal differences. As a first step foreign interference must cease and the Belgian military personnel must be made to leave without delay. But neither the problem of Congo nor that of disarmament could be dealt with dispassionately in the atmosphere prevailing in the Assembly.

Among the leaders assembled Prince Sihanouk, head of the State of Cambodia, impressed the Assembly by his dignified and constructive speech. He urged the great powers to stop arming small countries and persuading them to kill each other under the pretext of the anti-communism and anti-imperialism. He proposed the creation of an alliance

between Cambodia and Laos the neutralisation of which would be guaranteed by the great powers. Crown Prince Hussain of Morocco who met Nehru for a long private talk displayed detailed knowledge of every aspect of Moroccan life and economy. He was anxious to see his country make progress in every sphere and had a progressive outlook on international affairs generally. He created a good impression on Nehru.

One leader on whom Nehru chose to call within two or three days of his arrival was Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba. Refused accommodation by the leading hotels of New York, Castro succeeded after a good deal of effort in finding room in a small hotel at Harlem, and Nehru called on him in his room. When Nehru and his party arrived at the hotel in the late afternoon, Castro was not there. All the rooms on the particular floor seemed occupied by young Cubans, men and women, and Nehru was led into a room which was almost entirely filled by two huge beds. There were papers lying all about and next to the wall were three or four old wooden chairs. Within a few minutes Castro arrived apparently from another engagement outside the hotel. He warmly greeted Nehru, made him sit on one of the beds and immediately began to discuss at great length the changes which had been brought by his Government. The enthusiasm of the man was infective. He did not show the slightest complex in dealing with Nehru, occasionally shook him by the shoulder and read out pages from official handouts which were lying scattered in the room. He was by no means discourteous to Nehru, but obviously he had no use for formal diplomatic courtesies or conventional manners. It was a novel experience for those in Nehru's party to see their idol treated so informally by a young person half his age.

The ordinary people of New York used to greet Nehru warmly wherever he appeared in public. Small groups of people used to gather in front of the hotel every morning to greet him when he walked from the hotel entrance to his car. Many bouquets of flowers and other small tokens of appreciation were sent to the hotel by unknown admirers and there were many requests for interviews. How much Nehru enjoyed the confidence of the ordinary people will

be clear from the remarks made by the American driver of my car in New York. Driving to the U.N. building one morning he asked me whether Nehru had been able to find a solution of the difficult problems facing the world. "He is our only hope" the old man said. "I fought in the first world war, my son fought in the second and I do not want my grandson to fight in the third".

The return journey from New York was marked by an important airport meeting between Nehru and the West German Chancellor Adenauer at Köln. For years the two leaders had misunderstood each other. Adenauer thought that Nehru though nonaligned was inclined more towards communist countries. Nehru on the other hand felt that the old Chancellor by following a very rigid policy was impeding return to normal relations between the West and the East. But time had mellowed both. The airport meeting was something more than a mere courteous gesture by the West German leader. The two had a long private talk without their aides and both seemed pleased.

Summing up his impressions of the 15th session of the General Assembly later at Delhi Nehru said that it marked a turning point in the development of the United Nations. The turning point would come even if Khrushchev had not gone to New York because of other developments and circumstances, but Khrushchev's appearance made a big difference. It dramatised everything and almost forced everyone to think of certain important problems, not the least of which was the future of the United Nations. In Nehru's view the UN which was set up in 1947 was no longer representative of conditions of the world in 1960. It had swayed too much in favour of Europe and the Americans. A special position was given to five big powers of which the China that was represented in the organs of the United Nations was not a power at all, while England and France had ceased to be big by modern standards. The rule of unanimity in the Security Council meant that the division of powers in that most important of the U.N. organs was broadly speaking 4: 1, 4 on the Western side and Russia standing by herself. Whatever yardstick one might use, such a division, Nehru said, did not represent the actual balance of power in the world. Besides, other changes had

occurred in Asia and Africa since 1946 of which the Charter took no notice.

To say that Hammarskjöld was an instrument of the State Department was absurd, said Nehru. Hammarskjöld was an independent person and very fair-minded but by upbringing and background generally he was very much a West European. The large majority of important functionaries in the U.N. organs also represented the viewpoints of the West. They could not help their backgrounds, it is true, but their approach to world problems was bound to be coloured by their individual backgrounds. At a dinner given by the U.N. Correspondents' Association Nehru was asked about Hammarskjöld's impartiality. All Hammarskjöld could do, Nehru said, was to try deliberately to be impartial but our own thinking colours our action. We may be men of high quality but we cannot get rid of our own minds and approaches to questions.

Thus ended the abortive session of the General Assembly which had opened with such fanfare.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

CLOSING MONTHS : NEPAL, CONGO, QUEEN'S VISIT

ONE OF NEHRU'S greatest disappointments was the sudden deterioration in relations between India and Nepal in 1960. Ever since the Rana regime was dislodged from power at Kathmandu in 1950-51, Nehru used to take a close personal interest in the fortunes of that small Himalayan kingdom. Nepalese political leaders as well as the King, first Tribhuvan and later his son and successor Mahendra, looked upon Nehru as a sincere friend and consulted him on their problems and difficulties. Nehru's advice to the political leaders was to hasten slowly and not to undermine the position and prestige of the royal house which was the symbol of the unity of the country and its people who were scattered over wide areas with hardly any facilities of communication.

Times had greatly changed since King Tribhuvan with the members of his family including his eldest son Mahendra sought refuge in the Indian Embassy at Kathmandu on November 6, 1950. The ruling Prime Minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Nepal at the time, Maharaja Mohan Shamsheer Jung Bahadur Rana, immediately ordered counter measures to deprive the King of his title and authority. By an accident while the King and the rest of his family had found shelter in the Indian Embassy, the second son of the crown prince was left behind in the palace. The Maharaja proclaimed the little prince as the new King and enthroned him under the name and title of Maharajadhiraj Ganendra Vir Vikram Shah. He then turned to Britain and U.S. for recognition of the new King. The British Government seemed inclined to fall in line with the Prime Minister's wishes. Nehru made it clear to the British, that they could interfere in the new situation in Nepal, only at peril to India's continuing membership of the Commonwealth. This threat had the intended effect. The new King was not recognised by the British and their example was followed by the Americans who anyway knew little

in those days of conditions in Nepal and therefore followed the British lead. King Tribhuvan arrived in Delhi with his family on November 11 in a plane sent to Kathmandu by the Government of India. As a result of subsequent negotiations in which Nehru counselled caution to both sides, an agreement was reached between the King and the Prime Minister Mohan Shamsheer to call a Constituent Assembly and form an interim government including persons representing popular opinion. The King returned to his capital from Delhi on February 16, 1951.

In the years that followed there were many changes in Nepal. The Rana Prime Minister gradually lost all authority and finally sought shelter in India. King Tribhuvan was a person of considerable political sagacity. He died in 1954 and was succeeded by his eldest son Mahendra Vir Vikram Shah. The new King's personality was a complete contrast to his father's. 'A man of few words Mahendra possessed considerable shrewdness. He tried several experiments with a number of changes in the office of the Prime Minister, and ultimately approved a Parliamentary constitution. Fresh elections were held throughout the country. It was generally believed that no single political party would win absolute majority in the new elections and the King would therefore be in a position to exercise effective power in the administration. In fact, however, the Nepali Congress led by B. P. Koirala secured an absolute majority in Parliament. Koirala was not unknown to Nehru and other Indian political leaders, having taken part in the Indian freedom movement as a student in Patna in the forties and suffered imprisonment in India. The King invited Koirala to form a Ministry.

The new government faced formidable difficulties in administering democratic constitution in a country with primitive communications and a very low percentage of literacy. These difficulties were compounded by what appeared to be the King's unhelpful attitude. The impression was gained in Kathmandu that the King was unhappy with his new Prime Minister who, he felt, was not consulting him on various measures proposed by the Government. Nehru advised the King informally to let elected political leaders to learn from their mistakes if any, and not to inter-

fere in their exercise of authority. Koirala on his part felt that the King was trying to interfere too much in administration and not giving the support and confidence to which he was entitled as Prime Minister. Nehru's advice to Koirala also was to avoid any action that would bring him in direct conflict with the King. The Indian Ambassador at Kathmandu, Bhagwan Sahay, who had easy access to the King and the Prime Minister and his colleagues and had their confidence, similarly counselled caution to both sides. In June 1959 Nehru paid an official visit to Nepal. He had long talks with the King as well as the Prime Minister and his colleagues. He received conflicting reports from the two sides on the recent happenings in Nepal. During a long discussion that lasted until early hours of the morning Koirala gave Nehru a detailed account of the issues which were causing difficulties between him and the King. He mentioned to Nehru, for example, that the King was keen on establishing diplomatic relations with Pakistan on which the ministers were not keen. The King on the other hand had earlier told Nehru that it was Koirala and his Cabinet who were insisting on exchanging embassies with Pakistan.

The internal squabbles in Kathmandu continued in the following months with Koirala doing his best to make up with the King. On December 14, 1960 both the King and the Prime Minister were guests at dinner at the Indian Ambassador's house. Koirala who was in a good mood told Ambassador Bhagwan Sahay that at long last he was feeling a little free as he had succeeded in winning a measure of the King's confidence. What was his surprise, therefore, when the following morning as he was presiding over a largely attended public function with some of his colleagues, Koirala was suddenly surrounded by the King's bodyguard and led straight to a place of detention.

The King formally proclaimed a state of emergency, suspended the constitution and arrested besides Koirala all the members of his Cabinet present in Kathmandu. The official proclamation charged Koirala and his government with having given an impetus to anti-national elements, and alleged that the administration had been in a state of paralysis, selfish and group interests had been promoted

and lawlessness had increased.

Within a few hours news of these sudden developments reached New Delhi. Nehru was angry beyond measure. It was he who had helped to break the back of the Rana regime ten years earlier and since then had done everything possible to befriend Nepal. The King's latest move in his view was the complete reversal of democracy; the King in fact resumed the autocratic power of the Rana rulers. Nehru expressed his views unequivocally during a debate on foreign affairs in the Indian Parliament on December 20, 1960. He referred to the vague charges against the Koirala Cabinet in the King's proclamation and said that he failed to understand reference to the dismissed Cabinet's crude economic policies. The Cabinet in his view was faced with a tremendous task and its land policies were very moderate. For the first time since the overthrow of the Rana regime, Nepal had some orderly government. Nehru added that his surprise was all the greater as the King had given the impression that he was working with his Cabinet more harmoniously than before.

On December 26 the King swore in a new Council of Ministers under his own chairmanship. One or two leading members of the deposed Cabinet including the former Home Minister Subarna Shum Sher Jung were in India when the royal coup took place in Nepal. It was a measure of the political stability achieved by Nepal during the previous 10 years that attempts by some disgruntled elements to create trouble in the border areas in the south as in 1950 miserably failed. The new government in Nepal, however, inspired a full scale propaganda blast against India over the troubles. The official organ of the government, the *Gorkha Patra*, alleged that Koirala had pro-India leanings and there was much satisfaction that for the first time an action had been taken in Nepal of which the Government of India or the Indian Embassy knew nothing. The Kathmandu newspapers welcomed the King's action as one giving Nepal a more independent status and holding a balance between India and China.

Nehru took note of these criticisms while speaking in the Lower House of Indian Parliament on April 3, 1961. He described the report that some kind of a secret under-

standing had taken place between India and Nepal during Koirala's premiership as entirely baseless. India, he said, had not interfered in the least in the affairs of Nepal and added that when a person like Koirala who was a comrade in the Indian struggle for independence went on a hunger-strike, it was enough to distress the people of India. Such feelings could not long be interpreted as interference. Nehru was speaking the truth. One or two persons holding high official positions in India suggested that we should give active support to disgruntled Nepali elements within and outside Nepal so as to frustrate the King's action annulling a democratic constitution. Nehru was strongly opposed to any interference in the affairs of another country and issued instruction against Indian territory being used for subversive activities against Nepal. There was no parallel with the situation ten years earlier when India had given active assistance for overthrowing the Rana regime and restoring the authority of the King. However much he was disappointed by the King's action, he would leave the King to learn from his mistake. Fitful attempts were made by a few Nepalis to create trouble across the India-Nepal border, but these led to nothing.

Some Indian newspapers, however, continued to voice criticism of the King's action. The King must have resented such criticisms and took the occasion of the New Year message to his nation on April 13, 1960, to reply to these. He regretted, he said, that "some people outside Nepal were still indulging in all sorts of misleading propaganda" and added "We have no hesitation in saying that if anybody still has dreams of making our country a playground of his whims and fancies, he is in a dreamland". These were harsh words and within a few days the King sought to amend them. Speaking to a news agency correspondent on April 20, he said that Nepal could never go against India and suggested more frequent exchange of thoughts and ideas between India and Nepal at Government and popular levels for better understanding and strengthening of the ties of friendship between the two countries.

Relations between India and Nepal had not been easy since the middle fifties. Once the euphoria of freedom from Rana rule achieved with the Indian assistance passed off,

the Nepalese politicians lost no time in making India a favourite whipping horse. Those in power were anxious to cultivate friendship with India if only for the massive economic aid that India had been pouring into Nepal. But the same politicians when out of power were free with allegations of Indian interference in their country's affairs. Such criticisms could be attributed in part to jealousy and an innate inferiority complex. It must be added in fairness that the manner in which some of the early Indian officials in Kathmandu, including some highly placed ones, conducted themselves caused resentment among the educated Nepalese. The Indian expatriates were highly paid and some of them threw their weight about in public. Unfortunately some people selected by the Government of India in those days for service abroad did not have adequate training nor did they have proper appreciation of the history and culture of the countries in which they were to serve. In the early years India sent a large number of experts to Kathmandu for the execution of many aid schemes. There was also a large Indian military training group in Kathmandu and at the request of the Government of Nepal Indian personnel manned the posts on the northern border of the country. Although all these persons were employed in aid of Nepal, the presence of such a large number of foreigners must have proved galling to the new generation of Nepalese youth. In the beginning the only two resident foreign embassies in Kathmandu were those of India and Britain. Later came the Americans. Initially the U.S. Ambassador at New Delhi was accredited to the Court at Kathmandu and the Americans took care to concert their aid schemes in Nepal with those of India so as to prevent avoidable overlapping. Later the Soviet Union also established diplomatic relations with Nepal but the Soviet Ambassador specifically assured the Indian Foreign Office that the Soviet aid schemes also would not overlap India's and the Soviet Government had no intention to work at cross-purposes with India in Nepal. The position, however, could not remain static. As more countries established diplomatic relations with Nepal, some with offers of economic and other aid, there could be no question of concerting the plans of different

countries among themselves. Authorities in Nepal dealt with each country separately.

For reasons easy to appreciate both the King and his Government wanted to free themselves of complete dependence on India for economic and other aid and made the fullest use of the strained relations between India and China from the summer of 1959. On June 28 1960, there was a serious border incident between Nepal and China on the northern border of Nepal in which several Nepalese were killed. Referring to the incident in the Indian Parliament Nehru declared that aggression by any country against Nepal would be regarded as aggression against India. This was strictly in accordance with the Treaty* of Peace and Friendship signed between Nepal and India in 1950 and Nehru thought that this assurance would be appreciated in Nepal. He was therefore surprised at the strong exception taken to his statement by wide circles in Nepal, including the Nepalese Communist Party and India-baiting politicians like K. I. Singh and Tonka Prasad Acharya, two former Prime Ministers. Even B. P. Koirala who was generally friendly to India sought to maintain an attitude of neutrality between India and China. As Prime Minister of Nepal he had paid a visit to Peking in March 1960 and was greatly feted by the Chinese government and senior Chinese leaders. He came back obviously impressed with what he had seen in China. When he visited New York in October 1960 as the Head of the Delegation to the General Assembly, he and Nehru had several talks on relations between India and Nepal and a number of other international issues which were likely to come up before the General Assembly but unlike in the past Koirala was not very forthcoming in discussion. The King also left no doubt in anybody's mind that while he was generally friendly to India, he would like to establish closer relations with Pakistan and China and maintain a position of equidistance between India on the one hand and China and Pakistan on the other. Both China and Pakistan welcomed this opportunity to loosen the ties between Nepal and India and offered attractive terms of trade and communication. They also actively instigated

* The text of the treaty has not been published. Nehru referred to this at a Press Conference in December 3, 1959.

propaganda against India through Nepalese circles hostile to India. The Chinese Government realised their mistake in precipitating a border incident with Nepal. After his abortive talks with Nehru on the Sino-Indian border in New Delhi in March, 1960, Chou En-lai flew to Kathmandu and quickly reached a settlement with Nepal on the dispute over the Nepal-Tibet border. A formal border agreement was signed in Peking on March 21, 1960. The settlement was generous to Nepal and was appreciated by the Nepalese as a signal gesture of Chinese good intention and friendship towards their country. On the other hand, the King was not to be easily mollified over Indian criticism of his action against Koirala and relations between India and Nepal were not to be the same again. Nehru had done all he could and left the misunderstanding on the part of the King to be healed by the curative process of time. As a close student of history he knew that gratitude among nations wears out rapidly, and if he had any feeling of disappointment, he kept it to himself.

Towards the end of November, 1960, there was grave news from Congo. For months Nehru had been seriously disturbed by developments in that unhappy country. In September, Col. Joseph Mobutu, Chief of the Congolese Army, staged a coup d'etat with President Kasavubu's connivance displacing Prime Minister Ileo. Kasavubu himself had appointed Ileo as Prime Minister only a few days earlier in place of the dismissed Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. One of Mobutu's first acts was to expel the Ambassadors of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Law and order disappeared over large areas and local potentates seized power in more than one province. In his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in October 1960 Nehru had proposed that the elected members of the Congolese Parliament should be given facilities to meet and decide on the future of their country. This was a counsel of perfection to which the interests concerned were not prepared to listen. Mobutu had the full support of the Belgians and the strong steps he took against the Soviet Union had the sympathy and understanding of the United States.

^ Towards the end of November Lumumba escaped from

the prison where he had been detained since his dismissal. He was captured by Mobutu's men and brought back to Leopoldville after being subjected to brutal treatment. One of his fingers had been chewed off by his captors and there were grave injuries on his face and back. All efforts of the local U.N. officials to reach him through the International Red Cross were rebuffed by the Congolese administration.

On December 7, the Security Council met at the Soviet request to consider the situation in Congo. The Chief Soviet Delegate, V. Zorin, severely attacked the local U.N. Command and criticised the United States for its 'colonialist plot' in Congo. Nehru was well aware of the deficiencies of the U.N. Command, but he was convinced that the withdrawal of the U.N. force would be a calamity. He was most unhappy at the decision of the U.A.R.* to withdraw its contingent from the U.N. Congo Force. Krishna Menon, who participated in the debates at the Security Council on India's behalf, expressed misgivings on both these points. The Security Council rejected a Soviet resolution calling for immediate release of Lumumba and withdrawal of all forces from Congo. The debate was then transferred to the General Assembly at the request of India and Yugoslavia. India, U.A.R., Ghana, Indonesia, Morocco, Iraq, Yugoslavia and Ceylon sponsored a resolution which, among other things, demanded release of all political prisoners and immediate convening of the Parliament under adequate protection. It also demanded the withdrawal of all Belgian military and quasi-military personnel, advisers and technicians from the Congo. The resolution, however, failed to receive the required two-third majority.

India was soon faced with a difficult choice. Following the announcement of decision by Morocco, U.A.R. and Indonesia to withdraw their contingents from Congo, Hammarskjöld requested India to send a battalion of troops for service in the Congo. Although convinced that the withdrawal of U.N. troops would be a serious mistake, Nehru did not like the idea of an Indian contingent replacing the troops from other Asian-African countries. He was also unhappy at having to take a step which was directly opposed

*Comprising of Egypt and Syria between 1958-61.

to the Soviet policy.

India had already become unpopular in Leopoldville. It just happened that Hammarskjöld's personal representative at Leopoldville was Rajeshwar Dayal of the Indian Foreign Service. As a U.N. official Dayal had no contact with the Foreign Office in New Delhi and there was no question of his receiving any instruction from us. However, he knew a little too much about the internal happenings in the Congo from first-hand observation and reports of reliable U.N. officials. The authorities in Congo started a virulent personal campaign against him. Mobutu and Kasavubu charged him with aiding and abetting the pro-Lumumba Government of Orientale Province and demanded his withdrawal from the Congo. Hammarskjöld promptly rejected the demand, but was reminded that his personal representative could be thrown out by force.

In this situation it was obvious that the Congolese authorities would not look with a kindly eye at troops from India. Already some Indians serving on the U.N. staff had been badly treated by the local authorities at Leopoldville.

Nehru was not a person to be deterred by threats from Kasavubu and Mobutu. His interest was to avoid offending U.A.R., Indonesia and other Asian-African countries, who were withdrawing their military contingents from the Congo more as a protest against the ineffectiveness of the U.N. role in that country, than for any other reason. How would these countries consider India's action in filling in the gap left by their troops? Events soon overtook Nehru's hesitation.

The Security Council started another round of discussion on the Congo on February 1. As usual, they produced no results and the debate was adjourned on February 7.

On February 10, the Katanga Radio announced that Lumumba and two of his colleagues, Joseph Okito and Maurice Ampolo detained with him in the Jadotville prison, had escaped from custody on the night of February 4 after overpowering their two guards, and drove away in a car. This story was believed by none. Members of the U.N. Conciliation Commission then in Leopoldville expressed their apprehension that the story was put up as a cover

for Lumumba's murder. Reports of his death had been circulating for three or four days in Leopoldville. The U.N. Commission asked for facilities to meet Lumumba, but this request was promptly rejected by Kasavubu. Nevertheless, on February 11, a three-man U.N. military unit left Leopoldville by a special aircraft for Elizabethville, headquarters of Katanga province, to investigate reports of Lumumba's escape. At New York representatives of nine Asian-African countries including India urged Secretary General Hammarskjöld to verify the reports of Lumumba's escape. They expressed fear that the news of his so-called escape might be a camouflage and intended to prepare the way for the announcement of his death. But the camouflage could not be maintained for long. Throughout the world there was concern over Lumumba's fate.

On February 13, Moise Tshombe, Prime Minister of Katanga, announced that Lumumba and his colleagues had been killed by the inhabitants of a small village. Katanga's Minister of Interior, Munungo, making the announcement ruled out any pressure to start judicial proceedings against the villagers. They might have acted hastily, he said, but their action was excusable as they thought that the fugitives were armed.

The entire world was shocked by the news of Lumumba's death. Commenting on the event in a formal statement issued on February 13, Nehru said: "Murder has been committed; murder probably by people who occupy high places. This was almost expected but still it is a great shock. This is a culmination of a series of tragic and deplorable events which have been happening in the Congo. Unless the guilty are punished with speed and the entire situation in the Congo tackled, the consequences are going to be far-reaching". Speaking in both Houses of Parliament on February 15, Nehru said he had no doubt that it was a callous and dastardly murder and for this Tshombe and his henchmen were directly responsible. He once more demanded withdrawal of all foreign elements, specially Belgians, from Congo. He then expressed India's willingness to send combat troops to the Congo, provided the troops would be used to safeguard the freedom of the people. In a message to Hammarskjöld the same day he stated:

"The feeling in our country is strong and unless effective steps are taken immediately, it will be difficult for India to associate itself with policies which permit the perpetrators of these crimes to continue their gangster methods". The U.N. must meet the challenge, and it would be disastrous if the U.N. were to withdraw. He had Belgium responsible for all that had happened in the Congo and added that great and important powers tolerated and even encouraged what was happening. That was the reason why the U.N. remained immobilised.

In New York the Security Council resumed its adjourned debate on Congo on February 13. The Soviet Union tabled a formal resolution on February 14, demanding Hammarskjöld's dismissal and liquidation of the U.N. Congo operations. India gave ardent support to the resolution sponsored by the U.A.R., Ceylon and Yugoslavia urging immediate and impartial investigation into the circumstances of Lumumba's death and calling for the convening of the Congolese Parliament under U.N. protection and reorganisation of the Congolese military units.

Khrushchev lost no time in intensifying his offensive against Hammarskjöld. In a letter to the leaders of Governments in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America he urged support to the Soviet demand for Hammarskjöld's dismissal. "Hammarskjöld's entire line in the Congo", Khrushchev wrote, "was from beginning to end one of base treachery with regard to the interests of the Congolese people, abuse of the principles of the U.N. and elementary standards of decency and honour". He suggested that an African Commission should be set up to supervise the restoration of Congo's independence and its deliverance from colonial aggression.

Nehru was not impressed by Khrushchev's suggestion though he felt no less bitterly about the situation. Answering a question in the Upper House of the Indian Parliament on February 27, he said that "the raising of any question at that time about the reorganisation of the U.N. Secretariat or about the Office and person of the Secretary-General would push to the background important issues like Congo and Disarmament". The Government of India was of the view that when a country wished to raise any

question about the reorganisation of the U.N. or about the Secretary-General, it should be raised later and not at that stage. Otherwise, it would come in the way of all effective activities by the U.N." Nehru sent a reply to Khrushchev on these lines.

It was announced in New Delhi on March 3, that India agreed to send a brigade of 3000 combatant troops to Congo to serve under the U.N. Command there. It was the first time that independent India would send its fighting forces outside the country for combat duties and not for peace-keeping operations as in Korea or in Suez and Gaza. Nehru informed the Lok Sabha that the adoption of the Asian-African resolution by the Security Council had removed one barrier to the sending of the Indian combat troops to the Congo. The decision to send Indian troops to the Congo was taken after the fullest consideration and as events were to show later, the Indian troops, despite many difficulties, did much to curb the activities of anarchial and secessionist elements and thereby save the Congo from complete disintegration.

Differences over the Congo created some misunderstanding between India and the Soviet Union. Some Asian-African countries also did not entirely appreciate Nehru's insistence on retaining the U.N. Force in the Congo. Nehru was convinced, however, that the withdrawal of this force would rapidly lead to great power confrontation over Congo's future, and this would not only result in much greater suffering for the people of the Congo but would also endanger the peace of the world.

A pleasant interlude in those difficult months was provided by the visit of Queen Elizabeth to India. Since independence many heads of States had come to India on invitation from Government and the omission to extend an invitation to the Queen of England began to be noticed in some British circles. It was also no secret that the Queen and her Government would welcome such an invitation. Nehru, however, proceeded very cautiously. He was as firmly attached to the Commonwealth connection as before and considered that the grounds justifying independent India's membership of the Commonwealth which he gave in his broadcast from New Delhi on May 10, 1949, were as

valid as ever. Nevertheless, an important section of opinion in the country was still unreconciled to the Commonwealth connection. The Communist Party of India had voiced their criticism of Commonwealth connection on many occasions in Parliament and elsewhere. Some among the old fighters for India's freedom in the Congress Party also did not share Nehru's enthusiasm for the Commonwealth. Whenever relations between India and Britain worsened, whether on Kashmir, Goa or Suez, critics severely assailed the Commonwealth connection. Nehru knew and often said so openly that successive British Governments took an openly partisan attitude to the Kashmir dispute in favour of Pakistan. Over Goa, too, the British view was less than sympathetic to India. The Government and the people of India however had got used to these. The bitter memory of the Suez conflict of 1956 had become dim, relations between the United Kingdom and the U.A.R. having improved by the end of 1960. Nehru however did not want to take any risk of Queen Elizabeth's visit being made an occasion for the revival of unpleasant memories of Indo-British connection.

The visit of the Queen's husband, the Duke of Edinburgh, to India in January 1959 formed a good curtain-raiser to the Queen's own visit two years later. The Duke arrived at Delhi on January 21, 1959 as a leader of the British delegation to the 46th session of the Indian Science Congress. He was warmly received by Nehru and his colleagues at Palam and had friendly greetings from the people of Delhi. The Duke's easy and free manners endeared him to the common people wherever he went. Replying to a civic reception at Delhi the Duke said, "This visit has done two things for me. It has proved that friendship is stronger than pride and that understanding can do more than strength." These words were loudly cheered by the large assembly present. As Nehru himself said on the same occasion welcoming the Duke in a brief speech, "The civic reception was not a mere formality but a demonstration of the people's affection not only for the Duke but also for the people of his country."

As the Duke's visit progressed, the reception he got from the people became increasingly warmer until at

Bombay on January 28 an estimated one million people lined the route from the Santa Cruz airport to the Government House cheering and acclaiming him all the way. It was obvious that the people were happy to see a Royal Prince from England. Nehru did not quite appreciate the exuberance on the part of the official Reception Committee at Bombay. On one point, however, he felt satisfied. The Queen would be sure of a warm reception if she chose to visit India some day.

Mountbatten had been pressing Nehru to extend an official invitation to the Queen to visit India. In the summer of 1960, Nehru visited England for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and on that occasion, with President Rajendra Prasad's approval, he extended a formal invitation to the Queen to visit India as a distinguished guest of the President and the Government of India. Private advices from England indicated that the Queen was happy to receive the invitation. She promptly accepted it.

On January 21, 1961, the Queen accompanied by the Duke of Edinburgh arrived in Delhi to receive the biggest welcome ever accorded to a visiting head of State. President Rajendra Prasad was at the airport to receive her. So also were Nehru and his colleagues, a large number of members of Parliament and a vast concourse of common people, many of whom had travelled miles on foot and in bullock-carts to see the royal visitors. The speeches made by Indian leaders on the occasion of the Queen's visit to different places in India were marked by extreme cordiality. The tone was set by President Rajendra Prasad in his banquet speech on the 21st evening. In view of the importance of the occasion Nehru himself drafted the speech for the President, a very unusual thing for him to do. Welcoming the Queen Rajendra Prasad said, "The events of 1947 changed the whole aspect of the relations between our two countries; and the Indian people as much as the British elected to keep alive only the pleasant memories of their long association. This happy result was achieved on the one hand by the timely action of the British in parting with power effectively and gracefully, and on the other by the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, the philosopher and leader who guided us to this new destiny,

the destiny of peaceful relations, relations of friendship rather than strife, with those who ruled over us". Referring to the Commonwealth connection the President said, "Perhaps the most striking result of the goodwill with which the transfer of power was effected in 1947 is the fact that the institution of Commonwealth has been so developed that both our countries, without any limitations on their sovereignty, can continue to be members. It is a multi-racial association for consultation on matters of common interest that the Commonwealth has come into prominence and it is in this form that the Commonwealth has served not only to strengthen the relations between members, but also, if I venture to say so, has provided an example to organisational expression of the words 'independence' and 'inter-dependence' that exist today. It places no trammel on its members but fosters an intimacy beyond the formal communication of diplomacy. We do not all of us have the same viewpoint and we need not minimise the differences, but the very fact that they are expressed in friendly and informal discussions is, in this loud and raucous world today, a matter for satisfaction; and the association itself, based as it is on equality, tends to mutual advantage and benefit." Even the most ardent champion could not have put in a more convincing plea for the Commonwealth.

The Queen's visits to other cities in India were marked by equal enthusiasm among the people. The climax was reached at a civic reception on January 28 at New Delhi where nearly half a million citizens gave a standing ovation to the distinguished visitor. Mayor Noor-ud-din Ahmed in his address quoted a couplet from the famous Urdu poet Mirza Ghalib: "May you live a thousand years and may each year be of 50,000 days."

The exuberant reception which the people of India gave to the Queen came as a surprise to the diplomats from East European countries. They failed to understand how the people of India who had struggled for a hundred years to get rid of the British from their soil and undergone many sacrifices and hardships to achieve that goal, could be enthused to such an extent over the visit of an English Queen. It so happened that A. Kosygin, then

Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, came on an official visit to India within two or three days of Queen Elizabeth's departure. Nehru asked me as Ambassador-designate to the Soviet Union to accompany Kosygin during his tour of India. In Calcutta flags which had been put up to greet the Queen had not yet been taken down. In most places they still lay rolled up. Driving with me from the airport at Dum Dum, Soviet Ambassador Benedictov asked me how the Government and the people of India could accord such a reception to the Queen of England which had committed so much oppression in India for nearly two hundred years. I explained that we as a people entertained no permanent ill-will against any country and would like to retain memories of a friendly act as the voluntary transfer of power in 1947. Neither the Ambassador nor the distinguished visitor from his country appeared to be convinced. Nehru who was sensitive to all trends of opinion within the country had probably a similar criticism in mind when he had mentioned in his brief address of welcome to the Queen at the civic reception at Delhi that it was not fair to suggest that Delhi had done much too much or much too little in welcoming the Queen. These objections, he said, only demonstrated that the right and middle course was followed.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

NEHRU—SOME PERSONAL REMINISCENCES

LATE ONE EVENING I was leaving the Foreign Office after a heavy day. Suddenly I felt somebody touching me on the shoulder from behind. It was the Prime Minister. He asked me if I was unwell. When I said that I had a bad headache, he seemed very surprised. "I do not know what headache is like not having had any in my life" he remarked. I was amazed that a man in his 69th year should be able to say so although I knew that he enjoyed perfect health. During nearly 12 years I worked with him in the Foreign Office, I saw Nehru miss office only once for a day or two on account of cold and fever. I believe the key to his good health and his ability to go through an immense volume of work day after day, without any rest or recreation, lay in his complete control over himself. However difficult a situation might be, national or international, he never let himself be upset. He organised his day's programme in every detail and went through it without the slightest deviation. There was nothing casual about his disposal of business nor did he appear ever to be in a hurry. On some days he used to see as many as 20 visitors in office, apart from those he saw at home, but each had his allotted time, and whatever the pressure of other work, no visitor would leave Nehru with a feeling that he had been hustled. On the contrary Nehru would carefully take note of important points during conversation and at the end of the day would pass on these notes to the officials concerned for necessary action. He followed this practice even when attending international conferences. During the long sessions of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in 1955 Nehru took down in long hand the main points in the speech of every single speaker. Each note was preceded by the name of the speaker and the hours at which he started and closed his speech. At the end of the Conference he handed to me the notes he had made. There was not one correction or overwriting in that long record. This was typical of

Nehru's ability to concentrate on one subject at a time. He was, of course, aided by an extremely good memory.

And yet if he did not feel interested in a discussion, he could take his mind entirely off. I have attended many conferences in Delhi where heterogeneous groups of people would talk at cross-purposes. In the earlier years, Nehru used to lose his temper with speakers who talked at length or without any relevance. Later he became more tolerant and not unoften he would take his mind completely off the discussion and close his eyes. The only other person I have known who had complete control over himself was Mahatma Gandhi. In 1944 he was camping at Sodepur some miles out of Calcutta. From there he would drive to the Government House in the heart of the city to see Governor R. G. Casey. The great man would go off to sleep as soon as he entered the car and invariably open his eyes when the car crossed the gate of the Government House.

Whatever the load of work in office, Nehru appeared to cast off all his cares at meal time. He ate frugally but enjoyed his food. He observed strict punctuality in whatever he did, whether he was receiving a visitor, attending a meeting or appearing at a meal, formal or informal. During a State visit to Kathmandu we had all assembled for breakfast with the Prime Minister at 7.30 in the morning. His grandson who had accompanied him during the visit was a few minutes late in arriving at the table. Nehru spoke to him sharply in the presence of others for not turning up in time.

If he could write a letter today, he would not keep it for tomorrow. Probably this was due to his anxiety not to let arrears accumulate, for he knew he would find it difficult to catch up with them. Sometimes this led to unfortunate results. When relations with China worsened from the summer of 1959, Nehru and Chou En-lai used to exchange long letters. Whenever a letter arrived from the Chinese Prime Minister, Nehru wanted to send an immediate reply. He would get impatient if he was advised to wait even for a few days. The Chinese, on the contrary, would sometimes take weeks, if not months, to reply to our communications. This gave them a tactical

advantage in a fast developing situation.

I was with Nehru during the worst days of communal frenzy in August-September, 1947, which engulfed large areas of India and Pakistan. Millions of helpless men, women and children were maimed or killed. Nearer home, in Delhi, hundreds of thousands were driven out of their homes and several thousands knifed or clubbed to death. Again, in February-March 1950, when both parts of Bengal, in India and Pakistan, were overwhelmed by a flood of communal violence and hatred, and stories of rapine and murder were carried in either direction by refugees fleeing from one country to the other, for a few days India and Pakistan seemed on the verge of war. Nehru was shocked but his spirits did not flag. The new problems created by man-made catastrophes on both the occasions with their challenge to all the values he held dear in life merely steeled his resolve to meet the situation unflinchingly, never to give way to despair or depression. Nor did he waste time on mutual recrimination.

Yet, Nehru had his spells of depression. Two remain vivid in my memory. One was in September, 1954. It was no secret that Nehru was anxious to include Krishna Menon in his Cabinet. Menon had played a notable part in the negotiations leading to a truce between the warring sides in Korea. He was Nehru's unofficial adviser in all matters concerning Korea and later Indochina. The important part that he played during the discussions on Indochina in Geneva in the summer of 1954 was acknowledged by Eden, Molotov and Bidault. India was not a formal participant in the conference, but during a crucial period when the Five-Power negotiations were on the verge of a breakdown, Menon devised a formula which helped in providing a bridge between the contending sides. Nehru wanted to show his appreciation of Menon's ability by formally giving him a post in the Cabinet. He was aware that some of his senior colleagues were prejudiced against Menon, but did not expect any serious opposition to his proposal. In this he was mistaken.

Abul Kalam Azad, Minister of Education and a personal friend of Nehru, strongly opposed Menon's inclusion

in the Cabinet. He insisted that Menon should not be given a seat in the Cabinet until his part in the jeep business had been cleared. This referred to a contract for the purchase of a large number of reconditioned war-time jeeps in Europe by the Government of India. As High Commissioner in London, Menon took a leading part in concluding the deal. It was alleged in the press and in Parliament that the jeeps were in very poor condition, that the price paid for them was too high and the contract was made with a middleman who had little credit or standing. There was widespread demand in India, which later found an echo in Parliament, that a thorough probe into the transaction should be made. In fact, more than one enquiry were undertaken later and ultimately Menon was cleared. But this was some years later. In 1954 a cloud of suspicion still hung over him in the eyes of many people not all of whom were his traditional detractors.

Azad's vehement opposition seriously upset Nehru's plans. He had already told Menon of his proposal and regarded Azad's objection as a challenge to his right as Prime Minister to choose his colleagues. Azad offered to resign himself, but this would not solve the dilemma. Azad was the seniormost Minister next to Nehru only in rank, and had a high political standing in the country and in the Congress. Besides, he was the most influential Muslim leader in India and his exit from the Cabinet in protest against Menon's appointment would make the appointment most unpopular. Nehru felt extremely unhappy. For a few days he seemed to lose interest in other matters. But this mood did not last long. Nehru decided not to press the proposal then. Menon continued to function as his unofficial adviser on foreign affairs until he was inducted into the Cabinet in the beginning of 1956. He then became a Cabinet Minister without portfolio and was given an office room in the Ministry of External Affairs almost next door to the Prime Minister's room.

Another period of mental depression through which Nehru passed was in March-April, 1958. On February 13 that year, T. T. Krishnamachari, Finance Minister in Nehru's cabinet, sent in his resignation as a sequel to the

report of the one-man Commission of Enquiry headed by M. C. Chagla, then Chief Justice of Bombay High Court, into the purchase of shares belonging to a business man Haridas Mundhra by the State-owned Life Insurance Corporation of India. Chagla found that the shares were acquired by the Corporation to help save the financial empire of Mundhra from collapse. The Finance Minister to whose Department the Corporation, a semi-autonomous body, was attached, was held constitutionally responsible for the transactions and had no option except to resign. Nehru who had the highest opinion of Krishnamachari's intelligence and ability was pained by this sudden development, but in view of the keen interest in Parliament in the Chagla Commission's findings, he had to let Krishnamachari go. This parting greatly distressed him. Not that Krishnamachari shared Nehru's views on foreign and domestic affairs to the full, but Nehru had the highest opinion of his keen intellect and his presence in the Cabinet was a useful check on the conservatism of some of his other senior colleagues, in particular Morarji Desai. Once again Azad's counsel proved decisive. He advised acceptance of Krishnamachari's resignation, which Nehru did on February 14, 1958. Within eight days Azad himself was dead. Over his dead body Nehru wept uninhibitedly like a child. The loss of two colleagues within a short period greatly depressed the Prime Minister. On April 29, 1958, he announced his decision to resign his office as Prime Minister. He said he was physically and mentally tired and wanted to work for the country as an ordinary citizen. In the External Affairs Ministry in those days he was strangely quiet and pensive. But urgent matters could not wait and besides giving decisions on important issues he had to receive distinguished foreign visitors including, among others, King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan. He appeared to carry on his duties with a peculiar air of detachment. To those of us in the Foreign Office who had worked with him for years this looked very unusual. We were uneasy in our own minds and were hoping that the worst would not come to pass. Within four days Nehru changed his mind. There was a unanimous demand throughout the country that he must not quit and pressure was

brought to bear on him from all sides to change his decision. He yielded. There was a sigh of relief all over India, not least in the Foreign Office. The cloud of depression that had descended on him lifted and he was his own buoyant self again.

In the earlier years Nehru's sudden anger was almost proverbial. As a leading congressman in pre-independence days many congress workers, high and humble, experienced shafts of his quick temper. As Prime Minister, too, he had no patience with people, however highly placed, who would indulge in prevarication or support an obviously unfair or unjust proposition. I remember an important conference attended by several Central Ministers, the Governor of East Punjab, Ministers of the East Punjab Government, and a number of high officials and advisers of the Central and East Punjab Governments. Nehru felt that the action taken by a Department of the Central Government stopping supply of water to West Punjab canals was not right and he was anxious to see the wrong remedied. The Minister-in-charge, N. C. Gadgil, however persisted with his arguments in support of the action he had already taken. Suddenly the Prime Minister who was in the Chair flared up. "Mr. Gadgil", he said, "if you disagree I want your resignation here and now." We were all taken aback. Rajagopalachari, then Home Minister, immediately saw the embarrassing situation and asked all others to withdraw. He apparently remonstrated with Nehru with success, for when we went back to the conference room, the discussions were resumed in a calm atmosphere as if nothing had happened. Nehru's temper had cooled down as quickly as it had risen.

Nehru had no patience with long statements or notes, particularly from civil servants. Those of us who worked in close touch with him day to day would reduce to the briefest compass what we had to tell him in seeking his instruction and mention the precise points at issue together with our own views as to appropriate action. It so happened that the head of Tripura Administration called on Nehru to report on his work and the problems of his territory. The visitor, a civil servant of middling

seniority, kept on talking for nearly half an hour. All the time I was feeling increasingly uncomfortable knowing that he would soon experience Nehru's temper. I had not to wait long. The Prime Minister sharply asked the official to be brief and precise if he wanted anything done.

When I returned to the Foreign Office in June 1954 for my second spell of duty, I found Nehru noticeably changed. He appeared to have become more patient and tolerant. Fewer were the occasions when he would lose temper during discussion or at conferences even when speakers were talking irrelevantly. And as the years passed, a strange mood of benignity settled on him. Was it because of his awareness that his life's mission was coming to an end, that he had to work with the instruments he had and there was not much time to effect any radical change? This was a pity I thought. There was so much of easy-going attitude all around that the fear of a blast of temper from the Prime Minister could serve as a healthy check on laziness and indecision.

Nehru was as free of personal prejudice as any human being could be. He had spent nearly nine years in British jails in India and given many years of his life to fighting iniquities of the British rule. But he had no prejudice against England and Englishmen generally. He appreciated many traits of English character—honesty, straightforwardness, restraint. Many of these qualities had become distorted in Englishmen engaged in the execution of imperialist policies in India and Nehru bitterly criticised these distortions. But he had always a soft corner for England in his heart. "Personally, I owe too much to England in my mental make up", he wrote in his Autobiography "to feel alien to her. And do what I will, I cannot get rid of the habits of mind, and the standards of ways of judging other countries as well as life generally, which I acquired at school and college in England. My predilections (apart from political ones) were in favour of England and the English people, and if I have become what is called an uncompromising opponent of British rule in India, it is almost in spite of this". Some Englishmen and women were his close personal friends. Notable among them were Lord and Lady Mountbatten. It would

be an over-simplification, however, to say that their influence played a crucial part in determining Nehru's attitude to England and Englishmen. Lord Mountbatten's notable contribution to the smooth transfer of power in the Indian subcontinent in 1947 did certainly save much bitterness which would inevitably have accompanied another prolonged campaign against British rule in India. As the last representative of the Raj in India, he and his wife established ties of close personal friendship with Nehru and some other Indian leaders and these in a broad sense helped the leaders of new India to forgive and forget the unhappy history of Indo-British relations.

Nehru had every reason to be prejudiced against members of the Indian Civil Service. The I.C.S., as the service was popularly known, provided the personnel for all the senior administrative and executive posts in India during the British rule. The members of this service were therefore directly responsible for the execution of British policies in India, and as such came in direct collision with the leaders of the freedom movement. During the non-cooperation and civil disobedience movements launched by the Indian National Congress in the twenties, thirties and forties severe laws, orders and regulations were enacted by the British Government and these were administered by members of the Indian Civil Service. By the time of the transfer of power almost half the service was manned by Indians. During the British period, some of the Indian Officers in their anxiety to prove that they were in no way different from their British colleagues were, if anything, more obnoxious in their manners and dealings with their countrymen. They would make slighting references to their country and the leaders of the freedom movement. There was hardly one among the senior Congress Ministers and Congress members of Parliament who had not been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment by members of the I.C.S. There was therefore every reason for the new rulers to distrust the Indian members of the I.C.S. who wished to continue in service after the transfer of power. Nehru and Patel realised, however, that there would be a breakdown of the administrative apparatus if these officers were to be

compulsorily retired from service. The new India faced an immense task of construction, rehabilitation and consolidation; an administrative vacuum would be against the best interests of the country. It did not take leaders long to find that the large majority of the Indian officers belonging to the old Civil Service were persons of ability and integrity and they threw themselves with zeal and devotion into the tasks allotted to them by their new masters. As a result, in the new Government Ministers of their own free choice retained the I.C.S. personnel in all senior secretariat and executive posts. All the senior officials in the Foreign Office, for example, were members of the old service. They had Nehru's fullest confidence, and although the final decision on any matter of policy was Nehru's, we could express our own views fearlessly. He had, however, no use for any special pay and privileges for any service. The proposal ultimately embodied in the Indian Constitution guaranteeing the pay and privileges of the old Secretary of State's services including the I.C.S. was strongly opposed by him but he did not make this an issue of principle nor did he subsequently initiate any move to curb these rights. In fact some of Nehru's critics in his own party not unoften complained that he was relying too much on his senior official advisers. They tended to attribute the responsibility for those policies which they disliked to his official advisers. This suspicion was entirely groundless. Nehru would be the last man to accept dictation from anybody, least to surrender his judgment to a civil servant.

Nehru was incapable of bearing a personal grudge. Some of his colleagues indulged in harsh criticism of the Prime Minister after resigning at different times from the Cabinet. Among them was John Mathai, Finance Minister, who resigned in 1950 over difference with Nehru on the setting up the Planning Commission. Mathai was opposed to the proposal in principle. The Planning Commission, Mathai said, would be a super-cabinet which would impede rather than help the formulation and execution of development projects. To strengthen the force of his arguments Mathai brought in other matters of detail. One such was the purchase of property for the

Indian Embassy in Dublin. Krishna Menon who as High Commissioner in London was concurrently accredited to Ireland as Ambassador insisted on the purchase and Nehru got the proposal approved by the Cabinet against Mathai's strong objection. After leaving the Cabinet Mathai strongly criticised this decision. For good measure he also brought in criticism of the Nehru-Liaquat Pact on the treatment of minorities. Two Ministers, S. P. Mukherjee and K. C. Neogy, had resigned in protest over this pact but Mathai had not registered his disagreement in any manner during the time he was in office. Nehru who had high opinion of Mathai's ability as a colleague was unhappy to let him go. He was also hurt by his erstwhile colleague's unfair remarks. But he did not allow his resentment to stand in the way of Mathai's subsequent appointment as Chairman of the State Bank of India. It is only fair to add that expenditure on the acquisition of a house for the Indian Ambassador in Dublin remained infructuous for years. Neither Krishna Menon nor his successors ever occupied the house at Dublin and no separate staff was sanctioned for the Embassy for years.

Another Minister, C. D. Deshmukh, resigned from the Cabinet in July, 1956, over differences with Nehru on the Central administration of Bombay City. In a long statement in Parliament on July 25, Deshmukh said, he wished "to protest generally against the manner in which this issue, so vitally important, has been handled by the Prime Minister". He accused the Prime Minister of having made and announced his decision without consulting the Cabinet or mentioning his idea even to those members who were interested in the question, e.g. those like Deshmukh whose home was in Maharashtra from which Bombay was to be separated. Nehru strongly repudiated Deshmukh's charge. "There was more consultation on this than on any other subject we have had since I have been Prime Minister", he said. The episode left a legacy of bitterness in the relations between Nehru and Deshmukh whose ability as Finance Minister Nehru highly appreciated, but not for long. Within a few months Azad, Minister of Education, sought to appoint Deshmukh to the important post of Chairman, University Grants Commission. Nehru readily agreed.

There was one political leader against whom Nehru had a deep-rooted prejudice. He was Shyamaprasad Mukherjee whom Nehru selected as Minister of Industries in the first post-independence Government. Mukherjee was a leader of the Hindu Mahasabha and Nehru had intense dislike for the politics of this organisation. It was a surprise to many that Nehru at all included Mukherjee in his Cabinet. He never gave his full confidence to Mukherjee, though he recognised his ability as a parliamentarian, if not as a minister. Mukherjee would express his views fearlessly and not shrink from controverting Nehru's arguments if he disagreed with them. Often there was acrimonious correspondence between the two on various policy matters. When Mukherjee resigned in 1950 over the Bengal Pact, Nehru was glad to let him go.

Nehru strongly disapproved of the Moral Rearmament movement and suspected its motive. He regarded the movement as a facade for anti-communist propaganda. Some of the people who had ready access to the Prime Minister carried lurid tales to him of the immense financial resources commanded by the Moral Rearmament movement and these they attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. He did not like any senior government servant to participate in the activities connected with the movement. When a general conference of the movement was to be held in India, Nehru's first reaction was to deny visas to foreigners for attending the Conference. Ultimately he desisted from such an extreme step realising that this would be strongly criticised abroad. It is interesting to recall that some of his colleagues did not share his prejudice and readily attended functions organised by the sponsors of the Delhi gathering.

It has often been said by Nehru's critics that he was not a good judge of men. This criticism is not entirely without basis. A straightforward person himself, he was incapable of suspecting the bonafides of others until experience taught him otherwise. Many people sought to take advantage of his trusting nature. One morning a smart young man with a foreign university degree saw Nehru in office with a number of testimonials and pro-

posed himself for the post of an adviser on international law in the Ministry of External Affairs. The young man had a very glib tongue and extremely plausible manners and mentioned to Nehru his bright ideas as to how the Legal and Treaties Section of the Foreign Office should be reorganised. Nehru was well impressed and wanted him to be given an appointment immediately. The visitor was referred to me as I was the competent authority to issue a letter of appointment. I spoke to the young man for about half-an-hour. He appeared to me to be a little too smart and somehow or other his testimonials looked suspicious. I wanted his antecedents to be checked and made a private reference to our High Commissioner's Office in London. Meantime, the young man kept on pressing the Prime Minister's Secretariat and once or twice the Prime Minister himself enquired why action was being held up. The report from the High Commissioner showed that the young man who had made such a parade of his knowledge on international law had been turned out of England. France and America on charges of fraud and other criminal offences. Although he had some sort of a degree from a University in the Netherlands, he was obviously an extremely undesirable person and could not be trusted with any responsible office.

There was still another case of an Indian in his forties who arrived in Delhi from the U.K. by air, introduced himself as a successful industrialist and offered his services in the industrial development of independent India. Nehru referred him to Dr J. C. Ghosh, then Member-in-charge of Industry in the Planning Commission. The visitor treated Dr Ghosh with extreme discourtesy. As Secretary-in-charge of Commonwealth Relations I was present at the discussions between the two and as the so-called industrialist tried his irritating manners on me, he got as good as he gave. However, his plans were so grandiose that even Nehru held back despite his initially favourable response. In high dudgeon the gentleman flew back to England and it was not long before he found himself in jail on a charge of fraud.

The success achieved by such persons in favourably impressing the Prime Minister can be explained in part

by his distrust of methods of business followed by civil servants. Nehru felt and said so on many occasions that the average civil servant's mind works in a narrow groove; he is too much tied by rules and precedents and impervious to new ideas. The Prime Minister was anxious to push things quickly and was always ready to receive any new ideas. Some civil servants were not above taking advantage of Nehru's socialist leanings to win his confidence. One of them after enjoying all the amenities—a good house, good pay and good status—which go with the post held by him suggested to Nehru shortly after relinquishing his position in the Secretariat, that it would be more in accord with the trend of times for civil servants to set an example of modest living by occupying small houses. Nehru was immediately impressed by the suggestion and had it circulated. Ultimately nothing came of it as other senior civil servants knew how to kill a proposal of this kind.

Nehru was accessible to all manner of people and as a result in the hothouse atmosphere of Delhi where intrigues and mutual recriminations flourished at all levels, many things used to reach the Prime Minister's ears for which normally a Prime Minister would have had no time. It would not be fair to say that Nehru believed everything that was brought to him. He listened to all, but on really important issues he kept his judgment to himself. One person who was in close and continuous touch with all matters that passed through the Prime Minister's Secretariat and who had Nehru's fullest confidence was M. O. Mathai. He concealed the immense power exercised by him under the nondescript title of Special Assistant to the Prime Minister. Joining Nehru's personal staff as a stenographer or in some such humble capacity in 1946 he rapidly acquired a position of power and influence, and by the time he resigned early in 1958 he was probably one of the most influential persons in Delhi. He was cultivated even by senior Cabinet Ministers, not to speak of a host of businessmen, civil servants and others who sought access to Nehru. It would be correct to say that with the exception of Azad and Morarji Desai there was hardly any important Cabinet Minister who did not cultivate Mathai's

company. A person of such great power without responsibility could create a lot of mischief. His loyalty to the Prime Minister was unquestioned. A man of shrewd judgment, he could see through the designs of politicians and on the whole he exercised his power and influence to protect Nehru's good name. It is also fair to add that he did not interfere in matters which passed through senior officers in the Foreign Office. Mathai resigned in February 1958, following widespread criticism of the manner in which substantial contributions had been collected for two Trust funds, one in the name of his mother, with which he was closely associated. He was later cleared by a confidential inquiry made by the Cabinet Secretary and Nehru wished to take him back, but was dissuaded from doing so by Vice-President Radhakrishnan.

Three persons, who had great influence with Nehru, each in his own way, were S. S. Bhatnagar, P. C. Mahalanobis and H. J. Bhabha. All of them were distinguished scientists and Fellows of the Royal Society. As Director of the Council of Industrial and Scientific Research and later Secretary in the Ministry of Education under Azad, Bhatnagar showed tremendous executive capacity in setting up a number of first-rate scientific laboratories all over India. Architecturally the buildings housing these laboratories were a pleasant contrast to the drab designs of the Central Public Works Department and had it not been for Nehru's unfailing support, it would have been impossible to cut across red tape and spend money lavishly on the projects. An extremely active person, Bhatnagar used to tour all over India and brought to Nehru reports of scientific and technological progress in the country not all of which were related to facts. Nehru was pleased with these reports. He firmly believed that the future of India lay with progress in science and technology and scientists should have the fullest freedom in their special fields of operation. Bhatnagar's death in January, 1955 removed a colourful personality from the small circle of public servants who enjoyed Nehru's confidence in a special measure.

Prof. P. C. Mahalanobis's relations with Nehru were of a different kind. Starting as a Professor of Physics in

the Presidency College, Calcutta, Mahalanobis was the pioneer of statistical study and research in India and by 1950 acquired international reputation as a leading authority on statistics. The Indian Statistical Institute which he established in Calcutta almost single-handed in the thirties and developed against opposition from many circles had become a recognised centre of study and research in statistics in India, visited by leading statisticians from many countries. Mahalanobis had a fine brain and capacity to carry conviction to his audience. He impressed Nehru as a firm believer in the role of planning in India's development. Statistical approach and analysis is vital to planning and Nehru appointed Mahalanobis to the important post of Statistical Adviser to the Cabinet. Mahalanobis's leftist views and his insistence on working in an honorary capacity enhanced his status with Nehru. Planning on a national scale was first conceived in the Soviet Union and successfully implemented in that country. Mahalanobis had close contact with leaders of science and planning in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in East Europe, as indeed with many other countries all over the world. Thanks to Nehru's unfailing support, the Indian Statistical Institute of which Mahalanobis was Director and later Secretary was plentifully supplied with funds outside the control of the Finance Department of Government. In 1959 Nehru himself piloted special legislation through Parliament conferring special powers of autonomy on the Institute and removing it from the control of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. Mahalanobis' detractors were many including one or two senior Ministers of Cabinet, but they could only fume and fret in private. None had the courage to measure his strength with the Professor. The Plan frame which Mahalanobis had devised with the assistance of a band of devoted experts for the Second Five Year Plan received world wide recognition as the best thing of its kind in a developing country, and enhanced his reputation. He repeatedly stressed the need for perspective planning and had a free hand in pursuing his ideas in a special bureau that he set up in Delhi. In his capacity to rouse personal loyalty and personal animosity he was a close

parallel to Krishna Menon. Both were convinced socialists and Nehru had both in the Planning Commission. It is a measure of the political, social and financial realities in India that despite the close association of these two convinced socialists with India's planning and Nehru's own predilection for socialist approach to development, the Second and Third Five Year Plans had not much of socialist content.

H. J. Bhabha, yet another scientist, was very close to Nehru. Bhabha's main centre of activity was Bombay where he was Director of the Tata School of Fundamental Science. He continued to function from Bombay even when Nehru made him head of the Indian Atomic Department and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Young in years, full of vitality, fond of good living, well dressed, a fine speaker with a rare capacity for explaining abstract science in terms easily understood by laymen, Bhabha would have impressed Nehru even if he were not a leading scientist. The fact that he was a scientist of international repute gave him a special advantage. Nehru treated him with special affection and confidence such as he gave to few outside his own immediate family. As Secretary of the Atomic Energy Department Bhabha enjoyed almost unrestricted power and authority within his domain, and since he worked mostly in Bombay, he saved himself from the contagion of power politics which pervaded all layers of official society in Delhi. Presiding over an international conference on Atomic Energy in Geneva in 1955 attended by leading scientists from all over the world, Bhabha spoke of the tremendous possibilities of atomic energy for industrial purposes. This was at a time when there was much doubt whether electricity generated by atomic power could compete with energy produced by coal. His speech on that occasion is still regarded as a landmark in discussions on the practical application of atomic energy.

Bhabha represented India on the International Atomic Energy Agency and took a leading part in discussions in the U.N. that led to the setting up of this Agency. He used to receive instruction direct from Nehru and this was resented by Krishna Menon who regarded himself as

Nehru's special adviser on all matters concerning the U.N. Bhabha was not an admirer of Menon and would tolerate no interference from him, and in whatever he did he could count on Nehru's fullest support. It should be said in fairness to Bhabha that despite his background and training he was far from pro-west. He strongly fought attempts by Western powers to control the use of nuclear raw material derived from indigenous sources in non-nuclear countries. It was a great tragedy for India that his life came to a sudden end in an aircraft disaster on the Swiss Alps in 1964. Nehru's confidence in Bhabha was entirely justified.

Nehru was a man of very simple habits. He hated extravagant living and waste of any kind. More than once during prolonged discussions with Chou En-lai in April 1960 he asked me to share his frugal lunch which consisted of chapaties, vegetables and a cup of curd. I remember an occasion in April 1959, when he drove to Mussoorie to meet the Dalai Lama and incidentally fulfilled a number of other engagements. I was with him during this journey. He returned to Dehra Dun for the night's rest about ten in the evening, tired and hungry. Hardly had he sat down to dinner and looked at the menu card on the table, he got up in temper and refused to touch any food. Why did they waste good food by arranging a five course meal? Much persuasion was needed to make him have his dinner. He contended himself with only two courses. I can recall still another incident which took place ten years earlier. He was proceeding to London for the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference with Secretary General Girja Bajpai who was then in poor health. Nehru would not take a sleeper in the aircraft himself but insisted on Bajpai having one. When he travelled abroad, he would hardly ever take a personal servant. Travelling to London on his way to New York for the U.N. Session in October 1960 I found him curled up in his seat during the night and early morning he had difficulty in finding his clothes and shaving accessories. It was characteristic of Nehru to put off the light and fan in his room in the External Affairs Ministry the last thing before leaving office late in the evening.

Did Nehru believe in any religion? A Hindu by birth he grew up in his father's home in a cosmopolitan atmos-

phere far removed from that of an orthodox Hindu household. He imbibed no preference for any traditional religion. Writing years later he said "Religion as I saw it practised and accepted even by thinking minds, whether it was Hinduism or Islam or Buddhism or Christianity, did not attract me. It seemed to be closely allied with superstitious practices and dogmatic beliefs and behind it lay a method of approach to life's problems which was certainly not that of science. There was an element of magic about it, an uncritical credulousness, a reliance on the supernatural". About God his remarks were equally revealing of his inner belief. "What the mysterious is I do not know. I do not call it God. God has come to mean much that I do not believe in. I find myself incapable of thinking of a deity or of any unknown supreme power in anthropomorphic terms, and the fact that many people think so is continually a source of surprise to me. Any idea of a personal God seems very odd to me". In another context he wrote,

"Religion as practised in India has become the old man of the sea for us, and it has not only broken our backs but stultified and almost killed all originality of thought and mind. Like Sinbad the sailor we must get rid of this terrible burden before we can aspire to breathe freely or do anything useful. I have no patience left with the legitimate and illegitimate offspring of religion".

But Nehru was by no means an irreligious person, far less an atheist. With most people in India religion was an empty dogma, a resort for sloth and superstition and an excuse for the preservation of outworn privileges and practices. For the majority Hinduism has long ceased to be a vital force encouraging its adherents to face life's problems with courage and determination, unaffected by success and failure. As Nehru himself recognised, Gandhi was a Hindu to the innermost depths of his being and yet Gandhi's conception of religion had nothing to do with any dogma or custom or ritual. It was basically concerned with his firm belief in the moral law which he calls the Law of Truth or Love. It was the empty dogma or ritual that repelled Nehru—an interpretation which equated Hinduism with a fatalistic approach to life and with the division into endless layers of castes and sub-castes with their many taboos

and inhibitions.

Nehru, however, recognised the positive influence of religion on the life of the common people in India. He participated in religious festivals such as the Holi, for example, with gay abandon. These were occasions when he freely mixed with common people, simple village and town folk, and shared their joy and pleasure. He would willingly submit himself to being daubed with vermillion marks on the forehead while visiting temples. I have seen him offer flowers and leaves to the deity at the famous temple of Pashupatinath at Kathmandu in Nepal. He would show respect and deference to holy men and women. What he disliked most was the mixture of religion with politics—abuse of people's religious beliefs for political ends by not very scrupulous politicians. If tolerance, compassion, regard for the truth are the standards by which to judge the spiritual advancement of a person, Nehru was spiritually more advanced than many vocal adherents of any of the traditional religions in India.

"God we may deny" wrote Nehru in the *Discovery of India*, "but what hope is there if we deny man and reduce everything to futility"? As Rajkumari, Amrit Kaur, a close personal friend and a fellow worker during the Congress struggle against British rule and later one of Nehru's colleagues in the post-independence Government, remarked of Nehru, "When Jawaharlal always says he does not believe in God, he is nearer God than many who profess to be His worshippers".

Nehru was in his happiest mood when he was in the midst of crowds of humble folk in India's towns and villages. They adored him and he loved them. He learnt from them too. As he himself has described it:

".....through the forces of circumstances rather than anything else that I started addressing public audiences. I began with the peasantry of my province. They did not think and I didn't think that I was delivering a public speech at all. But I used to meet them and talk to them and these talks gradually attracted more and more people. Yet they remained just personal talks. I did not feel shy with them because they were very simple folk. And so, very slowly I got over the inhibition, this difficulty

of speaking in public. But I retained that manner of speaking, that is to say of speaking to friends as if we were having a quiet talk together, even when the audiences grew and became colossal in number”.

This close rapport with the masses Nehru retained to the end. His day's schedule was extremely busy and interviews had to be fixed with great care, some times days in advance. Yet every morning crowds of people used to gather at the gate of his house at Teen Murti Marg and he would find time to meet and talk with them. Alighting from his car at the gate of the Foreign Office he would be greeted by another miscellaneous crowd. There were down and out refugees from East Bengal, a lonely woman leading a child, or an old man holding a petition in his trembling hand. Nehru would approach them completely ignoring the strict security arrangements that were invariably laid on for him, exchange a kind word or two, receive the petitions and then walk into the External Ministry's office at double pace.

Nehru had an intensely human approach to all problems big and small, whether dealing with Pakistan or with one of his numerous correspondents on a personal problem of his or her own. Every day hundreds of letters were received in his office from people all over India. His personal staff would examine them carefully and after suitable acknowledgement would pass them on to different departments of Government for appropriate action. Time and again I was astonished to see how Nehru would find time to reply personally to a letter from an utter stranger seeking his assistance in a personal matter. Many such instances I can recall. One, which was typical, related to a young woman, belonging to a middle class Christian family in the South who fell in love with a fellow student, a young Muslim from Mauritius, who had come to India for higher education on a stipend from the Government of India. The girl's parents were strongly opposed to her marrying the young man of her choice and going with him to Mauritius. They sought the intervention of local authorities to refuse a passport to the girl. In desperation she wrote a long and tearful letter to the Prime Minister. I was asked to look into the

matter and Nehru was visibly happy when the objections of the local Administration were overruled and a passport granted to the young woman.

No matter whether his kindness was abused by some, Nehru was always generous. He had a special measure of sympathy for writers and artists many of whom were impecunious. One morning entering the Prime Minister's room with an important telegram from one of our Missions abroad I found a number of paintings spread on the floor and against the wall. "How do you like them?" he asked. I had no pretensions to knowledge of art. Yet I was not greatly impressed. "You don't seem to care for them" he said and then, almost in a soliloquy, he continued "How can an artist make a living unless he is supported and encouraged? People with money in our country waste them on small pleasures and enjoyments." He sent for the artist who was waiting in the next room, selected a few paintings and asked his Secretary to pay for them immediately. When the artist left, he remarked, as if to himself "I shall have to do something about these", obviously doubtful whether they were good enough for display in his house.

During 15 years of association with Nehru, nearly twelve of these in close daily contact, I often wondered what enabled him to carry the tremendous burden which no ordinary mortal could bear. Circumstances at times looked forbidding, but each new crisis he took on as a fresh challenge and his spirit remained undaunted. I have heard it stated that the Chinese attack on India in October-November, 1962, made him extremely bitter, but by then my connections with the Foreign Office had ceased. The only visible change I noticed in the later years was that his temper had become much mellowed and he seemed to have developed a new attitude of tolerance.

Nehru was a born optimist. Addressing the students of the University of California, at Los Angeles on October 31, 1949, he said :

"As I stand here in the beautiful campus of this university, surrounded by the peace and beauty of nature and the genius of man, the conflicts and troubles of the world seem far away. The past crowds in upon me, the past of

Asia, of Europe and of America and standing on the razor's edge of the present I try to peep into the future. I see in this past the long struggle of man against adverse surroundings and in the face of innumerable difficulties I see his repeated martyrdom and crucifixion but I also see the spirit of man rising again and again and triumphing over every adversity. Let us look at the perspective of history, gain wisdom and courage from it and not be oppressed too much by the burden of the past and the present."

His spirit must have been sustained by a vision of free India, which to him was something bigger, more magnificent than just political freedom. "It is freedom", he said addressing the University of Calcutta as early as 1946 "in which four hundred million people can live the life which man should live, in which every individual should have the door of opportunity open to him; in which every person will be provided with the necessities of life, and those who have the leisure can explore the regions of science and the mind and start again in the great field of venture which was embarked upon in this country so many thousands of years ago. We will leave behind the past and hope to launch again a new adventure which has no end. The process of struggle will give us satisfaction that we have functioned in our brief lives as we should function." Who can say that the judgment of history will deny him this satisfaction?

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

FAREWELL TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

THE ABORTIVE TALKS with Chou En-Lai in New Delhi in April 1960 left no doubt in Nehru's mind that discussions with China on the boundry dispute had reached a point of no return. The decision taken during the talks to ask officials on the two sides to exchange information on details was merely an expedient to avoid an open and final deadlock. While for months acrimonious correspondence had been passing between the two Governments, and harsh statements were being made in India and Peking, the Soviet leaders maintained an attitude of studied reticence. Only once did the Soviet authorities express any view in public on the deteriorating border situation between India and China. That was in October 1959, when an Indian patrol party sustained severe casualties in a surprise attack by a superior Chinese force at Hotsprings in Ladakh. Premier Khrushchev then made a statement deploring the incident, but neither then nor subsequently, the Soviet Government sought to apportion responsibility between India and China for the tension that had developed between the two countries. On a number of occasions Ambassador K. P. S. Menon in Moscow explained our case on the border question to the Soviet leaders and senior officials in the Soviet Foreign Office. Their advice invariably was to settle the dispute amicably.

Our differences with China had nothing to do with the internal social or political structure of that country or its ideology. In the heat of controversy harsh words were used in the Indian press and Parliament and Nehru himself had occasions to criticise some negative aspects of communism. Chinese propaganda made use of these to create the impression that India was rapidly coming under Western influence. Nehru was anxious to prevent any misunderstanding on this account with the Soviet Union. He was appreciative of the Soviet policy of peace, anti-

colonialism and anti-racialism and attached importance to maintaining close touch with Soviet leadership.

Nehru was impressed by the work of K. P. S. Menon, India's Ambassador in Moscow. A former Foreign Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Menon had taken charge of the Indian Embassy in November, 1952, a few months before Stalin's death. There was not much appreciation of India's foreign policy in the Soviet Union in those days and contact between the two countries was entirely formal. Through patient and persistent efforts Menon brought the two countries much closer. He won a measure of personal esteem from the Soviet leaders and popularity with large segments of Soviet people. Nehru, however, felt that eight years were a long enough tenure at one post and a change would be desirable.

Towards the end of October, 1960, one evening as I was leaving Prime Minister's room in the Foreign Office after a long discussion on the U.N. General Assembly then in session in New York, he asked me to stay back. He then enquired whether I would be willing to succeed Menon in Moscow. In his usual manner of half soliloquy he continued to speak for a few minutes on the importance he attached to our Mission in the Soviet Union. For some time past I had been feeling myself that my tenure as Foreign Secretary should come to a close. I joined the Foreign Office for my second spell of duty in June, 1954. Many epoch-making events had taken place since then. It was exciting to watch the progress of these events and to participate in some but it had been gruelling work. The only compensation for this hard labour was the warmth and affection which I had always received from the Prime Minister. But I was feeling a little tired and wanted a change myself. I told the Prime Minister I was ready to accept whatever assignment he chose to give me. It would be an honour to go to Moscow. He gave me a broad smile.

For weeks I did not hear anything more on the subject. I knew that K. P. S. Menon had been asked to approach the Soviet Foreign Office for agreement to the change. There was pressing business in the Foreign Office—continuing anxiety over relations with China and

Nepal and developments in Congo. However, it appeared to me somewhat extraordinary that once or twice at diplomatic receptions senior diplomats of the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi asked me whether I would be really happy in the Soviet Union. It was an odd way of greeting the future Ambassador to their country, I thought. The Soviet Ambassador, however, was a model of discretion. He did not refer to the subject at all. Late one evening in January, 1961, Nehru entered my room in the Foreign Office, handed to me two letters and left without saying a word. One of these was a letter from Menon to N. R. Pillai, referring to an earlier request from the Soviet Government that Menon might be allowed to continue in Moscow and enquiring what decision the Prime Minister had taken. The other was the copy of a letter from Nehru to Menon paying him high compliments for his work in Moscow but asking him to let the Soviet Government know that I enjoyed Nehru's special confidence and would do everything possible to strengthen friendship between the two countries. Nehru said that he attached special importance to my mission to Moscow.

The period of uncertainty about my future ended. During the few remaining weeks in the Foreign Office I had a strange feeling. Nearly seven years had passed since I rejoined the Foreign Office for my second spell of duty—seven eventful years in which much had happened in India and abroad. Throughout the period I had the utmost consideration and many tokens of confidence from the Prime Minister. His enthusiasm was infective. Undemonstrative by nature, he was economical in words of praise for officials but those who worked with him from day to day needed no formal appreciation from him. To be able to work for him was a reward in itself. He was a fountain of perennial inspiration. This I would miss in Moscow. Besides, the easy life of an Ambassador had no charm for me, however important in the public eye the mission in Moscow might be. But the decision had been taken. I arranged to relinquish charge as Foreign Secretary on Monday, April 10, 1961.

On Saturday, April 8, the Foreign Office was busy as usual. After going through the day's official business, I

cleared my desk of some personal papers. The Prime Minister was going out of Delhi the following day. As I would not be meeting him again before handing over charge, I sent him a note telling him of my programme and adding that I would always cherish the memory of his kindness and consideration.

The same evening I received the following personal letter from Nehru written in his own hand:—

“You know how much I have appreciated our long companionship in our work in the External Affairs Ministry. We have worked, I think I am right in saying, as friends and comrades and more and more I came to rely on your ripe judgment and frank advice. Your going away now will create a gap for me. But anyhow it is comforting to know that we shall continue our joint work though in somewhat different spheres. I am deeply grateful for all you have done and you will always have my affection and goodwill.

Your affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru.”

APPENDIX

A GERMAN INTERLUDE

IN THE AUTUMN of 1951, the Government of India decided to raise the level of diplomatic implementation in the Federal Republic of Germany to that of an embassy and Prime Minister approved of my appointment as the first Ambassador. I had been given choice of Bonn and Rome. I had no difficulty in making my choice. I had been closely following developments in post-war Germany. We were receiving glowing accounts of the Federal Republic's phenomenal economic and industrial recovery which was being described as a German miracle. I welcomed the opportunity to see things for myself and understand how a divided and completely devastated country could rise so rapidly from the ashes to which it had been reduced by the end of the war.

I arrived in Cologne on 26th May, 1952. My family and I travelled overland across the Netherlands. It was not necessary for anybody to point out where the Dutch border ended and the German border began. From almost the edge of the border the scene was one of the complete devastation. Village after village, town after town lay in ruins. But everywhere there was an atmosphere of activity. When I first saw Cologne, I thought it had probably suffered the severest damage. Within a radius of half a kilometer of the famous cathedral the city lay flattened by allied bombs. Only later I realised that this impression was not entirely correct. Some other cities like Frankfurt, Hamburg and Berlin had suffered much worse. Conditions in West Germany, however, provided an ironic contrast to those in England, a victor's country. On my way to Germany I spent a few days in an West End Hotel in London. There sugar and bread were severely rationed and even potatoes were being offered at lunch and dinner in one or twos. On the contrary in West Germany shops were overflowing with all kinds of consumer goods and there was apparently no lack of meat, fresh vegetables and fresh fruits. I discovered only later that the picture of

plenty was misleading. Only those who had money could eat luxuriously. The average German lived on potatoes, bread and sausage. This was mentioned to me not only by the Indian students who were reading in German Universities but by many Germans including officials, industrialists and their wives.

Dr Konrad Adenauer who had been elected Chancellor by the Bundestag, the Lower House of the West German Parliament, by a majority of only one vote on September 15, 1949 had established full domination over German politics and administration by the time I arrived in the country. Both he and his principal aide, State Secretary Prof. Hallstein, were almost solely occupied with domestic problems some of which were formidable. The Basic Law which formed the Constitution of the new Federal Republic did not confer full sovereignty on the Republic. Simultaneously with the transfer of administration to German civilian control, the allied military powers then occupying West Germany, Britain, France and U.S., promulgated the Occupation Statute and established a new Allied High Commission. Under this the occupying powers reserved to themselves considerable control over the administration of the country. This control would be exercised by the three High Commissioners who together formed the Allied High Commission. The reserved powers included disarmament and demilitarisation, control in regard to the Ruhr, decartelisation and deconcentration of industry. The Allied High Commission had also authority to review any amendment to the Basic Law by the West German Parliament as well as Federal and land legislation to the extent such amendment affected the reserved field. That the reserved powers were not merely theoretical was evident from the arrest of several West German citizens by the British High Commission on January 24, 1953, without consultation with the Federal German Government on the ground that the persons were neo-Nazis.

The High Commissioners regarded themselves as pro-Consuls and maintained huge establishments and lived in great style. The Chancellor who was anxious to secure full sovereignty for his country concentrated his time and

attention on establishing good relations with the Allied High Commissioners, for he knew that on good relations with the three countries, U.S.A., Britain and France, would depend devolution of full sovereignty. He paid special attention to the American High Commissioner not only because U.S. was most sympathetic to his Government and giving him every possible support but also because the U.S.A. was giving massive financial and economic aid to the Federal Republic under the Marshall Plan. When a new U.S. High Commissioner, J. B. Conant, arrived at Cologne, the Chancellor himself went to the railway station to receive him. On the few occasions the Chancellor attended formal receptions, he was seen engaged in talks with the American High Commissioner away from other guests.

In those days the most controversial question under discussion in West Germany was the creation of a new German Army. It was proposed to have such an Army as part of a European Defence Community (EDC). In an informal talk with me on October 1, 1953, Blankenhorn, number two in the Foreign Office, who next to Hallstein enjoyed Adenauer's confidence, told me that the Chancellor was not interested in the creation of an independent German National Army, not even under the umbrella of the NATO. The Chancellor was afraid that German democracy was too weak to be able to stand up against a national army. He was aware of the French misgivings about German rearmament and was most keen on establishing relations of trust with France who he hoped would not look with suspicion on a German Army contingent as part of the EDC. Good relations with France were in the Chancellor's view basic to peace and security in West Europe. Adenauer's detractors went about saying that he was not at all interested in German re-unification and would be content with the boundaries of the Federal Republic as they were with a predominantly Catholic population and with Rhineland as a dominant constituent. That would also please France.

There were varying opinions within the country on the question of the creation of a new Germany Army. Some people thought that the only hope of reunification

of the two parts of Germany lay in the creation of a strong army. I recall with interest a talk I had with John Freeman in December, 1952. Freeman had been representing *The Times*, London, in West Germany for five years and was believed to be close to the Chancellor. According to Freeman the West could negotiate with Russia only from a position of strength and German rearmament was therefore a necessity. The ordinary people, however, did not appear to take much interest in the issue although many would like to see their country regain full sovereignty. On the other hand, more than one German holding high position in public life told me that whatever their individual opinion, the German people would not mind wearing uniform again if their Government wanted them to do so. It was interesting to note—this was some time later—that the embryonic Defence office under Theodore Blank received a hundred thousand applications from people already employed elsewhere for enrolment in the new army against only thirty thousand vacancies.

Nevertheless memories of the terrible suffering in the recent past were still fresh in the public mind. On the day the third reading of the EDC Treaty came up in the Bundestag, a large number of women held a demonstration outside the Parliament. While most Germans hoped that sooner or later the two parts of their divided country would come together, there could be little doubt that, as Ollenhauer, leader of the opposition Social Democratic Party, told me, such reunification could be possible only through lessening of tension between the Western allies and Russia and not by show of strength. Even Ollenhauer, however, echoed Adenauer's statement at the opening of the Bundestag on October 20, 1953, that the Germans would never recognise the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern frontier of East Germany.

Whatever the West German Chancellor did to reach an understanding with France, the French Government had serious reservations about the creation of a German Army. Officially they took the line that the creation of the EDC must wait for a satisfactory solution of the issue of the Saar. Berard, the French Deputy High Commissioner, told me in an informal talk that the Russian menace was

being over-emphasised in the west. On the other hand from the talks I had with people in all walks of life I had the impression that the French were more unpopular than the British and the Americans. There were complaints that the French had denuded their zone of occupation thoroughly. It was alleged that entire forests had been cut down and the timber removed to France and the process was still continuing.

The average German would prefer not to talk about Hitler and the Nazi period. Some even among the higher-ups in industry pretended that they did not know of the atrocities that the Nazis had been committing. Only one person, a Director of Daimler Benz, who had held the rank of Major General in the old German Army, was frank enough to tell me that it was too early to make an assessment of the Hitler period. He said that towards the end of war, Hitler had gone completely mad. There were caricatures of Hitler and a number of other Nazi leaders at the famous *Fashioning* (carnival) at Cologne but these one could not take seriously. I noticed, however, that at a reception given to me at Dusseldorf, when H. Schacht, the former Nazi Minister of Economy, came to my table, other German guests promptly left it.

It was surprising to hear more than one German industrialist say that they were not interested in political questions. Von Mittelwarner of Kraus Maffei of Stuttgart, a sympathetic friend of India, frankly admitted that he was too busy to read newspapers. I recall a talk I had with a leading industrialist at Heidelberg on the day the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* the leading South German newspaper, had devoted long columns to discussion of the EDC Treaty. He told me that he did not usually read the front page of a newspaper as he was not interested in political problems. His interest lay in other subjects. Could this indifference to political issues among persons holding responsible positions be one of the reasons why unscrupulous people could get hold of the German political and administrative machinery in the early thirties?

Industrial production all over the country was booming. I visited a large number of factories and industrial establishments to acquire first hand knowledge of how

German industry had made such a remarkably quick recovery. The Germans were, of course, known for hard work and their technological superiority. Each establishment had its own story to tell. Massive aid under the Marshall Plan, of course, helped but other West European countries which received comparable aid were still struggling to find their feet. The Directors of Maschinen und Apparatenwerke (MAN) at Augsburg told me that their first capital was derived from the sale of scrap worth four million D.M. to the Swiss. Siemens of Berlin similarly made a start with raw materials worth half million D.M. that they recovered from the ruins of their burnt-out factory. Almost everywhere the Directors complained that not only the machinery that had escaped damage during the war had been removed by the occupying powers, but they were also forced to divulge their patents. During a visit to Augsburg, the Managing Director of MAN told me that an entire laboratory in which they had been experimenting on improvement of diesel engines had been removed to America. Similarly, at the BASF Works at Ludwigshafen British and French observers were said to have watched for a full year every process in the manufacture of various synthetic products and took copious notes. Two Directors of Farbwerke Hoechst at Frankfurt complained that at the end of the war the Americans not only took detailed notes of their secret processes but later published them in American magazines. On the other hand a Director of Daimler Benz said he was not unhappy that their machinery had been dismantled and removed by the occupying power. They had now set up more modern machinery and were able to compete better with their rivals.

In the midst of their preoccupation with questions of immediate concern neither the Chancellor nor the State Secretary had any time for Ambassadors of Asian-African countries. I did not take long to realise this after reaching Bonn. The Foreign Office had not yet been properly organised and decisions of any importance could only be taken at the highest level. Our policy of nonalignment and frequent criticism of the NATO could hardly be to the liking of the West German Government which had set its heart

on closer integration with the Atlantic powers. Senior officials were polite enough not to express any view on our foreign policy. When under New Delhi's instruction I conveyed the Government of India's concern at the U.S.-Pakistan Military Pact to the West German Foreign Office, I was listened to in silence. There was, however, some interest in the Economic Division of the Foreign Office in closer trade relations with India. They prepared a draft treaty of friendship and trade. A senior official, Von Scherpenberg, who later became State Secretary, visited Delhi with the draft towards the end of October, 1952, but R. K. Nehru who was then Foreign Secretary refused to have a look at it on the ground that "such a treaty would result in the permanent division of Germany". The German Foreign Office was not convinced by this argument. Nevertheless when Ashok Chanda, Secretary in the Indian Ministry of Production, visited Bonn in the summer of 1953 to discuss a Project of steel mill in India with German collaboration, the German Foreign office intervened on our side at a crucial moment when talks with Krupps and Demag were on the verge of a breakdown. The result was the agreement, first of its kind for India, which led to the setting up of the steel plant at Rourkela with external finance provided by West German firms.

It was somewhat unfortunate that Vice-President Radhakrishnan chose to come to Bonn on an informal visit in October, 1952. The ground for the visit had not been prepared in advance and I was not aware of any official invitation from the Federal Government. The Vice-President, a person of simple habits, arrived all by himself by a commercial plane. The Germans were not impressed by his lack of ostentation. Officially he was received with the barest minimum of protocol. One relieving feature was that President Heuss who was by temperament somewhat like Radhakrishnan received the guest most warmly and had long hours of talk with him. Even as late as May, 1953, when Prime Minister Nehru was in London to attend a conference, the German Foreign office asked me to convey to him "a very informal invitation from Chancellor Adenauer to pass through Bonn on his way back from London". I was told at the same time that "the Chancellor would under-

stand if for any reason Mr. Nehru could not accept the invitation". I thought that it was an odd way of inviting the Indian Prime Minister and the invitation was not accepted. I should add in fairness that when Anantaswamy Ayyangar visited West Germany a month later as Speaker of Lok Sabha and head of a Parliamentary Delegation, he received a warm reception from the President and members of the Bundestag and even the Foreign Office took better notice of the guest than they did of the Indian Vice-President the previous year.

The Indian Ambassador had another interesting assignment. He was simultaneously head of the Indian Military Mission in Berlin and as such was accredited to the Four-Power Allied Commandature consisting of the U.S., French, and Soviet Military Commandants for the city of Berlin. At the end of the war each of the victorious powers set up a Military Mission in Berlin. India which under the British decision fought on the side of the allies against Germany was also given the right to set up a Military Mission. The quadripartite allied control organisation for the whole of Germany had broken down following Soviet withdrawal in March, 1948 and similarly the quadripartite Commandatura organisation for the whole of Berlin practically ceased to function from then. All Military missions resident in West Berlin had, therefore, official connections mostly with the British, French and U.S. Commandants.

The first head of the Indian Military Mission was a Colonel in the Indian Army. My two immediate predecessors were officers of middling seniority in the Indian Foreign Service. They were given the courtesy rank of Major General in the Indian Army and while in Berlin they went about in a Major General's uniform. I was asked in Delhi before I left for Germany whether I would also like to have a military rank. I could not imagine myself in a General's uniform and immediately refused the offer.

The Indian Military Mission like several other similar missions had no function whatsoever in Berlin except for occasional work of a consular nature. The expenses of these missions were debited to the occupation cost of Germany and were ultimately borne by the German people.

It was not surprising, therefore, that these military missions maintained huge establishments in Berlin. The head of the Indian Military Mission, for example, had a big house belonging to a former industrial magnate, one of the few houses which had escaped destruction in the devastated city. In addition, he had a separate office with its own staff also financed from the occupation cost. When I took over in 1952, there were still 16 German maids in the residence 2 or 3 gardeners and 2 cars with chauffeurs. The Ambassador was resident in Cologne and visited Berlin once a quarter or so. During his absence the charge of the Mission was with a resident Second Secretary who lived in the big house and enjoyed all the facilities. The whole arrangement was absurd and it was some satisfaction to me that when I returned to Delhi and later became Foreign Secretary, the Military Mission was wound up and replaced by a Consulate-General the expenses of which as of consular posts in other countries were borne by the Government of India.

Berlin was a divided city. West Berlin which formed the occupation zones of U.S.A., France and Britain had its own separate administration under a Mayor and Senate. It was not part of the Federal Republic although under Basic Law it had some representatives in West German Parliament. East Berlin, which formally formed part of the Soviet Zone of occupation, was the capital of the German Democratic Republic and virtually integrated into the territory of that Republic. Heads of Military Missions residing in West Berlin could, however, visit East Berlin freely. Even ordinary Germans could move between the two parts of the city without much difficulty. The underground railway connecting East Berlin with West Berlin was still functioning as an integrated unit. The economy of East Germany was at a low ebb and the value of the East German D.M. in the free market was a quarter of the value of West German Mark. Prices of most things in East Berlin were controlled and some articles like glasses, China, photographic accessories, electrical equipment could be bought cheaply by customers from West Berlin. There were many booths in West Berlin where West German Marks could be converted freely into East German

D.Ms at high premium. The fullest advantage was taken of this by foreigners, particularly diplomats, to do some private trading of their own with goods of East German origin purchased in East Berlin. It was easier for diplomats to do so as their cars were not searched by the East German police at the Brandenburg Gate through which most of the traffic between East and West Berlin passed. The West Berlin administration was content not to interfere with this basically illegal traffic. After all, to the extent East German economy was adversely affected, the prospects of East Germany being able to last as a separate self-contained unit diminished. People in the West would still believe that the two parts of Germany would ultimately come together. The East German Government imposed control on the purchase of goods in East Berlin by people from the West on December 1, 1952.

West Berlin was a good listening post about conditions in East Germany which was a closely guarded territory not easily accessible to foreigners. Refugees in large numbers were still moving from East to West Germany; for them West Berlin formed a convenient exit point. Quite a large number of people of East Germany called on me in Berlin and gave grim accounts of life there. The story of the refugees who had fled the country for good had to be discounted a great deal but there were others who had come to West Berlin on temporary visits, sometimes for the day only, and would go back to their home in East Germany. Even these people said that not more than five per cent of the people supported the regime and conditions of life were very grim for those not belonging to the ruling party. I visited Potsdam and Leipzig and passed through towns and villages. Many houses had a tumble-down look and the people were generally poorly dressed. In the countryside horse-drawn ploughs were a common sight while they were rarely seen in West Germany.

I had an interesting talk with Bishop Dibelius in East Berlin in November, 1952. He was the head of the Evangelical Church for both Germanys and regularly held service in one of the main Churches in East Berlin. He had close liaison with the East German Government and had

a personal representative, Propst Grueber, accredited to that Government. Dibelieus said that not more than five per cent. people supported the Government of the territory and expressed the view that Russia would agree to German unity under certain conditions, the principal one being guarantee of control over German rearmament. I saw the Bishop next at a service on the New Year's Day, 1953 held in the Marien Kirche Church in East Berlin. He had in the meantime visited America where he was reported to have made anti-Soviet statements and thereby incurred the displeasure of East German authorities. The Bishop in his address stressed the need for faith at "that hour of trial for the German people" but neither then nor thereafter was any attempt made by the East German Government to control the Bishop's activities. Some months later, in September, 1953, I had a talk with Propst Grueber. He was not an admirer of Adenauer who had won a decisive victory at the election held that year. This victory he attributed to the weakness of the German people for a strong man. Adenauer, Grueber said, was talking of the liberation of eighteen million Germans in the East, and not of reunion with them. Grueber, like his chief, was also of the view that the Russians would be willing to agree to German re-unification provided that the four powers, U.S.A., France, Britain and Soviet Union, would enter an agreement guaranteeing that unified Germany would join neither the Western nor the Eastern bloc. Russian fear of Germany, according to Grueber was not entirely groundless.

In June, 1953 there was a serious mass uprising in East Germany against the Government. As the disturbances spread, there was much instigation from the Western side through Radio Free Europe and other Western broadcasts. East Germans were led to believe that if they could sustain the struggle, Western powers would intervene. In fact the Western powers had no intention to do so. The uprising was suppressed without difficulty, but it was still believed that the Soviet authorities who had already embarked on a policy of liberalisation after Stalin's death, would gradually relax control over East Germany. Unfortunately the people thought that further

pressure on the occupying power would hasten the process and in July there were widespread strikes through East Germany. The Russians immediately reacted with strong measures. Herr Ulbricht, the powerful First Secretary of the ruling S.U.P., whose position had become shaky, was given the fullest support by the occupying power and severe action was launched against the dissident elements.

The East German authorities were keen on good relations with the Government of India. Except for a few weeks following the June disturbances the Indian Ambassador could move between East and West Berlin with the minimum restriction. In October, 1952, when Vice-President Radhakrishnan visited West Berlin in course of his visit to West Germany, a secret emissary from President Pieck met me to convey a request from the President, for a meeting with the Indian Vice-President, and Radhakrishnan and I quietly drove to East Berlin at ten at night. We were very cordially received by Pieck. In course of a long talk he explained the East German viewpoints on the international situation and their relations with West Germany and the Western powers. He requested sympathetic understanding from India of his Government's difficulties. There was no specific request for Indian recognition of his Government. This was not surprising. The Government had not yet sufficiently established themselves.

While officials of the Federal Government were not particularly interested in India, there was considerable interest among industrialists, professors of universities and many students and some members of the opposition Social Democratic Party. A number of active Friendship societies sponsored training courses for Indian students and technicians in West Germany. The German-Indian friendship Society of Stuttgart took a leading part in arranging scholarship for Indian students. These were financed mostly by industrialists. Young Indians who arrived in West Germany under this scheme were treated extremely well both in the universities and by the higher executives in German industry. Some difficulties arose because of the unfamiliarity of our boys with ways of life in Western

society and one or two complaints reached the Embassy. I had the feeling that before young people were sent abroad, they should have been given a sort of orientation course. However, these difficulties were treated with extreme leniency by the Germans.

In quite a few West German universities there were special facilities for the study of Indology. Traditionally, German scholars had always taken considerable interest in the study of Indian philosophy, culture and religion. Tübingen University was specially noted for this under the inspirations of Prof. Glassenap. When I visited the University to present five volumes of *Ardha-Magadhi Dictionary* on behalf of the All Indian Jain Conference, a special function was organised attended by all the students and professors. Prof. Schubring of Hamburg University was another keen indologist. There was keen interest among the students at many universities to know about India. At the famous University of Göttingen the hall was crowded to capacity at nine in the evening to listen to my talk on recent developments in India. Nehru's name was known everywhere and there was some disappointment among the liberal elements that he did not take more interest in the German problem and sufficiently appreciate the woes of the divided country. People in the universities spoke more freely on the question of German rearmament and different views were expressed depending on the experience of the speakers. Thus the Rector of the Hamburg University who being a Jew had to leave Germany during the Nazi period and spent some years in India was unhappy at the proposed creation of a West German Army. Some others did not share this apprehension and their feeling was that the only hope of German reunification lay in West Germany becoming strong economically and militarily. On the other hand at Göttingen a famous professor of Physics, a Nobel-laureate, expressed the view that unless Germany became strong, it would be difficult to resist the growth of American influence.

The life of an Ambassador was easy and comfortable but I felt that I could do more useful work at home. I

was, therefore, delighted when I was called back to the Foreign office to resume charge of the Commonwealth Wing in June, 1954. Nehru affectionately greeted me when I called on him and said he was glad to see me back.

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